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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Alevis are considered to be the largest religious minority in Turkey. Although 
they originate from Turkey, many European countries including the United 
Kingdom accommodate organized Alevi communities. With the process of 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union, the last 20 years have witnessed 
the emergence of a transnational Alevi movement that advocates for the 
accommodation of Alevis in different politico-legal contexts, with each context 
producing different outcomes. This thesis problematizes the issue of Alevis’ 
recognition in three different politico-legal contexts, and questions the 
dominant identification of Alevism as a kind of religion for the purpose of 
recognition. It is in that light that the thesis addresses the question of how 
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights 
accommodate Alevis’ difference, and what the implication of this 
accommodation is for Alevis and the Alevi culture? 
Secular law is considered as an antidote to religious conflict and as providing 
the means of extending recognition to unrecognised groups. Yet, a major 
problem appears to be the assumption of secular law that every culture has a 
religion and differences of religions are what have to be accommodated for 
harmonious coexistence. Opportunity structures offered by politico-legal 
systems face this problem as well. Different from this framework, this thesis is 
theoretically grounded in the findings of the research program led by S.N. 
Balagangadhara, one of which is that religion is not a culturally universal 
phenomenon. 1  Supported by my ethnographic fieldwork with Alevis in 
London and Ankara, as well as a study of the existing literature and 
documentary evidence, this thesis argues that there is no religion in Alevi 
culture and the distinction between the religious and the secular is alien to 
Alevis.  
1 S. N. Balagangadhara, ‘The Heathen in His Blindness’--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994). 
 4 
 
The claim that religion is a cultural universal is embedded in the theology of 
Semitic religions, and is implicitly accepted in the dominant literature on 
Alevis. Its general acceptance points to the secularization of religion. As a 
consequence, embedded in this theology and its secularisation, political and 
legal systems which offer various opportunity structures for recognition, cause 
a kind of violence to people who may not have religion. The violence of 
‘effacing the otherness of the other’ occurs through forcing a religion onto 
Alevis in order to recognise them as a community and culture within the state 
or a broader international law framework such as the European Convention on 
Human Rights. In this connection, the emergence of a transnational Alevi 
movement that strives to be an authority to speak for Alevis and their religion, 
Alevism, can be read as an outcome of the opportunity structures available in 
these contexts. It is a strategy of recognition that comes with costs and benefits 
for Alevis. The case studies reveal that even though these politico-legal 
contexts in Turkey, the UK, and before the ECtHR are ostensibly different and 
provide different promises to Alevis, they all view Alevis as a religious 
community.  
 
This thesis suggests that by adopting this view Alevis’ experience of their 
culture is transformed. The process of portraying their culture as a religion for 
the purpose of recognition in the secular state deepens this transformation. This 
argument is developed in the three politico-legal contexts, in each of which I 
demonstrate that even when some kind of recognition is granted, this 
recognition treats Alevis as (falling within) some kind of religion. The way that 
they are compelled to frame their arguments in politics, charity contexts, 
education and law testifies to the ‘conversion’ of Alevis into a religious 
community, as do the decisions that administrative, political and legal 
authorities make. Applying the conceptual framework around 
Balagangadhara’s theory of religion to the fieldwork, the legal and policy 
related documentary evidence, case law, and the existing literature on Alevis, 
this thesis makes a significant contribution to knowledge on cultural 
recognition in three political-legal contexts and to rethink the dominant models 
for understanding cultural differences. 
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Deyiş/nefes – Alevi genre of poetry, often sung along with bağlama; but also 
referred by the Alevi to explain Alevi way of going about in the world in daily 
occasions.  
Bağlama – Stringed musical instrument.  
Semah – Alevi genre of dance.   
Muhabbet – Also means ‘3 can 1 cem’ (3 souls 1 gathering), Alevi gathering 
where deyiş/nefes sung along baglama to accompany the gathering.  
Cem – Alevi ritual where 12 services are conducted, deyiş/nefes sung, bağlama 
played, semah turned. Also community matters discussed and shared food (lokma) 
served. 
Zakir – One of 12 services in cem, person plays bağlama and accompany dede 
during cem rituals.  
Dede – Person who has proficient knowledge of Alevi traditions and whose 
hereditary link traced back to 12 Imams.  
Ocak – Dede families.  
Talip – Alevis guided by dede.  
Pişmek – Developing proficiency of practicing Alevi traditions.  
Hak – Essence of matter. It may be referred to as energy or god.  
Cemevi – Place where different Alevi rituals (cem, muhabbet, funeral, wedding) 




CHAPTER 1 -- INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Introduction and the Research Question 
 
  This thesis investigates Alevis’ recognition demands as a faith 
community and the legal aspects of the emergence or rise of Alevism as a 
religion. It aims to shine light on the predicament of the official recognition of 
Alevism in Turkey, the United Kingdom  and the European Court of Human 
Rights (the ECtHR) to illuminate the complex relation between law, religion 
and culture.  
  How do Turkey, the UK and the ECtHR accommodate Alevis’ 
difference, and what are the implications of this accommodation for Alevis and 
the Alevi culture? This involves further questions: How can we understand 
Alevis’ difference within the nexus of culture and religion? And in the larger 
context, what does the Alevi case tell us about the role law plays in the 
production of religion and the secular? In answering these research questions, 
this thesis is divided into two parts. The first part lays out the theoretical and 
conceptual framework that inform my analysis of Turkey, the UK and the 
ECtHR in relation to Alevis’ accommodation (Chapter 2) and explores Alevis’ 
difference within the nexus of culture and religion, using Balagangadhara’s 
theory of religion and my fieldwork with Alevis (Chapter 3). The second part 
discusses how Alevis recognition demands are shaped and responded to in 
three contexts, Turkey (Chapter 4), the ECtHR (Chapter 5) and the UK 
(Chapter 6), drawing on my fieldwork with Alevi communities in Turkey and 
the UK as well as the dominant literature on Alevis, the legal and policy 
documents that I have had access to, the case law and the relevant legislation 
and situating these case studies within the framework set out in Part one. This 
thesis argues that Alevis’ difference is a “different kind of difference,” one that 
Turkey, the UK, and the ECtHR are unable to adequately recognise. The 
attempt to fit within or be recognised has the potential to distort the Alevi 
culture, rendering it a religion or belief system for the purposes of recognition. 
  As this thesis will show further throughout, Alevis are people with 
contested roots and contested beliefs, without a consensus on the 
‘religiousness’ of their traditions. They are identified with multiple practices, 
which are shared by a number of other traditions. They respect historical 
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figures, some of whom are also shared by Islamic traditions, such as Ali, the 
son in law and cousin of the prophet Mohammad. They believe in the 
transmigration of the soul, similar to Hindu reincarnation. They praise nature 
like Zoroastrians. Alevis have sustained and transmitted their traditions in a 
secluded way for centuries. Considered as heretics by the Ottoman rulers, they 
traditionally inhabited the isolated geographical areas of Anatolia. In fact, little 
was known about them until 19th century Christian missionary expeditions to 
the region. This was when the word Alevism came to be attributed as a religion 
to Alevis’.2  
  In the 20th century, with the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, the positioning of Alevis was not settled, but negotiated within the 
framework provided by the imagination and ideology of the Turkish nation-
state and its institutions, as discussed in Chapter 4. One of the most intriguing 
aspects about this positioning is the difficulty of describing Alevism within the 
existing politico-legal frameworks that conceptually divide the Alevi culture 
into religious and secular spheres. The lack of consensus on the 
conceptualisation of Alevism and the Alevis' demands for official recognition 
was presented as the reason for the inconclusive outcome of the 'Alevi 
Opening', consisting of a series of workshops initiated by the Turkish 
government and organized with Alevi community leaders between June 2009 
and January 2010.3 The demands articulated in that process were about the 
legal status of cemevi (Alevi community house), the status of the official 
Directorate of Religious Affairs (hereinafter Diyanet), compulsory religious 
education, and the conversion of the Madımak Hotel into a museum, to 
commemorate more than thirty Alevis who were killed by a crowd which set 
the hotel on fire in 1993.4  
  Alevis are organized around associations, charities and federations 
in both Turkey and the diaspora, and have been increasingly assertive about 
their identity since the 1990s. These organizations claim to represent Alevis 
and advocate for recognition in the respective political and legal contexts since 
 
2 Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: the Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (Oxford University Press 
2013), Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, 'Subjects of the Sultan, Disciples of the Shah: Formation and 
Transformation of the Kızılbaş/Alevi Communities in Ottoman Anatolia' (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation Harvard University 2008) 26. 
3 Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (MoS 2010). 
4 Erdoğan Aydın, Kimlik Mücadelesinde Alevilik (Kırmızı 2008) 305-319.  
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the 2000s. I call this phenomenon the Alevi movement, similar to other 
scholars on the subject.5 The European Commission considers Alevis to be the 
largest religious minority in Turkey, where it estimates that 15-20% of the 
population are Alevis. 6  The attention paid by the European Commission 
reflects the transnational dimension of the Alevi movement. Although 
Germany accommodates the most organized Alevi diaspora, the number of 
Alevis living in the UK exceeds 300,000.7 The transnational terrain of the 
Alevi movement allows Alevis to navigate in multiple politico-legal 
frameworks and experiment with different formulations of Alevism that pave 
the way for different recognition claims.  
 
1.2. Research Problem 
 
  Describing Alevism is an intricate issue not only for Alevis 
themselves but also for scholars, official bodies and courts. They are often 
described as heterodox Muslims or as a spiritual branch within the Islamic Shia 
or Sufi traditions, while some argue that Alevism is a separate religion or a way 
of life.8 Academic studies often emphasise the heterodox and syncretic nature 
of Alevism at the margins of Islam. Similarly, the ECtHR considers Alevism 
as a non-Sunni religious tradition within the fold of Islam.9 In Turkey, the local 
courts deny the particularity of Alevism as a denomination analogous to Sunni 
Islam and insist on considering it as a cultural richness of local Islam and not 
different from Sunni Islam. 10  Once Alevism had attained a transnational 
dimension, the differences in conceptualising Alevism, its relation to Islam and 
 
5 Martin Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in 
Transnational Space, (Berghan Books 2008). Also for a slightly different use as 'Alevist 
Movement' see Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing 
Territorial Diversity (Routledge 2012).  
6 Commission of European Union, ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession’ 
(2004), available at 
ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_tr_2004_en.pdf (accessed 27 May 
2016). 
7 Britain Alevi Federation, Who we are?, available at 
http://www.alevinet.org/SAP.aspx?pid=About_en-GB (accessed 13.10.2017).  
8  Irene Melikoff, Uyur İdik Uyardılar, Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları (Demos 2009), Mehmet 
Bayrak,  Alevilik, Kürdoloji, Türkoloji Yazıları [1973-2009] (OZ-GE 2009), Fuat Bozkurt, 
Toplumsal Boyutlarıyla Alevilik (Kapı 2005), Rıza Zelyut, Öz Kaynaklarına Göre Alevilik (Yön 
1992). 
9 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007). 




its recognition as a separate religion are multiplied depending on the politico-
legal context. Many Alevis however claim that they are an autonomous group 
that does not follow the prescriptions of Islam.11 According to many Alevis, 
describing Alevism is the most difficult aspect of being an Alevi.12  
  What is interesting about the case of Alevis is their ability or struggle 
to come up with different conceptualisations of Alevism depending on the 
context. Depending on the politico-legal framework, Alevis try to give shape 
to an Alevism as a religion to gain recognition in different fields such as 
religious education, charity law and place of worship. The issue of describing 
Alevism becomes more apparent in their interactions with official bodies and 
courts. In these interactions, not only Alevis but also official institutions and 
courts are puzzled as to how to think about Alevism within the religious-secular 
divide.  
   
1.3. Placing the Research within a Larger Framework on the Study of 
Religion and Culture  
 
  In addition to the scholarship on Alevis, the answers to these 
research questions have profound interdisciplinary implications for socio-legal 
studies, anthropology of law, studies on religion and secularism, and 
transnational movements. The Alevis’ case is important to research because of 
the ambiguity of its ‘religiousness’. Many different new age movements or 
non-Western cultures are increasingly seeking recognition in Western societies 
governed by multicultural policies, as discussed in Chapter 6 through the case 
of Alevis in the UK. Given the literature13 critical about the phenomenon of 
religion, culture and the secular, the case of Alevis provides invaluable insights 
on the ability of current politico-legal systems to accommodate diversity.  
 
1. 3. 1. A framework for thinking about cultural differences  
 
 
11 My fieldwork findings.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford University 
Press 2003), S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the 
Dynamic of Religion (Brill 1994), Markus Dressler and Arvind Mandair, Secularism and Religion-
making (Oxford University Press 2011), Ann Pellegrini and Janet Jakobsen, Secularisms (Duke 
University Press 2008), Winnifred Sullivan, Robert A Yelle and Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, After 
Secular Law (Stanford University Press 2011). 
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  This thesis approaches the research question first by exploring the 
kind of differences in cultures. Studies on critical anthropology provide some 
insights about cultural encounters. Geertz underlines the difficulty of really 
understanding the cultural other, naming it "epistemological hypochondria 
concerning how one can know that anything one says about other forms of life 
is as a matter of fact so."14  Similarly on the issue of cultural differences, 
Balagangadhara inquires into the ways in which the culture of the describer 
influences his descriptions of other cultures 15  He suggests that cultural 
differences might bring different ways of experiencing otherness of different 
cultures.16 
  Van den Bouwhuijsen points out the persistent effort of 
ethnographers to describe non-Western cultures in terms of these cultures’ 
belief systems and underlines that “a 'belief system' presupposes a web of 
propositions in which a certain account of the world is confirmed as true.”17 
Instead, he argues that some non-Western traditions may not have an 
“epistemic attitude towards their tradition”, meaning that their relation to 
tradition might be different to Western approaches to tradition and might not 
centre on a specific set of beliefs.18 As a result, describing them in terms of 
their beliefs might be misleading. In this vein, Balagangadhara makes the same 
point: that Western culture tends to ‘theorise’ about actions; therefore, 
traditional practices are understood so long as they are the expressions of some 
beliefs.19  
  Through his analysis of Western descriptions of other cultures, Van 
den Bouwhuijsen finds that the Western culture’s relationship to tradition is 
structured on two assumptions: “1. Tradition is defined by a set of beliefs.2. 
Human actions are the expression of underlying beliefs. (So, traditional 
behaviour is the expression of beliefs that are handed down by the 
 
14 Clifford Geertz, Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author, (Polity Press 1988) 71.  
15 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 1. 
16 Ibid 512.  
17 Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, ‘What Makes Human Differences into Cultural Differences’ 
(1995) 55 (1) Philosophica 87-116: 103.  
18 Ibid.  
19 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) Chapter 11; also see S.N. Balagangadhara,  ‘Comparative Anthropology and 
Action Sciences: An Essay on Knowing to Act and Acting to Know’ (1987) 40 (2) Philosophica 
77. 
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ancestors.)” 20  In this connection he suggests that because the traditional 
behaviour “presupposes knowledge of beliefs,” 21  it is a “propositional 
knowledge”.22 Therefore he considers the Western relationship to tradition as 
an epistemic one.”23 Van den Bouwhuijsen points to the lack of knowledge 
about forms of life in cultures where “actions are not guided by beliefs but by 
tradition.”24 He proposes a different approach to study the difference between 
epistemic approach to tradition and that which does not have such an 
approach25 and is not guided by beliefs but by tradition: “to maximize un-
intelligibility, instead of reducing other cultures to mirror images of the 
West”. 26  Following in his footsteps, I suggest instead of trying to reduce 
differences between cultures, let us magnify them to understand other forms of 
life, other kinds of difference.27  
  Balagangadhara describes a culture as a “configuration of learning 
and meta-learning.” 28 Human beings, like other species, learn how to live and 
survive in their social and natural habitats.29 Culture can thus be understood as 
diverse ways of socialising and surviving in an environment; in other words as 
“how to go about in the world.”30 Since members of a society transmit their 
specific way of living to younger generations, culture is also learnable and 
teachable. Therefore, human beings not only learn their culture (how to go 
about). They also learn how to learn.31 In this regard, learning also includes 
learning to learn as meta-learning at a cognitive level and is informed by 
culture.32 That is to say, cultural differences might be contingent upon their 
meta-learning (learning to learn). Investigating how this culture specific meta-
learning is shaped, Balagangadhara suggests that there are various kinds of 
 
20 Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, ‘What Makes Human Differences into Cultural Differences’ 
(1995) 55 (1) Philosophica 87-116, 104. 
21 Ibid 105-106. 
22 Ibid 106. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 He opposes calling it “non-epistemic” as it would still reflect the Western cultural perspective.  
26 Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, ‘What Makes Human Differences into Cultural Differences’ 
(1995) 55 (1) Philosophica 87-116, 106. 
27 Ibid 98. 
28 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 427. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 442, I will broadly define learning as "the way in which an organism makes its environment 
habitable".  
32 Ibid.  
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learning processes and if knowledge is a product of learning, there are different 
kinds of knowledge in each culture.33 Each culture utilises available learning 
processes to a different degree. As such, the availability of different types of 
knowledge in a culture limits how the members of a culture learn to learn 
(meta-learning). A unique meta-learning process is established gradually 
through a configuration of different learning processes in every culture.34  
  Balagangadhara is not alone in drawing attention to different kinds 
of knowledge available in a culture. Aristotle, for instance, informs us about 
three different kinds of knowledge available in his culture: episteme 
(‘contemplation'), techne and phronesis.35 By phronesis, Aristotle refers to a 
kind of prudential wisdom, to do with choice, a choice which is shaped by the 
social practices of the community.36 Van den Bouwhuijsen explains phronesis 
as a kind of knowledge that has to do with relation to tradition. One could learn 
this kind of knowledge, according to Aristotle, by letting oneself be guided by 
the experience and tradition of one's community.37 With this in mind, in the 
culture of which Aristotle was a member relationship to tradition may not be 
guided by episteme, as it was a practical wisdom.38 As such, relationship to 
tradition cannot be considered epistemic, even though we do not have enough 
information about what kind of knowledge phronesis is.39  
  We do not find a further formulation on how these different kinds of 
knowledge shape cultures in Aristotle’s writings. Drawing from 
Balagangadhara, Van den Bouwhuijsen argues that unlike the culture Aristotle 
describes, Western culture is shaped by a configuration of learning and meta-
learning processes in which one kind of learning and meta-learning has 
dominated others: theoretical knowledge. 40  Drawing on Balagangadhara’s 
 
33 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) Chapter 11.  
34 S.N. Balagangadhara and Divya Jhingran, Do all roads lead to Jerusalem? The making of 
Indian religions (Manohar 2014) 246. 
35 Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, ‘What Makes Human Differences into Cultural Differences’ 
(1995) (55/1) Philosophica 87-116, 109. 
36 Ibid. Also see Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Herme- 
neutics, and Praxis (Blackwell 1983) 54. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
40 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) Chapter 11. and a similar point made see Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, ‘What 
Makes Human Differences into Cultural Differences’ (1995) 55(1) Philosophica 87-116, 111. 
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framework to explain the problem about describing culture in the discipline of 
anthropology, he argues that:  
The presupposition that all cultures do have 'an established system of 
beliefs' and that they can be adequately described by explicating these 
beliefs, which 'somehow' guide the behaviour of the participants, has 
great impact on the intellectual conscience of Western anthropologists. 
Apparently it is inconceivable to them that behaviour is not ultimately, 
somehow guided by 'a system of beliefs'. That is why they will assume 
that a culture can be described in terms of these beliefs.41 
 
  Balagangadhara argues, one type of (meta) learning process would 
be dominant and subordinate the other learning processes in the formation of a 
configuration of learning. Indeed, Balagangadhara argues that it is religion, 
specifically Christianity, that has provided the dominant meta-learning in the 
West and consequently shaped the Western culture.42 He came to formulate 
this argument after problematizing the existence of religion as a cultural 
universal and the belief regarding its universality.43 His research argues that 
the existence of religion as a cultural universal is a theological claim that has 
been secularised. Balagangadhara considers secularisation as the process in 
which theological ideas have gradually lost their obvious ties to theology, and 
have become common sense ideas.44  
  While Van den Bouwhuijsen argues that the Western relation to 
tradition is shaped by theoretical knowledge, Balagangadhara argues that it is 
religion (Christianity) that provides a dominant (meta) learning to shape a 
culture specific configuration of learning which cultivates theoretical 
knowledge.  
 
1. 3. 2. Explorations on religion as a cultural universal  
 
 
41Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, ‘What Makes Human Differences into Cultural Differences’ (1995) 
55 (1) Philosophica 87-116, 99.  
42 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994). 
43 Ibid. 
44 This thesis uses secularisation as the process in which theological claims become commonsense 
ideas. It will be elaborated throughout the thesis, particularly in Chapter 2 and 3.   
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  Dominant Western theorisations posit that religion is a culturally 
universal phenomenon.45 Prior to the Enlightenment, the persistent idea was 
that, as Fitzgerald puts it, “God implanted the desire to worship him in the heart 
of Adam and Eve’s descendants and in that sense all humans have religion.”46 
In the aftermath of the Reformation, in response to the debates between theists 
and free thinkers over the existence of God in the 18th century, David Hume 
developed the idea of natural religion.47 The dominant view of theists was the 
argument "from design" that the operation of the natural world is so perfect 
that it evinces the existence of God.48 Hume discredited this view by claiming 
that belief in the existence of God is not based on reason; but stems from the 
nature of human psychology.49 In this connection, he construed the difference 
between polytheism and theism as “a kind of flux and reflux in the human 
mind, and that men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and 
to sink again from theism into idolatry.”50 He further called polytheism the first 
ancient mode of religious belief while "the genuine theism" refers to 
monotheism.51  
  Regardless of this evolutionary view, the presumption that religious 
belief is inherent in human psychology has been recognised as culturally 
universal scientific data. Indeed, Preus is of the opinion that “Hume disposed 
of the last remaining religious explanation and legitimation of religion – the 
claim that religion is innate.”52 Thus, he credits Hume “with the intellectual 
completion of the paradigm shift from a religious to a naturalistic framework 
for the study of religion.” 53  However, Balagangadhara’s analysis of this 
intellectual paradigm reveals continuity between naturalistic explanations and 
theological explanations over the existence of religion. He demonstrates that 
the explanatory theories about religion as the naturalistic paradigm suffer from 
 
45 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Beacon Press 1993), Emile Durkheim, The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life (Courier Corporation 2008), Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the 
Profane: The Nature of Religion (Vol. 144) (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1959). 
46 Timothy Fitzgerald, ‘Who Invented Hinduism? Rethinking Religion in India’ in Bloch Esther, 
Rajaram Hegde, Marianne Keppens (eds), Rethinking Religion in India (Routledge 2009) 130-150, 
116. 
47 David Hume, The Natural History of Religion (A. and H. Bradlaugh Bonner 1889). 
48 Ibid Intro -5.2.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 8.1. 
51 Ibid Intro, 4.1, 15.1.  
52 J. Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud (Oxford 
University Press 1996) 207. 
53 Ibid. 
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petitio principii, which means that they assume the existence of religion and 
then try to find an explanation for its existence.54 Therefore, the explanatory 
theories that began crystallising with Hume mistakenly construct the relation 
between explanans and explanandum. Scientific methodology requires a 
logical relation between what is explained (the explanandum) and that which 
does the explaining (the explanans). In case of the naturalistic explanations 
about religion, the explanans identified the ‘natural’ causes, while what 
required explanation was the universality of religion or why mankind had to 
invent religion.55 Balagangadhara underlines two crucial weaknesses of this 
intellectual paradigm: first, a lack of empirical data about the existence of 
religion in other cultures and second, the presupposition of its explanandum. 
In other words, what needs proving (the universality of religion) was 
presupposed. In this connection, the assumption that religion is universal is not 
part of a theory formation; instead it precedes theorising about religion and as 
such what needs proving was presupposed.56 Studies on Alevis and Alevism 
demonstrate similar issues in the sense that they assume the existence of 
religion in Alevi culture and try to find an explanation for what kind of religion 
Alevism is. 
  The assumption that every culture or society has a religion has 
continued relevance.  It manifests in different definitions of religion that strive 
to encompass all relevant phenomena that ‘don’t really look like’ religion but, 
following the assumption, must be a kind of religion. For example, a well-
known scholar on the subject, Geertz, defines religion as a "system of symbols" 
that underlies a worldview. 57  However, scholars point to the difficulty of 
applying definitions of religion in Asian cultures.58 As the assumption that 
religion exists in every culture became rooted, academic discussions have 
 
54 S. N. Balagangadhara, “The Origin of Religion: Why is the Issue Dead?” (1990) 3(3) Cultural 
Dynamics 281-316. 
55 Ibid 285. 
56 Ibid 290. 
57 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic Books 1973). 
58 Frits Staal,  Rules without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras, and the Human Sciences (Peter Lang 
1989) 393, Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and 'the Mystic 
East' (Routledge 2001). Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford University 
Press 2000).  
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focused on disputes about definitions of religion.59 All these arguments over 
definitions obscure the fact that the assumption that the phenomenon of 
religion exists in every society is pre-theoretical. In other words, whether 
Geertz’s definition reflects Christian history or not does not help us in how to 
distinguish a phenomenon as a religion, which requires a theory and not a 
definition. Balagangadhara warns that “when one confuses between defining a 
word and theorizing a phenomenon[…] one enters a dead-end: it is as though 
the task of a definition is to classify objects and decide whether or not they 
belong to a particular category. But this generates disputes that cannot be 
settled.”60  
  Following the footsteps of the intellectual paradigm explained 
above, the attempts to come up with definitions of religion that include all 
religions paved the way for the emergence of the discourse of world religions.61 
However, with the general critique of Enlightenment ideas unpacked as 
Protestant theology, as discussed further below, academics have focused on 
investigating the constructions of different religions. For example, for Asad, 
by insisting on the importance of symbolic meanings in his definition of 
religion, Geertz expresses "a view that has a specific Christian history", since 
"the demand that a practice must 'affirm something', that it should be able to 
state a meaning, is the first condition for determining what is truly 
religious." 62 Asad suggests that using the genealogical approach to study 
religion as well as the secular tries to unsettle the formation of these categories 
and reveal different power relations embedded in these formations. Exemplary 
of this approach, Asad and Masuzawa argue that religion is constructed and 
carries strong theological bias against non-Western cultures. 63  Following 
 
59 Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion. (Beacon Press 1993), Emile Durkheim, The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life (Oxford University Press 2001), Mircae Eliade,  The Sacred and the 
Profane: The Nature of Religion (Vol. 144) (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 1959), Michael Lambek 
(ed) A Reader in the Anthropology of Religion Vol. 2 (Blackwell 2002). 
60 Jakob De Roover and Sarah Claerhout, ‘The Colonial Construction of What?’ in Bloch Esther, 
Rajaram Hegde, Marianne Keppens (eds), Rethinking Religion in India (Routledge 2009) 164-183. 
61 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: or, How European Universalism was 
Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (University of Chicago Press 2005). 
62 Talal Asad, ‘Anthropological conceptions of religion: reflections on Geertz’ (1983) 18 (2) Man 
237-259, 245. 
63 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford University 
Press 2003); Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European 
Universalism was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (University of Chicago Press 2005); 
Talal Asad,  Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam 
(JHU Press 2009). 
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colonial expeditions to foreign lands, the discourse of world religions was 
constructed: What were once Christians, Muslims, Jews and the pagan rest was 
dissolved into multiple "isms".64 However, arguments about the construction 
of a phenomenon are not clear about what is being constructed and whether 
constructed phenomena exist in reality or not. De Roover and Claerhout’s 
analogical insight helps us to pinpoint the problem with the constructivist 
approach: Analogically thinking of gravity, observing the ebb and tide in the 
sea and objects falling down can only be explained by a theory of gravity. 
Similarly, in order to account for religion being a mere construct, we first need 
to have a theory of religion that accounts for its characteristics and its link to 
other phenomena.65   
  All these above mentioned issues concerning religious studies 
denote the lack of scientific theorising about religion. In his book, the Heathen 
in His Blindness, Balagangadhara develops a theory of religion through an in-
depth historical and cultural analysis of Christianity, Antique Greek, Roman 
and Indian cultures and offers a framework for the comparative study of 
cultures. Balagangadhara’s theory of religion gives us another way of 
understanding the assumption that religion is a culturally universal 
phenomenon. He proposes that religion is an explanatorily intelligible account 
of the cosmos and of itself.66 As such, the only religions are Christianity, Islam 
and Judaism, as these belief systems are the only ones which subscribe to the 
definition. His theory will be explained further in the following chapter, and 
used to analyse Alevism and the Alevi culture. There seems to be a consensus 
about Alevism as a religion, albeit disputed whether as a cultural richness of 
Islam (as considered by the Turkish authorities), or a non-Sunni Islamic 
denomination of Isla (as considered by the ECtHR), or a religion on its own (as 
considered in the UK). This thesis intends to disrupt the consensus by drawing 
on Balagangadhara’s theory of religion.  
 
 
64 Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions: Or, How European Universalism was 
Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (University of Chicago Press 2005). 
65 Jakob De Roover and Sarah Claerhout, ‘The colonial construction of what?’ in Bloch Esther, 
Rajaram Hegde, Marianne Keppens (eds), Rethinking Religion in India (Routledge 2009) 164-183, 
166. 
66 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994). 
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1. 3. 3. Cultural encounters 
 
  Recalling Balagangadhara’s claim over the double dynamic of 
religion that shapes dominant meta-learning in the West, we first need to 
explain what this dynamic consists of. Balagangadhara describes this dynamic 
through two processes: proselytisation and secularisation. The account of the 
cosmos that religion provides spreads in two ways. It gains converts in the 
process of proselytisation through the spread of its specific account. Yet, also 
as an account it universalises itself, which is also accompanied by the process 
of secularisation. These two processes bring about universalisation of religion 
as a religion and as a worldview (religion in a secularised guise). In this 
connection, the continuity between the theological explanations about the 
universality of religion and the intellectual paradigm that displays petitio 
principii, explained above, is attributable to the secularisation of religion. 
Secularisation of religion and specifically Christian ideas are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2 and 3.  
  Drawing on the above framework on cultural differences as 
differences in configurations of learning, the double dynamic of religion is the 
movement that provides the dominant meta-learning, which generates 
‘knowing about’ or ‘theoretical knowledge’ which has an epistemic relation to 
tradition, in terms Van den Bouwhuijsen uses. Balagangadhara elaborates that: 
What makes this ‘knowing about’ into the dominant way of learning is 
its extension to all other goings-about in the world. To know a people 
or a culture is to know their ‘beliefs’. Because all human actions are 
expressions of beliefs, to know cultures is to have knowledge about the 
beliefs of these cultures. These beliefs, of course, will have to do with 
what they think about the world, what they think about what there is in 
the world.67 
 
  In response, his problematisation of religion as a cultural universal 
and the belief in its universality shows him that Western culture is constituted 
by religion, which provides a (meta) learning that sees other cultures only 
through their belief systems or worldviews. Thus this framework for cultural 
differences enables him to explain why the belief about the universality of 
religion across cultures is so strong.  
 
67S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 401-402.  
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  Unlike Western culture, Balagangadhara argues the difference of 
Indian culture lies in lacking religion. Instead, he proposes that performative 
learning dominates the configuration of learning in Indian culture, similar to 
Van den Bouwhuijsen’s term ‘other than epistemic’. This point will be 
elaborated in detail through my fieldwork analysis of the Alevi traditions, in 
Chapter 3. However, it is important to note that a configuration of learning is 
an amalgam of different learning processes, where one particular learning 
process dominates others in Balagangadhara’s framework. As such, different 
learning processes do exist in each culture and hence different kinds of 
knowledge. However, the dominant learning process gives shape to meta-
learning and thus a culture specific way of learning. As Balagangadhara points 
to the relationships between the dominant and subordinate processes of 
learning that account for a culture.68 Therefore, subordinate learning processes 
do operate but manifest themselves differently depending on the meta-learning.  
  Reading the analytical separation of religious traditions and 
‘performative’ traditions with this in mind, there are rituals in religious 
traditions and elements of religion in ‘performative’ traditions.69 However, in 
a religious tradition, ritual is reduced to the level of symbols and meanings.70 
The belief and meaning of the ritual guides the religious ritual. Similarly, art 
becomes the expression of an idea.71 By the same token, elements of a religion 
might exist in a ‘performative’ tradition. Yet, these do not create an 
explanatorily intelligible account of the cosmos or a worldview, or a system of 
belief. Thus one may recognize some fragments and pieces, that belong to a 
different pattern of life.72 Therefore, rather than classificatory speaking, it is 
important to examine the ‘place’ of a domain within the learning process of a 
specific tradition. In this sense, despite ‘performative’ traditions seeming to 
have ‘gods’, ‘worship’ and ‘doctrines’, they address different aspects and are 
shaped in different learning processes. This aspect of Balagangadhara’s 
analysis is applied in Chapter 3 to understand the relationship between Alevism 
 
68 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 427.  
69 Ibid 426-429. 
70 Ibid 437. 
71 Ibid 402. 
72 Ibid 429.  
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and Islam, that is a matter of continuous debate, as seen in Alevis’ recognition 
demands before the authorities and before courts of law.  
  At the time of contact between these cultures (a culture with religion 
and a culture without a religion), the culture with religion absorbs the culture 
without religion into its own image, which brings about “effacing the otherness 
of the other.”73 This is because from the viewpoint of religion, all cultures must 
have a religion or a system of belief (worldview in secularised terms) and thus 
understanding other cultures means trying to know of their religion or system 
of belief. The religious cultural attitude sees traditional practices as being 
grounded on beliefs. Two theological ideas of three existing religions 
(Christianity, Islam and Judaism) prepare ground for the universality of 
religion. The idea that God implanted the desire to believe in him and the idea 
that all human races have been descendants of Noah.74 These theological ideas 
that all three religions share do not allow the existence of people without 
religion. 75  Therefore, at the time of contact, as in the case of colonial 
expeditions, cultures without religion were constructed on imagined religions. 
  This construction is different from the above-explained genealogical 
approach in the sense that these constructions did not have a place in reality; 
rather they exist as experiential entities of cultures with religion. They are 
experiential in the sense that they provide coherence to a religion’s account of 
another culture. It is a reflection of the experience of cultures with religion. In 
this connection, Balagangadhara argues that  
‘Hinduism’ is both a false description of Indian reality and is an 
imaginary entity. It is false not because the West gave a false 
description of some reality (‘Hinduism’ in this case) but because they 
falsely assumed that the experiential entity was also a real entity in the 
world. It is imaginary in the sense that it does not have an existence 
outside the experience of western culture.76 
 
 
73 Ibid 330-331.  
74 Jakob De Roover, ‘Incurably religious? Consensus Gentium and the Cultural Universality of 
Religion’ (2014) 61(1) Numen 5-32. 
75 Ibid 8 where De Roover makes this claim for Christianity in particular over the challenge to this 
theological claim, posed by the existence of people without religion and the endeavour of revising 
the first-phase reports from Colonies to represent the natives’ religion. He adds: “In this way, 
during the course of 18th century, the theological postulate about the existence of God in human 
communities was transformed into the anthropological belief about cultures.” 
76 S. N. Balagangadhara, ‘Orientalism, Postcolonialims and the ‘Construction’ of Religion’ in 
Bloch Esther, Rajaram Hegde, Marianne Keppens (eds), Rethinking Religion in India (Routledge 
2009) 135, 138. 
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  According to Balagangadhara, the Indians also internalised the 
process described above that effaces their otherness. He calls this process of 
internationalisation as “colonial consciousness” by arguing as a product of 
colonialism since “colonialism denies the colonized peoples and cultures their 
own experiences; it makes them aliens to themselves; it actively prevents 
descriptions of their own experiences except in terms defined by the 
colonizers.”77 In this connection, it creates and sustains a consciousness that 
replaces the experiences of the colonized about their own culture with the 
experience of the colonizer. Relying on violence to alter the experience of the 
colonizer, for Balagangadhara, colonialism “denies the colonized their 
experience of the world by imposing on them unjustifiable frameworks of 
description through violence.”78 As a result of both intellectual and physical 
violence, Indians came to internalise the experiential entities of the coloniser 
and describe their culture in terms of the coloniser’s culture as though there are 
indigenous religions in India. In case of Alevis, the transformation that they 
have been going through by being organised in a transnational movement that 
have been gradually engaged with religious rights advocacy might be seen as 
a something similar to the consciousness Balagangadhara talks of. While we 
cannot talk about a project like colonialism to alter the Alevi experience of 
their culture, their historical contact with Muslims might have similar effects 
on the transformation of the Alevi traditions, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
  Alevis, historically known as Kızılbaş, were subjected to 
persecution by the Ottomans for their beliefs and practices because they were 
accused of holding heretical beliefs and practices. In addition to this physical 
violence, their interactions with Muslims reflect a process of effacing the 
otherness of the other. As a result. Balagangadhara’s research focuses on 
Christian missionaries and Western colonialism in Asia. Thus, it remains 
limited in analysing the contact between Islam and cultures without religions 
in Turkey and the Middle East. However, his framework for analysing the 
conversion process of cultures without religion into heathen religions, which 
results in effacing the otherness of the other, is a useful heuristic to analyse 
 
77 S. N. Balagangadhara, Reconceptualizing India Studies (Oxford University Press 2012) 111. 
78 Ibid 113.  
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how Alevis are absorbed into an Islamic framework. In this regard, Chapter 3 
specifically demonstrates the ambiguity of religious adherence in the Ottoman 
Empire until the 15th century and subsequent “Sunnitization” of the Empire, 
simultaneously absorbing non-religious elements of the Empire by labelling 
them heretical.  
 
1. 3. 4. The process of secularisation  
 
  The process in which colonial consciousness was created and 
sustained in India spans a few hundred years from the 15th century missionary 
expeditions until 18th century colonial governance. I analyse this process in 
parallel to the developments in Europe that include the Protestant Reformation 
and the Enlightenment, which gave rise to the ideas of religious toleration and 
a secular state. In parallel to Balagangadhara, De Roover indicates a certain 
dynamic within Christianity that triggered the Protestant Reformation: the 
crucial separation between true worship and false worship, that precedes 
determining the realm of the secular. Demarcating the realm of allowed 
(secular) and forbidden (false worship) practices to be a ‘true’ Christian has 
carried great importance since the early formation of Christianity. In parallel, 
distinguishing true and false worship has been a constant dynamic within 
Christian theology. Hence, it is said that: "[idolatry] directed its worship at 
visible and carnal objects, while true religion should have the invisible spiritual 
as its object of worship. Second, idolatry presented human laws and works as 
means to the justification of the soul."79 The Protestant Reformation marked an 
enormous effort to cleanse Christianity of idolatrous practices in order to (once 
again) purify it. Reformers objected to a number of Catholic rituals and 
performances such as festival dances and local customs on the grounds of 
idolatry. 80 In this regard, Balagangadhara argues that the Protestant 
Reformation brought about four main issues, which transformed the perception 
 
79 Jakob De Roover, ‘Secular Law and the Realm of False Religion’ in Sullivan W F, Yelle R A, 
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of belief: the concept of idolatry, corruption of religion, relationship between 
God and humanity and the issue of truth.81 
  In his book Europe, India and the limits of Secularism, De Roover 
traces the ideas of religious toleration and the secular state that Western 
political theory has been grounded on and investigates the process in which the 
separation of the realm of true worship, false worship and secular was reduced 
to the realm of religion and secular.82 That is, he analyses how the triad of true 
religion, false religion and secular were transformed into the binary between 
religious and secular during the post Reformation formulations of political 
theory.83 His analysis of Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke reveals a 
strong connection between the ideas of religious toleration, secular state and 
Christian theology. This connection is indeed cited by other scholars as well.84 
However the strength of De Roover’s analysis comes from his argument that 
the ideas of political theory depend on Christian theology for their 
intelligibility. In non-Christian contexts, he shows for the case of India, they 
lose sense and therefore cannot provide solutions for co-existence. For him, the 
general acceptance of liberal toleration as the formula for co-existence shows 
the secularization of Christian theology in the form of political theory. This is 
when “Christian religious ideas are being reproduced in secular guise in the 
Western intellectual tradition.” 85  De Roover describes it as “the process 
whereby tropes of a particular theology are transformed into topoi of a culture 
or society.”86  Indeed, He dismantles many promises of the Enlightenment 
narrative as unravelling the patterns of the Protestant theology. De Roover 
considers secularization as a complex process:  
Tropes are patterns of reasoning that become commonplaces of a 
culture and can then be transformed into topoi that constitute social and 
political theories. Both tropes and topoi consist of clusters of ideas 
which are articulated and interpreted in many ways and combined and 
recombined to build different theories.87  
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  Because of the dependence on the earlier theological claims, the 
reduction of the triad into the binary between religious and secular drives the 
realm of false religion away from the discourse of political theory. Idolatry or 
false religion has been secularised as the system of belief and a competing 
claim to the ‘true’ account of religion. However, as will be shown in the case 
of Alevis, some differences cannot be articulated as a system of belief. By 
accepting the Semitic religion’s idea of religion as a matter of truth, secular 
law cannot keep up its promise of neutrality. Since secular law fails to 
acknowledge the presence of false religion and secular law’s dependence on a 
theological framework, traditions that fall within the realm of false religion 
(within the theological framework) struggle to find a place (be recognised). 
This is where Alevis also find themselves, as this thesis will demonstrate. This 
argument is developed particularly in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 in relation to Alevis’ 
interactions with law.    
 
1. 3. 5. Secular law’s treatment of religion  
 
  These critiques on the formation of religion and the secular have 
strong implications for the study of law as well. The implicit assumption that 
religion is a culturally universal system of symbols that constitutes a 
cosmological framework is manifested in the recognition of religious belief as 
a fundamental human right.88 Religion becomes the domain where cultural 
differences are articulated, even though religion and thereby the separation 
between religion and secular might seem to alien in some traditions. In this 
connection, Scholars increasingly argue against secular law’s image as 
ahistorical and afloat from its culture-specific context. They point to how the 
secular law inherited the Protestant understanding of religion as centred around 
belief and how problematic the universal application of the principle of 
freedom of religion became. 89  
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  In her book the Impossibility of Religious Freedom, Sullivan argues 
that diverse religious communities are compelled to 'reinvent' their religions to 
fit into the secular legal systems.90 Analysing the case of Werner v Boca Raton 
in Miami in the US, Sullivan shows how legal systems that proclaim religious 
freedom are unable to fulfil that promise because of the constrained notion of 
religion and its permitted exercise. Her analysis is based on her involvement as 
an expert in the court proceeding of Werner v Boca Raton where applicants 
argue their distinctive way of decorating graves were within the ambit of free 
exercise of religion. For Sullivan, freedom for “lived religion” is impossible in 
the US because of law’s reliance on Protestant understanding of religion as 
doctrinal and belief centred. Instead Sullivan suggests shifting the focus from 
religious freedom to the principle of equality for accommodation of difference 
without particular treatment of religion. 91  Although Sullivan addresses an 
important point by pointing to the implicit Protestant approach that law adopts, 
she does not go far enough with it. Merely abandoning religion is avoidance of 
the core of the problem that a religious framework within the law continues to 
replicate.  
  Similar to Sullivan, Laborde also identifies the inability of secular 
law to accommodate religious claims; but also avoid the problem that this 
thesis aims to address. Approaching from a philosophical standpoint and 
concerned with the liberal egalitarian theory of religion and the state, Laborde 
tries to revise liberal egalitarianism to respond to the critical religious studies, 
mainly the genealogist approach discussed above, although she does not 
discuss Balagangadhara’s theory of religion in her response.92 For Laborde, the 
secular courts of law do not need to define religion semantically. She adopts 
an ‘interpretative’ approach and therefore suggests desegregating religion 
based on the values it promotes. She aims at developing a response to critiques 
over liberal egalitarians’ consideration of religion as being narrow, sectarian 
and unfair to non-religious people.93 The problem Laborde addresses is to find 
an approach (which she calls, desegregation) for an inclusive theory of 
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religious freedom that meets three necessary desiderate, being non-narrow, 
non-sectarian and fair to non-religious people.94 However critical these studies 
on the secular law’s handling of religion, they presume the universality of 
religion across cultures. I aim to explore the problem over assuming religion 
as a cultural universal, which is not addressed by these studies.  
 
1. 3. 6. Literature on Alevis and Alevism 
 
  The question of how Alevism and the elements of the Alevi culture 
were constructed has been asked before. For example, a great deal of attention 
has been given to the political formation of Alevism and historical and cultural 
aspects of Alevi culture.95  These studies attribute a nebulous religiosity to 
Alevi traditions as an un-theorised premise, however critical they might be in 
other aspects.96 While some studies discuss the intertwining categories of the 
religious and secular, they do not question the use of the religious-secular 
framework itself.97 Unlike the available literature, this thesis scrutinises Alevi 
traditions without presuming religiousness in them. In this connection, it also 
scrutinises the very existence of an Alevi religion in the form of Alevism.  
  Moreover, there is no research specifically looking at the legal 
aspects with respect to the formation of Alevism, although Alevis' increasing 
reliance upon law for official recognition has been noticed by many scholars.98 
As the human rights framework is of increasing relevance to the rise of identity 
politics in multicultural societies, Alevis also demand their ‘rights’ and so also 
 
94 Ibid 586.  
95 Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: the Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (Oxford University Press 
2013); David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey: the Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition 
(Routledge 2003); Martin Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany 
and in Transnational Space (Berghan Books 2008); Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and 
Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity (Routledge 2012); Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, 
Barbara Kellner Heinkele, Anke Otter Beaujean (eds), Syncretistic Religious Communities in the 
Near East (Brill 1997); Irene Melikoff, Uyur İdik Uyardılar, Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları 
(Demos 2009).  
96 Martin Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in 
Transnational Space (Berghan Books 2008); Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: 
Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity (Routledge 2012); Irene Melikoff, Uyur İdik 
Uyardılar, Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları (Demos 2009). 
97 Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (Oxford University Press 
2013); Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, 'Subjects of the Sultan, Disciples of the Shah: Formation and 
Transformation of the Kızılbaş/Alevi Communities in Ottoman Anatolia' (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation Harvard University 2008).   
98 Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity 
(Routledge 2012) 155-157.  
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become particularly concerned about the legal aspects of the formation and 
representation of Alevism.99 In this connection, the major thrust of this thesis 
is to unsettle the categories of the secular and religious by analysing the 
framing of Alevi claims within the secular legal systems of the modern state.  
  Alevis’ immigration to different European countries gave rise to the 
formation of an Alevi diaspora forging transnational ties. Literature on 
diasporas generally has expanded since the late 1980s.100 Diaspora literature 
varies in conceptualizing the term from a strict approach adapted by Saffran to 
an extensive approach inclusive of many immigrant communities.101 However, 
scholars agree that an imagined homeland and its influence on identity 
formation remain distinctive for the concept of diaspora. In parallel to 
Vertovec, Marienstras, I consider the concept of diaspora involving a strong 
connection between an immigrant population, a place of origin and people of 
similar origins elsewhere.102 Also following Vertovec, I use transnationalism 
in the sense that “the actual, ongoing exchanges of information, money and 
resources – as well as regular travel and communication – that members of a 
diaspora may undertake with others in the homeland or elsewhere within the 
globalized ethnic community.”103   
  Although the concept of diaspora has been criticised for its strong 
reference point to the nation-state model and thus not a sufficient tool for 
analysing global dynamics of culture, identity and belonging, 104  the Alevi 
presence in Europe can be considered as a diaspora community for two main 
reasons: the reference to Turkey not only for current identity formation but also 
historical reference to past persecution is prominent in the formation of Alevi 
identity in the UK and Europe as well as the transnational dimension of identity 
formation, as will be discussed in Chapter 4 and 6. Therefore, not in the sense 
 
99 Celia Jenkins and Ümit Çetin, ‘From a “Sort of Muslim” to ‘Proud to Be Alevi: the Alevi 
Religion and Identity Project Combatting the Negative Identity among Second-generation Alevis 
in the UK’ (2018) 20(1)  National Identities 105-123; Celia Jenkins, Ümit Çetin and Suavi Aydın 
(eds), Alevism as an Ethno-religious Identity: Contested Boundaries (Routledge 2018). 
100 Rogers Brubaker, ‘The ‘diaspora’ diaspora’ (2005) 28 (1) Ethnic and Racial Studies 1-19.  
101 Virinder Kalra, Raminder Kaur, and John Hutnyk (eds), Diaspora and Hybridity (Sage 2005). 
102 Steven Vertovec, ‘Religion and Diaspora’, in Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz and Randi Warne 
(eds), New Approaches to the Study of Religion 275-304, 282; Richard Marienstras, ‘On the 
Notion of Diaspora’ in Gerard Chaliand (ed) Minority Peoples in the Age of Nation-States (Pluto 
1989) 119-25, 120.  
103 Steven Vertovec, ‘Religion and Diaspora’, in Peter Antes, Armin W. Geertz and Randi Warne 
(eds), New Approaches to the Study of Religion 275-304, 282. 
104 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, ‘Citizenship and Identity: Living in Diasporas in Post-war Europe?’ 
(2000) 23(1) Ethnic and Racial Studies 1-15.  
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of an isolated closed community but in the sense that a reference to homeland 
and transnational ties are very strong in the identity formation of Alevis in the 
UK that enable me to consider them a transnational diaspora community. 
Moreover, this identity formation exhibits strong continuous reference to 
Turkey not only historical but also contemporary. For instance, the All Party 
Parliamentary Group for Alevis (APPGA) in the UK was established in 2016 
with the aim of promoting Alevis’ legitimate socio-political aspirations. One 
of the first activities of the APPGA was to send letters to the Gaziantep 
Governorate in Turkey to grant permission for Alevi commemoration of Maras 
1978 events that targeted Alevis.105 In addition, different Alevi Federations 
operate together in their advocacy strategies and community formations in 
respective countries. For instance, in preparing an Alevism curriculum for 
religious education in the UK, the Britain Alevi Federation consulted with the 
Alevi Federation in Germany to learn about their curriculum and efforts. 
  The Alevi diaspora in different European states is organized into 
local community centres, and regional and national federations, which are all 
linked to the umbrella organization, the Europe Alevi Federation. 106  The 
administrative boards of these organizations have been actively involved in 
formulating policies for recognition in the respective countries, as well as 
lobbying their local authorities and governments to improve the situation of 
Alevis in Turkey.107 This diaspora movement has an influence on the formation 
of Alevism in Turkey. For example, an Alevi Manifesto, in which demands for 
the recognition of Alevis were set out for the first time, was first declared in 
Hamburg in 1989 and then in Turkey in 1990.108 Similarly, the increasing 
visibility and celebration of Alevi traditions was manifested in a public display 
of the Cem ritual in Cologne in 2000 and in Istanbul in 2002.109 This colossal 
event was called 'saga of millennium' and was organized by the European 
 
105 ‘İngiltere Parlamentosu Alevi grubundan Maraş Katliamı kararı’, 17 December 2015, available 
at  http://www.sizehaber.com/mobil/haber/240611/ingiltere-parlamentosunda-maras-katliami-
karari-alindi (accessed 16 November 2019). 
106 My fieldwork findings discussed in Chapter 6, also for the context of Germany, see Martin 
Sökefeld, ‘Alevis in Germany and the Politics of Recognition’ (2003) 29 New Perspectives on 
Turkey 133-161. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Mehmet Demiray, 'Understanding the Alevi Revival: Transnational Perspective' (Unpublished 
PhD Dissertation Bilkent University 2004) 113. 
109 Cem is considered as the foremost Alevi ritual and in the claims for recognition, Cem is 
represented as worship and hence cemevi to be recognized as a place of worship.  
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Federation of Alevi Associations.110 Thousands of people attended including 
government officials.   
  The transnational terrain of Alevi politics allows Alevis to navigate 
in multiple secular legal frameworks to experiment with different formulations 
of Alevi traditions, which would pave the way for legal recognition. In 2000 
the Islamic Federation of Berlin was granted the right to teach Islam at schools 
in Berlin.111 This development marked a turning point for the Alevi diaspora, 
which awakened in a rather unexpected way to the potential of making legal 
claims through minority rights and the principle of freedom of religion.112 
Subsequent to the demands of Alevis, in 2002, the Federation of Alevi 
Organizations in Germany was also recognised as a religious community 
distinct from Sunni Islam and allowed to teach Alevism in schools in Berlin.113 
This legal gain in the German context accelerated the advocacy of the Alevi 
movement in other diaspora contexts as well as in Turkey.  
  Moreover, the transnational dimension of the Alevi movement 
necessitates comparative research, coupled with multi-sited fieldwork, to better 
comprehend the formation of Alevi claims and Alevism. Beginning in the 
1980s and accelerating in the 1990s, the culmination of several factors 
discussed below, this transnationalism reinforced a process that is known as 
'the Alevi Revival'.114 This process is marked by Alevis' thirst to understand 
who they are and what Alevism is, primarily for the purposes of self-expression 
and transmission of the tradition. It led to a boom in the number of publications 
on myriad aspects of Alevism, and the increasing visibility of Alevi identity, 
public performance of the Alevi traditions, and the number and forms of Alevi 
 
110 Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, 'Subjects of the Sultan, Disciples of the Shah: Formation and 
Transformation of the Kızılbaş/Alevi Communities in Ottoman Anatolia' (Unpublished PhD 
Dissertation Harvard University 2008).  
111 Elise Massicard, The Alevis in Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial 
Diversity (Routladge 2012) 195-199. 
112 Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, ‘Alevis in Germany on the Way to Public Recognition?’ (2001) 
8 ISIM Newsletter 1. 
113 Ibid; also see Esra Özyürek, ‘The Light of the Alevi Fire was Lit in Germany and Then Spread 
to Turkey: A Transnational Debate on the Boundaries of Islam’ (2009) 10 (2) Turkish Studies 233-
253. 
114 Besim Can Zırh, ‘Becoming Visible Through Migration: Understanding the Relationships 
Between the Alevi Revival, Migration and Funerary Practices Through Europe and Turkey’ 
(Unpublished PhD dissertation University College of London 2012); see also Esra Özyürek, ‘The 
Light of the Alevi Fire was Lit in Germany and Then Spread to Turkey: A Transnational Debate 
on the Boundaries of Islam’ (2009) 10 (2) Turkish Studies 233-253; Elise Massicard, The Alevis in 
Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity (Routledge 2012)  195-199. 
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organizations. The process in Turkey also concomitantly converged with the 
process of a more organized Alevi diaspora in Europe. In particular, the post-
cold war politics of identity and multiculturalism encouraged a kind of 
community formation around religion, with its tax benefits or other modes of 
redistribution.115  
  From 1970s different European countries began implementing 
multicultural policies as a response to increasing diversity. Multiculturalism 
refers to the wide spectrum of theories, practices, approaches and policies that 
aim at providing public recognition of and support for accommodation of 
minorities.116 Despite significant criticism of multiculturalism and the change 
of language in government discourse regarding multiculturalism, 
multiculturalism has been a persistent trend in policy-making and 
accommodation of diversity in many European countries including the UK, 
since the 1970s. Vertovec and Wessendorf describes multiculturalism as “as a 
broad set of mutually reinforcing approaches or methodologies concerning the 
incorporation and participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities and their 
modes of cultural/religious difference.” 117  Borrowing Ballard’s term of 
cultural navigators, Alevis navigate within the politico-legal systems of their 
settlement countries to ask for recognition as a faith community, given the 
benefits of being recognised as a faith community in the UK.118  
  This thesis analyses the context of Turkey and the UK comparatively 
as well as the jurisdiction of the ECtHR, where Alevis increasingly litigate 
against Turkey, although not as yet the UK. As law is the primary domain for 
implementing state policies with regards to religion, comparing these different 
legal systems in terms of the accommodation of Alevi claims allows for a more 
elaborate analysis of the role of legal frameworks in the conceptualisation of 
Alevism. This comparison also provides indicators about what mechanisms are 
available for the recognition of 'religious' communities in respective contexts.  
 
115 Esra Özyürek, ‘The Light of the Alevi Fire was Lit in Germany and Then Spread to Turkey: A 
Transnational Debate on the Boundaries of Islam’ (2009) 10 (2) Turkish Studies 233-253. 
116 Duncan Ivison (ed), The Ashgate Research Companion to Multiculturalism (Routledge 2016) 2. 
117 Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds), ‘Assessing the Backlash Against 
Multiculturalism in Europe’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds), The 
Multiculturalism Backlash (Routledge 2010) 1-31, 4. 
118 Roger Ballard, ‘The Emergence of Desh Pardesh: Introduction’ in Roger Ballard (ed) Desh 
Pardesh: the South Asian Presence in Britain (Hurst & Company 1994). 
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  Turkey, which has the largest and indigenous Alevi population, 
secures the principle of laicism (laiklik in Turkish) in its constitution. Turkey’s 
unitary legal structure was established upon legal transplantation from 
European countries and law was instrumentalised to transform a largely Islamic 
society to mimic the West, particularly Western secularism.119 Yet, the Turkish 
Republic has institutionally supported only a certain version of Islam through 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet).120 As a state institution, the 
Diyanet is responsible for organising religious life in Turkey. It has gradually 
expanded over the years with its budget exceeding that of a number of 
ministries.121 Furthermore, upon request, the Diyanet provides opinions with 
respect to Islamic acceptability of certain practices to courts and other state 
bodies over a wide range of issues, including a variety of Alevi demands. We 
will see further in Chapter 4 how these structures marginalise Alevis in the 
Turkish political and legal context.122  
  As discussed further in Chapter 4 and 5, compulsory religious 
education in Turkey, the content of which is decided at national level, is an 
issue of conflict with the state. Most Alevis perceive it as an assimilation policy 
primarily due to the content of the syllabus that promotes the Sunni Islamic 
doctrines.123 Another area where Alevis demand recognition in Turkey is the 
recognition of cemevi, Alevi community houses, as a place of worship, which 
has certain benefits for land allocation and exemption from electricity bills. In 
the context of Turkey, the issue of Alevi representation within the state 
institution, Diyanet, causes internal disputes within the Alevi movement, while 
the Turkish government and the Diyanet consider Alevism as a Sunni Islamic 
tradition with cultural peculiarities specific to the Turkish nation and hence 
deny it differentiated treatment. Despite some Alevi associations' strong refusal 
to be represented within the Diyanet, in a recent case brought by a particular 
Alevi association, Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı (hereinafter, 
CEM), in favour of state support, the ECtHR ruled that Turkey's refusal to 
extend the Diyanet’s public religious services to Alevis violates Article 9 of 
 
119 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (McGill-Queen’s Press 1964); Derya 
Bayır, Türk Hukukunda Azınlıklar ve Milliyetçilik (Bilgi 2017). 
120 İstar B Gözaydın, ‘Diyanet and Politics’ (2008) 98 (2-3) The Muslim World 216-227. 
121 İstar B Gözaydın, Diyanet: Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Dinin Tanzimi (Iletisim 2009). 
122 Derya Bayır, Türk Hukukunda Azınlıklar ve Milliyetçilik (Bilgi 2017). 
123 Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey App no 21163/11 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014). 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, the Convention), 
namely the freedom of religion.124 In this and several other cases, therefore, the 
ECtHR has also become involved in the process of shaping Alevism for the 
purposes of secular law and official recognition. Decisions of the ECtHR 
would have a direct or indirect legal impact on both the UK and Turkey because 
both are bound by the Convention and the ECtHR’s rulings, although they give 
different domestic status to the Convention and judgments of the Court.125 
  The Alevi community in the UK is a result of migration and refugee 
flows from Turkey, especially since the late 1980s, and forms a major part of 
the Turkish and Kurdish diaspora in the UK.126 By the time Alevis arrived, 
Britain has already been dealing with accommodating ever growing immigrant 
communities most of whom migrated from different parts of the common-
wealth since 1950s.127 Compared to Turkey, local governance is stronger in the 
UK and provides different opportunity structures for multicultural 
communities with an emphasis on inter-faith dialogues.128 My fieldwork as 
discussed in chapter 6 brings out this difference. There are multiple ways at 
local level for communities to be represented although in some cases, such as 
the Alevis, this may be dependent on access to sources of advocacy. In this 
connection, the Alevi movement in the UK has become increasingly assertive 
about the Alevi identity and hence the representation of Alevism.  
  The movement strives to gain recognition as a religious community 
at multiple levels. The main areas where the Alevi movement opts to make 
recognition claims in all three of the jurisdictions examined, include the 
teaching of Alevism as part of compulsory religious education, the status of 
cemevi as a place of worship and the charity status of Alevi associations, as 
discussed in Chapter 6. However, these demands have been shaped by the 
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different contexts in Turkey and the UK. For instance, the Alevi movement 
promotes a project to include Alevism in the religious education curriculum at 
local level in some London Boroughs and schools, which would then pave the 
way for the inclusion of Alevism in the national curriculum. Also, in the UK, 
the current Charities Act 2011 (as well as its earlier versions) enables 
communities to be recognised as religious charities, which thereby provides 
certain tax benefits. This has prompted the Alevi movement in the UK to make 
claims as a faith community, as framed by Charity Commission decisions and 
the Charities Act. Additionally, the Alevi movement engages with creative 
projects such as organizing performances of semah (Alevi traditional ritualistic 
dance) at Oxford and Cambridge universities for the representation of Alevism 
in the UK’s multicultural society. I discuss these efforts for recognition further 
in Chapter 6. 
 
1. 4. Methodology for Qualitative Research: Multi-sited Fieldwork 
 
  This thesis is an inter-disciplinary work that brings together studies 
on law, religion, culture, and public policy on accommodating diversity. 
Therefore, it benefits from different methodologies of anthropology and law. 
The significance of this approach is its endeavour to present a fuller picture of 
socio-legal reality and diversity. For instance, criticising the three-model of 
Church-state relationships 129  in Europe (an aspect of religion and law 
scholarship), Sandberg underlines the inadequacy of the study of laws on 
religion to account for the complex relationship between religion, law, and 
society and points to the necessity of taking an interdisciplinary 
approach.130My interdisciplinary work, therefore, combines case law-analysis 
(primarily, from the ECtHR), re-examination of literature on Alevis, 
application of a theory of religion and an ethnographic study together to present 
 
129 To account for different forms of the relationship between religious establishments and the 
States, this model argues that “state church systems, separation (secular) systems, and 
cooperationist (hybrid) systems." At 331, Russell Sandberg, ‘Church-state relations in Europe: 
from legal models to an interdisciplinary approach' (2008) 1(3) Journal of Religion in Europe 329-
352. 
130 Russell Sandberg, ‘Church-state Relations in Europe: From Legal Models to an 
Interdisciplinary Approach’ (2008) 1(3) Journal of Religion in Europe 329-352, 344-346.  
Also see Norman Doe, ‘A Sociology of Law on Religion—Towards a New Discipline: Legal 
Responses to Religious Pluralism in Europe’ (2004) 152 Law and Justice 68-92, 68.  
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a holistic picture to better understand the problem of Alevis’ accommodation 
by law. In this respect, it would be misleading to read it from a mere legal or 
anthropological perspective. For instance, it is very difficult to access relevant 
court cases in Turkey, the first-instance judgments can only be accessible to 
those who are parties to the case, while high-court judgements are selectively 
located in online resources. Moreover, in order to access the available 
judgments, one has to be an eligible lawyer in Turkey that I was not. Therefore, 
I was able to gain access to the judgments and in some cases lawyers through 
my fieldwork. Without my ethnographic study, I would not have been able to 
access these documents.  
  The multi-sited fieldwork, which was conducted in London and 
Ankara, enables a more profound comprehension of the tensions over the 
question of what Alevism is for the purpose of official recognition and how 
Alevi claims are officially channelled. Additionally, this fieldwork provides 
insights at the micro-level, which cannot be captured by merely analysing legal 
systems and relevant regulations and case law. For instance, the project of 
including Alevism in the religious education curriculum in The UK could not 
have been analysed without my participant observation, since it is not an 
established practice guided by textual material. Instead, it is an evolving project 
in response to the demands of the education system in the UK and the ability 
of Alevis to reinforce their tradition as part of the curriculum. Similarly, 
without this fieldwork, the process by which the British Alevi Federation 
gained recognition as a religious charity by the UK Charity Commission, 
would have been impossible to investigate. Relying on simpler alternatives like 
document-based research from the Internet would not have yielded the richness 
of material I gained. Moreover, this multifaceted fieldwork also allows for 
exposing the forces that drive Alevis as a community to struggle for 
recognition, regardless of the advantages that come from state recognition. 
Therefore, my fieldwork with Alevis draws attention to the 'meaning' of being 
recognised in a world laden with identity politics, where the emphasis on faith 
communities has been remarkable. This thesis, therefore, provides insights into 
how Alevis claims-making for recognition manifest this emphasis.   
  My fieldwork is based on original qualitative research methods, 
particularly semi-structured and unstructured interviews as well as participant 
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observation. Participant observation as an essential aspect of ethnography 
pioneered by Malinowski, a British social anthropologist who studied the 
people of the Trobriand Islands in the Indian Ocean at the turn of the 20th 
century. Although his account employs a language, which would now be 
thought politically incorrect and racist,131 his method has been broadly adopted 
by ethnographers: “Spend lots and lots of time in studying a culture, learn the 
language, hang out, do all the everyday things that everyone else does, become 
inconspicuous by sheer tenaciousness, and stay aware of what’s really going 
on.” 132  Bernard underlines that “participant observation is about stalking 
culture in the wild—establishing rapport and learning to act so that people go 
about their business as usual when you show up.”133  
  Recalling the discussion at the beginning of this chapter about 
describing cultural others and the lack of a theory on cultural differences, the 
data non-Western cultures collected by the method of participant observation 
was not, however, the most straightforward. How to analyse this kind of data 
about different cultures has been a focus of debate in the discipline of 
anthropology. Geertz, in his famous essay on Thick Description: Toward an 
Interpretive Theory of Culture, advises ethnographers to combine hermeneutic 
interpretation of the structure and nature of a culture's semiotic formations.134 
Using the metaphor of tacking between part and whole [of a culture], for him, 
the ethnographer can interpret culture by situating a particular aspect of culture 
(a particular set of beliefs) into the larger framework of culture. 135   His 
conceptualisation of culture as a system of beliefs and of ethnography as a 
study to interpret these symbols are problematic in understanding cultural 
differences.   
 
131 Such as “ […] and I ceased to be a disturbing element in the tribal life which I was to study, 
altering it by my very approach, as always happens with a newcomer to every savage community.” 
Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (first published 1922, Routledge 1972) 
7–8. 
132 H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology: Quantitative and Qualitative Methods 
(AltaMira 2002) 345. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ in Timothy 
Oakes and Patricia L. Price (eds) The Cultural Geography Reader (Routledge 2008) 29-39. For its 
criticism see Allaine Cerwonka and Liisa Malkki, Improvising theory: Process and temporality in 
ethnographic fieldwork. University of Chicago Press 2007) 12.  
135 Joseph Ponterotto, ‘Brief Note on the Origins, Evolution, and Meaning of the Qualitative 
Research Concept Thick Description’ (2006) 11(3) The Qualitative Report  538-549. 
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  The problem with interpreting cultural differences was noted at the 
beginning of this chapter. Van den Bouwhuijsen emphasises the absence of a 
viable theory of culture to specify differences between cultures, 136  while 
Balagangadhara underlines the importance of empirical data for constructing a 
theory on human culture: “Multiple descriptions given by members from 
different cultures of both themselves and others against the background of their 
own cultures”.137In this regard, my ethnographic fieldwork with Alevis aims to 
contribute to providing empirical data about Alevis. Throughout my fieldwork, 
I have been guided by the insight on differences between epistemic approaches 
to traditions and those traditions that do not have such an approach. Therefore, 
I have tried to avoid conceptualising Alevis as a variant of cultures that have 
an epistemic attitude to tradition. Moreover, I have been mindful of 
Balagangadhara’s finding that religion is not a culturally universal 
phenomenon and thus have been attentive in my use of language while 
describing Alevis and their practices.  
  Although the Alevi participants in my fieldwork were of Kurdish 
and Turkish ethnicities, Alevi practices are conducted in the Turkish language, 
as far as I observed in my fieldwork.138 Alevis have a distinctive terminology. 
For instance, dede literally means ‘grandfather’ in Turkish; but it does not refer 
to grandfather in Alevi terminology. Dede is the person who leads Alevi rituals 
among other functions in the Alevi culture, which will be discussed in Chapter 
2. Another issue concerns the appropriation into Alevi terminology of religious 
terms either Islamic or Christian (especially when translated into English). 
Again with the same example, dede is translated as ‘priest’, ‘holy man’ or 
‘spiritual leader’. Similarly, niyaz etmek would be translated into worship 
(ibadet in Turkish). However, as I discuss in Chapter 2, niyaz etmek is indeed 
different from worshipping. In Chapter 2, I discuss Alevi terminology in more 
detail and as based on my fieldwork and the theoretical framework that my 
analysis is grounded on.  
   I started my ethnographic fieldwork with Alevis in London in 
January 2015 with the aim of conducting interviews as well as participant 
 
136 Harry van den Bouwhuijsen, ‘What Makes Human Differences into Cultural Differences’ 
(1995) (55/1) Philosophica 87-116. 
137 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994). 
138 It is important to note that I did not attend in Kurdish-only Alevi rituals.  
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observation. Throughout my fieldwork, I faced difficulties with scheduling 
interviews with individuals: either I was turned down or the interview would 
be cancelled at the last minute. Those I approached would often tell me that 
they ‘do not know enough about Alevism’, ‘are not really religious’ and that it 
would be ‘better if I approach others’. In addition to the difficulty with 
scheduling interviews, I also found it difficult to interview in the presence of a 
recorder. Sometimes I was asked specifically if the recorder was off while 
critical views on controversial issues were being shared with me, such as the 
influence of the Alevi movement in Germany on the contemporary 
conceptualisation of Alevism. At other times, I realised I was being told ‘more 
stuff’ after I ‘officially’ ended the interview by turning off the recorder. 
Another difficulty about scheduling interviews, especially in Turkey, was the 
political atmosphere there. The initial scheduled interview period for Turkey 
was for summer 2016.  However, at that time a coup attempt resulted in a state 
of emergency being declared, which lasted almost two years. 139  In this 
turbulent political climate, I not only had to cancel some of the interviews in 
Turkey; but also changed the official title of my thesis as a precaution.140 
  Despite these difficulties, I was able to conduct 23 individual 
interviews in London and 13 interviews in Ankara, Turkey.141 Yet the strength 
of my fieldwork lies in my participant observation and the contacts that I 
established and with whom I was able to keep in touch over the years. In this 
regard, I consider my fieldwork as an on-going journey for my research. As an 
essential part of ethnographic research, participant observation enables the 
researcher:  
 
139 Öykü Altuntaş, ‘OHAL'siz ilk gün: OHAL'in kalkması Türkiye'de neyi değiştirecek?’ (BBC 
Turkish, 18 July 2018), available at https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-44743453 
(accessed 21 December 2018).  
140 The Turkish government had been asking about the titles of Turkish PhD students at some 
British universities and had recalled Turkish PhD students, who were funded by Turkish state 
scholarships, to Turkey or intervened in their research topics. I was not funded by a Turkish state 
scholarship.  
141 The details of interviews are as follows: London: 15 male, 8 female 
5 of them were aged between 20-25, 12 is between 35-45, 6 is between 45-60,  
4 of them were reached through personal contacts and not active participants in the London 
Cemevi, 16 of them were reached through my visits in the London Cemevi and actively 
participating in events organised by Cemevi or the Federation. Also, I interviewed 3 non-Alevi 
persons (school master, ex chair of Sacre and head of RE). 
Ankara: 5 female, 8 male. 2 were aged between 20-25, 2 between 30-35, 9 between 40-60.  
2 of them are lawyers, while other contacts were reached through my network in the Mekteb-I 
Irfan initiative and visits in the Sercesme Cemevi.  
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To identify and guide relationships with informants; to help the 
researcher get the feel for how things are organized and prioritized, how 
people interrelate, and what are the cultural parameters; to show the 
researcher what the cultural members deem to be important in manners, 
leadership, politics, social interaction, and taboos; to help the researcher 
become known to the cultural members, thereby easing facilitation of 
the research process; and to provide the researcher with a source of 
questions to be addressed with participants.142  
 
  Since January 2015, I have observed a variety of events and rituals 
organized by Alevis, been involved in many of them as a participant, and made 
a number of contacts, who became friends with whom I talked about the issues 
surrounding my research question. I talked about issues like hak, being an 
Alevi, Alevi culture as well as how Alevis are accommodated by the state, and 
looked at the way that they describe Alevis. I observed many muhabbet rituals 
(cem being one of them), where Alevi music and poetry (deyiş/nefes) and Alevi 
dance (semah) were performed. Additionally, I talked with people affiliated 
with the Alevi movement and talked with them about how to use the 
opportunity structures that are provided by different states. Alevis with whom 
I interacted are quite sceptical of any state involvement in their affairs, but also 
they want to be able to exist and be supported. Thus, for instance, the obstacles 
put in the way of constructing cemevi are not welcomed, while they also do not 
want state recognition for cemevi if this also means state interference in their 
affairs.  
  London and Ankara were chosen since these cities accommodate 
some of the largest and most diverse Alevi communities in their respective 
national contexts. The Alevi organizations and cemevi were preferred 
fieldwork-sites, since they are the interlocutor-advocates for official 
recognition and provide the space for Alevi solidarity by organizing various 
events. The cemevi is the place where different Alevi rituals including cem, are 
performed and many Alevis consider it to be a place of worship. As my 
fieldwork, both in London and Ankara, suggests, the cemevi facilitates many 
functions and the performance of cem is only one of them. It is a place of 
community gathering for funerals, marriages, conferences, celebrations and 
 
142 Margaret Diane LeCompte and Jean J. Schensul (eds), Designing and Conducting 
Ethnographic Research (Vol. 1) (Rowman Altamira 1999) 91.  
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conversing and exchanging information about the affairs of the community. It 
is also a site for classes on the Alevi ritual dance, semah, and playing the Alevi 
musical instrument, baglama. As I observed in my fieldwork, some cemevi 
administrations may even offer geometry or maths classes to support school 
age children, while their parents are having Sunday brunch in the communal 
area. 
  In London, I visited the only cemevi in the city, established in 1993, 
and attended a number of organized activities, besides those activities taking 
place as a matter of course within the cemevi itself. As a non-Alevi researcher, 
I was welcomed by the administration to observe the project of including 
Alevism in the religious education curriculum and pilot classes in the Highbury 
Islington School in the London Borough of Islington. Some other activities in 
which I was a participant observer were Alevi annual festivals, youth 
gatherings, semah performances, political demonstrations against the Turkish 
government, film screenings organized with a Member of Parliament (MP)143, 
an election campaign support night for an MP, a meeting of the All Party 
Parliamentary Group for Alevis,144 taking part in meetings with the Charity 
Commission, and meetings for the preparation of the Alevism curriculum.  
  Whereas in London there is only a single cemevi and the Britain 
Alevi Federation, which is the only Alevi organisation and physically attached 
to the cemevi building, while there are a number of cemevi and Alevi 
organizations in Ankara. Aiming to maintain the integrity and coherence of the 
multi-sited fieldwork, the fieldwork site in Ankara was chosen through my 
referrals from London to represent similar views on Alevism; that is to say, 
those that express a distance from Alevism’s affiliation with Islam. With this 
in mind, I made contact with the Sercesme Cemevi. This enabled me to focus 
on the differences between the English and Turkish secular legal systems by 
keeping the differences in the cemevi administrations and their specific agendas 
about Alevism at a minimum. In addition to conducting interviews, I attended 
cem rituals, participated in a visit to the historical site of Hacı Bektaş Dergah145, 
and observed a hunger strike organized by the Alevi Bektaşi Federation of 
 
143 In Portcullis House, provides offices for members of parliament.  
144 For more info: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/151223/alevis.htm, 
accessed 17/10/2017.   
145 Dergah is usually translated as a convent. Yet, a dergah is actually a shrine to a departed 
master (usually sufi).  
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Turkey, to protest against Turkey’s foreign policy on Syria. Additionally, I 
became affiliated to the Mekteb-i Irfan. The Mekteb-i Irfan initiative sprang 
out of concerns over the continuous assimilation of Alevi practices into the 
Islamic framework. 146 This initiative, which was organized as weekly 
gatherings for two months, was a series of seminars, muhabbet and cem rituals, 
where diverse Alevi traditions are practiced and discussed. I attended the fourth 
one in Ankara, which was organised between November 2015 and January 
2016. Moreover, I have kept in contact with course attendees and have been 
invited to different muhabbet rituals in Ankara since then.  
  Both in London and Ankara, the fieldwork was conducted with a 
particular group of Alevis, who share broadly similar views (albeit sometimes 
differing on minor points) on Alevism, Alevi traditions, and the terms of 
official recognition. Therefore, the fieldwork findings should not necessarily 
be regarded as representative of all Alevis, but should be considered as offering 
a glimpse into what otherwise more often appears as fragmented Alevi 
communities. For example, different from the Alevi movement in Turkey, the 
Alevi diaspora movement pursues a more provocative policy for the advocacy 
of Alevism with a strong emphasis on conceptualising Alevism against (Sunni) 
Islam. Most Alevis in London are those who left Turkey following the Elbistan 
and Maraş incidents in 1967 and 1978, where more than a hundred Alevis were 
killed by Islamist Turkish nationalists.147 In this regard, the diaspora movement 
in London is critical of the Turkish government and its Syrian foreign policy 
as well as the treatment of Alevis in Turkey.  
 
1. 5. Structure of the Thesis   
 
  I will now elaborate in further detail the structure and argument of 
the thesis. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 reviews the current critiques 
on religious freedom in law and discusses the limits of the genealogical 
approach adopted by them. Moving beyond the genealogical approach, I 
explain Balagangadhara’s theory of religion, the concept of tradition, as well 
as De Roover’s secularisation thesis. Dealing with a substantial body of theory, 
 
146 My fieldwork findings.  
147 Mehmet Bayrak, Alevilik, Kürdoloji, Türkoloji Yazıları [1973-2009] (OZ-GE 2009).  
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and bringing this to bear on the question the status and recognition of Alevis in  
Turkey, the UK and before the ECtHR, the foundation set out in Chapter 2 
enables us to grasp the problems rising in these three jurisdictions in concrete 
and original ways.  
  Chapter 3 reviews the literature on Alevis that exemplifies the 
dilemma of religious studies as described in this introduction: the 
presupposition of Alevism as an instance of religion and the efforts to explain 
the kind of religion Alevism is. Based on Balagangadhara’s theory of religion, 
I analyse whether there is a religion in Alevi culture and respond in the 
negative. I further present my own description of Alevi traditions based on my 
fieldwork, which might offer insights on the possible ways of thinking about 
the Alevi traditions. Following that, I analyse the transformation of Kızılbaş 
into adherents of Alevism, a variant of religion. The second part of Chapter 3 
(3.7-3.9) focuses on the 19th century and the first records on Alevism as Alevis’ 
religion amidst Christian and Islamic missionary efforts and the birth of the 
Republic of Turkey. With this historical and theoretical analysis in Chapters 2 
and 3, I set the ground for the following Chapters, to analyse accommodation 
of Alevis’ difference through their contemporary recognition demands as 
formulated by the Alevi movement. 
  Chapter 4 focuses on the Turkish context. I first discuss the 
transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey and the 
transplantation of the principle of laïcité (laiklik). I review the legal 
developments that have had a significant impact on Alevis and explore the role 
of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (hereinafter, the Diyanet) within Turkish 
laiklik. I also examine the emergence of the Alevi movement as a response to 
Turkey’s politico-legal framework, which is also shaped by the process of 
Turkey’s accession to the EU. The Alevi movement gradually pursued activism 
for recognition of Alevis’ difference by articulating this difference in terms of 
religion. Compulsory religious education and the status of cemevi are examined 
as two burning issues with respect to the accommodation of Alevis’ difference 
in Turkey. I conclude Chapter 4 with an examination of 'the Alevi Opening', as 
part of the democratisation process initiated by the Justice and Development 
Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; hereinafter AKP).  
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  Chapter 5 scrutinises the ECtHR as an opportunity structure for the 
Alevi movement to pursue legal and political strategy to gain recognition for 
their demands in Turkey. Two different segments of the Alevi movement has 
been active at the ECtHR so far. Five cases brought by Alevis regarding 
compulsory religious education, the place of religion in birth certificates, 
places of worship and public religious services are analysed. All the five 
judgments resulted in favour of the Alevi claimants. In this regard, the ECtHR 
framework might seem to be providing a better accommodation for Alevis’ 
difference. However, as we shall see, the ECtHR framework, more specifically 
the way the Court conceptualises Alevis’ difference, has certain repercussions, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 5.   
  Chapter 6 begins with an introduction of British multiculturalism 
and introduces the Alevi community in London. This provides a background 
for understanding the reasons behind the efforts of the Alevi movement to gain 
recognition for Alevism. In this connection, I examine the project of including 
Alevism in the religious education curriculum, the Britain Alevi Federation’s 
(BAF) application to the Charity Commission as well as events organized by 
BAF for publicising Alevism. I argue that  
  In Conclusion Chapter, I remind my research question and my 
approach by going through the main findings of the theoretical framework that 
guided my analysis throughout this work. From my point of view, informed by 
the theoretical framework, I explain the dynamics of the Turkish laiklik in 
accommodating Alevis’ difference and compare it with the accommodation 
provided by the ECtHR and the UK. While Alevis’ difference is submerged 
into Sunni Islam by the Turkish authorities, the ECtHR frames it as rival to 
Sunni Islam and the UK framework of multiculturalism focusing on promoting 
faith communities encourages them to frame their difference in religious terms. 
Conversely, the theoretical framework I am guided enables me to recognise the 
sui generis nature of the Alevi traditions. In this respect, I suggest approaching 






PART  I -- THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
CHAPTER 2 – A THEORY OF RELIGION AND 
SECULARISATION  
 
2. 1. Introduction  
 
  In this Chapter, I summarise the critical approaches to freedom of 
religion and law’s handling of religion confining it to a belief-centred doctrinal 
account, which was historically and culturally influenced by the theology of 
Protestant Christianity in the aftermath of the Enlightenment. These critiques 
draw their analysis on genealogical approach to the study of religion, which 
consider all religions as constructs. I discuss the weaknesses of genealogical 
approach as adopted by these critiques. Moving beyond genealogical approach, 
I elaborate the theoretical framework that informs my analysis of Alevi 
traditions and their accommodation. This theoretical framework draws on De 
Roover’s thesis on secularisation of Christian theology in the form of political 
theory and Balagangadhara’s theory of religion, that analytically distinguishes 
tradition as a different phenomenon from religion. As explained further, this 
theoretical framework helps me to analyse Alevi traditions substantially 
different from religion and therefore identify the issues raising from 
conceptualising Alevism.  
  
2. 2. A Critique of the Freedom of Religion  
 
  The relationship between religion and law has been analysed by 
scholars from diverse disciplines, most notably scholars of critical religious 
studies and socio-legal studies as well as political theorists.148 Many argued for 
 
148 Balagangadhara The Heathen (s 16). 
Jakob De Roover, Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism (Oxford University Press 2015). 
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the Protestant imprint on the category of religion as understood by law because 
of the assumption on religion as belief centred and doctrinal.149 Dismantling 
the narrative of the Enlightenment, specifically the freedom of religion and 
secular state, these scholars argued that the concept of religion in law is heavily 
indebted to the Protestant theology. In this regard, the Enlightenment and 
Protestant Reformation triggered together a paradigm shift in understanding 
religion. For instance, King points to two inter-related processes in 
construction of religion: the first is Christianity and the second the 
Enlightenment and the modern nation-state. 150  Following to the Protestant 
Reformation, the separation of the state and law from religion and the state 
neutrality have been considered necessary to guarantee religious freedom. The 
rule of law has been imagined as autonomous, universal and secular and 
therefore essential for ensuring the freedom of religion and religious pluralism.  
  King explicates the consequences of this construction on non-
Western civilizations as “the translation of non-Western civilizations in terms 
of a binary opposition between religion and secular results in a distortion of 
their own histories and a transformation of their present. Such translation 
became necessary step in any society’s conversion to modernity.” 151  The 
increasingly problematic implementation of religious freedom both in Western 
states, where various ‘religious’ diasporas pose challenges, and non-Western 
states led to scholars from different disciplines to revisit the narrative of 
religious freedom. 
  Criticism has been directed at “the gospel of religious freedom” that 
leads to greater liberty if properly implemented.152 This gospel of religious 
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of Religious Freedom (University of Chicago Press 2015).  
 47 
freedom is promoted by the international organizations advocating for a 
universally valid and objectively assessed religious freedom.153 Many have 
argued that despite the success of legal protection of religious freedom in post-
Reformation Europe, this political idea becomes “a force for intolerance.”154 
Scholars critical of this narrative argue that in today’s world “religion brings 
together a vast and diverse, even shifting, set of social and cultural phenomena 
that no longer convincingly underwrite and justify legal action in its name. To 
continue to use the word in law is to invite discrimination.”155 
  Political theorists explain the protection given to religion through 
the state’s duty to promote the conception of good. Therefore, religion is not 
special but should be seen as an example of the conception of good, in Rawl’s 
terms.156 The treatment of religion in the theory of multiculturalism is also 
derived theoretically from the conception of the good. In her book Liberalism’s 
Religion, Laborde revisits this view, the subtraction theory as she names it and 
finds it unsatisfactory because religion is treated more special among other 
conception of good.157 She, therefore, tries to incorporate the critical religious 
studies’ worries about the place of religion in law (though she does not engage 
with Balagangadhara’s theory of religion).158  She argues for desegregating 
religion into the normative values it represents and thus argues that religion 
need not matter in the liberal state. She develops her theory primarily on the 
US constitution (on Free Exercise and Non-establishment clauses). 159  As 
mentioned in the Introduction, she aims at providing a liberal egalitarian theory 
of religion and secular state that accommodates the critiques over law’s 
handing of religion as narrow, sectarian and unfair to non-religious people. 
However, her suggestion to desegregate religion into the values that religion in 
law “eschews the term ‘religion.’”160 Yet, she does not explain how we can be 
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assured of the values religion holds, without knowing of religion. Similar to 
the problem about the construction of a phenomenon pointed in Introduction, 
it is difficult to talk of values independent of a theory of a phenomenon. Only 
once we have a theory of a phenomenon, we can identify what values it may 
intrinsically bring in. Nonetheless, her suggestion might be helpful in some of 
the cases dealing with religion remotely for example in case of Article 2 of 
Additional Protocol No. I of ECHR; but does not help with most cases where 
the courts are required in identifying religion. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
ECtHR actively enter in problems of definition and theological debates, while 
underlining its intention to avoid.  
  In addition, scholars critical of religious freedom in law subscribe 
the genealogical approach. 161  Genealogical approach, as elaborated in the 
Introduction, does not use of a theory of religion, rather considers religion as a 
construct. In this regard, it does not offer a theoretical analysis for the 
difference between Semitic religions and vast traditions that were constructed 
as religions in the 19th century. Engaging with the genealogical approach, while 
Laborde differentiates between ritualistic religions and doctrinal belief centred 
religion, Sullivan and Hurd make a similar differentiation with lived 
religion.162 Although they trace back the formulation of religion as a private 
matter of belief rather than public performances to the dynamics subsequent 
the Reformation in Europe, they do not question the universality of religion 
across cultures. However, the genealogical approach is limited to 
conceptualizing things within power/ resistance.163 I think this shortcoming 
stems from lack of alternative theory engagement. One of the implications of 
this shortcoming is the assumption that all religions are constructs, which does 
not help us to see the differences between self proclaimed religions such as 
Christianity and Islam on one hand and the various cultures that were 
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constructed following colonial period such as Hinduism, Sikhism and Alevism 
on the other hand. By assuming that all these traditions are constructed as 
religions, the genealogical approach evades engaging with a theory and 
assumes the universality of religion across cultures.  
  Yelle points to this important shortcoming of the genealogical 
approach to go beyond analysing power structures in constructions of religion 
and secular. He argues that “the redefinition of religion as freedom of 
conscience simultaneously “liberated” religion from control by the state and, 
to some extent, rendered this freedom nugatory.”164 He underlines that this 
redefinition was necessary and pragmatic for peaceful coexistence in the 
history of Europe. Indeed, as will be discussed further in this Chapter, 
confining religion into conscience is rooted in a very particular interpretation 
of Protestant theology as developed in Europe subsequent to the 
Enlightenment. This confinement first allowed multiple Christian 
denominations to co-exist and then paved the way for formulation of religious 
tolerance. However, it also allowed the modern-state to regulate the 
manifestations of religion. As religion became identified with conscience, 
various manifestations- practices- became ‘non-essential’ and even ‘false 
worship’. Pointing to the problems of applying this culture-specific solution in 
contexts that lack the necessary theological presuppositions, Yelle suggests 
going beyond genealogical approach.165  
  Going beyond the genealogical approach, I engage with De 
Roover’s analysis of secularisation and Balagangadhara’s theory of religion. 
De Roover demonstrates how the framework behind our ideas of toleration and 
freedom of religion is provided by Christian theology. He analyses the limits 
of liberal secularism as depended on certain Christian theological ideas for 
their intelligibility. Another strength of De Roover’s theory is that without an 
understanding of the theology of Christian freedom, it is not possible to make 
sense of the private realm of religion and public realm of secular. In this vein, 
secularisation indicates a process in which “recurrent patterns in a religion’s 
traditions of theological reasoning are secularized into the clusters of 
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commonplace ideas that constitute the social, political and cultural theorising 
of a culture or society.” 166  If Balagangadhara explicates on the recurring 
themes within the Western Christian tradition of theological reasoning that led 
to the universality-of-religion thesis, De Roover does that for secularism and 
the accompanying cluster of concepts. In as much as the universality of religion 
has been a claim of Christian theology, so also is the division of the world in 
terms of the political theology of the two kingdoms.  
 
2. 3. The Christian Triad and the Protestant Reformation  
 
  From its earliest days, Christian theology has made the distinction 
between true and false religions — a distinction that Islam and Judaism also 
make.167 When Christianity made the distinction between the religious and the 
secular, it was not a binary but a triad instead: true religion, false religions, and 
the secular; or, the religious, the idolatrous (or the profane), and the secular.168 
While true religion was the act of worshipping the true God, false religions 
worshipped false gods. The secular or religiously indifferent followed by this 
separation. The importance of framing the realms of true religion, false religion 
and the secular has thus been a constant dynamic within a religion. In the 
example of Christianity, De Roover examines how the Protestant Reformation 
was the result of this kind of dynamic within Christianity, in terms of creating 
sharper boundaries between true worship and false worship.169 The idea that 
human beings can reach salvation at the spiritual level, with the work of the 
Holy Spirit alone, paved the way for the Protestant Reformation. During the 
Protestant Reformation, reformers objected to the clergy’s hierarchical 
superiority and argued for the duty of every Christian to go through the process 
of conversion.170 According to Reformers, despite the sinful body, the soul was 
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promised God’s grace through the work of the Holy Spirit.171 That is why it 
was argued that every soul was capable of worshipping and pursuing the 
process of conversion, without the guidance of clergy.172 The Doctrine of Two 
Kingdoms formulated by Martin Luther and shared by Lutherans and Calvinists 
rigidly separated the private realm of eternal soul and public realm of 
temporary body, as it argued that the path to salvation for each Christian soul 
should not be subject to intervention by human laws. 173  Similarly, Calvin 
asserted that each soul was capable of worshipping. 174  This imposed an 
enormous burden to cleanse idolatrous practices in order to guide the Christian 
community in daily life. In the course of purifying Christianity, the Protestant 
theology treated man-made practices as impediments to salvation for 
interrupting the relationship between the soul and God.175As elaborated in 
detail below in this Chapter, this is where tradition differs from religion: 
tradition does not need a foundation in reason for its practice, unlike 
Christianity where traditional practices are associated with a reason which is to 
substantiate and reproduce the relationship with God. Therefore, which 
practices are true or false gained increasing importance.  
  Different interpretations of what constitutes true and false worship 
resulted in the confessional movement. Reformers objected to a number of 
Catholic rituals and performances such as festival dances and local customs on 
the grounds of idolatry. Even celebrating Christmas was condemned as an “old 
superstition of observing feast days.” 176 They also introduced different 
disciplinary methods for the true believer to avoid idolatry – human corruption 
of religion. The believer’s life was divided into three: what is required for 
spiritual freedom (religious), what is forbidden as the devil’s work (idolatry), 
and what is outside these two realms – worldly affairs (secular). That is to say, 
the boundaries of the realm of the truly religious, idolatry and the secular were 
 
171 Ibid 97.  
172 Ibid 98-100.   
173 Jakob De Roover and S. N. Balagangadhara, ‘Liberty, tyranny and the will of god’ (2009)  30.1 
History of Political Thought 111-139. 
174 Jakob De Roover and S. N. Balagangadhara, ‘John Locke, Christian Liberty, and the 
Predicament of Liberal Toleration’ (2008) 36.4 Political Theory 523-549. 
175 Jakob De Roover, 'Secular Law and the Realm of False Religion' in Winnifred F Sullivan, 
Robert A Yelle, Mateo Taussig-Rubbo (eds), After Secular Law (Stanford University Press 2011) 
43-61. 
176 Ibid 46.  
 52 
re-drawn.177 Thus, each drawing a different realm of true religion, false religion 
and secular, the confessional movement brought about widespread religious 
violence. 
 
2. 4. Secularisation of Christian Theological Ideas into Political Theory  
 
  The strength of De Roover’s analysis is how it reveals that the 
developments following the Protestant Reformation first manifested 
themselves in the proliferation of different denominations, each accusing one 
another of false worship, later evolving into an anti-confessional movement 
that rejected all dogmas in the spiritual realm as manifestations of false 
worship. Subsequently, anti-confessional movement prepared the ground for 
the formulation of the principle of religious toleration and the secular state. Yet 
the theological basis of these ideas that shaped political theory remained crucial 
for the intelligibility of these ‘secular’ ideas. The anti-confessional movement 
reformed the theology of Christian freedom further and gradually gave rise to 
considering freedom of conscience as God’s will for humanity. This paved the 
way for the emergence of toleration in Europe. Although there were different 
arguments about the scope of toleration, they shared common ground, 
including a number of theological ideas: firstly that false religion created a 
cocktail of politics and religion; secondly, an objection to all ‘priests of the 
devil’, and, thirdly, that mixing religion with politics caused conflict.178 Hence 
the belief that religious conflict was not rooted in religion itself, but in its 
human corruption.179 As will be examined in Chapter 4, reformers in Turkey 
argued for a similar claim that Islam was not the problem for transplanting 
laïcité in Turkey, but its human corruption that needs to be banned. Thus the 
discussions internal to Christianity travelled to Turkey as well and produced 
different results, which will be discussed more fully in Chapter 4.  
 
177 Yet, what needs to be underlined that this separation of triad has been the internal dynamic of 
Christianity as a religious tradition. The boundaries had been constantly re-drawn/ negotiated 
throughout the history of Western Christendom, owing to what De Roover calls ‘normative 
dynamic’, see Jakob De Roover, Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism (Oxford University 
Press 2015) 112. 
178 Jakob De Roover, Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism (Oxford University Press 2015) 
130. 
179 Ibid 131. 
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  Despite the limited scope of toleration at its initial phase, De Roover 
demonstrates that, by the 17th century in The UK, several thinkers argued for 
granting toleration to all, because “even though idolatry desecrated the will of 
God, it ought to be tolerated for it was as much His will that no conscience 
should be coerced[…]This thesis was founded in the belief that Christian 
conversion requires the free work of the Spirit, which cannot be shackled by 
the sword of human coercion”.180 In this way, God’s will brought about a 
normative ground to consider toleration a moral obligation. 181  In this 
connection, the concepts of Christian theology have first been widely 
circulated and entrenched into the mindset of society and gradually became 
common sense ideas about human existence, on which new theories were 
constructed. De Roover uses the term topoi, meaning “commonplace idea, 
which plays a central role in the conceptual world of a society” and defines 
secularisation as:  
The process whereby tropes of a particular theology are transformed 
into topoi of a culture or society. That is, recurrent patterns in a 
religion’s traditions of theological reasoning are secularised into the 
clusters of commonplace ideas that constitute the social, political, and 
cultural theorising of a culture and society.182  
 
  In this light, it is important to note that the normative model of 
toleration is rooted in this “inbuilt conception of religious conflict.”183 That is 
to say, it came as a way to accommodate the diversity within Christianity over 
a common understanding of religion as a matter of truth, including the inherent 
triad of true worship, false worship and secular. Therefore, this model is based 
on a number of assumptions: first is that religion is a matter of truth relating to 
worship and beliefs, it is a matter of conscience in the private realm, different 
religions or denominations conflict each other over holding the only truth and 
lastly all cultures have religions. Therefore, it tends to formulate plurality into 
religious conflict (or conflict of world-views, systems of belief) and then 
present itself as the model for its accommodation. In this model, “each tradition 
in society needs to take the form of a religious community defined by a set of 
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181 Ibid 135.  
182 Jakob De Roover, Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism (Oxford University Press 2015) 
71-72. 
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beliefs and values.”184 In a nutshell, this is how toleration worked: it allowed 
different denominations to co-exist, as they share the common theological 
ground. Yet, when the idea of religious tolerance travelled overseas, as in the 
case of colonial India, it required first identifying ‘the others’ belief system/ 
religion in order to tolerate, assumed that every society has a religion.185 
Around a century later, in 19th century, the Ottomans introduced religious 
tolerance and the missionaries travelled to the Ottoman lands ‘to protect’ 
religious minorities; this was when the religious roots of Kızılbaş/Alevi gained 
importance, as will be shown in detail in Chapter 3.  
  De Roover shows how the formulation of the secular state and 
toleration by political thinkers such as John Locke continued to remain within 
this theological framework.186 The only framework where the separation of the 
private realm of religion and the public realm of the secular are identifiable is 
within Christian theology. However, it is important to note the differences 
between the English and French reformations, as these two led to different 
political arrangements. While the English reformation aimed at 
accommodating a multiplicity of Protestant groups, Catholics and Jews in the 
same society, the French enlightenment dealt with the dominance of the 
Catholic Church.187 In the former the same framework of anticlerical theology 
produced the idea that the state ought to tolerate all forms of religion as long 
as it did not harm the public order, while the latter banned religion from the 
public sphere. Although the Protestant critique of Catholicism was transformed 
into a general critique of organised religion, instead of arguing that the state 
ought to tolerate, France developed a different principle that all forms of 
organized religion ought to be banned. This gave rise to the model of laïcité in 
France. Nonetheless, these two models share the same theological reasoning 
inherited from anticlerical theology. Based on his research, De Roover notes 
that “in the absence of this background, the liberal model faces fundamental 
problems that threatens its intelligibility and accessibility. These problems 
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arise from trying to provide secular foundations for the model of Christian 
freedom and its two kingdoms.”188 In parallel, De Roover demonstrates how 
the idea of religious toleration migrated to the colonial India and transformed 
the understanding of Indian traditions from ‘heathen’ religions into religions. 
Using his framework together with Balagangadhara’s theory of religion, I will 
explore the application of religious toleration and secular state in relation to the 
accommodation of Alevis’ difference.  
 
2. 5. Balagangadhara’s Theory of Religion 
 
  As mentioned in the Introduction, the assumption that religion is 
universal across cultures is not part of a theory formation; instead it precedes 
theorising about religion. 189  In the Heathen in His Blindness, in order to 
hypothesise about religion, Balagangadhara first suggests that if religion refers 
to anything in our language use, it must refer to Christianity.190 Thus he picks 
Christianity as the most self-proclaimed example of religion; prototypical 
example. He also adds that Christianity competed with Islam and Judaism for 
the category of religion, in the same way Islam and Judaism competed as well. 
Therefore, religious rivalry among these three allows him to pick three 
prototypical examples of religion - Christianity, Islam and Judaism. As 
opposed to this rivalry between these three Semitic religions, his in-depth 
historical analysis regarding cultural contacts between Christianity and Roman 
pagan culture on the one hand, and with Indian traditions on the other, points 
to the indifference of these traditions towards the religious rivalry claims of 
Christianity. Thus, he first examines the properties that these prototypical 
religions have by virtue of being religions and then looks into the reasons for 
the incomprehension of Romans and Indians.  
  In order to theorise about religion, he follows four analytical 
steps:191 The first step examines the properties Christianity attributed to itself 
as a religion, while the second looks at the way in which Islam, Christianity 
 
188 Ibid 167.  
189 Ibid 290. 
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and Judaism considered each other rival religions. The third step underlines 
that both Christianity and Islam considered the Indian traditions as rivals in the 
same way. Finally, the fourth step inquires into why Indian and Roman 
traditions did not recognise themselves in the description given by the Semitic 
religions.  
 
  Religion as the explanatory intelligible account of the cosmos 
  
  Digging into this religious rivalry, he shows that these three 
prototypical religions had disputes concerning God and God’s relationship to 
humanity and claimed to hold the true account of it. His examination about the 
kind of narrative that these three prototypical rival examples suggests a 
narrative that sets apart God, the creator of the Cosmos, from the Cosmos and 
everything in it as his creation. Further, this account claims that God has a 
purpose (purposes) in his creation(s). It is further claimed that God reveals 
himself to humanity, through its creation as the Cosmos as well as his message, 
as captured by the doctrines.192 Human beings may not know God's reason; but 
they are told that there is a reason God created the Cosmos and everything in 
it. This claim is secured in a religious doctrine.193  
  The strength of this narrative is its claim that God’s actions do not 
deceive us. Now, this claim is extraordinary, Balagangadahra argues, because 
it is actually not possible for human beings to bridge a link between intentions 
and actions as such. Cognitively speaking, human behaviour can be understood 
either by addressing the reasons (intelligibility account) or by explaining the 
causes (explanatory account). For example, the account for Sarah wearing a 
scarf would be either that the weather is cold and Sarah felt cold (causality- 
explanatory account) or because Sarah believes the scarf looks pretty on her 
(intelligibility account, appealing to beliefs). However, both accounts are 
limited for understanding human behaviour, since there are innumerable causal 
explanations for actions we perform. Similarly, regarding Mark suffering from 
fever, Mark’s mum might think that he has a fever, because he didn't put 
enough clothes on and eventually got a cold. Mark’s doctor might think that 
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Mark may have an auto-immune disease resulting in fever, as some medical 
tests suggest. Mark might feel that he was stressed about his exams, which 
brought on fever in his body. It might also have stemmed from his mild allergy 
to mushrooms, given that he had had a mushroom risotto, prior to fever. This 
list of possibilities to provide an explanatory account for Mark's fever is 
endless, for there are infinite possibilities of a causality. Therefore, a religious 
account is peculiar in the sense of attributing both an intelligible account and 
an explanatory account of God's action/behaviour, unlike human behaviour. If 
God created the Cosmos and everything in it, there must be an intelligible 
reason for the explanation of its creation.194 This is what makes an account, a 
religious account. Therefore, religion is the explanatorily intelligible account 
of the Cosmos.  
  The actions of God are different to human behaviour. An 
explanatory account and intelligibility account coincide in the case of God's 
action (behaviour) - creation of the Cosmos. As opposed to human behaviour, 
according to the account religion provides, God's behaviour (his act of creation) 
can be understood by seeking his reasons in the doctrine and by discovering 
the structure of the Cosmos. In this way, God's act of creation guides us through 
his reasons for creation. This is peculiar to God in that his reasons for acting 
are also the causes of his actions, since God is almighty, supra-human and 
trustworthy. Therefore, to get this message, human beings should understand 
the Cosmos as well. As Balagangadhara puts it: "A complete and accurate 
description of the actions [Cosmos] is required before we have a complete 
knowledge of the reasons for the actions [his revelation]." 195  However, 
Balagangadhara draws our attention to the point that a religious account does 
not make the Cosmos an expression of some hidden order that is created by 
God but merely attests it.196 Hence, it lends intelligibility to everything in the 
Cosmos, which leads to asking meaning questions. 
 
 
194 Indeed, in a deeper analysis into this account of religion, Balagangadhara argues that this claim 
of religion gave birth to the emergence of natural sciences in the West by producing theory 
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195 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 300. 
196 Ibid. 
 58 
  Religion as the explanatorily intelligible account of itself  
 
  Balagangadhara’s research into the properties of these prototypical 
examples reveals that the account religion provides involves: 1. Created by 
God, the Cosmos exhibits His purpose; 2. We know this because God has 
revealed it; 3. God’s revelation consists precisely of both the previous steps 
including this step.197 Yet Balagangadhara also argues that religion exhibits a 
reflexive quality and makes the same claim for itself as well. The account that 
religion provides for the Cosmos is structurally the same as that it claims for 
itself: religion is God’s gift to humanity. By placing the origin of this account 
outside (God is outside of the Cosmos and its creator), the religious account 
avoids circularity and becomes its own justification. 198  Balagangadhara’s 
theory also accounts for the incomprehension and indifference of the Roman 
and Indian traditions regarding Christians’ rivalry claims. In his theory the 
prototypical examples of religion (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) are indeed 
the only instances of religion.  
 
 
2. 6. Mechanism of Conversion and “Effacing the Otherness of the Other” 
 
  Arriving at his theory, Balagangadhara also analyses how 
Christianity spread in the Roman pagan world on one hand, the missionary 
expeditions and the colonial government in India on the other. He not only 
finds incomprehension of the Roman and Indian traditions to the universal truth 
claims of Christianity; but also accounts for how these traditions were seen as 
holding onto idolatry by Christians. In Balagangadhara’s account, the concept 
of idolatry functions to domesticate non-religious traditions in mechanism of 
conversion or mechanism of “effacing the otherness of the other.”199  
  The claim that religion is universal across cultures is embedded in 
each religion. There are two theological claims specific to Semitic religions. 
The first is that God implanted in the hearts of human beings the desire to 
 
197 Ibid 346. 
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believe in him and the second is that we (the entire humanity) were all Noah’s 
sons once upon a time.200 The latter claim provides a common history for 
humankind, while the former claims religion as a universal property of every 
culture. Cultivating a certain anthropological account, the Semitic religions 
therefore postulate that the humanity was on the true path before the Noah, 
even if some cultures were corrupted in time. Thus, idolatry addresses the 
human corruption of religion.201 In parallel, for there can be only one true God 
that provides the only true account of the Cosmos, if the pagans do not follow 
the true God, they must be worshipping the false gods. Therefore, the pagan 
cultures are construed as worshipping the false gods.  
  With this in the background, Balagangadhara argues that the 
missionaries knew that Indians have a religion even before their expedition to 
India; they did not know if they were still worshipping the true God or 
corrupted in worshipping the false god(s). He demonstrates how early 
missionaries described Indians as idolaters, who “worship the sun and the 
moon and cows." 202 For instance, as described by Varthema: "they lie with 
their body extended on the ground and very secret, and they perform certain 
diabolical actions (or motions) with their eyes, and with their mouths they 
perform certain fearful actions (or motions); and this lasts for a quarter of an 
hour."203 Similarly, in Balagangadhara’s account for the spread of Christianity, 
we see that early Christians framed some performances of Roman religio as 
manifestations of ‘false’ beliefs and criticised them for worshiping false gods. 
Balagangadhara’s analysis suggests that this is quite different from how the 
Romans and Indians considered their traditions, as transmitted from ancestors 
and performing them was part of tradition. Thus, questioning their truth or 
falsity was irrelevant. There was not a direct link between a practice and belief. 
People were free to hold multiple beliefs or no belief to perform the tradition. 
Drawing from the transformation of Roman religio and Indian traditions as 
manifestations of false beliefs in the accounts of Christians, Balagangadhara 
formulates analytical steps of mechanism of conversion.  
 
200 Ibid 85; Jakob De Roover, ‘Incurably Religious? Consensus Gentium and the Cultural 
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Balagangadhara describes the mechanism of conversion as follows:  
Though blind to the divine truth, the heathen is cognisant of 
human certainties. His certainties regarding his tradition reflect 
the character of traditions as such: customs handed down with 
their ‘origin’ lost in time; lore, legends and myths; etc. an 
individual located in a tradition [that does not have a religion] is 
always fallible. There is no cognitive certainty that he is 
continuing the tradition. In the first moment, religion amplifies 
this uncertainty and fallibility. There is no ‘guarantee’ that the 
transmission was accurate; the accumulated stories and legends 
do not agree with each other[..] that is to say, religion plays upon 
the very nature of tradition to efface its otherness as tradition.204 
 
Religion is an account provided by God, secured by the doctrine and it is the 
truth for humanity. Unlike religions, the non-religious traditions are human 
products. Each tradition is different from the other, because each is that of some 
people.205 Through the mechanism of conversion, non-religious traditions are 
also constructed as religions, having the false one though.  
 
2. 7. Universalisation of Religion trough Secularisation  
 
  Balagangadhara points to the transformation of the descriptions of 
Indian traditions by the Europeans from 15th century to 18th century. He shows 
that the concept of idolatry disappeared in these descriptions and this 
transformation produced entities like Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism etc as 
religions of India.206 In his framework, this transformation is a reflection of 
secularisation of religion. When Christianity cannot spread, it spreads as an 
account by creating religious worldviews for other cultures. He describes 
secularisation as “the process where themes from a religion become low-level 
facts about human beings.”207 The theological idea that every culture has a 
religion became a common sense fact from the grocer to Guru. 
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  Balagangadhara explains that every religion carries a dynamic to 
universalise itself through the process of secularisation and argues that the 
Protestant Reformation led to the first phase in the universalisation of 
religion.208 Balagangadhara accepts that his account cannot provide insights for 
the notion of idolatry within a specific religion; but he appeals to this dynamic 
of religion that idolatry has a certain function in the spread of religion and its 
consequences.209 From the example of Christianity, Balagangadhara observes 
that as the Roman pagan traditions were identified false religion, or idolatry, it 
was crucial for the expanding Christian community to avoid the practices of 
this false religion, false worshipping, since the true worshipping is an essential 
aspect of the religion. Thus, idolatry and worship function together to draw the 
boundary of a religious community: one has to worship the true God and avoid 
worshipping false gods. In this sense, the realm of secular is drawn only after 
the demarcation of true worship and false worship. In this connection, the 
concept of idolatry not only functions to domesticate non-religious traditions 
as religions; but also functions as an outer boundary of a religious 
community.210  
  This mechanism of domestication is what allowed Christianity to 
expand in the pagan world.211 Idolatry as a theological concept is a crucial 
aspect for religions because it is indispensable for attracting the community of 
believers as well as to proselytise the non-believers.  During its expansion, 
what a Christian should practice on the one hand and avoid on the other (to 
refrain from idolatry) had immense importance. Therefore a believer’s life is 
divided into three: practices allowed (true worship), practices forbidden (false 
worship) and only after this separation what is left as the secular. In this regard, 
the secular is an internal aspect of religion. If there is no religion in a culture, 
there is no separation of religious and secular and no separation of false and 
true worship. When a non-religious tradition is domesticated as false religion 
(or idolatry), this division, which is internal to a religion, is also attributed to a 
non-religious tradition. This is also what Alevis today have been facing in the 
law courts, dialogues with state authorities and internal discussions that are 
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demonstrated in the following chapters. To sum up, the concept of idolatry 
functions in two ways in Balagangadhara’s theory: while it domesticates non-
religious traditions into variants of religion albeit false, it is also crucial in 
drawing the boundaries of a religious community. Here, it is also important to 
underline that the boundaries of a religious community have three dimensions: 
the realm of religious, the realm of idolatry (forbidden practices) and the realm 
of secular.  
 
 
2. 8. A framework for Comparative Study of Cultures  
 
  It is important to emphasise that religion does not make the cosmos 
intelligible; it merely states that the cosmos is intelligible and thereby 
structures the experience of life as such. The action of creating the cosmos and 
everything within it demonstrates the intention or message of God for 
humanity. In this way, religion postulates a peculiar link between actions and 
beliefs or intentions. Balagangadhara notes that: "religion was not invented to 
answer questions about the meaning and purpose of life. These questions come 
into being within the framework of religion."212 This is not to suggest that life 
is meaningless, for the question of meaning in relation to one's life arises within 
the framework religion provides. This exhibits the same pattern of postulating 
a link between actions and beliefs, where actions can be understood or learned 
only through the beliefs that they embed. Within this framework, the 
knowledge of action cannot be divorced from beliefs, motivations, intentions, 
or a thought process of mind. Therefore, Balagangadhara argues that religion 
becomes the root model of order in a culture in which it exists by structuring 
the experience of life. In this way, it brings about a culture-specific type of 
learning and meta-learning that produces theoretical knowledge that tends to 
consider actions as embodying beliefs/intentions. For this kind of culture, 
knowing a different kind of culture means learning about the beliefs of that 
culture because all human actions are seen as embodiments of beliefs.213  
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  Comparing this kind of culture to Indian culture, Balagangadhara 
suggests that ritual becomes a root model of order, which forges a different 
relation between actions and intentions. 214  Acting does not necessarily 
demonstrate execution of a belief, intention or thought. In some cultures like 
the Roman, religio is practiced as the tradition of their ancestors, as handed 
down over generations.215 For instance, quoting from a dialogue between a 
Balinese and a German writer from the 19th century, the Balinese finds the 
question “Do you believe in the history of Prince Rama?” irrelevant to his 
practice and culture.216 The Balinese is indifferent to the truth status of the story 
of Prince Rama. Moreover, even if the story of Prince Rama is invented, the 
story still remains a property of his culture.  
  Balagangadhara does not formulate this separation between 
religious and non-religious traditions rigidly. He stresses that “over a period, 
the configuration of learning comes into being slowly by coordinating different 
kinds of learning processes. It is stable only to the extent cultures are, and 
finished only the way cultures could be.” 217  His analysis points out that 
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invented it’, I answered and felt triumphant, when I thought that I had convinced him. But he said: 
‘It is quite possible that somebody invented this story. But true it is, in any case.’ 
‘Then it is the case that Prince Rama did not live on this earth?’ 
‘What is it that you want to know? He asked. ‘do you want to know whether the story is true, or 
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‘The Christians believe that their God Jesus Christ was also on earth’, I said, ‘in the New 
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My Balinese friend thought it over and said: ‘I had been already so informed. I do not understand 
why it is important that your God was on earth, but it does strike me that the Europeans are not 
pious. Is that correct?’ ‘Yes, it is’, I said.” 
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although Christianity absorbed many elements from the Roman pagan culture, 
nonetheless it consolidated itself not only as a historical movement, but also as 
a religion.218 That is to say that certain practices and doctrines were made use 
of in making an explanatorily intelligible account; this is however different 
from the place of these elements in non-religious traditions. "The presence of 
elements in cultures, which resemble each other very closely, does not tell us 
much in and by itself. These elements could be the products of different 
processes or of the same process."219 In this regard, the elements of religion 
can be found in other cultures but they do not interpenetrate and interact with 
one another in such a way as to formulate the Cosmos as an explanatory 
intelligible account. Additionally, his research shows that although there is no 
religion in India, elements present in religion can be found in Indian culture 
too. Yet again, these elements do not form a religious account.  
 
2. 9. Conclusion  
 
  Critical religious studies are divided into two approaches: there is 
group of scholars criticizing the theories of religion for deploying overly 
Christian view of religion. They suggest instead considering religion as a 
concept constructed by power relations defined and confined by the modern 
state that pretends to be neutral and secular and as such contributes creating the 
religious and secular (which are then considered mutually constructed). There 
is another approach taken by the research group at Ghent University led by 
Balagangadhara, that goes beyond these critics and analyses religious and 
secular in relation to tradition, a third aspect, the implicit realm of false religion 
or idolatry.  
  In this Chapter I first discussed the critical approaches to religious 
freedom in law and then explained Jakob De Roover’s thesis on the 
dependency of this freedom to the theology of Christian freedom. De Roover 
shows its unfolding dynamic in the Reformation’s anti-clerical theology, which 
is directed first to the Catholic Church, but is then used by radical Protestants 
against all confessional churches. Through the formative thinkers of the 
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Reformation and the Enlightenment, De Roover shows how the theology of 
Christian freedom was developed as a moral obligation of each Christian to 
tolerate the private realm of religion. This conceptualization later became 
secularized as commonplace ideas in the formulation of political theory.  
  While De Roover examines specifically the secularisation of 
Christian theology, Balagangadhara argues for the secularisation of theological 
ideas about the universality of religion across cultures. The theory of 
Balagangadhara identifies religion as peculiar account that only Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam make. In a nutshell, the argument is this: God, as the 
creator, ontologically outside of the Cosmos, created the Cosmos and 
everything within it (including religion), for a purpose (thus an intentional act). 
In this way, religion provides an account that brings actions and intentions 
together in an extraordinary way, an explanatorily intelligible account of the 
Cosmos and of itself.220 Such an account is only possible for God because his 
actions do not deceive us and perfectly embodies his reasons. 
        To elaborate further the implications of explanatorily intelligible 
account, religion structures a certain experience of the Cosmos as an entity 
carrying meaning. It does not provide the meaning but only asserts that there 
is. It emphasizes beliefs or thoughts over rituals and practices. Actions become 
meaningful as long as they embody a belief or an expression of a thought 
process. As this account links actions to a thought process or belief, over time, 
it may become the prototype account for how to go about in the world. It shapes 
the culture’s understanding and learning at meta-level. Balagangadhara 
proposes that in the West, Christianity provided a culture specific meta-
learning that brings about theoretical knowledge, or ‘knowing-about’. In this 
culture specific learning, actions are intrinsically linked to a thought process. 
Similarly, understanding other cultures means learning their systems of belief 
or religions or worldviews.  
        Through a close analysis of Indian traditions and Romans over 
Christians’ claim for supremacy /religious rivalry, Balagangadhara suggests 
that tradition is a different kind of a phenomenon. Tradition is a set of practices 
that are handed down over generations and practised not because a certain 




need to be rationalized for its practice. As such, there is no need to theorise 
about and for creating an explanatorily intelligible account of Cosmos. He 
suggests that tradition cultivates performative knowledge, or action-
knowledge, “knowing of.” 221  In cultures where there is no religion but 
tradition, diverse teachings on metaphysics and human life are also present. 
But these teachings and traditions are not framed in one single belief system or 
world view. Rather they exist as tools for members of that culture to utilize in 
their way of going about in the world.   
       From the viewpoint of a religion, the practices of a tradition are 
transformed into a set of beliefs that ought to be guiding these practices. Thus, 
tradition is transformed into a variant of religion. In other words, practices of 
a tradition are constructed as founded on some set of beliefs that correspond or 
even alter the teachings available in culture. However, it is important to see the 
difference between these two phenomena because lumping everything into 
religion kills the tradition, results in transformation of tradition into a distorted 
variant of religion, and as such creates burden on people belonging to a 
tradition. In this regard, he analytically examines tradition as a different 
phenomenon than religion. Balagangadhara’s theory enables me to analyse 
performative side of Alevi traditions and tensions of its becoming (a religion), 
which I turn to Chapter 3. My take on from Balagangadhara’s theory is the 
fundamental difference between religion like Christianity or Islam on one hand 
and Alevi traditions and teaching on the other. While Christianity and Islam 
construe a world view where practices have to be conducted for their reference 
in doctrinal teachings, Alevi practices do not need to be founded on some 
reference to scriptures, even though the Alevi culture has a variety of 
metaphysical teaching.  
     As I show in the following Chapter the more Islamized the Ottoman 
Empire, the non-Islamic elements were incorporated in Sufi-tariqa modalities, 
while Kızılbaş traditions and teachings survived in secret. Yet the introduction 
of religious freedom in Ottoman Empire marked a paradigm shift in 
conceptualizing Alevism. Similar to current debates on religious freedom, 
marking Alevis’ difference in religious terms diverted the discussion and 
 
221 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) ch 11. 
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curtailed our insight to see the core of the problem. With this inheritance, the 
history of the Turkish Republic has demonstrated ever changing / never ending 
issue of Alevis’ accommodation. This inherited view on Alevism was then 
travelled to Europe with Alevis’ migration as well as the legal activism at the 





CHAPTER 3 - ANALYSIS OF ALEVI TRADITIONS AND 
THE FORMATION OF ALEVISM  
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
  Despite being considered as heterodox Islam, Alevis do not seem to 
have much common with other Islamic traditions. Many do not go to mosque, 
they don’t do any kind of namaz, they think Quran was changed and do not 
hold Quran as their doctrine and etc. They have rituals, most prominent one 
called cem, where there is dance, music, singing and occasionally alcohol. 
What they have in common with some Islamic traditions are the prominent 
place of Ali, 12 Imams and the story of Kerbala. But these Islamic figures seem 
to be different figures in Alevi traditions. For example, Ali is considered insan-
i kamil, incarnation of perfect human being. Cem ritual is conducted by dede, 
who are proficient in practicing Alevi traditions and therefore not only guide 
cem rituals but also group of Alevis, who are named talip, meaning student. 
Thus, each dede traditionally are responsible of guiding a group of Alevis as 
their talips. Dede families are called ocak and being dede depend on their 
hereditary link. This traditional system of organization, however, has been 
dissolving since the foundation of Turkish Republic as the legal system 
criminalized their rituals and using dede titles, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
  In this chapter, I first review the main academic claims on Alevism, 
which continue to influence not only the general perception on Alevism but 
also Alevis’ own self-definitions. After pointing out the flaw in these claims, I 
will examine Alevi traditions in light of Balagangadhara’s theory of religion 
and will argue for a lack of religion. To strengthen my argument, I will explore 
on the performative side of Alevi traditions. Following, I will analyse how 
Alevism has been constructed as a religion at the confluence of Christian 
missionaries, Ottoman colonialism, and Turkish nationalism, which will 
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inform the discussions in Part II about how this construction has been evolving 
in response to political and legal contexts.  
 
3. 2. Explanatory Theories on Alevism 
 
  Among academics it is widely acknowledged that neither the terms 
Alevi nor Alevism has a long history.222 Rather, they came into common usage 
only in the 19th century. Alevi is considered to be an umbrella term. Bruinessen 
observes: “‘Alevi’ is the basic concept, which is used to define those heterodox 
groups whose beliefs and traditions vary”.223 Although this is a very vague 
sentence, it is accepted that Alevi historically used to refer to Kızılbaş, who 
appear in historical accounts of the Ottomans in the 15th century. As Kızılbaş 
is considered as a pejorative word, Alevi has replaced Kızılbaş since the 19th 
century. Today, studies on Alevis use the phrase “Alevi-Bektaşi” together. 
Alevi is also used to refer to Bektaşi, a tariqa that has been historically 
associated with the Kızılbaş due to the place of Hacı Bektaş in both traditions. 
Hacı Bektaş is considered a dervish, who migrated from Central Asia to 
Anatolia around the 13th century and following his death the Bektaşi tariqa was 
formed around the 15th century.224 Although united in their respect for Hacı 
Bektaş as well as rituals and ritual language, Kızılbaş/Alevi and Bektaşi 
communities were historically separate entities.225   
  Despite increasing academic interest in formations of the Alevi 
movement and Alevi identity, academic interest in Alevism with respect to 
theories of religion remains minimal. Most studies ground their research on the 
presumption that Alevism is an instance of religion and thereby try to provide 
explanations for what kind of religion Alevism is. Two of the most common 
approaches consider it to be an example of heterodox Islam or a syncretic 
religion. In this regard, similar to the flaw in religious studies as described in 
the introduction, literature on Alevism also suffers from a similar dilemma as 
 
222 Markus Dressler, 'Religio-secular Metamorphoses: The Re-making of Turkish Alevism' (2008) 
76 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 280, 283; Irene Melikoff, Uyur Idik Uyardilar, 
‘Alevism’-Bektasilik Arastirmalari (T. Alptekin, Trans. Demos 2009) 26. 
223 Martin Bruinessen, Kürtlük, Türklük, ‘Alevism’, etnik ve dinsel kimlik mücadeleleri (Iletisim 
1999) 116. 
224 Irene Melikoff, Uyur İdik Uyardılar, Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları (Demos 2009) 22-25. 
225 This point will be examined in detail later in this Chapter and Chapter 3.  
 70 
regards the explanandum and explanans. That is to say, they presume that 
Alevism is an instance of religion and based on this presumption, try to provide 
explanations on what kind of religion it is. The limited empirical inquiries into 
the existence of religion in Alevi culture provide explanations for the religion 
of Alevi communities, rather than questioning the existence of religion in Alevi 
culture. Moreover, studies undertaken during at least the last two decades have 
not been interested in discussing the religion of Alevism. Calling it a definition 
contest or definitional problem, these studies focus on political aspects of the 
formation of Alevism.226 It is as though they avoid engaging with the theories 
on religion to assess Alevism. Yet, how reliable are the findings of these studies 
that are grounded on an assumption of the existence of religion in Alevi culture 
that is not based on empirical evidence?  
  The endeavour to provide an explanation for Alevis’ religion and 
Alevism began in the 19th century, with Christian missionary accounts, which 
were followed by counter-missionary activity by the Ottomans.227 Academic 
studies that examine Alevism as Alevis’ religion appeared around the turn of 
the 20th century. Early republican scholar Köprülü’s conceptualisation of 
Alevism has been the most influential and is referred to by other scholars as 
“Köprülü Paradigm”.228 As a historian and literature scholar, Köprülü’s main 
interest was the history of Turks and Turkish literature. It is within this 
framework that he wrote about Alevis. As such his writings were not based on 
empirical data. According to the Köprülü Paradigm, Alevism is an example of 
heterodox Islam, which is heavily influenced by Shamanic beliefs in Central 
Asia, a region that is believed to be the homeland of the Turkish nation. Thus, 
by connecting the roots of Alevis to Central Asia, Köprülü also produced 
evidence for the history of the Turkish nation which constituted a fundamental 
element of the ideology of Turkish nation and represented Alevis as the carriers 
 
226 Talha Köse, ‘The AKP and the ‘Alevi Opening’: Understanding the Dynamics of the 
Rapprochement’ (2010) Insight Turkey 143-164; Ceren Lord, ‘Rethinking the Justice and 
Development Party’s ‘Alevi openings’’(2017) 18(2) Turkish Studies 278-296; Besim Can Zırh, 
‘Becoming Visible Through Migration: Understanding the Relationships Between the Alevi 
Revival, Migration and Funerary Practices Through Europe and Turkey’ (Unpublished PhD 
dissertation University College of London 2012).  
227 This process is examined in detail in Chapter 3.  
228 Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, 'Subjects of the Sultan, Disciples of the Shah: Formation and 
Transformation of the Kızılbaş/Alevi Communities in Ottoman Anatolia' (Unpublished PhD 
dissertation Harvard University 2008). 
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of pre-Islamic Turkish culture.229I will examine this process further below in 
this Chapter at section 3.5.  
  Another influential scholar of the early 20th century is Yörükan, who 
conducted ethnographic fieldwork with Tahtaci Alevis from the 1920s till his 
death in 1954.230 Some of his observations are as follows: the migration of 
souls is a common belief among Alevi communities. Alcohol is permitted. No 
one goes on pilgrimage. Neither do they go to the mosque, perform namaz  
(Islamic worship) nor do they fast. Thus they do not abide by the five pillars of 
Islam. He goes on: “For them these practices belong to “yezid”, which means 
Muslims other than themselves. Their life is simple: They consider some tombs 
belonging to certain historical figures, some big rocks, and trees important, 
visit them separately and make animal sacrifices [kurban] to them.”231 He also 
observes that Alevis consider Ali to be God.232 Based on similar observations 
he considers Alevism as a syncretic formation, influenced by archaic Turkish 
customs, which sometimes run contrary to one another.233 Separating Alevis 
from Bektasis 234 , he further asserts that Anatolian Alevism is not only a 
continuation of esoterism (batınilik), but a world that mingles some Turkish 
tariqas such as Yesevi, Kalenderi, Haydari, is influenced by Hurufi 
philosophies and includes Turkish customs and traditions as well as folk 
poetry.235  
 
229 Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: the Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (Oxford University Press 
2013); Ayfer Karakaya-Stump, 'Subjects of the Sultan, Disciples of the Shah: Formation and 
Transformation of the Kızılbaş/Alevi Communities in Ottoman Anatolia' (Unpublished PhD 
dissertation Harvard University 2008). 
230 Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, Anadolu’da Aleviler ve Tahtacılar (compiled by Turhan Yörükan, 4th 
edition, Ötüken 2005). His fieldwork with Tahtaci Alevis was mainly conducted between 1927 
and 1932, while he kept visiting these communities until 1950s. 
231 Ibid 449. The original passage is as follows: “Butun Alevilerde ruhun gocu inanisi, genel bir 
inanistir. Raki sarap helal, hacca giden yok namaz abdest oruc gibi dini emirler onlarca yezidlere 
yani kendilerinden olmayan muslumanlara aittir. Yasayislari pek basit olan Aleviler, Hacı Bektas’I 
Alaca’daki Huseyin Gazi’yi, digger yerlerde kendilerinden olduklarina inandiklari yatirlari, bazi 
yerlerde buyuk kayalari, agaclari toplu ve ayri ayri ziyaret ederler ve oralarda kurbanlar keserler.”  
232 Ibid 448.  
233 Ibid 445. The original passage is as follows: “Senkretik bir olusum eski turk adetlerine 
eklenmis bazen birbirine aykiri unsurlardan olusan […]” 
234 See his discussion for the relation between Alevis and Bektasis, see ibid 447-449 where he 
argues about the power shift to Celebi family, descendants of Hacı Bektas over some Alevi 
communities in 19th century.  
235 Ibid 445. The original passage is as follows: “Anadolu Aleviligi, sadece Batiniligin devami 
degildir. Yesevi, kalenderi, haydari, gibi Turk tarikatlarinin hurufiligin vucudiye ve dehriye 
felsefesinin karistigini icerisinde bazi turk gorenek ve geleneginin ve halk siirinin yasadigi bir 
dunyadir.” 
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  Framing Alevism as a syncretic belief system, he sees cem ritual as 
the main worship of Alevis.236 Some of the ‘prayers’ (called gülbang in Alevi 
terminology) uttered in cem rituals are as follows: For evenings: “Aksamlar 
hayrola, hayirlar fethola, serler defola, munkir munafik matola, uzerimizden 
kazalar, belalar defola, gercegin demine hu”. It is difficult to translate this 
gulbang as it is in the form of certain poetry, specific to Alevi culture. Yet, it 
would be: “evening to be good, good to be achieved, evil to be eliminated, 
infidels to be eliminated, troubles and accidents to be eliminated, ‘hu’ to the 
reality”. Again another gülbang is “Allah Allah, niyazi kabul ola, muradi hasil 
ola, tuttugu ileri gide, Sahi Merdan yardimcisi ola, evi ocagi sen ola, biri bine 
sayila, Halil Ibrahim berekati vere, gercegin demine hu”. This would be 
translated as: “Allah Allah, wishes to be accepted, hopes to be realized, efforts 
to go ahead, Sahi Merdan to be supporting, house and family to be happy, one 
to be counted thousand, Halil Ibrahim to bring abundance, ‘hu’ to the reality”. 
What makes these gulbangs into prayer and cem ritual into worship is not clear. 
The terms prayer and worship are internal to a religion. Therefore they cannot 
be used to differentiate a phenomenon from religion.237 As such, they remain 
Yörükan’s assumptions for finding a belief system for Alevis. Indeed, neither 
Köprülü nor Yörükan discusses whether Alevis have a religion. They, rather, 
try to explain the kind of religion Alevism is.  
  Following in the footsteps of Köprülü and Yörükan, in the second 
half of the 20th century, two students of Köprülü, Ocak and Melikoff, 
developed a conceptualisation of Alevism as a syncretic belief system, by 
demonstrating various similarities between Alevi beliefs and beliefs of Asian 
traditions such as reincarnation in Hinduism and tenasuh in Alevism or the 
sacred place of nature in Shamanic traditions and in Alevi traditions.238 Unlike 
the predominant place of old Turkish customs and traditions in the writings of 
Köprülü  and Yörükan, Ocak and Melikoff attribute influences on Alevism 
from not only Turkish Shamanism but also Iranian and Indian religious 
traditions. 239  Thus in an effort to provide a ‘better’ explanation for the 
 
236 Ibid 317-413.  
237 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 103-138.  
238 Ahmet Yasar Ocak, Alevi ve Bektaşi İnançlarının İslam Öncesi Temelleri (İletişim Yayınları 
2007). 
239 Ibid; Irene Melikoff, Uyur İdik Uyardılar, Alevilik-Bektaşilik Araştırmaları (Demos 2009) 26. 
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existence of a syncretic religion, both Ocak and Melikoff bring a more complex 
picture for the roots of Alevism. Their conceptualisation is important as it was 
also embraced by many Alevis and shaped their perspective on their own 
culture. During my fieldwork, many Alevis I encountered consider Shamanism 
as the root of Alevi practices such as “niyaz etmek” to the sun, mountains and 
trees. “Niyaz etmek” is sometimes referred to as worship, especially in the 
context of cem rituals. Yet, when it is done to a rock or tree, Alevis never use 
the word worship (ibadet) but always refer the act as niyaz etmek. According 
to my fieldwork observations, the closest translation for niyaz etmek would be 
to show respect or reverence. According to some Alevis this act of niyaz 
demonstrates Alevi culture’s link to Shamanism. However, they do not 
question why this reverence for nature must be an example of their Shamanic 
roots. Given that this connection has been argued by Melikoff and Ocak, their 
influence on Alevis’ perception of Alevi culture becomes clear. I have also 
encountered explicit references to Melikoff and Ocak in explaining Alevism, 
during my fieldwork interviews.  
  Köprülü’s paradigm has been invalidated by recent historical studies 
that proved a lack of sufficient historical evidence for a connection between 
the religious movements of Central Asia and Anatolia. Most important among 
these, the historian Kafadar demonstrates the ambiguous religious map of 
Anatolia during the formation of the Ottoman Empire. 240 Similarly, 
Karamustafa’s work on Sufism raises questions about the religious affiliations 
of different dervish groups in medieval Anatolia. 241  These studies are 
important because the history of Kızılbaş/Alevi communities is often traced 
back to 13th and 16th century events in Anatolia (seen in the ECtHR judgments 
as well, as discussed in Chapter 5). Thus, we see the earlier attempts of Köprülü 
and Yörükan to carve out the history of Alevis in order to substantiate a belief 
 
240 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Univ of 
California Press 1995). 
241 Ahmet T. Karamustafa, ‘Origins of Anatolian Sufism’, in Ahmet Yasar Ocak (ed), Sufism and 
Sufis in Ottoman Society: Sources, Doctrine, Rituals, Turuq, Architecture, Literature and Fine 
Arts, Modernism (Ankara TTK 2005) 67-95, 78-79. Karamustafa argues, contrary to Köprülü ’s 
assertions, there is no trace of Shism or Batinism in Yasavi tradition that was considered to be 
Turkish ancestors migrated from Central Asia. In addition, there is no firm evidence that even a 
slam number of Yasawi dervishes came from Anatolia to Central Asia. Since the theory of 
continuity of Turkish Culture is based on Köprülü ’s argument of a continuity of popular religious 
culture in general and the Yesevi-Bektasi connection in particular, Karamustafa’s criticism of 
Köprülü ’s interpretation of the Yeseviye dismantles one of the major pieces of evidence of 
continuity of Sufi-Muslim culture of Central Asia to Anatolia.  
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system for Alevis, however syncretic it was, continue to influence the current 
perception on Alevism before the courts, as will be analysed in Part II.  
  Although Kafadar and Karamustafa emphasise the ambiguous 
religious character of social movements and “dervish” groups in medieval 
Anatolia, both these scholars presuppose religious tendencies in these 
movements. For example, trying to find an explanation for the religious 
adherences of frontier communities in medieval Anatolia (from 11th till 15th 
centuries), Kafadar introduces the concept of metadoxy as “a state of being 
beyond doxies; a combination of being doxy-naïve and not being doxy-minded, 
as well as the absence of a state that was interested in rigorously defining and 
strictly enforcing an orthodoxy.”242  He comes to this conclusion upon his 
analysis of a literature genre called the hagiographies of the dervishes and the 
epics of the gazi warriors and finds ‘inconsistent’ elements such as a Muslim 
dervish praying together with Christians in some accounts while women 
warriors would be dominant characters in others. 243  The inconsistency of 
practicing in both Islamic and Christian ways by these warriors and dervishes 
for which he tries to find an explanation by introducing ‘metadoxy’ might also 
stem from a different approach to tradition, that is not an epistemic one. 
  Similarly, in his research on formations of Sufism in the Middle 
East and its diffusion in Anatolia, Karamustafa tries to reconcile the relations 
between the Sufi movements and the deviant ‘dervish’ groups, some of which 
are considered to be forerunners of today’s Alevis. He underlines the complex 
relations between Sufis and these dervish groups:  
It is not enough to characterize the conflict between Sufi piety and 
dervish religiosity as simple mutual hostility, however. It would be 
more accurate to compare this relationship to the complex bond 
between ‘socially conformist’ parents and their ‘rebellious’ offspring. 
Thus, although the dervishes vociferously rejected the main features of 
institutional Sufism, in the final analysis they could not help but retain 
essentially Sufi beliefs and practices. The tariqah determined the 
 
242 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Univ of 
California Press 1995) 76. 
243 Ibid 71, where his analysis of epics reveals practices, which contradict scriptural Islam such as 
women warrior figures, who transgress dress and behavioural codes by fighting in the company of 
men warriors. Similarly, the hagiographies demonstrate ‘pagan’ elements like stories of flying 
rugs. Kafadar describes these hagiographies as a fusion of pre-Islamic and Islamic beliefs as well 
as Christian motifs, noting: "There are numerous instances where Sari Saltuk gains converts 
among Byzantines by a display of empathy toward their Christian culture. He participates in 
numerous battles slaying infidels, but he can also stand by the altar in the Church of Hagia Sophia, 
when Constantinople is still Byzantine of course, and recite the Bible with such emotion that the 
Orthodox congregation dissolves into tears.” 
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general pattern and shape of its shadow counterpart, the dervish group. 
The latter was a mirror image, in its negation, of the former.244 
 
  What holds together these ‘socially conformist’ parents and their 
‘rebellious’ offspring is the cult of evliya, translated as ‘saints’ by 
Karamustafa. Evliya is a person who is considered to be ‘God’s friend’ by 
deviant dervish groups. He introduces the term, institutional Sufism, and 
separates it from the kind of Sufism practiced by these deviant dervish groups. 
This enables him to include these dervish groups within Sufism and therefore 
account for their religious affiliations. The prominent place of stories of 
evliyas among dervish groups provides the link for this religious affiliation. 
Yet what makes these evliyas into ‘saints’ or religious figures is not clear. 
Indeed, he himself notes the scarcity of information about the influence of non-
Islamic traditions in the formation of Sufism and nonconformity of these 
dervish groups with ‘orthodox’ Islam. The compulsion that the scholars have 
to discover religious roots of every culture might be the reason for his 
presumption on the religious nature of evliya stories.  
   Kafadar’s student Karakaya’s historical analysis of some written 
documents belonging to certain dede families further examines the formation 
of the ocak structure and their shifting alliances. However critical these studies 
of the history of the formation of Alevi traditions are, they do not question the 
religiousness of these traditions. Rather, it is taken for granted, thus Karakaya 
tries to come up with a more suitable term to refer to Alevis’ religion: 
“charisma loyal Islamic group”. Another term is introduced by Dressler, who 
follows in the footsteps of Talal Asad. Adopting a genealogical approach, he 
considers religion to be a social construct and suggests studying Alevism 
within the vernacular of Islam as an “inner-Islamic” tradition. There are two 
main problems with Dressler’s and Karakaya’s approach. The first one is their 
assumption that Alevism exists as an instance of religion (Islam). The second 
one is the confusion over the differences between a definition and a theory. 
Simply replacing what earlier scholars referred to as heterodox or syncretic 
with ‘charisma-loyal Islamic group’ (by Karakaya) and within ‘inner-Islamic 
 
244 Ahmet T Karamustafa, God’s unruly friends. Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Period, 
1200-1250 (Univ of Utah Press 1994) 91. 
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difference’ (by Dressler) does not solve the problem concerning the Alevism 
phenomenon.  
  Moreover, Dressler’s genealogical analysis considers religion, thus 
Alevism, as a discursive construct, which has been homogenised and 
modernised and appropriated both by Turkish nationalists and Alevis 
themselves.245 The issue about the construction of a phenomenon is elaborated 
above through the analogy to claim about gravity. Additionally, claims about 
the construction of religion also conceal a fundamental empirical problem. By 
talking of religion in general, they make it seem as though a symmetrical and 
equivalent process is at work in the construction of all religions; since religion 
is a construct, Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Alevism are 
all equally constructed. However, as Balagangadhara explains, Christianity has 
described itself in terms of religion and also recognised certain others as its 
rival religions, while these descriptions in terms of religion failed to make 
sense to many of these others.246 As explained in Chapter 2, throughout history, 
both these self-descriptions and descriptions of the other in terms of religion 
have made sense to Christian Europeans, whereas the Romans and Indians 
responded with incomprehension. 247  The suggestion that all religions are 
products of construction ignores this fundamental asymmetry. In addition, the 
arguments about the construction of Alevism are not clear about what exactly 
is constructed and whether the constructed phenomenon has a place in reality. 
Consequently, the literature on Alevism demonstrates the predicament of 
religious studies: the presupposition of the universality of religion across 
cultures. With this presumption in the background, they look for the beliefs and 
gods and worship of all cultures. This is a practice of petitio principii; assuming 
the truth of a proposition whose truth should be demonstrated: that religion is 





245 Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: the Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (Oxford University Press 
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3. 3. Alevi Traditions in Balagangadhara’s Theory of Religion  
 
  The controversy over establishing Alevism as a religion has been 
illustrated above. Despite the categorisation of Alevism as being ‘within 
Islam’, as a separate religion or as a syncretism, considering Alevism as an 
instance of religion is pre-theoretical and does not go beyond classificatory 
definitions that lack the power of explanation. Therefore, this section will 
examine Alevi traditions through the lens of Balagangadhara's theory of 
religion. His theory meticulously revolves around aspects, through which 
Christianity defines itself as a religion and considers Islam and Judaism as 
rivals. 248  He demonstrates that this rivalry was argued on the ground of 
doctrinal differences and God. He identifies three aspects: religious rivalry, 
importance of doctrine, and the necessity of God to religion, which contribute 
to forming religion that is an explanatorily intelligible account of the Cosmos 
and of itself.  
  Regarding the aspect of rivalry, Balagangadhara argues that 
intolerance is the inevitable outcome of an explanatorily intelligible account of 
the Cosmos. Faith may be the key here because the more faithful one is to 
God’s plan for us the more intolerant one has to be to other versions of that 
plan (other religions). My fieldwork findings suggest that if religion is about 
rivalry, Alevis do not appear to demonstrate it. Alevis are proud of "looking at 
72 nations with the same gaze". Alevis often use this phrase to emphasise their 
respect for different religions and cultural differences.249 Furthermore, there is 
no record of Alevis engaging in proselytising activities throughout history. My 
fieldwork findings confirm this and suggest that Alevis do not compete with 
people of other traditions over the truth of their beliefs or practices.250 Neither 
do they argue over there being only one way to navigate life. For instance, 
participants’ descriptions of Alevism often underline that Alevism has 
historically been shaped through its encounters with various traditions such as 
Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. No tradition is considered 
in competition to theirs. During my fieldwork, I witnessed similar indifference 
 
248 Ibid.  
249 My fieldwork findings.  
250 Also see Ali Yaman, Alevilik & Bektaşilik Tarihi (NoktaKitap 2007); Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, 
Anadolu’da Aleviler ve Tahtacilar (compiled by Turhan Yörükan, 4th edt, Otuken 2005) 443-449.  
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when I was informed that Jehovah Witnesses would drop a copy of their 
publications every now and then into a local Alevi community centre in 
London. In this regard, Alevis seem to be indifferent to rivalry claims. Even 
when they need to situate Alevism within Islam, they do not argue the 
superiority of Alevism over Islam. Rather, they would explain what they do 
not appreciate about Islam and how it differs from their culture. Yet, they do 
not postulate a rivalry between them and other traditions. In this regard, I argue 
that an explanatorily intelligible account of Cosmos and of itself that the rivalry 
is off product is missing in Alevi culture.  
  Unlike Alevis’ approach to other cultures, for Muslims and 
Christians, the Alevi needs to be converted to the true path. This is why the 
Ottomans called them heretics. Alevis’ resistance to the missionaries' efforts to 
convert the Alevi also demonstrates the indifference of the Alevi to the 
Christian doctrine.251  From the records of ABCFM, a letter from Mr. Herrick 
charged with missionary activity in Anatolia, dated 16 November 1865, noted 
that:  
Some things are now clear. 1. These people were formerly, though 
nominally Mohammedans, really heathens; paying a respect amounting 
to worship to their chief Sheiks, and from time to time bowing 
idolatrously before wands cut from a certain tree, and kept in the houses 
of their Sheiks. But 2. their religious faith and customs had too little of 
substance and body to hold them firmly, and their faith in Mohammed 
and the Koran was, and was known to be, a mere lip confession. When, 
therefore, some dozen years ago, Armenian Protestant brethren brought 
them the gospel, they professed, whether in sincerity or with hope of 
advantage, to receive it; and ever since that time, some score or two of 
houses are known as Protestant; and they adhere to this profession, 
although they have suffered a great deal of persecution from other 
Koords. 3. They are now very timid and fearful. This timidity is so 
great, that one can make nothing of their talk while other Koords are 
present; for then they will avow precisely the same belief in 
Mohammed and the Koran as in Jesus and the Gospel, and express 




251 Markus Dressler, Writing Religion: the Making of Turkish Alevi Islam (Oxford University Press 
2013). 
252 George Herrick, ‘Western Turkey - Letter from Mr. Herrick’ (1866) Volume 62 Missionary 
Herald 68-69, available at 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=nyp.33433068289077&view=1up&seq=85 (accessed 3 May 
2020).  
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  The missionaries did not find the acceptance of Mohammad or Jesus 
by the Kızılbaş enough for their conversion. Similar to the dialogue with the 
Balinese, the Kızılbaş belief is different from a religious person, who 
experience religion as an explanatorily intelligible account through faith. 
Having faith in God's word consequently results in intolerance to other 
accounts. Similar to the missionaries interacting with the Kızılbaş, the 
missionary reports on the conversion of Hindus to Christianity, mention that 
for Hindus believing Jesus to be another avatar among many in India was a 
common reaction; but not enough for their conversion. Adhering to a religious 
account causes intolerance to any other account. In this connection, the 
indifference of the Kızılbaş is similar to the attitudes of Indians to the 
conversion efforts of Islam and Christianity.253  Comparing the Indian and 
Western culture, Balagangadhara argues that “Having worldviews is not how 
the human being goes-about in the world. It is merely a way of going-about. 
Some culture claims to have the worldview (be it scientific one or a ‘religious’ 
one); the pagans acknowledge the possibility and merely say that it is not their 
way of going-about.”254 From this point of view, it could be noted that the 
Alevi traditions lack the aspect of rivalry and indeed could not understand a 
religious rivalry in their contact with Islam and Christianity. This might stem 
from the constraints of a culture without religion that does not lend 
intelligibility to some lines of inquiry. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Alevi 
Federation in Britain explained Alevism as an instance of Humanism in its 
application to the Charity Commission. For Alevis, there is no rivalry between 
Alevism and Humanism. However, the Commission objected to equating 
Alevism and Humanism in framing Alevism as a religion and asked the 
Federation to promote only one of them; either Alevism or Humanism.  
  A doctrinal core over the relation between God and humanity has 
been the focus of religious rivalry.255 This is because each religion claims to be 
holding ‘the true’ account of the Cosmos and therefore necessitates a doctrine 
for its ahistorical, unchanged, ever accessible account. Additionally, a religious 
doctrine is crucial in establishing an explanatorily intelligible account of the 
 
253 S.N. Balagangadhara and Dıvya Jhingran, Do All Roads Lead to Jerusalem? The Making of 
Indian Religions (Manohar 2014) 179.  
254 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 430. 
255 Ibid 297. 
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Cosmos and of itself, as it captures the revelation of God. My fieldwork 
findings suggest the absence of a religious doctrine among Alevis. None of the 
participants in the research asserted the existence of a religious doctrine that 
accounts for the world and God, which also accounts for Alevism. Indeed, the 
very absence of any doctrine that sets rigid rules and regulations over beliefs is 
underscored as one of the 'values of Alevism'. The lack of doctrines and the 
existence of questioning are represented as values of Alevism. Alevis praises 
questioning the validity of any fact, and some of them call themselves hakikatci 
(seekers of reality). In the interviews, some participants said that even Ali or 
dede (spiritual guide) might be criticised regarding their deeds in a particular 
context, to underline this sceptical attitude. I myself witnessed many occasions 
where the place of Ali within Alevism was discussed or dede’ views on 
Alevism being objected to by others. Also, in a cem ritual, a dede stated that  
Islam is still being administered by the rules of 1000 years ago. Alevism 
is different. Alevism has carried its essence to this day while adapting 
itself to life. If anything does not suit today's living conditions, no need 
to do that. Reinterpreting Alevism and applying it accordingly is what 
we need.  
 
In other words, there is no authoritative text for the transmission of Alevi 
culture. Neither is there an authoritative interpretation of Alevism. In this 
regard, it might be suggested that religious doctrine is not a feature of Alevi 
culture.  
  There are some written materials belonging to Alevi culture. Among 
them the most relevant one is buyruk. Its literature dates back to the 16th 
Century.256 The identity of its author is controversial; he was most probably 
Imam Jafer, the sixth Imam, or Shah Ismail.257  This controversy does not 
concern Alevis. They are indifferent to the question of author and authenticity. 
Indeed, most Alevis do not read buyruk, although it is available. Neither do 
they refer to it during the interviews I conducted and my participant 
observations of cem rituals and different events, as opposed to references to the 
deyiş/nefes genre of Alevi poetry258. In other words, the Alevi does not have 
the habit of referring to buyruk or any scripture to clarify a contested issue or 
to explain Alevi values. In this regard, neither buyruk nor any other written 
 
256 Fuat Bozkurt, Buyruk: Imam Cafer-i Sadik Buyruğu (Kapı 2009).  
257 Ibid. 
258 My fieldwork findings.  
 81 
material is perceived as a revelation of God. Indeed, Yörükan observes from 
his fieldwork with Tahtacı Alevis that they do not know who the author of 
buyruk is.259  
  Instead, what is very common among Alevi-Kızılbaş communities 
is to refer to deyiş/nefes. I observed the prominent place of deyiş/nefes in my 
conversations with dede like Dertli Divani as well as Alevis who consider 
themselves atheists because of their lack of interest in Alevism. In a seminar 
series organized at the London Cemevi, aiming to clarify what Alevism is, no 
emphasis was put on buyruk or any scripture. Instead, the history of religions 
such as Shamanism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism etc were discussed to 
understand Alevism and this discussion was followed by the singing of 
deyiş/nefes.260 Similarly, during my fieldwork observation of Mekteb-i Irfan in 
Ankara that was another effort to learn about Alevism, there was no emphasis 
placed on scripture. Indeed, the Mekteb-i Irfan initiative used the method of 
playing saz, singing deyiş/nefes, and also talking about these deyiş/nefes, as it 
is a form of poetry and some words are archaic, rooted in either Persian, Arabic 
or Ottoman. Additionally, there was no emphasis on Alevi scripture during my 
fieldwork observation of Religious Education on Alevism at the Highbury-
Islington Secondary School in London. Deyiş/nefes is a genre of Alevi poetry 
that will be analysed further below. However, there is no demonstrable means 
by which one could say that there is a religious doctrine present. There is no 
scripture talking about God in Alevi culture. There is no revelation to be 
secularised as a world-view or a system of belief. In the absence of a religious 
doctrinal core, it is difficult to state that Alevism provides an explanatorily 
intelligible account of the Cosmos and of itself.261 
  During my fieldwork, I attended a seminar series, led by an Alevi 
ozan (bard), organized by the London Cemevi, intended to clarify what 
Alevism is for Alevis themselves. Although the seminars did not continue due 
 
259 Yusuf Ziya Yörükan, Anadolu’da Aleviler ve Tahtacilar (compiled by Turhan Yörükan, 4th 
edition, Ötüken 2005) 283. The original passage is as follows: “Bunlar Sah Ismail’I, Cafer’in oglu 
zannederler. Fakat bazilari Sah Ismail icin “Hz Ali’nin biraderzadesidir.” Der. Nasir-I Tusi’ye de 
“Muhammed Safi’nin ogludur”, derler. Aralarinda Seyh Safi ismi mevcut oldugu halde kim 
oldugunu bilmezler. Erdebil kelimesi de aralarinda soylenmektedir, ancak bu hususta da bilgileri 
yoktur.”  
260 These seminar series are discussed below with more detail.  
261 Also see S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the 
Dynamic of Religion (Brill 1994) 371-373, about how the aspect of religious doctrine is also 
important in securing the transmission of religious account.  
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to the lack of attendance by the community, the curriculum was prepared in a 
chronological order of all the belief systems and religions which would 
eventually influence Alevi traditions, such as Brahmanism, Zoroastrianism and 
Islam. Therefore, these seminars differed from Quran or Bible courses, since 
the aim was not to teach the practices of Alevi traditions, but how to frame 
Alevism vis-à-vis other traditions. Indeed, there is a repeated tendency to 
explain Alevism through comparison with other traditions/religions, as also 
observed by other scholars.262 This tendency supports further the theory that 
Alevism does not present a core account of the Cosmos, compatible to a 
religious account.  
  The difficulty of describing Alevism was apparent in the instructor’s 
attitude in leading these seminar series. The two most popular questions posed 
by the students were what Alevism is and when Alevism appeared. That is to 
say, concerns over its 'roots' and gaining information about Alevism. The 
instructor, however, used to refer to upcoming classes, which would "bring 
clarity to Alevism". He used to avoid naming Alevism as a phenomenon 
through a number of manoeuvres, such as "Alevism is that which takes the 
good sides of other beliefs and religions and leaves out their bad sides," or "we 
find Alevism out of all these [Brahmanism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, 
Hinduism]” or “you need to drink tea in order to understand what tea is” etc. 
Yet, it was unclear if these answers met the students’ expectations, some of 
whom complained that “it [understanding Alevism] is like a chess game; pieces 
have never been placed properly” and “we are people of an ill-fated era: we 
struggle to explain ourselves”. In this connection, I suggest that Alevis are 
confronted with a demand to explain Alevism through an implied requirement 
of having a system of belief and a doctrine to play the chess game.  
  Keeping in mind the content of this rivalry over religious doctrine 
for an explanatorily intelligible account, de facto there is no notion of God in 
Alevi culture, corresponding to God in Abrahamic religions, as the creator, 
transcending this world and superior to humanity. However, this does not mean 
that the Alevi do not refer to God in language use. To explain whether there is 
 
262 Martin Sökefeld,  ‘Alevis in Germany and the Politics of Recognition’ (2003) 29 New 
Perspectives on Turkey 133-161; also see Besim Can Zırh, ‘Becoming Visible Through Migration: 
Understanding the Relationships Between the Alevi Revival, Migration and Funerary Practices 
Through Europe and Turkey’, (Unpublished PhD dissertation University College London 2012). 
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God or not, whom to address as God, Alevis often refer to various deyiş/nefes. 
One of them says: "Allah sees everything, so he has eyes; hears everything, so 
has ears; knows everything, so has a brain; that's to say he resembles you". 
Comparing God to human beings would be considered blasphemous in Islam.  
  In their language use Alevis may refer to God, particularly with 
reference to hak. Hak does not have a single definition, being described in 
myriad ways. One description is as follows: Some call it the universe or the 
energy, of which everything is part. A very well-known Alevi saying goes: 
"Enel hak", which is translated as: "I am hak", which was first uttered by one 
of the Alevi poets, Nesimi, in the 14th century and caused him to be sentenced 
to be flayed alive on the grounds that he was a heretic, who considered himself 
God. It might be the case that hak is something that the Alevi experience, but 
do not necessarily describe in a way that appears consistent. The Alevi 
considers that everything in the universe is a part of hak. Some Alevis see hak 
in everything in the universe, not necessarily or solely in living things. Quoting 
from my memory of a dede in London, he and I left the cemevi in Ridley Road, 
walking to the bus stop. It was raining. He did not have an umbrella, while I 
had a crooked umbrella. When I was complaining that the umbrella was out of 
shape, he said ‘semsiyeyi gucendirmeyelim’ meaning ‘let’s not offend the 
umbrella’ as there is hak in an umbrella, too.263  
  The descriptions of participants often start with an emphasis on the 
value of the human being in the Alevi traditions and that human beings are the 
foremost 'thing' for the Alevi. They stress that god refers to human beings and 
life for Alevis. In this regard, Alevis do not pray to god to act upon their 
requests. During my fieldwork, over the issue of God or hak, participants often 
emphasised that for Alevis the most important thing is the human being. When 
asked if hak refers to God, a usual response would be "the most important thing 
in Alevism is the human being. Human beings are the creator. Hak would be 
an energy." However, as will be discussed in the following chapters, hak is 
often translated as ‘truth’ or ‘God’ in the UK context for the purposes of the 
religious education curriculum and applications to the Charity Commission, in 
Chapter 6.  
 
263 My fieldwork observations, April 2015, London 
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  Moreover, a religious account builds a very specific relationship 
between God and a human being through faith and worship. It proposes faith 
and worship as being rewarded and bringing salvation in an afterlife in heaven. 
The Alevi understanding of life after death demonstrates the lack of such an 
account for Alevis. None of the Alevis I talked believed in heaven and hell 
after death, based on their deeds in the world. For them, there is no world 
beyond this one. Balagangadhara suggests that for non-religious traditions "life 
would be an unbroken movement of ‘lives’; by the same token, there could be 
neither a unique or a radical beginning, nor a unique or a radical end to a 
person."264 Similarly, Alevis construe the concept of 'tenasuh' as 'walking to 
hak', or 'changing underwear', all of which indicate the continuity of life after 
death through the migration of the soul. Thus, there is no concept of heaven or 
hell, heaven being the preferred aim in Semitic religions of worship and 
conforming to God's purpose in this life.  
  Consequently, Alevis do not theorise the world through a revelation 
of God. Neither do they consider the Cosmos as an ‘explanatorily intelligible 
account’. In light of this examination, it might be possible to say that the Alevi 
culture may not have a religion.  
 
3. 4. Alevi Traditions Based on the Fieldwork 
 
  My above analysis suggests that religion does not seem to be a 
property of Alevi culture, when I apply Balagangadhara’s theory on my 
fieldwork. To strengthen my argument, I describe some Alevi practices to 
understand the resources of the Alevi culture.  
 
Ocak formation / culture-specific organizations of Alevis  
 
  Ocak (hearth) is described as the chain of "El Ele, El Hak'a" (Hand 
to Hand, Hand to hak), that is called "an ocak-based trans-local socio-spiritual 
 
264 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 424. 
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network" 265  or "the traditional Alevi socio-religious structure". 266  Ocak 
structures are founded around dede families, whose members are known as 
ocakzade (literally, child of ocak). The Dede is considered as the spiritual 
leader/ spiritual guide of Alevis, due to holding the authority to guide Alevi 
rituals; but also as a guide in community matters. Talip literally means 
student.267 In this culture-specific system, a talip would ‘el almak’ from a dede 
and every dede would ‘el almak’ from a murşid, who is also from a dede family. 
‘El almak’ literally means ‘getting hand’. In Alevi culture, it signifies forging 
a specific relationship, where the talip is guided by the dede through Alevi 
culture, its teaching and practices. This relationship is initiated and sustained 
through a cem ritual that is called görgü.  
  Additionally, the talip would forge another relationship with another 
talip, through a ritual, called musahiplik268, on the condition that the talip is 
married. Thus musahiplik is for married talips. These talips would be known 
as musahip to each other and are expected to guide each other in life. 
Musahiplik is similar to kirvelik 269 , that is mostly specific to Kurdish 
communities.270 Therefore, it might be suggested that Alevis are linked to one 
another through an amalgam of different units of organization and kinship ties. 
According to Zırh, this is “how Alevis were able to sustain their cultural 
geographies in the face of this [Ottoman] politically hostile administrative 
cartography.”271 
  Historically, dede families have a claim of being descended from the 
lineage of the 12 Imams.272 However, it is not clear whether Alevis accept this 
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claim as a fact. Even among dede families, tracing their origin to ‘Arabs’ is a 
disputed fact. Yet, this does not prevent them from asserting themselves as 
dede families. My fieldwork findings suggest that the reason why some 
families are dede families is not a concern to Alevis. Furthermore, dede 
families’ claim for this is generally accepted and already established.273 Dede 
have certain functions within Ocak. They guide a number of rituals. They also 
guide the community in their life in light of Alevi teachings, but are also guided 
by the community. According to Yaman, the dede is expected to act as a 
mentor, an educator and a role model for his followers.274 In this regard, the 
dede is also considered as “the state, the judge, and the teacher of Alevis”.275 
  These depictions about who the dede is may not be shared by all 
Alevis. Nonetheless, the distinctive feature of being a dede is to lead Alevi 
rituals. Most of them also play music and sing deyiş/nefes and are asked advice 
on all matters of life. They are expected to be someone from the yol, ‘path’, the 
Alevi way of doing things, going about in the world.  
 
Cem ritual  
  Since one of the main demands of Alevis is the recognition of cemevi 
(house of cem) as a place of worship, cem can be considered as the main ritual. 
Cem simply means gathering. There are different types of cem rituals for 
different occasions: Abdal Musa cem, hizir cem, gorgu/ikrar cem, dar cem. 
While dar cem is conducted for funerals, Abdal Musa is performed whenever 
possible. Cem is always led by a dede, who calls ‘özünü dara çekmek’, meaning 
self-criticism in light of Alevi teaching. Cem mostly revolves around twelve 
performances, referred to as "12 services" that facilitate the ritual. For example, 
the ritual would begin with "cerağ / delil uyandırmak", which is performed by 
lighting candles. This is followed by dede giving gülbang, a culture- specific 
genre of speech, considered as Alevi prayer. However, music, poetry and dance 
dominate the ritual of Cem. Another culture-specific genre of speech is called 
deyiş/nefes- Alevi poetry. While some short sections of deyiş/nefes often 
circulate verbally in Alevi daily language, deyiş/nefes is sung in melodies 
 
273 In my fieldwork observations and interviews, I haven’t encountered questioning dede’s lineage. 
The dede families and ocak formations seem to be acknowledged in time.  
274 Ali Yaman, Alevilik & Bektasilik Tarihi (NoktaKitap 2007) 156.  
275 Nedim Şahsüleymanoğlu, Alevi Örgütlerinin Tarihsel Süreci (Italik 2001) 103.  
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through a stringed musical instrument, called bağlama. Bağlama is also called 
"telli Quran" (Quran with strings) to underline its importance for Alevi 
culture.276 Bağlama and deyiş/nefes are crucial elements of cem rituals together 
with semah, a culture-specific genre of dance. The cem concludes with the dede 
serving lokma, a food-sharing ritual.  
  Cem is considered to be the representation of the Assembly of Forty 
beings.277 This is the most well-known story of the Alevi traditions. It is a story 
of a dervish gathering to which Muhammad, the Prophet of Islam, is denied 
entry as the prophet, entering instead as an ordinary poor man. There are 
different accounts of cem ritual that vary on the details. The diversity of these 
accounts is contrary to religious doctrine which need to be reconciled to the 
revelation in religion. While different accounts vary on the details, I will 
convey a version from a recent research work.278 It is important to note that 
Alevi stories might be inconsistent or varied, unlike religious doctrines, which 
need to be reconciled to the revelation in religion.  
  The gathering of Forties includes women and men, as well as 12 
Imams, who are known as ‘Forties’ (Kırklar), and it takes place when 
Muhammad is on his way back to earth after his meeting with God in heaven. 
Muhammad attempts to join the assembly as the prophet of God but is denied, 
and is then told by an angel to put his prophecy ring in the mouth of a lion, the 
guardian of the assembly. Although he does so, he is not allowed to enter until 
he presents himself as an ordinary man. When he enters and wants to be one of 
them, he is told that the Forty merges into one being and if one cuts his finger, 
each of them would feel it. Indeed, one of them cuts his finger and Muhammad 
witnesses the bleeding of the others’ fingers. One drop also falls from the sky, 
which belongs to Salman-i Farisi, who had gone out to find food and comes 
back with a single grape. Muhammad is then asked to divide a grape into 40 
pieces equally as a precondition of joining the assembly. God helps him to 
make a bucket of grape juice out of this single grape. When they all drink it, 
they “turn Semah” a form of dance performance. This is how Muhammad is 
finally accepted into the Assembly of Forty. When Muhammad returns from 
his journey, Ali gives his prophecy ring back to him, which is why Ali is also 
 
276 Ali Yaman, Alevilik & Bektasilik Tarihi (NoktaKitap 2007). 
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known as the Lion of God. This story is striking in terms of demonstrating the 
difference between Islamic and Alevi traditions and their respective views on 
the place of Muhammad.  
  As opposed to Muslims, who consider Muhammad as the prophet of 
God as a historical fact, Alevis seem indifferent to the veracity of this story. 
While some believe that it actually happened, some may be more doubtful as 
to its truth. There are also different versions of the above story. For example, 
in another version Muhammad squeezes the grape, which is enough for the 
Assembly to taste it, while in other versions, when Ali gives Muhammad's ring 
back, Muhammad tells Ali: "If I hadn't known you were born by a human, I 
would call you God". In some other versions, the Assembly rejects 
Muhammad, saying, "go and make your people do namaz (Islamic 
worship)". 279  While these versions share a common view on the place of 
Muhammad in Alevi culture, they also demonstrate that there is no particular 
doctrinal belief that is grounded in the ritual of cem.   
  During my fieldwork, I was constantly told to look at deyiş/nefes in 
order to understand what Alevism is. Deyiş/nefes is Alevi poetry, where the 
Alevi way of going about in the world is expressed. This includes Alevi values 
such as the importance of consent, love between humans, the path to 
enlightenment and becoming insan-ı kamil, as well as the Alevi's difference 
from the Semitic understanding of life. Balagangadhara considers stories as 
units of learning and teaching in Indian culture.280 While describing the place 
of stories in Indian culture, he observes that there are stories for each and every 
situation. All reasons and explanations require stories. Analogically, I suggest 
that the variety of deyiş/nefes has a similar place in Alevi culture. Some of the 
participants suggested that the Alevi use deyiş/nefes to express any situation in 
life. This is also one of the findings of my fieldwork with Alevis. Another 
participant told me in an interview for my fieldwork, "when you have a 
question mark about something, you look at deyiş/nefes, like how the Sunni 
looks at the Quran, you would look at what Shah Hatayi [one of seven 
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important bards] says about it." For example, the Alevi way of understanding 
God is described in Edip Harabi's Vahdetname in the following way:  
Daha Allah ile cihan yok iken / Biz anı var edip ilan eyledik / Hak'a 
hiçbir layık mekan yok iken / Hanemize aldık mihman eyledik 
Kendisinin ismi henüz yok idi / İsmi şöyle dursun cismi yok idi / Hiçbir 
kıyafeti resmi yok idi / Şekil verip tıpkı insan eyledik.281  
 
  It is interpreted for the utmost importance given to the human being 
in Alevi culture. With reference to other sources282, my translation of this 
deyiş/nefes would be the following: 
While God and the world did not exist / we created and announced time 
/ while there was no place for hak / we put it in our heart.  
While it did not have a name / and not even a shape / without clothes 
and picture / we gave it a shape, just like a/the human.  
 
  This deyiş/nefes is often quoted on the issue of the existence of God 
or Alevism’s link to Islam. For example, the lawyer who prepared the case of 
Sinan Işık, told me that he provided this deyiş/nefes to the ECtHR as evidence 
of Alevis’ difference from Islam. Interestingly though, the ECtHR considered 
Alevism as an instance of Islam in its judgment.283  
  Deyiş/nefes can be classified innumerably, while most notable ones 
are tevhid, duaz-i imam, miraclama, shatiye and devriye. For example devriye 
describes the Alevi way of understanding the life and death circle and the 
migration of the soul.284 A well-known devriye, by Gufrani, exemplifies this:  
"Bulut olup ağdığımı bilirim / Boran ile yağdığımı bilirim / Alt anadan 
doğduğumu bilirim / Kaç ebeden kaç soruldum kimbilir". 285  Although 
translating without losing the meaning is difficult, it could be translated as: "I 
had known [myself] of raining as a cloud / I had known [myself] of thundering 
/ I had known [myself] of born by 6 mothers / Who knows how many times I 
was nurtured by how many midwives".   
  Regarding interpretation of this deyiş/nefes, there is no consensus on 
how coming to this life again is imagined. Some Alevis consider that one can 
 
281 Dertli Divani, ‘Edip Harabi- Vahdetname’ (2015) May 20 Serçeşme Dergisi 18-22. 
282 Ibid.  
283 see Chapter 5 for further information, Sinan Işık v. Turkey App no 21924/05 (ECtHR, 2 
February 2010). 
284 Dertli Divani, ‘Sıdkı Baba – Devriye’ (2015) July-August 22 Serçeşme Dergisi 30-32.  
285 Turan Dursun, ‘Devriye uzerine yazilar’ (Turan Dursun, 9 Dec 2011), available at 
https://www.turandursun.com/forumlar/archive/index.php/t-27075.html (accessed 20 April 2018).  
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come to life as a desk or umbrella, many did not ‘know for sure’ what belief 
they should hold about it. Devriye is a good example to understand hak as 
energy circulating in life. Alevis see hak in everything in the universe, not 
solely in living things. This understanding of hak is embedded in the culture. 
Quoting from my memory with a dede in London, me and him left the cemevi 
in Ridley Road, walking to the bus station, it was raining. He did not have an 
umbrella, while I have a crook umbrella. When I was saying loud that umbrella 
is crook, he said ‘semsiyeyi gucendirmeyelim’, you find hak in semsiye too as 
in everything in cosmos.  
  Deyiş/nefes is composed infinitely, as many as circumstances in life. 
For example, one of the participants encountered a new genre called sefalama, 
while inquiring about a deyiş/nefes she had heard recently. However, learning 
through deyiş/nefes is not an obvious way of learning, according to the 
participants. The lyrics of deyiş/nefes also create a language specific to Alevis, 
which is called 'the language of the path'. Most of the participants stated that 
although they began understanding their culture or what deyiş/nefes is actually 
saying at later stages of their lives, they had listened to deyiş/nefes since their 
childhood. For example, one of the participants shared her memory about 
devriye genre of deyiş/nefes, which expresses the life-death circle:  
I did not know many things about the path [Alevi culture], I began at a 
later stage of my life [...] when I heard about devriye in mekteb-i irfan. 
I remember my grandma used to tell me a story when I was a child. It 
was about a child, who was born in a village, describing a place in the 
outskirts of the village very precisely and claiming to be living there 
previously. But the child is very small that he could not have gone to 
that place on his own. So a lot of things are actually coming up from 
my childhood, during these muhabbet gatherings now. 
 
  Alevi music travels to different places through regular visits of dede, 
bağlama players and bards. This provides a connection between scattered 
Alevi communities. This musical instrument bears great importance for the 
transmission of the culture, even in the midst of persecutions against the Alevi. 
For some, following the urbanisation of the Alevi, the culture survived through 
the bağlama, as the most important medium of Alevi gatherings. In these 
gatherings, as nefes/deyiş would be played along with bağlama, the entire 
experience generates an Alevi way of articulating memory. Indeed, I am often 
told that most Alevi families, even those who keep a low profile or are 
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assimilated, possess a bağlama at home. Even if no one would play, it is kept 
at home for occasional visitors who would play it. Indeed, those who identify 
themselves as 'not really Alevi, but atheist', underlined the role of Alevi music 
as their only tie to Alevism.  
  Alevi children are exposed to Alevi music at a very young age. 
Balagangadhara observes "If a child is exposed to stories at all levels of social 
construction [...] they are ingredients in the process of learning with others. 
Stories function as the units of learning process."286 As explained above, it 
might be suggested that bağlama and deyiş/nefes would have a similar role in 
the Alevi meta-learning mechanism. In parallel, Alevi children are usually 
encouraged by their families to play the bağlama. For example, one of the 
participants described how she used to watch her father playing bağlama, 
writing down whatever came out of his mouth or repeating whatever 
deyiş/nefes he sang in her childhood.  
  Moreover, most participants are of the opinion that in learning 
deyiş/nefes, bağlama is important since melody makes remembering easier. 
Rao suggests that acoustic performance - non-writing nurtures different 
abilities in individuals, instead of reading, it teaches active listening. 287 
Similarly, one of the participants explained that she had read the anthology of 
deyiş/nefes, as she had been advised to do in order to understand what Alevism 
is. However, she said she had not understood anything by merely reading the 
anthology. She emphasised that her way of learning was by listening and tuning 
in to deyiş/nefes along with bağlama and participating in performances at 
different Alevi gatherings. Some other participants also agreed that it is easy to 
memorise deyiş/nefes with the help of melodies.288 
  Another ability that Alevi music nurtures might be composing and 
improvising. Rao points out the role of improvisation and composition for 
articulating memory in Indian culture. During one of the discussions over 
introducing modern musical notes to bağlama playing, those who argue against 
 
286 S. N. Balagangadhara, ‘ “We Shall Not Cease from Exploring” An Invitation Disguised as a 
Position Paper Composed at the Behest of Arena for the Theme “Decolonizing Social 
Sciences”’(unpublished 1985), available at  
https://www.academia.edu/4214176/We_Shall_Not_Cease_from_Exploration (accessed 12 April 
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287 D Venkat Rao, Cultures of Memory in South Asia (Springer 2014). 
288 My fieldwork observations. 
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playing with notes expressed their worries that this might hamper the need of 
the bağlama player to improvise, as the player acts upon the entire atmosphere 
of the experience. It is interesting that someone supporting the inclusion of 
musical notes objected to this argument by pointing out that they are all Alevis 
in their roots, having listened to the deyiş/nefes since their childhood, and that 
if anyone wants to improvise, of course they would do so. This remark 
obliquely suggests that being an Alevi and growing up in the culture teaches 
one the ability to improvise.  
  One of the 12 services of the cem ritual is the semah, the Alevi 
dance. However, some participants disagreed with the notion that semah is only 
a dance; for them it is a way to reach hak and therefore stressed that it is a type 
of worship (ibadet). As with deyiş/nefes, the genres/types of semah are infinite. 
Every local Alevi community generates or modifies different semah genres. 
This is similar to what Rao calls 'genre defying genre' in order to explain the 
Indian cultural formations with reference to performances and the medium of 
the body to articulate memory.289 Similarly, I was told that the type of semah 
and even the execution of a particular type of semah might be constantly 
improvised, depending on the improvisation of the bağlama player, which is 
also called "aska gelmek" in the ritual. According to Rao, in the Indian context, 
"the most powerful material and tangible modes of articulating memory are 
speech and gesture".290 This makes memory something that is nurtured in the 
body of the being, brought forth in practices". 291 Similarly, for the Alevi, 
memory is something nurtured by and in the body and brought forth as 
practices through the medium of music, poetry and dance.  
 
  Pişmek - Acquiring experience as an Alevi with the Alevi meta-
learning mechanism 
  "Pişmek" is a verb, which signifies acquiring the skills of being an 
Alevi. During my fieldwork, I noticed that it is the most common concept that 
emerged in reference to the cultural reproduction and identity construction of 
the Alevi. Being an Alevi, learning and teaching the Alevi culture have a strong 
emphasis on performances. One learns by performing, actively participating in 
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a ritual. In this regard, memory is also nurtured by the body. Secondly, 
performances should be acted out within the community. One can learn and 
live as a Muslim or Christian as an isolated individual. However, the Alevi 
needs a community for his/her very existence. Thus, the self is constructed 
within and is thus dependent on the community. All of the participants agree 
that one becomes an Alevi by "pişmek". This means one has to participate in 
the muhabbet and cem rituals and other performances in order to comprehend 
the Alevi culture. For example, one of the participants said that when he was 
asking questions about Alevism, his family used to tell him "you will 
understand when you participate". Another participant described how 
deyiş/nefes is composed out of the accumulation of cultural repertoire from 
experience. In this regard, it resembles what is called 'action-knowledge', that 
is, "to develop the ability of performing and improving actions".292   
 
  Tradition versus religion  
   With this structure of culture as explained above in mind, the 
controversy over the accorded resemblance of Alevism to Islam might stem 
from the prominent place of some Islamic figures within Alevi traditions, such 
as Ali and the twelve Imams. This analysis is especially useful to elucidate on 
the reasons why Alevism is constructed as an Islamic tradition, given the 
apparent elements of Islam occupying an important place in Alevi culture. 
Drawing on the above analysis of Alevi culture and the theoretical framework, 
one may infer that Kızılbaş/Alevis indeed embrace various figures into their 
tradition and the circulation of these figures is different from their meaning in 
Islam or Christianity. Unlike Islam, in Alevi traditions, there are multiple Ali 
figures, who lived in different eras. For instance, one of the participants 
decoded the deyiş/nefes "those who don't know me, should know me. Ali is me 
and I am Ali" by Pir Sultan Abdal, one of 7 great bards, as meaning that the 
participant wanted to proclaim himself as the Ali of his time. Another 
participant also underlined that both the Sunni and the Alevi refer to Ali; but 
they do so differently. Yet elements from Alevi culture that are packed as 
 
292 S.N. Balagangadhara, ‘Comparative Anthropology and Action Sciences: An Essay on Knowing 
to Act and Acting to Know’ (1987) 40 (2) Philosophica 77-107, 86. 
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religion, as formulated in Alevism, possibly as a belief system, syncretic 
religion or heterodox Islam, depend on who conceives (the conceiver). 
 
3. 5. Sunnitization of the Ottoman Empire / Secularisation of Islam 
 
  The Kızılbaş293  were labelled and persecuted as heretics by the 
Ottomans following the Battle of Çaldıran in early 16th century.294This thesis 
does not aim to scrutinise how the universalisation dynamic through 
secularisation played itself out in the history of Islam. As Balagangadhara also 
accepts that his account for the mechanism of conversion (effacing the 
otherness of the other) is abstract and his analysis of idolatry is based on 
Christianity. 
   The cultural plateau, which prepared the ground for the emergence 
of the Kızılbaş movement, is complex.295 Historians underscore the ambiguity 
of the religious beliefs of different communities in Anatolia (historical name 
for the Asian part of Turkey, where the Alevi lived). Kafadar suggests that 
although “the early Ottomans chose to retain several of their ‘shamanistic’ 
notions or, rather, to redefine them within a syncretistic understanding of 
Islam”, this presumably reflects a peculiar understanding of Islam adopted by 
the gazi warriors and dervishes, who were instrumental in gaining power in 
Anatolia.296 Kafadar problematises the use of Shamanism to address anything 
pre-Islamic and Turkish belief and suggests the term ‘metadoxy’ that is 
“beyond doxies in order to capture the religious complexity of medieval 
Anatolia.”297 Similar to Kafadar, some other scholars also note the difficulty 
of mapping the variety of cultural and religious practices of medieval 
Anatolia.298 For instance, Karamustafa emphasises the scarcity of information 
about different forms of religiosity in medieval Anatolia and the Islamisation 
of the region. Based on his research on Sufism, he notes the lack of Islamic 
theologians, emphasising instead that medieval Anatolia witnessed many Sufi 
 
293 How the Alevi were named before 19th century.  
294 During the 16th century Ottoman records inform us about Kızılbaş rebellions. 
295 See the discussion about the religiosity of medieval Anatolia, in Chapter 3.5. 
296 Cemal Kafadar, Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Univ of 
California Press 1995) 53.  
297 Ibid 76.  
298 Ahmet T Karamustafa, God's Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle 
Period 1200-1550 (University of Utah Press 1994); Selim Deringil, The Well-protected Domains: 
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and mystical movements.299 He states that “an exceptionally high number of 
dervish groups were in operation in Asia Minor and the Balkans during this 
time.”300  
  The time period that these scholars examine accounts for the Babai 
revolts, prior to the emergence of the Kızılbaş movement, the Babai being 
considered the ancestors of Alevis in the narrative of Alevism. 301  These 
dervish groups were known for their deviant practices and beliefs outside of 
Sharia and for their distinctive appearance such as shaven heads and eye 
brows, wandering almost naked, using hashish and playing musical 
instruments.302 As such, they were at odds with the Sufi movements as well. 
For Karamustafa, it is imperative to consider the importance of veneration for 
the Prophet Mohammad’s family lineage, the concern to trace their lineage to 
the Prophet and the belief in saints,303 in order to understand the Islam that was 
practiced in Anatolia between the 13th and 16th centuries.304What is interesting 
here is that he accounts for affiliations with Mohammad’s lineage and the place 
of evliyas in stories by assuming that these are indicators of belief in Islam, 
albeit ‘non-orthodox.’ Hence, he disregards the possibility of practices 
showing veneration to some common figures with Islam to fall outside of 
Islam. I argue that this disregard stems from the compulsion of ‘seeing’ 
practices as manifestations of beliefs which refer to a world view.  
   What all this historical analysis shows is that we do not have 
sufficient knowledge about the religiosity and religiousness of multiple 
movements in medieval Anatolia. In this regard, the scholars who associated 
the ‘ancestors’ of today’s Alevis, either those involved in Babai revolts or the 
Kızılbaş movement, with ‘metadoxy’, ‘shamanic’, ‘syncretic’ or ‘heterodox’, 
merely provide explanations on the presupposition that these traditions adhere 
to this or that religion. In this regard, they presuppose the existence of religion 
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and try to present explanations concerning its nature. This is similar to the 
quandary into which Balagangadhara inquired regarding the intellectual 
paradigm on religious studies in the sense that the explanans assume the 
veracity of their explanandum.305  
  Analogously speaking, the 15th century witnesses a similar dynamic 
between Christianity and Islam in terms of a battle against idolatry, which is 
explained in Chapter 2. While the Protestant Reformation paved the way for an 
anti-confessional movement that gradually considered true worship in terms of 
conscience and consequently in the private realm, I argue that Sunnitization of 
the Ottoman Empire gradually brought about a certain kind of secularisation 
by absorbing idolatrous traditions into Sufi brotherhoods, which also began 
around the 15th century. While the Ottoman Empire endorsed a process of 
Sunnitization, non-Islamic elements were appropriated into Sufi brotherhoods.  
  One of these Sufi brotherhoods is the Bektaşi order. The Bektaşi 
order was formed with the support of the Ottomans in the 13th Century 
following the Babai Uprising, which was a protest by Anatolian dervishes.306 
Although it was not their sole aim, the Ottomans aimed to Islamise non-
Muslims such as the Kızılbaş, paving the way for institutionalising the Bektaşi 
tradition.307 The Bektaşi order remained relatively immune from the Ottoman 
pressure due to the fact that the Janissaries, a major military unit of the Ottoman 
army, recognized Hacı Bektaş as their ‘pir’, or spiritual guide. Their affiliation 
with the Bektaşi dergah in Kirsehir is thus significant. Karamustafa argues that 
while some of these deviant dervish groups “ceased to exist as independent 
social collectivities”, “the Bektaşi dervish group was transformed into a full-
fledged Sufi order”. 308  The Bektaşi order is important for today’s Alevis. 
Indeed, the term ‘Alevi/Bektaşi’ has been gaining prominence both in literature 
 
305 In addition to these explanatory accounts, some scholars, exemplified in the writings of Serif 
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and general discourse as well as in the politico-legal contexts on which this 
dissertation focuses, while ‘Kızılbaş/Alevi/Bektaşi’ is also used.309  
  The Bektaşi order was named after Hacı Bektaş, who is highly 
respected by today’s Alevis. Hacı Bektaş is believed to have migrated from 
Central Asia and to have been involved with the Babai Revolt.310 According to 
Melikoff,  
Hacı Bektaş was no theologian. He had not studied in the Medrese as 
did Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, who was his contemporary. He was a 
mystic, born among the people who remained near to the people. 
Though he was a Muslim, he did not give up ancient practices and 
customs of Central Asia. He was a healer and thaumaturge. This is 
clearly seen from his hagiography, the Vilayetname. It tells us that Hacı 
Bektaş did not like to pray in mosque. He would climb a mountain with 
his abdals. […] The dervishes used to light fires and dance around 
them, performing the sema, ecstatic dance.311 
 
It is not clear what makes Hacı Bektaş a Muslim in Melikoff’s words, 
especially so when she adds that the tribes to which Hacı Bektaş was affiliated 
in Central Asia were not all Muslims yet, even though they had embraced 
Islam.312  
  The Kızılbaş are considered ‘village Bektaşis’ by Köprülü because 
of the similarities of beliefs and practices between Bektaşi and Kızılbaş.313 
Melikoff also suggests that despite being examples of religious syncretism at 
their early stages, Kızılbaş and Bektaşi were differentiated later on: the latter 
used to lead a sedentary life, while the former used to be nomadic or semi-
nomadic. In this connection, she notes that the term Alevi took the place of 
Kızılbaş, because of the pejorative meaning of the latter. 314  The main 
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difference between the Bektaşi order and Kızılbaş/Alevi communities is the 
ocak structure, which is still presented as the reason why Alevism cannot be 
considered a Sufi tradition by Islamic theologians.315 The initiation to a Sufi 
order like the Bektaşi order is open to all, while one can be born an Alevi and 
prefer to be initiated into his/her own ocak and its specific dede lineage.316   
  Earlier in this thesis, I described the dynamic of religion and the 
concept of idolatry within a religion as well as the mechanism in which non-
religious traditions are denied otherness and absorbed into religion as another 
religion (idolatry). I have elaborated this dynamic of religion through the 
example of the Protestant Reformation. Before analysing the transplantation of 
the above ideas emanating from Christian theology, I draw an analogy: the 15th 
century also marks a similar dynamic in the case of Islam, which will be 
described through the Ottomans’ battle against idolatry and Kızılbaş. Today’s 
Alevis, historically known as Kızılbaş, appeared in Ottoman records of the 15th 
century as heretics and fierce supporters of Shah Ismail, who led the Safavid 
Empire. According to the historian Karakaya, the Safavid dynasty was 
established as a Sufi order in Ardabil, Iran, in the 13th century, but it 
“transformed into a radical religio-political movement espousing features of 
what orthodox Muslims would call Shiʿi ghuluww” 317  by the mid-15th 
century. 318  The Safavids were defeated by the Ottomans at the Battle of 
Çaldıran in 1514. This was the first military chalenge that the Ottomans 
initiated against another Muslim empire, as noted by historians.  
  According to Kafadar, the debates among Ottoman scholars and 
statesmen concerning the correctness of some of the practices of their ancestors 
began later around the Safavid conflict.319 Terzioglu argues that Sunnitification 
had been a gradual process that reached its peak in the 16th century following 
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the Ottoman-Safavid conflict. Her research into this process draws attention to 
ilmihals as a genre of catechism. Her analysis of ilmihals reveals that although 
these catechisms of the early 15th century were more concerned with 
demarcating the boundary between Muslims and non-Muslims, later examples 
of the 17th century covered matters of Sunni-Shia differences, following the 
conflict with the Safavids. From the 16th century, ilmihal writers began 
emphasising the denominational factor: "In an effort to bring them to par, the 
‘ilm-i hal writers not only instructed their readers in what to believe, how to 
worship, and how to conduct themselves with other people, but also drafted 
long and detailed lists of beliefs, utterances and practices that would place them 
outside the circles of right-believing Muslims" against erroneous Islam.320 In 
other words, the necessity to draw the boundaries of the Sunni Muslim 
believers of the Ottoman Empire gained increasing importance. This boundary 
is drawn against the realm of idolatry or false worship. Similarly, De Roover’s 
historical analysis of the Protestant Reformation points to the role of 
catechisms in Europe in consolidating the realm of true worship within 
Christianity.  
 
3. 6. Tanzimat Reforms - Transplantation of Religious Toleration in the 
Ottoman Empire 
 
  The fact that the liberal model of religious toleration is based on 
Christian theology may pose an obstacle for its application, since, as explained 
above, this model is entrenched in Christian theological concepts for its 
intelligibility. Therefore, applying it in non-Christian contexts may bring 
unpredictable outcomes.  
  The Sunnitization of the Ottoman Empire had continued from the 
15th century onwards.321 The process also led to the emergence of different Sufi 
brotherhoods some of which absorbed ‘deviant’ dervish groups, like the 
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Bektaşi Order, named after Hacı Bektaş, highly respected by Alevis today. The 
place of religion in the general administrative set-up of the Ottoman Empire 
was complicated. Despite being referred to as ‘the millet system’, scholars 
argue that it was far from an established system, at least until the 18th 
century.322 The millet system was based on the differentiation between Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities of the Empire. However, Bayır underlines the 
complexity of accommodating diversity based on pluralist legal systems in the 
Ottoman Empire that could not be reduced to a simplistic reading of the millet 
system as Muslim and non-Muslim communities. 323  Rather, there was a 
complex diversity among these Muslim and non-Muslim communities that the 
Ottoman pluralist governance addressed in different ways at the local level.324 
In this regard, instead of a center-periphery axis, a regional-individual 
differentiation based on a person’s occupation, place of residence and social 
status as well as religious affiliation would influence the laws that would be 
applicable. In this regard, evidence shows that religious affiliation was not the 
sole basis for accommodating diversity in the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, 
further research is needed to understand the legal status of communities like 
the Alevi, who were not clearly classified as falling either within Islam or 
outside it. Many Alevi writers claim that the Alevi would solve their problems 
among themselves, without recourse to the Ottoman legal apparatus. 325 
However, there is not sufficient research to substantiate Alevis’ legal status in 
the Ottoman Empire.  
  The early 19th Century marks a series of reforms in the Ottoman 
Empire, known as Tanzimat. Tanzimat reforms not only introduced the idea of 
religious freedom and equality of all subjects of the Empire, but also limited 
the centuries-long practice of legally pluralistic systems of managing diversity. 
This Ottoman traditional system of governance that was summarised above 
began to be replaced by a transition of the Empire to a modern state inspired 
by developments in Europe. Thus, these 19th century reforms marked the end 
of this era and the beginning of efforts to centralise legal and governmental 
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systems. The series of reforms were introduced by the Sublime Porte, with the 
proclamation of the Gülhane decree in 1839 that stipulated the equality of 
Muslim and non-Muslim subjects before the law. Hence it also marked the first 
official recognition of the principle of religious tolerance. 
  Tanzimat reforms were not introduced with a clear set of aims by 
the Sublime Porte to maintain an 'equal' governance of its subjects; rather it 
was an imposed politico-legal response to pressure by European powers 
regarding the perceived oppression of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman 
Empire.326 Tanzimat was seen as an excuse to intervene in the protection of 
Christian subjects of the Empire and therefore led to increased missionary 
activity in different parts of the Empire. 327 It is not clear to what extent this 
objective of providing protection for non-Muslims was achieved. For instance, 
in his book Culture of Sectarianism, Makdisi argues that sectarianism in Mount 
Lebanon was a modern construct that "emerged at the crossroads of Ottoman 
modernization, European colonization and local Lebanon order", by 
demonstrating the interplay between different communities of Mount Lebanon, 
who interacted with the European powers, different Christian missionaries and 
the centralising efforts of Ottoman rulers following the reforms of Tanzimat.328 
In this connection, keeping in mind De Roover’s analysis together with 
Makdisi’s findings, it is possible to suggest that transplantation of religious 
toleration to the Ottoman Empire accentuated religion as the primary marker 
for identifying communities. Unlike the complex hierarchy and different 
affiliations in which the Millet system operated, a framework of religious 
toleration configured these multiple affiliations around religion and then 
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3. 7. Christian Missionary Encounters with the Kızılbaş/Alevi  
 
  In support of the above argument, it is interesting to note that 
research into the religious roots of Kızılbaş/Alevis began with the work of 
Christian missionaries.329 The Tanzimat reforms provided a legal justification 
for Christian missionary activity, since it promulgated equal rights for non-
Muslim communities and therefore marked a transition to a new system. Thus 
the missionaries and foreign representatives in the Empire perceived the 
reforms as justification for their activity and considered themselves as the 
inspectors of reforms and protectors of the Christian communities.330  
  The Kızılbaş had been a concern of the Ottoman rulers for centuries 
and they were considered heretics. However, there were no efforts made to 
find out exactly what the Kızılbaş believed in. In a way, there was a limited 
accommodation of the Kızılbaş, so long as they did not rebel against Ottoman 
rule, while the Kızılbaş lived in isolated geographical areas to avoid 
confrontation.331 Missionaries noted the 'heterodox' nature of the Kızılbaş and 
their pagan traditions, which are, at times, similar to Islamic traditions and 
Christian traditions. Within this trajectory, Karakaya argues that:  
Fascinated by their idiosyncratic beliefs and practices, the missionaries 
presumed that the Kızılbaş were most likely descendants of an ancient 
Christian stock, made Muslim through the force of the sword. They 
depicted the Kızılbaş sect as pseudo-Islamic and syncretistic, marked 
by heavy doses of Christian and pagan elements.332  
 
  Despite the confusion over the “roots” of the Kızılbaş/Alevi, it was 
clear that they had to be converted to the true path. However, this was not an 
easy task. A Protestant missionary from the American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) asserts that: “The 
‘Kuzzlebash’, presented as a subgroup of the Kurds, would however be 
pantheist; while they accepted Christ as divine, it does not mean too much 
since they accepted other religious figures and living beings, as well as parts 
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of nature, as divine”.333 Missionary memoirs also mention the difficulty of 
converting Kızılbaş-Alevis on the grounds that “their particular ideas of fate, 
pantheism, and the transmigration of souls make it difficult for them to grasp 
Christian doctrine”.334 Missionaries wanted to consider Kızılbaş as people of 
concern and were willing to call them to the Christian truth, as memoirs and 
reports indicate. However, the ambiguous religious status of Kızılbaş 
communities as heretics, but not Christians and not non-Muslims,335 in other 
words a status, which was not settled, raised the possibility of a conflict of 
interest with Ottoman rulers, because Christian missionary activity among 
Muslim communities was forbidden.336 Given this background, and despite 
their initial excitement about potential converts, missionaries were cautious 
about spreading God's word among the Kızılbaş. They wanted to avoid having 
trouble with Ottoman rulers, particularly because the Sublime Porte was not 
happy with missionary activity and kept it under surveillance. Hence, it did not 
take long for the missionaries to halt their interest in the Kızılbaş communities.  
  The missionaries' efforts to convert the Alevi also demonstrate the 
indifference of the Alevi to Christian doctrine.337 From the records of ABCFM, 
a letter from Mr. Herrick charged with missionary activity in Anatolia, dated 
1865, noted that: 
Some things are now clear. 1. These people were formerly, though 
nominally Mohammedans, really heathens; paying a respect amounting 
to worship to their chief Sheiks, and from time to time bowing 
idolatrously before wands cut from a certain tree, and kept in the houses 
of their Sheiks. But 2. their religious faith and customs had too little of 
substance and body to hold them firmly, and their faith in Mohammed 
and the Koran was, and was known to be, a mere lip confession. When, 
therefore, some dozen years ago, Armenian Protestant brethren brought 
them the gospel, they professed, whether in sincerity or with hope of 
advantage, to receive it; and ever since that time, some score or two of 
houses are known as Protestant; and they adhere to this profession, 
although they have suffered a great deal of persecution from other 
Koords. 3. They are now very timid and fearful. This timidity is so 
great, that one can make nothing of their talk while other Koords are 
present; for then they will avow precisely the same belief in 
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Mohammed and the Koran as in Jesus and the Gospel, and express 
almost entire indifference as to learning to read, or for instruction of 
any kind.338 
 
  The acceptance of Mohammad as well as Jesus by the Kızılbaş/Alevi 
was not considered enough for their conversion by the missionaries. As noted 
in Chapter 2, to have an explanatorily intelligible account of the cosmos and 
religion itself, in other words to have an epistemic approach to tradition, the 
‘truth’ of religion’s claims carries the utmost importance and thus faith is 
required. However, Alevis do not consider other traditions as competing 
systems of belief with Alevism. Therefore, it might be suggested that the 
Kızılbaş/Alevi was blind to the proselytisation efforts of missionaries. 
Additionally, Karakaya notes that the missionaries gave up their interest in 
converting the Kızılbaş/Alevi in the early 20th Century due to political tensions 
with the Sublime Porte.  
 
3. 8. Counter Missionary Activity –  the Late Ottoman Period  
 
  Missionary activity gathered momentum during the 1880s and 
1890s with British, American, Russian, and French missionaries operating in 
different areas of the Ottoman Empire. This increased missionary activity led 
to a situation in which, according to Jeremy Salt, “the relationship that 
developed between the missionaries and the Ottoman government was one of 
mutual suspicion and mutual dislike.”339 For instance, Deringil’s research of 
the Hamidian era after the Tanzimat reforms reveals that the Sublime Porte 
closely monitored missionary publications.340Missionary activity to convert 
the Kızılbaş/Alevi prompted Ottoman rulers’ interest in the Kızılbaş/Alevi 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
  Sultan Abdulhamit II initiated counter-missionary activity based on 
the Hanefi school of Islam. This counter-missionary activity focused on 
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opening new schools and building new mosques to convert the nominal 
Muslims of the Empire who had been left to their own pagan practices.341 In 
this vein, Deringil suggests that “an ideological war reminiscent of the late 
Cold War” between Islam and Christianity took place through missionary 
activities342 since the Ottoman aims were similar to those of the missionaries, 
with respect to their method of schooling and conversion.343 The Sublime 
Porte sent agents to gather information about the Kızılbaş communities. The 
first reports of the Hamidian era reported that the Kızılbaş might refer to 
themselves as Muslims, but that this should not be respected as they had no 
relation to Islam and were indeed pagans.344 According to an imperial order of 
1890, catechisms (ilmihal) and Imams were sent to Kızılbaş communities to 
convert them to Islam.345  
  This counter-missionary activity was also part of promoting 
Ottomanism blended with pan-Islamism as a policy for the Empire’s survival 
in an age of rising nationalist movements.346 The Ottomans were increasingly 
losing territory with the Russian threat in eastern Anatolia. Nationalist 
movements sparked riots that ended up in further loss of territory in the 
Balkans. Against nationalist sentiments, the Sublime Porte tried to propagate 
the idea of Ottomanism, blended with Pan-Islamism. 347 Insecurity in eastern 
Anatolia, where Armenian communities threatened an alliance with Russia, 
increased the importance of the Kızılbaş for the Sublime Porte. In this regard, 
the first reports of the Hamidian era also emphasised the risk that went with 
the close connection between Kızılbaş and Armenian communities.348 Based 
on Alandagli’s research, one of these reports indeed stated that the Kızılbaş 
were only nominally Muslim and in reality were no different from the 
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Kızılbaşlık, Alevilik, Bektaşilik (Iletisim 2015) 230. 
346 Selim Deringil, The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the 
Ottoman Empire (IB Tauris 1999). 
347 Alişan Akpınar, ‘II. Abdulhamit Dönemi Devlet Zihniyetinin Alevi Algısı’ in Yalçın Çakmak, 
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Armenians. 349 In this connection, Alandağlı argues that the Kızılbaş were 
labelled as an unreliable group, who might well support the Armenians against 
the Ottomans.350  Notably, the Kızılbaş had been considered unreliable by 
Ottoman rulers ever since the Ottoman-Safavid conflict and, in this sense at 
least, the reports of the 19th century in connection to the Armenian issue 
reproduced an older epithet.  
 
From the perspective of Islamic theology – tariqa or mezhep?  
  From the perspective of Islamic theology, Alevism is a displaced 
phenomenon. The most relevant terms applied to Alevis are mezhep or tariqa. 
Indeed, the recent claims made about Alevism/Bektaşism by CEM in the 
ECtHR case of Dogan v Turkey represents it as a Sufi tariqa.351 Mezhep means 
the road to be taken in Arabic, referring to a school of law in Islam. 352 
According to Gölpınarlı, different mezheps are united in certain faith 
requirements but differ in minor aspects. To illustrate, fasting during Ramadan 
is one of the main faith requirements and cannot be overridden by a mezhep.353 
To remain within the fold of Islam, Imam Gazali listed the three requirements: 
faith in God Allah; his prophet Mohammad, books and angels; and belief in the 
afterlife. 354  Gölpınarlı differentiates between knowledge as mezhep and 
wisdom as tariqa. In this regard, for him, while mezheps would differ in their 
understanding of what Sharia entails, tariqas would focus on the mystical 
aspects of Islam (tasavvuf) as ways that help believers to reach God.355  
  Regarding the place of Alevism within Islamic theology, Gölpınarlı 
considers Bektaşism to be a tariqa, but not Alevism. From the perspective of 
Islamic theology, Alevism cannot be considered as a tariqa because there is no 
initiation to be an Alevi: one is born into being an Alevi.356 There is also the 
issue of excommunication (düşkünlük) if anyone marries a non-Alevi 
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according to the tradition. As opposed to this structure, tariqas gain members 
through initiation ceremonies, as one becomes a Bektaşi after initiation. In 
Alevism one’s spiritual guide is a dede, who is considered to be a descendant 
of Mohammad, the source of his charisma. Whereas in a tariqa, one follows a 
clear hierarchical order to reach certain spiritual positions and to attract 
students in turn. Similarly, a dede cannot chose his lineage and thus which 
Alevi communities to guide because this is predetermined according to his 
ocak affiliation. In a tariqa, followers are free to subscribe to the spiritual guide 
(baba) they prefer. A Bektaşi can choose his/her spiritual guide, whereas an 
Alevi youth cannot chose which dede to subscribe to.357 Similarly, another 
theologian Kaplan underlines this difference between Bektaşism with its own 
tariqa rules such as initiation, and Alevism, as an umbrella term that emerged 
in the 19th century, which historically refers to the Kızılbaş communities.358  
  Despite these differences, the similarities between Bektaşi and Alevi 
rituals and practices are striking. Gölpınarlı considers that both of them stem 
from the Hutuvvet current of mystic Islam. In this vein, trying to reconcile 
Alevi traditions with Islamic theology, Gölpınarlı argues that Alevism can 
neither be a mezhep due to a lack of distinguished theology, nor a tariqa 
because of its different structural system known as ocak. Therefore he refers to 
Alevism as ‘a social mezhep’ or indeed ‘a social religion’.359 Similarly, another 
theologian, Fığlalı, suggests that given human nature, different Muslim 
communities continued carrying the imprints of their culture so long as it did 
not contradict Islam and “painted these elements with the paint of Islam and 
gave a new shape; that is to say they muslimize [these elements].”360 According 
to him, Alevis are perfect examples of this phenomenon. In parallel, he 
continues, Alevis are proper Muslims who retained some of their pre-Islamic 
practices with a sycnretic mind.361 While Fığlalı claims that these ‘pre-Islamic’ 
practices were islamised, he presumes that Alevis are Muslims with an 
incomplete conversion process.  
  According to Kaplan, whose book was published and awarded for 
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Islamic Studies by the Diyanet in 2010, the Kızılbaş movement was founded 
during the Ottoman-Safavid conflict as a tariqa that emphasised the twelve 
imams and love of the Prophet’s family (Ehl-i beyt). However, they were 
alienated both by the Ottomans for their rebelliousness and by the Safavids, 
who declared Twelve Imam Shiism as the state religion and who were 
furthermore defeated by the Ottomans and thus did not maintain contact with 
the Kızılbaş. As a result, the Kızılbaş lived in isolated areas of Anatolia and 
were hence ‘left on their own’ to practice folk Islam. Eventually they lost their 
tariqa structure. Those who left these isolated areas and migrated to urban areas 
became Bektaşis. This account implies that Alevism is a form of degenerated 
tariqa. From the perspective of Islamic theology, Alevism bears scrutiny only 
as a deviant tariqa, which needs to be corrected. In this connection, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 4.2 on Diyanet, Alevis’ recognition demands for cemevi 
as the Alevi place of worship has to be denied, since the Islamic theology does 
not accept any place of worship other than the mosque. Thus, under the rubric 
of heterodox Islam, they ought to be corrected from the perspective of Islamic 
theology. Additionally, from this point of view, it would be difficult to consider 
a place where music is played and dance is performed as a place of worship. 
The section below discusses the 19th century, when Alevism began to be seen 
as the religion of diverse Kızılbaş communities with the work of missionaries 
and was taken up by Ottoman statesmen, before the foundation of the Turkish 
Republic.  
 
3. 9. The Committee of Union and Progress, Turkish Nation-building and 
the Kızılbaş/Alevis   
 
  The reign of Abdulhamit II came to an end with the Young Turk 
Revolution at the turn of the 20th century (1908), which restored the first 
Ottoman constitution dating from 1878. The Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP), founded by the Young Turks, governed the Empire until the end of the 
First World War. During this time, the Young Turks, who received education 
in Europe and were influenced by the Enlightenment (ie. Positivism), were 
concerned with formulating novel ways to ensure the social cohesion of 
diverse communities of the Empire. However, the period in which they were 
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in power brought about increasing communal violence and the CUP’s violent 
repression.362 
  During the reign of Abdulhamit II, the war with Russia and loss of 
territories in Europe had changed the demographics of Anatolia in favour of 
ethnic Turks for the first time. During the CUP period, the Balkan Wars (1912-
1914) traumatised the minds of the Ottoman rulers due to the enormous 
number of Muslim refugees flooding into Anatolia.363 The devastating failure 
and losses of territory in the Balkan Wars prompted an ideological shift from 
Ottomanism to Turkism. According to Berkes, the CUP “no longer meant the 
union of its various ethnic elements, but the unification of the Turks”.364 
Similarly, Dressler emphasises how, following the Balkan Wars, the 
publications of CUP affiliates increasingly focused upon Turkish nationalism 
and suggests this period as “a crucial phase in the sorting out of the respective 
plausibilities of political projects organized around notions of constitutional 
citizenship (Ottomanism), ethno-religious nationalism (Turkism), and 
religious communalism (Islamism)”.365  
  At the turn of the 20th century, therefore, the CUP commissioned a 
mission to eastern Anatolia to gather information about the population, 
initially aimed at demographic engineering in the region in favour of Muslims 
to prevent the alliance of non-Muslim Armenians with Russia. 366  Thus, 
collecting information on the Kızılbaş communities was part of a larger social 
engineering plan. Baha Said, who was commissioned to gather information on 
the Kızılbaş communities, began publishing his findings in 1918.367 For him, 
since the Kızılbaş worshipped in the Turkish language, “Bektaşism and 
Kızılbaşism were the two currents who would still follow the old Turkish 
religion, described as natural religion dedicated to the ideal of “earth is my 
mother, heaven my father.”” 368  He further considered the Kızılbaş and 
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Bektaşis as having “lived a national existence and understood religion within 
a national life and consciousness.”369 From this perspective, the late Ottoman 
statesmen considered peculiar Alevi beliefs and practices as the heritage of 
Shamanic Turks, whose roots were traced back to Central Asia. Therefore, 
Dressler finds the ideal and practical role of religion in the formation of 
Turkish Nationalism as imperative to understand how the new concept of 
Alevism was founded.370 For him, “the ‘discovery’ of the Kızılbaş/Alevis as a 
community of national importance took place within the tumultuous period 
from the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 to the 1930s in the Turkish Republic, 
parallel to the formation of Turkish nationalism.”371 He suggests that “toward 
the end of the First World War, when the Ottomans were put under extreme 
pressure by the Allied forces, who wanted to change the balance of political 
power in favour of non-Muslims, the various religious groups at the margins 
of Islam became a subject of increased interest for the Turkish nationalists, 
who endeavoured to combine forces against non-Muslim aspirations in the 
region”372. In this vein, for Baha Said, the Kızılbaş were important as they 
revealed the original Turkish culture. Putting the emphasis on culture rather 
than religion, he could attribute Kızılbaş and Bektaşi difference to ancient 
Turkish shamanism. 
  The ideological shift from Ottomanism to building Turkish 
nationalism at a time of confusion during the transition from the Ottoman 
Empire to an unclear system of governance, which was declared a republic in 
1923, brought about different dynamics. While the Young Turks had received 
Western education and were influenced especially by positivism, they carried 
the heritage of Islam. Not much effort was put into the evaluation of the 
Kızılbaş from the perspective of Islamic theology. For example, a 
contemporary to Baha Said, Habil Adem reported on the Kızılbaş as an Islamic 
sect, while underlining the numerous differences between the religion of 
Kızılbaş and Islam. 373  Keeping in mind the theological perspectives on 
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Kızılbaş communities, discussed above, Turkish nationalism might bring 
about a certain degree of secularisation of Islam. Turkish nationalist discourse 
has tried to absorb Kızılbaş elements into Islam by linking them to the Turkish 
nationhood, while the explicit differences of Kızılbaş communities, such as 
their differences from Islam, were effaced (effacing the otherness of the other) 
through this link to pre-Islamic Turkish heritage. In the Turkish republic, this 
tension has never disappeared, and will be discussed in the following 
chapter.374  
 
3. 10. Conclusion 
 
  At the beginning of this chapter I presented examples from 
explanatory theories on Alevism that presuppose the existence of religion in 
Alevi culture and then try to explain what kind of religion Alevism is, as an 
instance of syncretic religion or heterodoxy. I discussed that these accounts on 
Alevism erroneously establish the link between explanans and explanandum: 
they presuppose the existence of religion and then provide explanations for 
what kind of religious construct Alevism is.  Following this section, I applied 
Balagangadhara’s theory of religion to examine religion in Alevi traditions. 
The analysis of claims over rivalry, religious doctrine and the relationship of 
God to humanity with respect to Alevi culture suggested that religion is not a 
property of Alevi culture, in light of Balagangadhara’s theory. In response, I 
presented my fieldwork observations about the resources of Alevi culture and 
suggested that deyiş/nefes genre of Alevi poetry, which is practiced in 
muhabbet rituals along with music and dance, might be providing a certain 
configuration of learning for Alevis, which needs further research. However, 
the predominance of performative actions strengthens my argument for lack of 
religion in Alevi culture.  
  In the second half of this Chapter, I focused on the transformation 
of Alevi traditions into a variant of religion, which will be examined further in 
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Part II how legal and political contexts give a certain direction to. In light of 
the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, I highlighted possible 
universalisation of Islam in the form of Sufi/tariqa structures and provided a 
brief historical account on the Kızılbaş/Alevi communities’ links to one of 
these tariqa structures; the Bektaşi order. Although not extensive due to the 
scope of this dissertation, I provided a historical account on the Kızılbaş, as 
ancestors of today’s Alevis and their positioning in the Ottoman Empire. This 
account provided the ground for 19th century developments for the birth of 
Alevism, which we will see the shape it has been taking since then in Part II. 
In this regard, the Chapter ended with analysing the transplantation of religious 
tolerance onto the Ottoman context and the emergence of the new concept of 
Alevism by the CUP leaders as instrumental in the formation of Turkish 
nationalism.  
  The transplantation of norms of the above-explained framework to 
Turkey began during the last century of the Ottoman Empire. The Tanzimat 
reforms marked a turn in Ottoman governance from the millet system to an 
ambiguous structure. I introduced the main features of these reforms such as 
politico-legal centralisation efforts and their ambiguity and duality in 
institutions, and then Christian missionary activity and counter missionary 
activity of the Sublime Porte with a focus on Kızılbaş/ Alevis. I suggest that 
transplantation of the idea of religious toleration seems to require bolder 
boundaries of communities along religious lines. Also, implicit in the idea of 
religious toleration is the existence of religion in every culture. Therefore, the 
framework of religious freedom requires communities to take the shape of a 
religious community. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the violence that minority 
communities face today is often framed as though religious tolerance is the 
ultimate solution without a deep understanding on the multiple faces of this 
violence.375 Bearing in mind De Roover’s analysis, this outcome might be 
attributed to the necessity that the theological framework on which the 
principle of religious toleration requires first to demarcate what lies within the 
realm of religious. The tendency to consider Kızılbaş/Alevis within the realm 
of the religious (true or false) and the desire of both Christian and Muslim 
 
375 Winnifred F Sullivan, Elisabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood, Peter G Danchin 
(eds), Politics of Religious Freedom (University of Chicago Press 2015) 3-5.  
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missionaries to categorise them do indeed support De Roover’s finding that the 
framework of religious toleration compels communities to take the form of a 
religious community and that therefore there is a certain intolerance embedded 





PART  I – CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
  This thesis is divided into two Parts. Before moving to Part II, I 
summarise the points of my analysis in Part I that are relevant for my analysis 
of three politico-legal contexts in Part II. In Chapter 2, I criticised the critical 
socio-legal studies that examine the law’s handling of religion and religious 
freedom at meta level for considering religion as cultural universal by adopting 
genealogical approach, which studies religions as constructs. Later, I 
introduced De Roover’s secularisation thesis, that argues the interdependency 
of Christian theological ideas to the political theories on religious toleration 
and secular state. More specifically, the idea of toleration is grounded on the 
belief that it is the moral duty of a Christian to tolerate people’s religion 
because the salvation comes through the free work of the Holy Spirit, which 
also provides basis for considering religion as a matter of conscience in private 
realm. Moreover, these ideas as well as the political theory on accommodation 
of religion presume that every culture have their own religion. This theoretical 
framework places religion as the foremost medium to articulate differences.  
  As I elaborated through Balagangadhara’s theory of religion, 
religion is not the property of every culture. Indeed, religion is a specific 
account which is provided by three religions; Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
Two doctrines shared by these religions do not allow for the existence of 
societies without religion. These are: God implanted the need to believe in him 
in the hearts of humans and that we were all Noah’s sons once upon a time. As 
their theology does not allow for existence of societies without religion, 
religious societies seek religion in others. This triggers transformation of some 
traditions into a variant of religion, albeit false. It is false because these 
traditions do not provide an account that is peculiar to religion. What is 
distinctive of these traditions is their ritualistic culture where performance of 
rituals is grounded on generational practice and not on God’s premise and 
doctrines as in religion. Where belief takes precedence in the account religion 
provides, tradition does not need a specific belief to be guided. However, in 
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post-Reformation Europe, as mentioned above, religious toleration entailed 
Christians to tolerate these false religions once the idea that it is the moral duty 
of a Christian to tolerate has been secularised as a constitutive element of 
political theory. This development paved the way for the formation of 
traditions that previously seen as false religions, into religion. Although 
explicit reference to their falsity dropped off, implicitly these traditions remain 
false because they were obliged to fit in a framework that is not theirs.  
  Setting the above explained theoretical framework in Chapter 2, I 
turned my analysis of Alevis in Chapter 3. While in the first half of Chapter 3, 
I examined Alevi traditions in terms of the constitutive elements of religion 
and found that Alevis do not seem to have a religion, according to the 
Balagangadhara’s theory of religion. I further supported my finding through 
my analysis of the predominance place that rituals take in Alevi culture. In 
addition, I provided an historical analysis that questions the religious 
affiliations in medieval Anatolia. My analysis reveals that the presumptions on 
Alevis’ ties to Islam and Central Asia have not scientifically proven. This 
further supports my argument on Alevis lacking a religion. In the second half 
of Chapter 3, I focused on how Alevism became an identifier as Alevis’ 
religion in the late 19th century. This process, I argue, was triggered by the 
missionary activity after the Tanzimat reforms introduced religious toleration 
in the Ottoman Empire. The Christian missionary activity to discover Alevis’ 
religion was followed by the Ottoman’s missionary activity that aimed at 
converting Kızılbaş into proper Muslims. In the last phase of the Ottoman 
Empire, when the CUP formulated Turkish nationalism, Kızılbaş played an 
important role to provide an evidence for the historical link between Turkish 
nation and its acclaimed ancestors in Central Asia. In this way, the ‘heretical’ 
Alevi traditions were seen as the heritage of pre-Islamic Turkish culture. 
However, this formulation of Alevism brings in an anomaly to the Islamic 
doctrines, since Alevism cannot be considered as a mezhep for its lack of 
adherence in five pillars. Neither can it be considered as a Sufi order because 
of its initiation by birth, as opposed to the initiation by choice as in Sufi orders. 
Moreover, the historical accounts that provide explanation for Alevis’ Central 
Asian roots are rebutted by recent historical studies as explained in Section 3.5. 
Nonetheless, in Chapter 4, I argue that the instrumentalization of Alevis in 
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Turkish nationalism has continued as well as the tension with the Islamic 
doctrines through the obstacles put by the Diyanet on Alevis’ recognition 
demands. In Chapter 5, I argue that the ECtHR also subscribe to the now 
rebutted assumptions on Alevis’ historical links to Cental Asia, while entering 
in the inevitable debate on place of Alevism in Islam. In Chapter 6, I argue that 
the remote historical links with Bektaşi order and its moral framework become 
instrumental while presenting Alevism as a system of belief in the UK context.  
  The general conclusions that are drawn by my analysis of Alevi 
traditions in Chapter 3 are that Alevis do not have a religion, when 
Balagangadhara’s theory of religion is applied. Instead, Alevi traditions 
correspond to a diverse set of rituals, practices, and beliefs such as cem rituals, 
deyiş/nefes poems, ocak structures, belief on migration of soul etc. Yet, 
Alevism gradually became an identifier as the religion of Alevis. This 
transformation was triggered by both by transplantation of European ideas on 
religious toleration and secular state and the formation of Turkish nationalism. 
In Part II, I discuss how Alevis also contributed in this transformation in order 
to adjust to the politico-legal systems that formulate Alevis’ difference in terms 
of religion. In this connection, De Roover’s secularisation thesis provides lens 
for my analysis of the politico-legal systems in Turkey, the UK and before the 
ECtHR. As will be seen in Chapter 4 on Turkey, where these theological ideas 
are absent, the transplantation of the idea of religious toleration and secular 
state resulted in a peculiar form of laiklik that use the meta-language of Islam 
and instrumentalise and control religion through the Diyanet – Directorate of 
Religious Affairs. In Chapter 5 on the ECtHR judgments relating to Alevi 
claims, the Court relies on a meta-language of Christianity that enables 
conceptualising Alevism as a denomination of Islam, equivalent to Sunni 
branch. In Chapter 6 on the UK context, the multicultural policies supporting 
faith communities encourage the Alevi movement to seek recognition as a faith 
community. 
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PART  II -- ACCOMMODATION OF ALEVIS’ 
DIFFERENCE  
 
      In the introduction, I underlined that this thesis answers its research 
questions in two parts. In Part I, Chapters 2 and 3, I lay out the framework to 
analyse the accommodation of Alevis’ difference in Turkey, the UK and the 
ECtHR. In Chapter 2, I laid out the theoretical framework that informs my 
approach to the research question. I discussed the critical religious studies and 
studies critical of the freedom of religion in law. In Chapter 3, I explored the 
kind of difference Alevis have, through my application of Balagangadhara’s 
theory of religion to the Alevi traditions. I then examined the process that 
triggered the formation of Alevism as a religion. The conceptual framework 
Balagangadhara provides helped me to analyse the differences between 
religion and tradition. I also introduced De Roover’s secularisation thesis about 
the ideas of secular state and religious freedom that are the cornerstones of 
political and legal systems in Turkey, the UK and the ECtHR. In light of the 
theoretical framework that would help me to situate my analysis of Alevis’ 
difference in Turkey, the UK and the ECtHR, in Part II, I scrutinise how these 




CHAPTER 4 – ACCOMMODATION OF ALEVIS’ 
DIFFERENCE IN TURKEY  
 
4. 1. Introduction  
       
  I have made two points in Part I that are relevant for my analysis in 
Chapter 4: First I elaborated on how the ideas of secular state and religious 
freedom are derived from Christian theology and are dependent on this 
theology for their intelligibility. I also introduced the concept of secularisation 
in terms of the general acceptance of these theological ideas as facts about 
human beings and accommodation of differences. Second, I elaborated on the 
concept of idolatry as the third (though hidden) element that belongs with the 
religious and secular distinction. In this vein, I argued that the distinction made 
by a religion’s theology between true worship, false worship (idolatry) and 
secular were transformed into truly religious, possibly religious and secular, a 
distinction that is still implicit in policies and laws. I explained the theoretical 
framework that makes the above points, through the example of transplantation 
of the principle of religious toleration in the Ottoman Empire and missionary 
activities with respect to Alevis during the 19th century. I underlined that the 
theoretical framework I use does not focus on the secularisation of Islam 
specifically but provides insights as – according to the theory of 
Balagangadhara – both Christianity and Islam are religions and therefore are 
anchored in a similar dynamic of secularisation and universalisation. Yet, the 
application of the principles derived from specific Christian theology in Turkey 
produces tensions, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
  In this Chapter, I first discuss how the transplantation of religious 
toleration and the secular state takes a peculiar form in Turkish laiklik (laicism) 
and then analyse the accommodation of Alevis’ difference in Turkey. I develop 
my analysis in the following structure. I describe how secular law operates in 
Turkey. In connection, I discuss (4.2) the legal framework that was established 
with the foundation of the Republic of Turkey with respect to governing 
(religious) diversity and how it affected Alevi communities. The aim is not to 
provide a general history of laiklik in Turkey, but very specifically to look at 
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the laws and formation process of laiklik in relation to Alevis. Two laws that 
were promulgated by the Republicans are significant as the Government, 
Diyanet and courts continue to rely on these laws to refuse Alevis’ demands 
for recognition. While Law no. 633 enabled the Turkish state to monitor and 
impose its own understanding of Islam through the establishment of the 
Diyanet, Law no. 677 prohibited the practice of Sufi brotherhoods, which 
included Alevis. In this respect, Law no. 677 introduced an alien division of 
religious and secular within the Alevi culture.  
  Subsequently, I discuss how this alien division led to a 
transformation of the Alevi culture and alienation of Alevis from their own 
traditions, as many were affiliated with leftist ideologies and subsequently 
abandoned their traditions, as they saw it, in the form of religion during the 
polarization of politics in Turkey from the 1960s until the 1980 Military Coup. 
The same group of Alevis who were affiliated with the leftist ideology prior to 
the 1980 Coup, eventually founded associations that advocate ‘Alevi rights.’ 
The Alevi Revival of the 1990s brought about a different transformation, which 
culminated in the emergence of a transnational Alevi movement that advocate 
for Alevism being a religion on its own in other European states which has 
influenced the Alevi movement in Turkey to make claims with respect to 
religious freedom. In the last few decades, we have witnessed the formation of 
a transnational Alevi movement that puts an increasing emphasis on claims to 
religion for the recognition of Alevism. I argue that this formation is closely 
linked to the framework that, as explained in Part I, compels communities to 
articulate their difference in terms of religion. This imposed framework was 
introduced with the Tanzimat Reforms during the Ottoman Era in late 19th 
century, as explained in Chapter 3 and consolidated with the formation of 
Turkish laiklik. While the dominant Islamic influence in the formation of 
laiklik has been trying to submerge Alevis into Islam as a ‘cultural richness,’ 
the European framework that was inserted in Turkish politico-legal system 
through Turkey’s accession to the EU and the ECtHR cases, framed Alevis’ 
difference as a matter of sectarian division between Alevis – ‘non-Sunni 
Muslim community’ and Sunnis. Although the European framework alleviates 
the pressure of assimilation on Alevis, it nonetheless remains limited insofar 
that Alevis’ difference is transformed into a religious difference. Therefore, it 
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denies Alevis their experience of the world by imposing on them an 
unjustifiable framework which does not recognise their difference from 
religion.  
  The positioning of Alevis in response to these imposed frameworks 
took shape in formation of the transnational Alevi movement which gradually 
evolved into rights advocacy as a religious community as a response to the 
imposed framework. The two important areas where this advocacy has focused 
are religious education and the status of cemevi. Since the 1982 Constitution 
enacted religious education compulsory without opting out mechanism that 
Alevi parents can benefit, Alevi pupils are exposed to Islamic teaching, that 
was considered risking ‘indoctrination’ by the ECtHR in 2007 decision on the 
case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin. Despite the curriculum change since the 
ECtHR decision, the current curriculum has also been criticized. With regards 
to the status of cemevi, the assimilationist approach of the Turkish politico-
legal system to submerge Alevis into Islam promoted by the Diyanet, the legal 
obstacles to construct cemevis as well as the generous benefits provided for the 
places of worship in the Turkish legal system has urged the Alevi movement 
to demand recognition for cemevi as a place of worship. Together with the 
positioning of the Diyanet, standing as an impediment in Alevis’ success at 
courts, who seek the Diyanet’s opinion on Alevism, the issue of compulsory 
religious education as well as the status of cemevi were discussed in an official 
dialogue with the Turkish state in 2009-2010 through a number of workshops, 
named “the Alevi Opening.” None of the demands raised by the Alevi 
movement have been responded so far. I argue that this dialogue brings about 
a certain kind of violence by effacing the otherness of the Alevi and thus 
transforming Alevism into a variant of Islam.  
 
4. 2. The Formation of Turkish Laiklik   
  
  The transition from the Ottoman Empire, where the Sultan was also 
the Caliph for five centuries, to a "secular" republic in a short period of time 
has been a transformative (if not traumatic) experience for the people of 
Turkey. On 29 October 1923 Turkey became a republic. The Caliphate was 
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abolished on 3 March 1924.376 On the same day, an education statute (Tevhidi 
Tedrisat Kanunu) aiming at a uniform and secular education system, was 
passed. Meanwhile, in the judicial arena, Sharia courts were abolished on 8 
April 1924.377 Additionally, the Ministry of Sharia and Charitable Foundations 
(Ser'iye ve Evkaf Vekaleti) was abolished and replaced by the Diyanet. The 
Diyanet was attached to the office of the Prime Minister.378 The Diyanet was 
established according to Public Law no. 430 in order “to manage the 
administrative affairs of religion.”379 According to Berkes, “the department 
was to be an agency of public service rather than the supreme spiritual body of 
a religious community[...] issuing fatwas upon matters having legal 
implications was no longer possible.” 380  Despite Berkes’ observation, the 
Diyanet evolved into a state legitimisation of religion, representing the Sunni 
way of Islam since its foundation, even though it was proclaimed as a ‘neutral’ 
institution by the state authorities. Thus, it has been a significant control 
mechanism over religion that the Republic introduced. Since its establishment, 
the Diyanet has gradually gained more economic, political and legal power.381 
Unlike Berkes’ prediction, the Diyanet issues fatwas, even in the most 
mundane matters of daily life.382 This power of the Diyanet transforms it into 
an important interlocutor concerning the recognition demands of the Alevi 
movement, which will be examined in detail, further in this Chapter.  
  The founders of the Turkish Republic went further in their pursuit 
of intervening in the religion of society. Law no. 677 on the Closure of Dervish 
Monasteries and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and 
the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles (Tekke ve Zaviyelerle Türbelerin 
Şeddine ve Türbedarlıklarla birtakım unvanların meni ve ilgası) was 
promulgated in 1925.383 According to this law, dervish lodges (tekke ve zaviye) 
other than those used as mosques were closed, the tombs of sultans and saints 
 
376 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (McGill-Queen's Press 1964) 457-
460;  Derya Bayır, Türk Hukukunda Azınlıklar ve Milliyetçilik  (Bilgi 2017) 112. 
377 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (McGill-Queen's Press 1964) 472. 
378 Derya Bayır, Türk Hukukunda Azınlıklar ve Milliyetçilik  (Bilgi 2017) 112.  
379 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (McGill-Queen's Press 1964) 484. 
380 Ibid 485. 
381 Erdoğan Aydın, Kimlik Mücadelesinde Alevilik (Kırmızı 2008) 346-349. 
382 For example, under the new legislation accepted in March 2010, according to No 633 law, Art 
6 was amended and Diyanet is able to regulate the internet and publications on any matter of 
Islamic religion and is even able to recommend the closure of any website, provided that the 
website can be shown to include ‘false’ information. 
383 Law no. 677, 13.11.1925. 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were closed, and the  ceremonies of these lodges were criminalised, while their 
properties were seized by the state.384 In November 1928, Article 2 of the 
Constitution stating that the Turkish state religion is Islam, was annulled.385 
Nine years later, on February 5, 1937, laikilik was explicitly stated in Article 2 
of the Constitution.386  
  Led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of 
Turkey, the People’s Republican Party (Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi, hereinafter 
CHP) ruled Turkey until the introduction of a multi-party system in 1950. The 
period of single party rule during which the above-mentioned laws were 
promulgated is known as the Kemalist regime. Zürcher describes Kemalist 
laicism in three aspects: the first aspect aimed at the secularisation of state, law 
and education as a result of abolishing the Caliphate (1924), deleting the phrase 
that the state religion is Islam from the constitution (1928) and promulgating 
the principle of secularism in the constitution (1937). The second aspect 
targeted religious symbols through the promulgation of the Hat Law (1925), 
shifting to the Latin alphabet (1928) and adoption of European measurements, 
calendar and time. The third aspect concerned secularising the public sphere 
and eliminating the influence of popular Islam on daily life through Law no. 
677.387 However, the Sunni dervish lodge of Mevlana (Rumi) was allowed to 
remain open after its brief closure at the same time as the others, while Alevi 
 
384 Law no. 677, 13.11.1925. The English translation here is extracted from İzzettin Doğan and 
Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016). 
Section 1 of Law no. 677 of 30 November 1925 on the Closure of Dervish Monasteries and 
Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of 
Certain Titles reads as follows:  
“Throughout the territories of the Turkish Republic, all tekkes and zaviyes (Dervish monasteries) 
established either as a foundation, or as the property of a sheikh or in any other way, shall be 
completely closed, subject to the owner’s right of possession. Those which are still being used as 
mosques or prayer rooms in accordance with the statutory procedure shall remain operational.  
In particular, the use of certain religious titles such as Seyhlik, Dervichlik, Muritlik, Dedelik, 
Seyitlik, Celebilik, Babalık ... shall be prohibited. Throughout the territories of the Republic of 
Turkey, tombs belonging ... to a Sufi order (tarika) or used for purposes of interest, and other 
tombs, shall be closed ... . Anyone who opens tekkes and zaviyes or tombs and begins carrying on 
these activities again, or anyone who provides religious premises, even temporarily, for Sufi 
practices and rituals, and who bears one of the above-mentioned titles or carries on the associated 
activities, shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of three months and to a fine ...”   
For Turkish version see:  
https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc004/kanuntbmmc0
04/kanuntbmmc00400677.pdf  
385 Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (McGill-Queen's Press 1964) 461. 
386 Law no. 3115, 05.02.1937, amending the 1924 Constitution.   
387 Erik J Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi (Iletisim 1995) 186.  
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and Bektaşi dergahs were not.388 According to Bayır, despite the principle of 
secularism, “the state would reorganize public life with reference to Sunni-
Hanefi Islam, adhered to mostly by the Turks in Turkey.”389 In this connection, 
she argues that secularism adversely affected Turkey’s diversity, as it resulted 
in “the elimination of traditional, religious and social structures, and 
substituting them with state-controlled organizations, while also removing 
traditional identities attached to the people’s religious beliefs.”390 
  Law no. 633 (establishment of the Diyanet) and Law no. 677, 
constitute the foundations of laiklik in Turkey. The establishment of the 
Diyanet and Law no. 677 enabled the Republicans to take full control over 
religion. For example, Mardin argues that although the state religion and the 
public religion were profoundly different, the Republicans aimed at eliminating 
this lack of integration by totally discarding ‘public religion’ that also included 
‘heterodox’ groups.391 The Government pursued a policy of assimilating public 
religion into state religion, which was Sunni Islam. Mardin points out that the 
Reformists’ stance of banning public manifestations of Islam is continuous 
with the stance taken by Şeyhul Islam (the highest religious authority in the 
Ottoman Empire).392 For Mardin, the tension between folk Islam as practiced 
by the general populace and high Islam, which is doctrinal and endorsed by 
ulema (scholars of Islam) had been characteristic to the Ottoman Empire.393 
Therefore, by banning public manifestations of Islam and by limiting the 
doctrinal realm of Islam through the establishment of the Diyanet, he argues, 
the early Republicans continued the Ottoman state tradition, despite their 
efforts to differentiate themselves from it.  
 
388 Hülya Küçük, The Role of Bektashi in Turkish National Struggle: A Historical and Critical 
Study (Brill 2002).  
389 Derya Bayır, Minorities and nationalism in Turkish law (Ashgate 2013) 111-112.  
390 Ibid.  
391 Şerif Mardin, ‘Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution’ (1971) 2(3) International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 197-211. 
392 Şerif Mardin, Din ve Ideoloji  (Iletisim 2010) 146.   
393 Şerif Mardin, ‘Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution’ (1971) 2(3) International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 197-211, 203 “[…] a division of Islam into a public Islam, that is 
based on cults and includes pre-Islamic elements of practice, and a high Islam that is followed by 
city dwellers, the palace and the ulema, based on the doctrinal interpretation of Islam. This split is 
often described in terms of folk Islam vs palace Islam or heterodox Islam vs orthodox Islam. Folk 
Islam was “institutionalized in the form of dervish orders” that “provided cultural services, 
functioned as a channel for social mobility, and took on responsibility for various forms of social 
assistance. Wherever the aloof state failed they moved in.” 
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  Mardin’s observation, however, is limited to examining the effects 
of these laws on the Alevi/Bektaşi communities, since, for him, both Sunni 
brotherhoods and Alevi/Bektaşi communities are included in the catch-all 
category of folk Islam. Also, this division of folk and high Islam (or heterodox 
and orthodox Islam) is not helpful to explain the differential treatment of Sufi 
brotherhoods and Alevi/Bektaşi communities by the state. By criminalising the 
use of titles associated with the Alevi traditions and closing their traditional 
lodges, Alevi practices were restricted. The importance of Law no. 677 is 
twofold: first, it declared the public manifestations of Islam as illegal. I argue 
that this banning of public manifestations of Islam stemmed from the 
Republicans’ consideration that public manifestations of Islam were 
‘superstitious’ and human additions to Islam and therefore constituted 
instances of false worship. The law implies that true worship would be a matter 
of conscience for Islam too. Similar to the Christian division between true 
worship and false worship, the Kemalist regime presented the type of Islam 
promoted by the Diyanet as true worship, while banning false worship.  
  In fact, late Ottoman statesmen had already been discussing and 
developing ways to reconcile ideas about the division of the realm of public 
and private religion and religion as a matter of conscience with the principles 
of Islam. The first generation of the Young Turks was also the first-generation 
Ottomans, who received a Western education and pushed the Sublime Porte to 
introduce the first constitution. 394  Enlightenment ideas like positivism, 
secularism and liberalism were transplanted through their prism. The research 
on the mindset of this group suggests an effort to merge the idea of secularism 
and Islam.395 Publications produced by Young Turks discussed the issue of 
how to apply secularism to the Muslim Ottoman state. 396  For example, 
Abdullah Cevdet was of the opinion that Islam was not an impediment to 
reform, but its wrong interpretation was.397 Two points are important about this 
discussion. These writers did not see any incompatibility between Islam and 
laïcité, while rejecting the validity of ‘batıl itikat’ (superstition). For Young 
 
394 Şerif Mardin, Continuity and Change in the Ideas of the Young Turks (Yenisehir 1969). 
395 Ibid; Nuray Mert, Laiklik Tartismasina Kavramsal Bir Bakis (Baglam 1994).  
396 Nuray Mert, Laiklik Tartışmasına Kavramsal Bir Bakış (Baglam 1994). 
397 Ibid 66: “Abdullah Cevdet […] Islam dininin ilerlemeye engel teskil etmedigini, bu konuda 
yaniltici kanilarin nedeninin Islamin yanlis degerlendirilmesi oldugunu ciddi bir sekilde 
tartismistir.” 
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Turks, Islam was compatible with laïcité; but its corruption by superstitions 
was the impediment for the diffusion of a laic system. Therefore, the 
superstition that pervaded society was separated from ‘pure’ Islam, which is 
based on true doctrine and reason and as such is fully consistent with the laïcité 
as practiced by France.  
   ‘Pure’ Islam was also suggested to be a matter of conscience from 
the viewpoint of the Young Turks. This same dynamic continued to the second 
generation of the Young Turks, part of whom led to the movement that 
eventually founded the Republic of Turkey. Among the second-generation 
Young Turks that founded the Republic and shaped its ideology these 
tendencies are evident as well. For instance, Ziya Gökalp, known as the father 
of sociology in Turkey, formulated the idea of material (maddi) life and 
spiritual (manevi) life instead of the public-private distinction and argued that 
a person’s spiritual life is fed by two phenomena – nation and religion, with 
the latter belonging to the spiritual realm (manevi).398 Similarly, a follower of 
Gökalp, Halil Nimetullah, suggested that Islam is a matter of conscience if 
cleansed from superstition (batıl itikat).399 Another thinker, Kılıçzade, argued 
that it is not Islam that contradicts science, but superstitions. In this vein, since 
the Young Turks of early 20th century, the ruling elite tried to formulate Islam 
in terms of the theology of Christian Freedom, which is explained in Chapter 
3. They tried to draw a clear distinction between true worship based on 
scriptures and false worship that is the human addition to religion, that is called 
‘batıl itikat’ (superstition). Also, they argued for transplanting the division of 
public sphere and private sphere, which is based on the freedom of conscience, 
into an Islamic society. Yet, with the end of the single party period, this 
imposed structure of laiklik began to change to a structure where the realm of 
true Islam expanded along with the Diyanet’s functions, and practices of Sunni 
Islam were favoured, while Alevi practices were considered false worship. 
  The second aspect of Law no. 677 is that it dealt with the Alevi 
traditions as though they were of the same kind as the targeted public 
manifestations of Islam. In this respect, I argue that this law divided the Alevi 
culture into the realm of religious (Alevism) and the secular, a division alien to 
 
398 Ibid 68. 
399 Ibid 72.  
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the Alevi culture. Recalling the triad that secular law is grounded on, 
considering religion as a matter of truth and practices as embodying beliefs, 
the Alevi culture is transformed into a version of Islamic brotherhoods. As we 
will see below, this law has been the legal basis for rejecting Alevis’ 
recognition claims in the history of Turkey. However, Alevis are blind to this 
consideration. They object to being considered as following a variant of Islam 
within the ambit of this law; but are not able to articulate their difference. The 
same issue surfaces again in Chapter 5 where I discuss the ECtHR’s judgments. 
During the Alevi workshops initiated by the Turkish government, the only 
official dialogue between the Alevi movement and the Government in Turkey, 
Alevis frequently voiced this objection. 400  Similarly, in the domestic 
proceedings as well as before the ECtHR in the case of Dogan, CEM objected 
to Alevism being considered as coming within the scope of Law no. 677 and 
insisted that that law aimed at fundamentalist brotherhoods.401 However, while 
presenting Alevism as a Sufi tradition, CEM was not able to explain the 
difference between Alevis and the brotherhoods targeted by this law and 
emphasise their categorical difference to the Islamic brotherhoods.  
  Although Law no. 677 carries ostensibly similar implications both 
for public manifestations of Islam and Alevism, subsequent developments 
proved it to be to the disadvantage of Alevis. For example, the Sunni Dervish 
lodge of Mevlana was reopened in 1927, shortly after its closure under Law 
no. 677, while the Bektaşi dergah at Hacı Bektaş remained closed until 1964.402 
While the Mevlevi dergah’s management was left to Mevlevi tariqa, the Hacı 
Bektaş Dergah was reopened as a museum in 1964 and was not returned to its 
traditional owners, the Çelebi family. Indeed, Alevis vocalise their discomfort 
at visiting Hacı Bektaş as museum visitors, paying a fee and not being able to 
conduct cem rituals within the premises. During my fieldwork, I often heard 
Alevis complaining that at least they should be allowed to enter their heritage 
centre without paying a fee. In this regard, one of the claims of the Alevi 
movement is the return of the dergah to the Çelebi family. Additionally, the 
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Alevis I talked to complain that they should be allowed to conduct cem rituals 
in this dergah. Since it is a museum, conducting cem rituals inside is forbidden. 
However, I was also told by two Alevis on different occasions that they had 
managed to conduct cem rituals from late in the evening till morning by using 
personal contacts. No prosecution has been brought due to these sporadically 
conducted cem rituals. Their enthusiasm and excitement while conveying the 
story to me indicates the importance of this occasion for them.  
  The treatment of Mevlana’s dergah and that of Hacı Bektas reveals 
the state’s differential treatment of Sunni and Alevi dergah, despite the fact 
that both of them to be covered by the same Law no. 677. Moreover, some 
other dergah and tombs were reopened after 25 years of closure. In 1950, Law 
no. 677 was amended through Law no. 5566 (4 March 1950). This amendment 
provided for the reopening of those tombs that belonged to important Turkish 
figures and that have a high architectural value; but did not extend to the dergah 
of Alevi/Bektaşi. The preamble to Law no. 5566 states that it targets 
superstitions (batıl itikat) that are not related to the spirit of true religion 
(‘gerçek din ruhu ile alakası olmayan batıl itikatların’).403  
  In this connection, Law no. 677 considered Alevism a superstition 
(batil itikat) and prevented Alevis from practicing their tradition to a large 
extent by banning their dergah and criminalising the use of Alevi titles such as 
dedelik, seyitlik, çelebilik, babalık. Furthermore, in 1949 an additional clause 
was added in Law no. 677 that introduced the sentence to exile of Alevi dede 
had they continued using the dede title. 404 This addition to Law no. 677 was 
instrumental in dissolution of Alevi communal ties to dede. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, each dede used to be responsible of certain Alevi groups and used 
to travel to conduct Alevi rituals among these Alevi groups that geographically 
lived in separate Alevi villages. The above-mentioned additional clause, 
however, was removed by Law no. 647 in 1965. Nonetheless, it is likely that 
this additional clause that criminalized using dede title with exile, had 
adversely affected the practice of Alevi culture during the 16 years that it was 
in effect. In my fieldwork, I was told that dede used to be detained during this 
period (post 1950s) at train stations and mistreated due to their appearance and 
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this made it very difficult for dede and zakir to travel between Alevi villages 
to conduct rituals. In fact, a dede told me that his grandfather used to complain 
that “Alevism died during the last 30-40 years”, when he was young in the 
1980s, which corresponds to the 1950s onwards.  
  Furthermore, according to the Village Law that was promulgated in 
1924, the mosque was declared as one of the main elements of a village, while 
the imam was a member of the village authority council.405 Law no. 442 has 
been criticised by the Alevi movement, which argued that the Law aimed to 
assimilate Alevis into Sunni Islam through the construction of mosques in 
Alevi villages.406 During my fieldwork, many Alevis, including dede and zakir 
who travel to villages in Anatolia for muhabbet and cem rituals, complained 
that the construction of mosques in Alevi villages is a sign of the state’s 
assimilationist policies because, in the course of time, Alevis begin going to 
mosques, maybe only for the bayram prayer (the eid), and then gradually 
attended mosques regularly. Bayır argues that the laiklik  principle that claims 
to separate the public realm and private realm, is instrumentalised to eliminate 
the minority religions from the public sphere, while the supposedly neutral 
public sphere is used for promoting Sunni Islam as sponsored by the state.407 
Indeed, the situation in the village as well as the developments subsequent to 
the introduction of the multi-party system, analysed below, support this 
argument.  
 In addition to the above-mentioned regulations over religion, the 
Turkish legal system does not offer any procedure for religious communities 
to gain legal personality. However, it is important to note that the status of 
minority is granted only to three communities: Greeks, Armenians and Jews. 
In 1923 when the newly established Turkish government signed the Lausanne 
Agreement that ended the war against the allies, the legal status of minorities 
were determined. During the negotiations, the representatives of Turkey 
resisted recognising any Muslim community as a minority.408 According to 
Bayır, although Christian groups like Nestorians, Chaldeans and Assyrians, 
and Bulgarians explained their cases during the conference, they were not 
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included in official documents. 409  Indeed, the Turkish representatives also 
resisted granting the Jewish community minority status, since they did not have 
a problem with the state. This attitude reveals the negative connotation 
attributed by the Turkish representatives to minority status - a group having 
problems with the state. Eventually, however, the Jewish community was 
included as well and three non-Muslim groups (Greeks, Armenians and Jews) 
were recognized as minorities of Turkey under Section III of the Agreement 
(Art 37-45).410 Yet, other non-Muslim communities such as Alevis, Chaldeans 
and diverse Muslim communities were not granted the minority status.  
  As described above, Turkish laiklik differs significantly from the 
laicism in France both in terms of historical background and its application. 
The French laïcité was gradually formed in an on-going confrontation between 
the Roman Catholic Church and the State. 411 This difference brought up the 
development of French laïcité as a bottom-up process, while evolving as a top-
down project in Turkey.412 Unlike France, the Turkish laiklik, as explained 
above, was a top-down project of the Kemalist regime to transform the society. 
In addition to this historical difference, the Diyanet, on a surface look, seems 
to be similar to the French Direction des libertés publiques et des affaires 
juridiques, within the Ministry of the Interior.413 However the power that the 
Diyanet holds in interfering with the political and legal debates through 
theological arguments is much greater than its French counterpart. To draw out 
the stark difference in the two approaches, Stepan underlines that controlling 
religion to the degree that the Kemalist regime aimed would not have been 
assumed in 1905 France.414 In this vein, Davison argues that Turkish laicism is 
weakened not only as a result of the state’s influence over religion but also over 
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individuals and shaping the content of social morality. 415  In Chapter 2, I 
suggested that the lack of theological background that would make intelligible 
the public-private divide and religion as conscience, the transplantation of 
laïcité to Turkey brings about distortions, where the meta-language that 
Turkish laiklik is rooted in Islamic doctrines.  
  Not surprisingly, the early Republican aspirations were not shared 
by the general populace, who did not embrace their vision because the imposed 
realm of true religion did not correspond to the reality of Islamic society.416 
The transition to a multi-party system saw increasing return of Islamic 
doctrines in the application of Turkish laiklik that has prioritised the concerns 
of the Sunni majority.417 Since then, the doctrinal core of Islam has played a 
larger role. Nevertheless, the tendency to prioritise a doctrinal Islam has not 
led to religion being considered as a matter of conscience; as a particular 
manifestation of Christian theology it seems not to play a role in Turkey. 
Instead, Islamic doctrines are pervasive. In the process, some practices that 
were previously considered false religion by early Republicans who tried to 
apply French laïcité were transferred to the realm of true religion.418 However, 
a particular section of false religion as human corruption of religion remains 
within the realm of false religion. Moreover, Alevi traditions increasingly 
become subject to the evaluative framework of Islamic doctrine, which 
pervades politics and this Chapter aims to shed lights on.  
  After the Kemalist regime introduced the multi-party system, the 
policies restricting the visibility of Islam has been softened. Two periods are 
particularly significant to point out: the 1980 Military Coup and AKP 
governments that has been in power since 2002. Putting and end to violent 
polarisation of politics, the leaders of the 1980 Military Coup incorporated 
Islam into the state ideology as ‘Turkish-Islam synthesis,’ which aimed at 
promoting Turkishness in public sphere with “a privileged place for Islam with 
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a clear Sunni flavour.”419 The Article 136 of the 1982 Constitution imparted 
increasing power to the Diyanet and authorised the Diyanet with “maintaining 
national unity and solidarity.” Additionally, the Article 24 of the Constitution 
enacted religious education compulsory. When AKP came into power in 2002 
as a moderate Islamist party, AKP pursued policies to improve the 
implementation of religious freedom. A comparison between the Kemalist 
regime’s implementation of laiklik to that of AKP has been made by many 
scholars. Pointing to policies to relax the use of religious symbols like 
headscarf, it is argued that AKP governments take a more moderate view 
against the anticlerical Kemalist regime.420 On the other side of the debate, 
which I reckon with, argued that the liberal policies of AKP has been one-sided 
and favour the Sunni Muslims. 421  Particularly with respect to the 
accommodation of Alevis’ difference, AKP governments advance a discourse 
that neglect Alevis’ difference and submerges it into Sunnis, as revealed during 
the 2009-2010 workshops with the Alevi movement that I discuss in Section 
4.8. As the epitome of this discourse is the President Erdogan’s speech 
indicating that “if Alevism is the love of Ali, then we are all Alevis.” This 
discourse makes a number of assumptions taken for granted that Alevis are 
Muslims, Sunnis, go to mosque and their difference lies in some minor 
traditions. While both the Kemalist regime and AKP governments reduce the 
Alevi traditions as some variety of Islamic traditions, because AKP 
governments embrace the meta-language of Islam deeply in policy 
implementations as opposed to the anticlerical approach of the Kemalist 
regime, Alevis have been more exposed to Islamic assimilation under AKP 
governments. An important instrument of this assimilation is enforced by the 
Diyanet that I now turn to discuss.  
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4. 3. The Diyanet and the Recognition of Alevism  
 
  As mentioned above, the Diyanet has grown in size and influence 
since its establishment. Its budget exceeds that of many ministries. In 2014 its 
personnel was reported to number 120,000 and the institution was responsible 
for 86,000 mosques.422 Law no. 633 on the Organisation and Duties of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs, which was published in the Official Gazette 
on 2 July 1965 and came into effect on 15 August 1965, indicates a different 
mentality compared to that of the Republic’s founding elite. In this legislation 
the duties of the Diyanet were stated as being “to carry out affairs related to the 
beliefs, worship and moral foundations of Islam, to enlighten Turkish society 
about religion and to manage places of worship.”423 
  Particularly after the promulgation of the 1982 Constitution that is 
in effect currently, the Diyanet’s duties are tied closely with preserving the 
sentiment of national unity, promoted as the Turkish-Islam Synthesis. Article 
136 of the 1982 Constitution states that one of the aims of the Diyanet is 
“promoting and consolidating national solidarity and unity.” Under the rule of 
the AKP governments, the Diyanet has been acquired even more power as an 
institution that implicated the AKP’s support.424  The status of the Diyanet 
within the state apparatus often stirs up discussions over Turkish secularism. 
For example Gözaydin points to the increasing network of the Diyanet in the 
country and warns that “the Diyanet as an administrative organism may 
indirectly obtain power over the government.”425 Similarly, in terms of the 
agency that the Diyanet uses, Lord argues that Diyanet “is able to negotiate 
national boundaries on the basis of its position as a religious authority with its 
own agenda, resisting efforts and policies by other state actors such as the 
military regarding Alevism.”426 For instance, a draft law prepared in 1963 by 
Cemal Gürsel, the head of the junta regime, to define the organisation and 
duties of the Diyanet proposed the establishment of a department of 
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denominations. 427  During the discussions of having denominational 
representation within the Diyanet in the early 1960s, an article published by 
the Diyanet argued that “there were no ‘real Shi’a’ in the country and that those 
‘associating themselves with Shiism’ – which they alleged was what the Alevis 
were doing – were ‘extremist and perverted tariqas’ steeped in ‘superstition’, 
which could not be recognised by a ‘laic’ state as a ‘religious 
denomination’.”428 The proposal for the draft law was criticised on the grounds 
that it could “pave the way for official separation [between Alevis and Sunnis]” 
and was never implemented.429 The idea of a department of denominations was 
abandoned by 1966 following derogatory statements made against Alevis by 
the former president of the Diyanet, İbrahim Elmalı (1965–1966).  
  Comparing the discourses of the Diyanet over Alevism in different 
periods of Republican history, Lord claims that the Diyanet adopted an 
inclusive approach towards Alevis, especially from the 1990s, when ‘the 
Kurdish issue’ dominated Turkish politics. According to Lord, such a turn is 
evident, for example, in the works of a long-term Diyanet official Abdülkadir 
Sezgin, who published numerous texts (on behalf of the Diyanet) in the 1990s 
claiming that Alevis were in reality Hanefi Sunnis.430 However, the ‘inclusive’ 
approach that Lord attributes to the Diyanet is not convincing, for the Diyanet 
tried to preserve its stance on the proposal of a department of denominations 
and submerge Alevis into Sunni Islam. For instance, in 2001, at a time of 
discussions about a department of denominations, the president of the Diyanet, 
Ali Bardakoğlu, asserted that such a change in the institutional structure of the 
Diyanet to include various different inner-Islamic groups would be 
“completely against the nation-state and society project as aimed for by the will 
that established the Republic.”431Examining the radical transformation of the 
Diyanet, Ozturk argues that while the Diyanet has always been the main 
ideological instrument of Turkish state, the Diyanet under the AKP rule 
“synchronized with the ruling party’s discourses and actions.”432Indeed, AKP 
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government’s report on Alevi workshops that is examined in 4.8 supports this 
finding as well as Erdogan’s speech cited above in 4.2.  
  As regards the official recognition of Alevism and Alevi demands, 
the Diyanet poses one of the biggest obstacles. Whether in the legal or political 
sphere, whenever an Alevi recognition demand is voiced, the Diyanet’s opinion 
on the matter is sought, be it by the secular courts, municipalities or the 
government. In effect, the Diyanet insists on considering Alevism as an inner 
Islamic richness that could not be easily classified as tariqa. It strictly rejects 
granting cemevi the status of a place of worship, since, in the eyes of the 
Diyanet, such a move implies Alevism is outside of Islam, for the only place 
of worship in Islam is the mosque. In this vein, in 2016, the head of the Diyanet 
gave a speech in which he drew attention to ‘two red lines’ for the Diyanet: to 
define Alevism as a separate religion outside Islam and to consider cemevi as 
an alternative to and as the equivalent of the mosque.433 
  According to an information note on Alevis on the Diyanet’s 
website, the umbrella term Alevism is used to refer to different ocak-groups434 
and Bektaşis and considers them within the fold of Islam as examples of 
historical formations that reflect Islamic richness.435 The Diyanet emphasises 
that this view is not given merely as an opinion of the Diyanet, but has a basis 
in Islamic methodology. This emphasis might have been formulated as a 
response to Alevis’ common complaint about being defined by Diyanet that 
adopts the Sunni Islamic doctrinal position and therefore rejects the 
particularities of Alevism. Indeed, I witnessed this complaint over ‘being 
defined by Diyanet’ uttered by many Alevis during my fieldwork.  
  The same information note also touches on the variety of views on 
Alevism presented by different segments of the Alevi movement that brings 
about ‘the problem of representation’ pointing to the diverse voices within the 
Alevi movement, as the following section examines in detail. However, the 
note states that the theology of religion divides faith groups into three: religion, 
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sect (mezhep), and mystic formations that include Sufi traditions. Adopting this 
framework for an analysis of Alevism, the Diyanet’s note goes on to declare 
that Alevism and Bektaşism recognise Islam as the religion, Mohammad as the 
last prophet and the Quran as the Holy Book and therefore they cannot be 
considered as a separate religion. Besides, as the note claims, a majority of 
Alevis consider themselves as ‘the root or essence of Islam’ (İslamın özü). 
Therefore, Alevism and Bektaşism are a richness (zenginlik) within Islam. 
Accordingly, the Diyanet analogically evaluates the similarities between Alevi 
traditions and Sufi traditions by considering the cem ritual as an example of 
zikr, deyiş/nefes as examples of Islamic hymns (ilahi) and the concept of hak 
as representing the vahdeti vücud idea of Sufi traditions. However, the note 
omits other elements of the Alevi traditions, which contravene the basic 
principles of Islam, such as the belief in reincarnation, semah danced by men 
and women together or alcohol consumption during rituals. It also makes no 
comment on the difference between Bektaşism and Alevism even though the 
former adopts an internal hierarchy as a tariqa, while, as discussed in Chapter 
3, the latter’s ocak lineages are formed in a different way and determined by 
birth in a particular Alevi community.  
  In the aforementioned note,436 the Diyanet also responds to the main 
Alevi recognition claims regarding the status of cemevi, the place of Alevis 
within the Diyanet and compulsory religious education. On the status of 
cemevi, citing some Alevi writers, 437  the Diyanet argues that cemevi is a 
contemporary construct as a result of migration to urban areas whereas, 
traditionally, the cem ritual used to be conducted in a tekke, dergah, ocak or an 
ordinary house. From this point of view, the Diyanet claims that cemevi can 
never be an equivalent of or alternative to the mosque, church or synagogue. 
The note underlines that the discussion on the status of cemevi as a place of 
worship raises the issue of whether Alevism is a separate religion or within 
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Doğanay, Anadolu’da Yaşayan Dergahlar (Can 2000). 
 
 136 
Islam, while the only place of worship in Islam has been designated as the 
mosque.  
  The same note also addresses the question as to whether the Diyanet 
should include a department on Alevism. In its response, the Diyanet first 
draws attention to Law No. 633 that sets out the duties of the Diyanet as a 
public institution operating in line with the principle of laiklik and as such 
providing services for all segments of the public. As a result, it says, the 
Diyanet is responsible for non-denominational service. Therefore, it suggests 
that changes in the institutional organisation of the Diyanet in providing 
services to different Islamic formations of the country such as Alevism should 
be considered carefully, since such a change in organisation affects the political 
formation of the Republic.  
  Regarding compulsory religious education, the note recognises the 
significance of including proper information on Alevism in the religious 
education curriculum. However, it highlights ‘the problem of representation’ 
of the Alevi community, in that different segments of the Alevi community 
have differing opinions on compulsory religious education. Therefore, it 
suggests encouraging academic research in social sciences in order to arrive at 
the most suitable form of regulation, which does not disrespect individuals 
having different opinions on Alevism.    
  As explained in Part I and earlier in this Chapter at Section 4.2, the 
transplantation of religious tolerance and secular state evolved into a system in 
Turkey where the Diyanet holds a peculiar authority in religious matters. It 
functions to assimilate not only ‘folk Islam’ as practiced by various Sufi 
brotherhoods but also Alevi traditions. As mentioned in Chapter 3.8 in Part I, 
Islamic doctrines differentiate between Sufi brotherhoods and Alevism and 
Alevism is a displaced phenomenon within Islamic theology. Whereas Alevis 
were considered to be heretics before the introduction of religious tolerance in 
Ottoman era, with the introduction of religious tolerance the matter of 
categorizing the Alevis’ religion gained importance. Continuing a trend that 
began in 19th century, the Turkish state continued to consider Alevis as part of 
folk Islam, albeit corrupted due to its link to pre-Islamic Turkish culture. As a 
result, holding the authority over true religion, the Diyanet never openly 
rejected Alevis as non-Muslims but carried on with an agenda of assimilating 
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them and thus bringing them back to the true religion. As long as generic 
inclusion of Alevis in Islam was preserved, such a positioning of Alevis 
allowed the Diyanet to step in as an authority.  
  The views expressed in Diyanet’s note are also similar to those 
produced by the Turkish authorities during the 2009-2010 workshops with the 
Alevi movement, which are examined in detail in Section 4.8. However, as 
examined in Chapter 3 in Part I, this thesis takes the position that Alevi 
traditions are different from religion and hence Islam. Alevi traditions have 
been practiced for centuries because they were handed down over generations 
and not because of their reference to Islamic doctrine. Indeed, Alevi philosophy 
differs significantly from Islam in terms of the positioning of shared Islamic 
figures. As explained in Chapter 3, Ali in Alevi traditions does not correspond 
to Ali in Islam and the Alevi traditions are starkly different from Sunni Islam. 
Yet, the Diyanet has been the most apparent impediment on Alevis’ recognition 
demands as it provides opinions on Alevism to courts and state institutions. In 
the following section, I argue how Alevis developed responses to the politico-
legal framework in Turkey by gradually getting organised as a movement that 
has been evolved into an advocacy for Alevis’ freedom of religion.  
 
4. 4. The Emergence of the Alevi Movement  
 
  The end of single party regime that established the foundation of 
Turkish laiklik signalled a new era that gradually extended toleration to 
Muslims, while ignoring Alevis. The introduction of a multi-party system in 
the 1950s re-legitimised Islam, as the wider powers given to Diyanet in the 
1982 Constitution also exemplifies. In this politico-legal system that has its 
roots in last period of the Ottoman Empire when Alevis were constructed as a 
sort of Muslims with their pre-Islamic Turkish heritage, as explained in 
Chapter 3, Part I,  we witness Alevis struggling to keep up or adapt to this view 
of themselves, and internalise it gradually. As this section aims to demonstrate, 
that struggle has its own dynamics in terms of how Alevis formulate strategies 
for their survival and adaptation. Together with the following section, I explore 
these dynamics, which gave birth to the transnational Alevi movement that 
advocates for the rights of Alevis. I read the emergence of the Alevi movement 
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as a product of the liberal governance that is grounded on the freedom of 
religion and secular state.  
  The transnational Alevi movement that articulates and advocates the 
current demands of Alevis began its formation gradually in the 1960s by 
founding village associations in cities. 438  This was triggered by Alevi 
migration from rural to urban areas and the need to conduct funerals. The report 
of the Alevi workshops and some Alevi authors cite the migration to the cities 
as being one of the most important developments that triggered ‘the distance 
between Alevis and Alevism’, or ‘the erosion of traditional Alevism’, as cited 
in the report by Alevi workshops and claimed by some Alevi authors.439 This 
migration brought about the disengagement of dede families from Alevi 
communities. Additionally, as I was frequently told during my fieldwork, 
migration to urban areas resulted in closer contacts with Muslims. The nature 
of this contact can be understood as Balagangadhara’s suggestions over the 
contact between religious traditions and non-religious traditions and the 
process of ‘effacing the otherness of the other’, discussed in Chapter 2. In the 
case of Alevis, this effacing has resulted in the gradual adoption by Alevis of 
Alevism as their religion, which was indeed imposed by a system that prioritise 
religion as protected area.  
  Scholars refer to an Alevi revival, indicating the acceleration of the 
Alevi movement, which dates back to the 1990s, which is examined further 
down in this section. However, the 1970s are also important to understand the 
cadre that initiated the emergence of the transnational Alevi movement to 
advocate for Alevis’ religious rights. This is a period when leftist ideologies 
became increasingly dominant in Turkey and clashed with the fascist ideology 
until the 1980 military coup.440 The vast majority of the membership of these 
leftist groups consisted of Alevi activists. Ertan argues that socialist ideology 
captivated Alevis for different reasons: because they were persecuted for their 
beliefs and culture and because of Alevis’ efforts to be involved in politics 
coincided with the leftist ideology’s need to appeal to the masses that found a 
 
438 The 1960s witnessed the emergence of Alevi associations, including the first and only political 
Alevi party. see Mehmet Ertan, Aleviliğin Politikleşme Süreci (Iletisim 2017) 34-49. 
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Ecevitoğlu, ‘Aleviliği Tanımlamanın Dayanılmaz Siyasal Cabizesi’ (2011) 66(3) Ankara Univ. 
SBF Dergisi 137-156. 
440 Suavi Aydın and Yüksel Taşkın, 1960'tan Günümüze: Türkiye Tarihi (İletişim Yayınları 2016). 
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response from Alevis.441 It is also important to note that the polarisation in 
politics divided society into two: either leftist groups or ultra-nationalist and 
Islamist groups. 442  Within this polarisation of politics pre-1980 Coup, the 
Alevi did not have another option to ally with, as the other option was ulta-
nationalists and Islamists.  
  The alliance with leftist ideology, however, proved to be costly for 
the Alevi for two main reasons: the denial of Alevi traditions by Alevis 
affiliated with the leftist groups and the pogroms perpetuated against them as 
a reaction against the left. Alevis were targeted in pogroms by anti-leftist 
groups. As the ideals of leftist ideology became more prevalent among the 
Alevi youth, some of the Alevi traditions, especially cem ritual and dede, were 
targeted for being religious and thus exploiting poor Alevis’ religious 
sentiments. For example, in my fieldwork, I was frequently told that during this 
time many dede were expelled from villages for exploiting people, while the 
youth became more distant from the tradition. Interestingly, however, the Alevi 
music and some of the Alevi bards were selectively dignified in the struggle 
against the oppressed. Thus, the Alevi culture was divided into the religious 
and secular realms, according to leftist preconceptions. In this respect, I argue 
that the leftist ideology brought about a distance between Alevis and Alevi 
culture. Leftist ideology that mirrored the criticism within Protestant theology 
about false religion as human corruption with priests as the main actors of this 
corruption, while extending this criticism by considering all religions as false. 
Some Alevis who were affiliated with leftist groups, alienated themselves from 
Alevi culture. Thus, the cem ritual and dede were identified as sources of 
exploitation in the community, while Alevi music and poetry for the oppressed 
were praised. The poems of Pir Sultan Abdal, one of the seven bards in history 
for Alevis, who was executed for his poems criticising the corruption of the 
Ottoman rules, were popularised as they were not in contradiction with the 
leftist ideology.  
  The Alevi also became the target of attacks against the leftist groups. 
For example, in Maraş in 1978, after the killing of two leftist teachers in a 
theatre bombing, rumours spread that leftists gathering for the funeral would 
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attack mosques, whereupon Islamist mobs began attacking Alevi 
neighbourhoods.443  The attacks lasted for several days and more than 100 
Alevis were killed before the police decided to intervene. Many Alevi families 
were forced to flee their homes. Indeed, London accommodates a considerable 
number of these families, who now lead the Alevi movement in the UK. For 
the last few years, Alevis have commemorated the Maraş massacre. In 
December 2015, an All Party Parliamentary Group for Alevis in the UK 
Parliament was established and issued a letter to the Governor of Maraş asking 
permission for a peaceful commemoration of the Maraş incident.444 Yet, the 
Governor of Maraş did not responded to it. Additionally, as a result of similar 
rumours, Islamists attacked Alevi neighbourhoods in Çorum in 1980.445 State 
security forces were not able to enter these neighbourhoods due to the severity 
and intensity of the attacks, in which 25 Alevis were killed.  
  The 1980 Military Coup signalled the inauguration of a new era and 
ended the polarisation of politics.446 Yet, many political activists, mainly from 
the leftist groups, were prosecuted and persecuted.447 Three important policies 
resulting from the Coup loomed large with regards to the place of religion in 
politics. First, there was an emphasis on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis and the 
Diyanet’s function in this ideology. Second, religious education was made 
compulsory. Third, the restrictions on the practice of religion were loosened. 
The first of these policies aimed to consolidate Islam as the true religion of 
Turkey in the political and legal arenas. While the leftist political activists were 
suppressed, the right was rerouted towards a new direction under state control. 
The state began benefiting from Islam in its nationalist discourse. The 
‘Turkish-Islamic’ synthesis became the foundation stone holding the nation in 
unison.448   
 
443 Levent Cinemre and Figen Akşit, 100 Soruda Tarih Boyunca Alevilik. (Hürgüç Gazetecilik 
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446 Sam Kaplan, ‘Din-u Devlet All over Again? The Politics of Military Secularism and Religious 
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  The already compromised feeling of Alevis’ confidence to the state 
as a result of events prior to the 1980 Coup was destroyed by a landmark event 
in the republican history of Alevis, which took place at Sivas in 1993. The Pir 
Sultan Abdal Association (PSAKD) had planned to organize a festival for the 
remembrance of Pir Sultan Abdal, an important Alevi rebel poet who lived in 
Sivas. Some 100 intellectuals had travelled to Sivas for the festival, the atheist 
writer Aziz Nesin among them. A Sunni group protested against the festival 
and particularly against Nesin’s attendance. The crowd targeted the hotel 
where the intellectuals, including Nesin, were staying, eventually firebombing 
the hotel. 37 people were killed during the ensuing inferno. Despite the police 
presence in front of the hotel, the authorities failed to disperse the crowd or 
prevent the spread of the fire. The State was criticised for the tardiness of its 
intervention. Subsequent police records of the incident reveal that the police in 
front of the hotel were ordered by radio not to interfere with the actions of the 
crowd.449 The police merely watched as the group committed arson. Following 
the incident, the Prime Minister announced: ‘The State was there. Those who 
surrounded the hotel were not harmed. Nobody from the crowd died.’ 450 
Subsequently, a parliamentary commission was established to investigate the 
incident. The report prepared by the parliament concluded that the events were 
the result of a provocation, which was triggered by the indifference of the local 
administration and security forces. 451  The state security court considered 
provocation as an extenuating circumstance. The court of appeal remitted the 
case to the state security court. The state security court reopened the file and 
sentenced 33 of the accused to death. 452 As the death penalty had been 
abolished with the beginning of the process of Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union (EU), the sentences were converted to life imprisonment.453   
  Another sign of this awakening can be seen in the Gazi incidents, 
which occurred in Istanbul in March 1995. The Gazi district of Istanbul had 
long been home to a large number of Alevis. In 1995, after an armed attack on 
a café in which some Alevis were killed, Alevi youth protested against both the 
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attack and the inadequate response by the police.454 The protests moved to the 
street outside the district police headquarters. The protest and clashes between 
Alevi protesters and the police lasted for two days, during which seventeen 
people were killed by the police. The instigators of the attack on the cafe have 
never been identified. After the subsequent judicial enquiry into the riots, 
commentators noted that court procedure was unfair and unduly lenient on the 
police officers who were alleged to have fired on the crowd. 455  Hence, a 
number of the victims’ relatives took their case to the European Court of 
Human Rights.  In the resulting case, Şimşek and others v. Turkey, the Turkish 
State was found to have violated Arts 2 and 13 of ECHR.456 The Court asserted 
that “the force used to disperse the demonstrators, which caused the death of 
seventeen people, was more than absolutely necessary within the meaning of 
Article 2.”457  In addition, the Court found that there had been failings in the 
investigation as well as in the domestic legal proceedings, stating that “the 
domestic authorities did not conduct prompt and adequate investigations into 
the killing of the applicants’ relatives.”458  
  The Sivas incidents represents a landmark for the Alevi, not only in 
terms of the extent and effect of its violence, but also the complicity of the State 
in its execution. The apparent cynicism of the State forced the Alevi into 
realising that the authorities were not there to protect them and that they must 
do something to protect themselves. My fieldwork also suggests that the Sivas 
massacre triggered an awareness of being an Alevi. Some Alevis learned that 
they were Alevis after their families’ reaction to the Sivas massacre. Some, 
who identified themselves with leftist ideologies, became more conscious of 
being Alevi. Some, for the first time in their lives, joined peaceful 
demonstrations with their families, making their Alevi identity visible for the 
first time. Together with the events prior to 1980, the Sivas incidents made the 
Alevi conscious of their identity and come into terms with the need for 
advocacy for their identity.   
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  Following the Sivas massacre, the membership of the PSAKD (one 
of the leading Alevi organizations) tripled, while the number of branches of 
HBVKD (another national Alevi organization) increased from 20 to more than 
50.459 The Alevi Revival also meant that the village-based organizations in 
urban areas that were founded for community needs were transformed into 
representational organizations at national level.460 Together with the already 
developing Alevi movement in Europe, a transnational Alevi movement has 
come into being. 461  Zırh defines the Alevi movement as “the main 
organizational current” of “the historical process by which Alevism evolved 
from a locally invisible to transnationally visible belief community”.462 Indeed, 
the influence of the Alevi Movement in Europe (primarily in Germany) on the 
politics of Turkey attracted attention first in 1990, when a local newspaper, 
Cumhuriyet, published an ‘Alevi Declaration’, in which the recognition 
demands of the Alevi for the first time found voice in Turkey, it having first 
been declared in Hamburg in 1989.463  
  The Alevi migration to European countries dates back to the 1960s, 
but intensified in the late 70s as a result of Alevi pogroms, which led to refugee 
flows and economic migration. After the military coup in 1980, another wave 
of Alevi refugees settled down in different European countries. As mentioned 
above, these political refugees were affiliated with leftist groups. In Europe, 
predominantly in Germany, they initiated the organization of the Alevi 
movement. These Alevi organizations did not conceptualise Alevism in 
religious terms until after the mid-1990s when they realised the legal 
mechanism offered by multi-cultural politics for faith communities.464 On the 
way to obtaining recognition to teach Alevism in public schools, the Federation 
of Alevi Communities in Germany (AABF) began gradually formulating 
Alevism as a religion within this legal mechanism. Ertan compares how the 
peer organizations PSAKD and HBVKTD in Turkey considered Alevism as a 
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way of culture, while the AABF preferred to define it in religious terms in the 
German context. 465 This is an important indicator to show that conceptualising 
Alevis as a religious community began in the European context.  
  As a result of the AABF’s efforts in Germany, Alevism was 
considered as Religionsgemeinschaft (religious community)466 and fulfilled the 
conditions for the teaching of Alevism in schools in different states in 
Germany. Turgut Öker, the director of the AABF at the time, reconciled his 
Marxist background and the struggle for recognition as follows:  
The only form of organisation we knew in Turkey were associations. 
There was no cemevi. And then maybe coming from left-wing 
organisations we were a little bit ashamed of presenting ourselves as 
religious. We used to be strongly criticised as democrats carrying out 
religious work. But we now say that Aleviness has existed in its 
religious form in Anatolia for 1000 years, so why should we reject this 
form and create something new? We now realise that Christians cannot 
operate without churches, Muslims without mosques, and Alevis 
without cemevi.467 
 
It is also important to underline that the success of the AABF in Germany 
stemmed from its broad representation of Alevis.468 In this connection, the 
AABF has become an ‘authority’ to speak for Alevis in Germany. This strategy 
for success has been copied in other European states as well as in Turkey with 
the establishment of federations and confederations that aim to unite different 
Alevi organizations under one umbrella. On many occasions during my 
fieldwork, I observed the emphasis on ‘being organised’ (örgütlenmek) for the 
representation of Alevis.469  
  Being organised is considered both as a survival strategy against 
assimilation (loss of identity) and as a matter of representation of the Alevi 
community. Balagangadhara emphasises that the framework in which the 
secular law and state operate indeed requires an authority for religious 
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communities to settle disputes about beliefs and to doctrinise the tradition, for 
this framework considers religion as a matter of truth revolving around 
doctrines. 470  And yet, Alevis do not have an epistemic approach to their 
tradition. Therefore, it is indeed a struggle to establish such an authority to 
speak for Alevis. One of the hot topics within the Alevi movement is the 
fragmented nature of the Alevi movement. Having an imposed 
conceptualisation of religion, different segments of Alevis founded 
associations to advocate for a single voice for ‘the Alevis’ rights’ and hence 
for a collective voice. It is further interesting that the same cadre that were 
affiliated with the leftist ideologies, founded associations to defend a uniform 
Alevi voice. In the following section, I examine the problem about the efforts 
to find this voice as opposed to the inherently diverse nature of Alevi voices. 
In the following section, I discuss how the process of Turkey’s accession to the 
EU has brought in European framework which facilitated conceptualizing 
Alevis’ difference as a matter of religious freedom. 
  The same cadre, who were affiliated with the leftist ideology prior 
to 1980s, founded associations to defend the rights of Alevis collectively. In 
this connection to the diversity in terms of the Alevi traditions, Massicard 
summarises the three main currents within the Alevi movement thus: one 
current is mainly established and run by a group trying to secure the 
transmission of the Alevi traditions by producing knowledge about the Alevi 
performances such as cem, semah, and deyiş/nefes within the given politico-
legal structure. These are mainly old-dergah organizations such as Şahkulu 
Dergahı and HBVKV. The second current is represented by PSAKD and ABF, 
which are more connected with the diaspora Alevi movement (AABF) and 
more active in politico-legal mechanisms. For example, the first case dealt with 
by the ECtHR, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey,471 was brought through the 
efforts of PSAKD members, demonstrating its willingness to adopt legal 
strategies. The third current is represented by CEM, under the leadership of 
İzettin Doğan, whose authority is based on being an international law professor 
in Galatasaray University, a reputable university in Turkey, as well as being a 
dede himself, a member of a dede family within the ocak-structure. Like 
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PSAKD, CEM is active in the politico-legal field. The latest controversial case, 
Doğan and others v Turkey was taken to the ECtHR by CEM and Doğan 
himself.472  
  The difference between PSAKD and CEM is in their 
conceptualisation of Alevism in terms of its relation to Islam, its history, 
teachings and practices. In fact, Ertan considers the PSAKD and CEM as 
representing two strong opposite poles in the formation of the Alevi movement 
when he suggests that the boundaries of the politics of the Alevi movement 
were drawn by CEM and PSAKD. 473  In referring to Nancy Fraser, he 
differentiates the two different positions taken by CEM and PSAKD as 
affirmative and transformative approaches with respect to the relation between 
state and religion. Representing the affirmative approach, CEM tries to engage 
Alevism to fit in the existing framework. In my opinion, CEM tailors a specific 
Alevism, as a Sufi tradition or mezhep (sub-denomination) analogously equal 
to Sunni Islam. Similarly, it demands the reorganization of the Diyanet and 
reform of religious education as well as granting cemevi the status of place of 
worship.474 Unlike CEM, PSAKD adopts the transformative approach.  That 
is, it aims to transform the very foundation of the relation between state and 
religion. For example, it seeks the abolition of the Diyanet and compulsory 
religious education, while not holding a particular view on the status of cemevi. 
Indeed, this difference between the organisations can be seen in the court cases 
that they have brought to the ECtHR. This will be discussed further in the 
following section.  
  In this section, I aimed to explore the dynamics that led to the 
emergence of transnational Alevi movement. In this vein, I described how 
Alevis began establishing village associations in 1960s for community needs 
such as funerals or cem rituals. I then described how the leftist ideology brought 
about a strong tendency among young Alevis to reject their traditions as source 
of exploitation. These developments provide the background for understanding 
the emergence of transnational Alevi movement. In the following section, I 
describe how the policies following the Coup together with Turkey’s EU 
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accession process gave a different direction to the emergence of a transnational 
dimension to the Alevi movement. The difference between the transnational 
Alevi movement and the Alevi activity before this era is that the former was 
organised in order to be a voice for Alevis as a collective identity in religious 
terms and to make demands in parallel. In this connection, Alevis realised the 
importance of legal recognition as a religious community in the politico-legal 
system, albeit one that treats their difference only in religious terms.  
 
 
4. 5.  The Process of Turkey’s Accession to the EU and the Alevi Movement   
 
  The process of Turkey’s accession to the EU impacted on the 
conceptualisation of Alevism and advocacy of the Alevi movement. In 2000, 
the representative of the EU on Turkey’s accession, Karen Fogg, had separate 
meetings only with CEM and PSAKD to discuss the recognition demands of 
Alevis.475In this connection, Ertan points out the change in PSAKD’s language 
and conceptualisation of Alevism. For PSAKD, to discuss whether Alevism is 
within Islam or not is to disregard the rich syncretic nature of Alevism and to 
imprison it into only one of its constitutive elements: Islam. But according to 
PSAKD, Alevism is the result of the class struggle in the Middle Ages and an 
ideology of the oppressed.476 In this regard, there is a tendency to make claims 
for Alevism as a religion in order to be involved in the EU talks, not only by 
CEM but also by PSAKD.477 In parallel, PSAKD’s emphasis on Alevism as a 
way of life and culture shifted towards a system of belief.478 The head of 
PSAKD in the 2000s, Ali Balkız, criticised the EU reports on Turkey for 
defining Alevis as “non Sunni Muslim community” and also for implying that 
Alevis demand public religious services from the Diyanet, teaching Alevism in 
religious education and financial support from the state for faith-related 
activities by comparing Alevis with Sunnis.479 Disagreeing with the definition 
provided by the EU, Balkız stressed that the EU was mistaken to define 
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Alevism and that Alevis’ only demand is laicism, meaning the state’s non-
interference in religious matters.480  
  Another aspect of the EU-Turkey relations on Alevis’ recognition 
demands concern the legal regulations on establishing Alevi 
associations.481Alevis began to be organized in an increasingly concerted way 
following the Sivas massacre, as described at the previous section. These 
organizations were established as cultural centres or foundations without 
connotations to Alevism in their constitutions and names. Thus, they generally 
adopted names such as Hacı Bektaş or Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Centre. 
Nevertheless, some of these associations were prosecuted, either under Article 
5 of the Law on Associations482 or Article 74 of the Civil Code483 that prohibit 
the founding of organizations for the promotion of religion or sect. In general, 
these associations, which were brought before the court on the grounds of the 
relevant law, were able to succeed in overturning any adverse decisions 
ordering their closure on appeal. However, success in this respect was 
conditional on a strong emphasis on the cultural side of their activities, 
avoiding reference to Alevism or ignoring it altogether.484 For instance, in 1995 
when the CEM Vakfı appealed a court decision banning its foundation, it 
highlighted that the aim of the foundation is “to study Alevi culture 
scientifically as a part of Anatolian culture.” The Supreme Court of Appeal 
(Yargıtay) overruled the first-instance court’s decision to outlaw the 
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4. Kanunlara, milli egemenliğe, milli güvenliğe, kamu düzenine ve genel asayişe, kamu yararına, 
genel ahlaka ve genel sağlığın korunmasına aykırı faaliyette bulunmak,  
5. Bölge, ırk, sosyal sınıf, din ve mezhep esasına veya adına dayanarak faaliyette bulunmak,  
6. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ülkesi üzerinde, ırk, din, mezhep, kültür veya dil farklılığına dayanan 
azınlıklar bulunduğunu ileri sürmek veya Türk Dilinden veya kültüründen ayrı dil ve kültürleri 
korumak, geliştirmek veya yaymak suretiyle azınlık yaratmak veya herhangi bir bölgenin veya 
ırkın veya sınıfın veya belli bir din veya mezhepten olanların diğerlerine hakim veya diğerlerinden 
imtiyazlı olmasını sağlamak.”  
483 Medeni Kanun, Law no. 743 (17.02.1926), Article 74 para 2 reads in Turkish: “Kanuna, ahlaka 
ve adaba veya milli menfaatlere aykırı olan veya siyasi düşünce veya belli bir ırk veya cemaat 
mensuplarını desteklemek gayesi ile kurulmuş olan vakıfların tesciline karar verilemez.” 
484 Lütfü Kaleli, Alevi Kimliği ve Alevi Örgütlenmeleri, (Can 2000).  
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foundation based on this cultural aspect of the foundation’s activities, 
justifying the decision by stating, inter alia, that semah is merely an Anatolian 
cultural dance.485  
  The Alevi Bektaşi Federation (ABKB), which was established in 
2001, declared itself as a cultural organisation openly through its use of the 
names ‘Alevi’ and ‘Bektaşi’.486 This was an important challenge as up until the 
foundation of ABKB, the Alevi organizations avoided using these terms and 
instead had to present themselves as cultural organizations promoting folkloric 
aspects of Turkish culture such as semah. Furthermore, Art 2 and 3 of its 
constitution asserted:  
Art 2: the aim of the association: to cherish and promote the study of 
the Alevi-Bektaşi culture and teaching;  
Art 3: the activities of the association: (1) carrying out works for the 
recognition, free expression and legal protection of Alevi-Bektaşi 
culture and teaching. (4) [...] opens, constructs and supports the 
construction of cemevi. 
 
  The Law on Associations prohibits the establishing of foundations 
based on religion, race, class, language that indicate separatist tendencies for 
the Turkish nation. 487  The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the public 
prosecutor both considered Alevism within the fold of Islam in light of the 
opinion of the Diyanet (1999). The Diyanet considered cem rituals as nothing 
more than musical entertainment (sazlı sözlü) gatherings and advised that 
allowing cemevi would damage the unity of the nation since the only 
worshipping place of Islam is the mosque. In consequence, MOI and the public 
prosecutor objected to Article 2 and 3 of the ABKB constitution on the grounds 
of Article 5 of the Law on Associations. 488  The prosecutor accused the 
founding members of the ABKB of being separatists and demanded the 
organization’s closure since Article 5 of the Law on Associations outlawed the 
establishing of associations that might risk religious or sectarian separation of 
the country.489 In contrast to the arguments of the public prosecutor and MOI, 
 
485 Yargıtay 18. Hukuk Dairesi, E. 1995/717, K. 1995/1097 (31.01.1995).  
486 See Chapter 3 for the connection between Alevi and Bektaşi communities.  
487 Dernekler Kanunu, Law no. 2908 (06.10.1983). 
488 Ibid. 
489 Ibid Article 2- pose a threat to the existence of the Republic of Turkey by supporting separation 
[...] religion and/or sect; Article 5- to conduct activities based on the essence [...] religion and/or 
sect; Article 6- to advocate the existence of minorities and create minorities based on [...] religion, 
sect”.  
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in its defence at the court, the ABKB stated that Alevism is neither a religion 
nor a sect. This statement was embellished by two Alevi sayings: “Love is our 
religion, we don’t believe in other religions’; and ‘we are not a sect, we have 
our path”. However, the Ankara 2nd Civil Court of First Instance (Asliye Hukuk 
Mahkemesi) grounded its decision on the opinion of the Diyanet and MOI on 
Alevism, as an Islamic tradition, even though the Ministry of Culture provided 
a different view, considering Alevism as part of the rich culture of Anatolia 
(kültürel zenginlik).490 The Court considered Alevism as ‘a sect and culture’ of 
Islam, thereby placing the constitution of the ABKB in breach of the relevant 
legislation with the effect that the association should be closed down.  
  The founders of ABKB appealed the decision. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal (Yargıtay) overturned the first-instance court’s ruling.491 In the wake 
of this decision, the ABKB prepared a declaration for its consideration of 
Alevism and submitted it to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The declaration 
completely rejected claims that Alevism lay in the realm of religion and merely 
stated that Alevism is aimed at promoting a culture, which was born in 
Anatolia. In overturning the decision to ban the ABKB, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal did not discuss whether Alevism is a sect, religion or culture. Rather, it 
ruled that the nature of the activities of the ABKB were not dangerous to 
national integrity. Despite the appeal decision, the public prosecutor insisted 
on standing by the opinion that the Alevi constitute a sect different to the Sunni 
and thus, the ABKB poses a threat to national integrity. Yet, the first-instance 
court allowed the establishment of the ABKB in its second consideration when 
the case was returned following the ABKB’s successful appeal.492  
  The decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal was issued in 2002 
and coincides with the first EU report on Turkey where the Law on 
Associations with respect to this case specifically was criticized. The 2002 EU 
report stated that:  
In February the Cultural Association of the Union of Alevi and Bektaşi 
Formations [ABKB] was dissolved on the grounds that, according to 
Articles 14 and 24 of the Constitution, and Article 5 of the Law on 
Associations, it was not possible to found an association by the name 
of Alevi or Bektaşi, which refer to Muslim religious communities. 
 
490 Ankara 2.. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi, E. 2001/654; K. 2002/59. 
491 Yargıtay 18. Hukuk Dairesi, E. 2002/9706, K. 2002/11660. 
492 Ankara 2.. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi, E. 2002/930, K. 2003/104. 
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Following an appeal by the association, the case is pending before the 
Supreme Court.493  
 
In this regard, it could be suggested that the decision reflected the politico-legal 
conjecture. Indeed, during the EU negotiations, the situation of Alevis became 
a criterion to evaluate religious freedom in Turkey.494  
  The substantive point with respect to talks on Turkey’s accession to 
the EU is its influence on the Alevi movement that leans more on identification 
as a faith community and that formulates claims on religious freedom. The 
Turkish laiklik and its courts of law consider Alevism as an inner-Islamic 
richness within Sunni fold. By addressing Alevis as a non-Sunni Muslim 
community, the EU accession process has supported the formation of Alevis’ 
advocacy of religious freedom, while clashing with Turkish laiklik. Although 
the European framework alleviates the pressure of assimilation on Alevis, it 
nonetheless remains limited insofar that Alevis’ difference is transformed into 
a religious difference. In a response to these imposed frameworks, the 
positioning of Alevis took shape in formation of the transnational Alevi 
movement which gradually evolved into rights advocacy as a religious 
community. Since 2004, with the amendment in Article 90 of the Constitution, 
as part of harmonisation Turkish legal system with the EU, Alevis have taken 
recourse to the advocacy at the ECtHR. The two important areas where this 
advocacy has focused are religious education and the status of cemevi. 
Although the Alevi activism at the ECtHR is analysed in detail in Chapter 5, 
following two sections look into the current situation in Turkey in terms of the 
status of cemevi and the compulsory religious education.  
 
4. 6. The Legal Status of Cemevi  
 
  Cemevi can be translated as the house of cem or gathering house. 
Historically Alevi rituals used to be performed in large village houses, in a 
 
493 Commission of European Union, ‘Regular Report on Turkey’s Prograss towards Accession’ 
(2002) 37, available at 
https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/AB_Iliskileri/Tur_En_Realitons/Progress/Turkey_Progress_Report_20
02.pdf (accessed 19 April 2020). 
494 Ali Çarkoğlu and Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, ‘A Precarious Relationship: The Alevi Minority, the 
Turkish state and the EU’ (2011) 16(2) South European Society and Politics 351-364. 
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section of the dede’s house and dergah.495 With the closure of these dergah 
and the banning of the title of dede in the post-Republican era by Law no. 677, 
along with urban migration, the Alevi lacked places to conduct their communal 
rituals. In addition, Law no. 677 also outlawed the conducting of cem rituals. 
Gül recounts an interesting anecdote that highlights this approach: in 1981, 
soon after the 1980 Military Coup, a group of Alevis in Bergama (Izmir 
province) were reported by members of a neighbouring Sunni village and taken 
into custody on the charge of violating Law no. 677. When they explained they 
were conducting a cem ritual, the prosecutor advised them to ‘correct’ their 
phrasing from “conducting a cem ritual” to “organizing a hayır yemeği (charity 
meal) gathering.” Since cem concludes with a common meal, this rephrasing 
alone was enough to have the charges immediately dropped.496  
  Moreover, in the urban setting, Alevis used to be confronted by 
Sunnis for their non-attendance at mosques. 497  One of the dede who 
participated in this research mentioned funeral rituals as the main driving force 
for establishing cemevi. In the absence of a place for their funerals, Alevis had 
to take the deceased to mosques. Instead of Alevi funeral rituals, the burial used 
to be conducted under the guidance of imams, according to the Islamic 
tradition.498 This would create an odd situation, where imams used to complain 
that Alevis visited the mosque only for their deceased. Indeed, cemevi are not 
places where only the cem ritual is conducted. They serve as more of a 
community centre for Alevis. All the participants were of the opinion that the 
cemevi is more than a 'place of worship'. Its functions are multiple, including 
the conducting of cem rituals, muhabbet rituals, funeral rituals, offering 
bağlama and semah courses, cooking and sharing food as well as discussing 
community matters.  
  In addition to its functions for Alevi communities, the recognition 
of cemevi as a place of worship is important for two reasons. As already 
mentioned, the Alevi have come into closer contact with the state and with 
 
495 Nejat Birdoğan, Alevilik Anadolunun Gizli Kültürü (Inkilap 2015) 290-292.  
496 Zeynel Gül, Yol muyuz Yolcu muyuz? (Can 1995) 38.  
497 Fieldwork observations and also see Murat Es, ‘Alevis in Cemevis: Religion and Secularism in 
Turkey’, in Irene Becci, Marian Burchardt, Jose Casanova (eds) Topographies of Faith: Religion 
in Urban Spaces (Brill 2013) 25- 43. 
498 Besim Can Zırh, ‘Following the Dead Beyond the ‘Nation’: A Map for Transnational Alevi 
Funerary Routes From Europe to Turkey’ (2012) 35 (10) Ethnic and Racial Studies 1758-1774. 
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Sunnis in urban settings. The problems that result from increasing contact 
between Sunni Muslims and Alevis in this context have been apparent.  Alevis 
are often confronted with the questions: "while we have a mosque, what do you 
have?", "if you are Muslim, why don't you come to the mosque?", "what is 
Alevism?" and so on. Bearing in mind the proselytising processes of religions, 
as discussed in Part I through the conversion process of traditions into variants 
of religion, Alevis have two options: either to accept the mosque as their place 
of worship or establish their own because of the underlying assumption that 
every culture has a religion and every religion has a place of worship. Whether 
as a system of belief or an Islamic Sufi tradition, the conceptualisation of 
Alevism has been strongly situated in relation to the Islamic framework. 
Scholars often stress negations embedded in the self-descriptions of Alevis 
about their traditions, with respect to Sunni Islam.499 Sökefeld observes in his 
fieldwork with Alevis that Alevis’ self-identification is grounded on a 
comparison with Sunni Islam.500 Similarly, during cem rituals I attended, I 
witnessed different dede explaining Alevism in opposition to Islam.501 This 
strategy is not new, nor did it emerge only in the context of migration.502 Murat 
Es for instance emphasises this aspect of the conceptualisation of cemevi in 
particular and Alevism in general. Based on his fieldwork on cemevi in 
Istanbul, he suggests,  
Just like Alevism is defined on the basis of what it “lacks” in 
comparison to Sunnism, cemevi is defined according to what they 
“lack” compared to mosques. […]Consequently, they have become 
increasingly similar to what mosques signify for Sunni communities: 
places of worship.503  
 
 
499 Martin Sökefeld, ‘Alevis in Germany and the Politics of Recognition’ (2003) 29 New 
Perspectives on Turkey 133-161; Murat Es, ‘Alevis in Cemevis: Religion and Secularism in 
Turkey’, in Irene Becci, Marian Burchardt, Jose Casanova (eds) Topographies of Faith: Religion 
in Urban Spaces (Brill 2013) 25- 43. 
500 Martin Sökefeld, ‘Alevis in Germany and the Politics of Recognition’ (2003) 29 New 
Perspectives on Turkey 133-161. 
501 For example, during a cem ritual, a dede said that Islam is governed with the same rules for 
thousand years, whereas Alevism is not like that; but carried its essence to today by updating 
itself. “Islam 1000 sene onceki kurallarla yonelitiyor. Ama Alevilik farkli; Alevilik yasama 
kendini uyarlayarak ozunu bu gune tasimistir. Bu modern topluma kendini en iyi uygulayan inanc 
Alevilik.” (12 Feb 2015, London) 
502 Martin Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in 
Transnational Space (Berghan Books 2008) 94. 
503 Murat Es, ‘Alevis in Cemevis: Religion and Secularism in Turkey’, in Irene Becci, Marian 
Burchardt, Jose Casanova (eds) Topographies of Faith: Religion in Urban Spaces (Brill 2013) 25- 
43, 38. 
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While Es’ critique of transformation of cemevi is convincing, still cemevi is 
different from mosque in many respects, such as conducting rituals which 
includes music and dance as well as community gatherings of both sexes.  
  The construction of cemevi has increased since the 1990s Alevi 
revival. According to Salman, while there were 106 cemevi before 1990, the 
number reached 169 in 2000 and 937 in 2012.504 Currently because Law no. 
677 is not actively applied to prosecute these cemevi, they can operate openly 
and conduct cem rituals without facing prosecution. For example, at the hearing 
in the case of Dogan and others v Turkey before the ECtHR, the Turkish 
Government argued that Law no. 677, which had been enacted in the wake of 
the proclamation of the Republic, was no longer applied.505 Although Law no. 
677 is not actively applied to prevent the construction of cemevi or destroy 
them, it remains the main impediment to legalising the construction of cemevi.  
  The place of worship has a specific status in the Turkish legal 
system. Article 3 of Regulation no. 2/1958 of the Council of Ministers, enacted 
in 1935 implementing the law governing the wearing of certain dress, provides 
a limited definition for places of worship in the following: “Places of worship 
(mabedler) are closed areas created in accordance with the relevant procedure 
and designed in the case of each religion for the practice of religious 
worship.”506 Despite lack of a procedure for being granted place of worship 
status, places of worship are exempted from various taxes and their electricity 
bills are provided from Diyanet’s budget, while urban development plans 
include provisions for construction of places of worship. The decision no. 
2002/4100, adopted by the Council of Ministers implementing Law no. 4736 
regulates the tax exemption of places of worship (includes in parenthesis-
mosque, church and synagogue).507 In addition, according to Article 4 (f) of 
 
504 Cemal Salman, ‘Space as an Identity Struggle and Intervention Symbol at Urban Areas: 
Djemevis in Turkey’ (2015)  4(1) Humanities and Social Sciences Review 305-314, 312. 
505 İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016) para 84. 
506 Bakanlar Kurulu, Decision no. 2/1958 (18.02.1935), implementing Bazı Kisvelerin 
Giyilemeyeceğine Dair Kanun, Law no. 259 (13.12.1934).  
507 Bakanlar Kurulu, Decision no. 2002/4100 (23.05.2002), implementing Law no. 4736, Madde 2 
“Aşağıda belirtilen [elektrik abone grubunda yer alan] (kişi ya da kurumlar, bu Kararın 3üncü 
maddesinde belirtilen koşullar çerçevesinde 4736 sayılı Kanunun 1inci maddesinin birinci fıkrası 
hükmünden muaftır: (...) e) Hayır kurumları, dernekler, vakıflar, müzeler, resmi okullar (...), f) 
İbadethaneler (camiler, mescitler, kiliseler, havra ve sinagoglar) (...). Madde 3 
Bu kararın 2inci maddesinde belirtilen abone gruplarına uygulanacak tarifeler aşağıdaki usullere 
göre belirlenir: (...) e) Hayır kurumları, dernekler, vakıflar, müzeler, resmi okullar (...) abone 
grubu için, adı geçen gruba uygulanan ortalama satış fiyatı ile mesken abone grubuna uygulanan 
aylık ortalama satış fiyatı arasındaki fark kilowatt-saat başına 15 TL’yi geçemez (...) f) (...) 
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the Property Tax Law, places of worship are granted tax exemption.508 Article 
36 of the Municipal Revenues Law grants tax exemption from electricity bills 
of “places of worship such as mosque, masjid, church and synagogue,” while 
Article 44 grants exemption from environmental cleaning tax.509 Additional to 
the same law, Article 2, also grants exemption from building and construction 
taxes for places of worship.510  
  The construction of places of worship subject to provisions in urban 
development plans. The Zoning Law that used to reserve a place for 
construction of mosque in development plans, was amended in 2003 within the 
framework of the EU harmonization policies. In the amended law, the word 
‘mosque’ was supplanted with ‘place of worship’, with ‘mosque, church or 
synagogue’ added in parentheses.511 Even though cemevi were still not legally 
recognised as places of worship, this change in legislation paved the way to 
advocate for their recognition as such. In 2004, a group of Alevis established 
the Çankaya Association for Founding Cemevis. However, its constitution was 
subjected to scrutiny by the Turkish authorities. Article 2 of its constitution 
states: “the aim of the association is to found cemevi, which is the centre of 
belief and worship of Alevi citizens, who live in Sincan,” while Article 4/a 
reads “to found cemevi that is the centre of Alevi belief and worship” and 
Article 4/b follows “to initiate constructing cemevi in places where Alevi 
citizens live, according to the land allocation for places of worship in zoning 
law.” The governorship of Ankara, instead of confirming the foundation’s 
application, asked the opinion of the Interior Ministry about its constitution. In 
the process, the Interior Ministry requested the opinion of the Diyanet on 
cemevi. The Diyanet stated that Alevism is an interpretation of Islam and the 
only places of worship are mosques and thereby a cemevi could not be 
 
ibadethanelerin elektrik enerjisi yıllık giderleri de Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığının takip eden yılı 
bütçesine konulacak ödeneklerden sağlanır (...).” 
508 Emlak Vergisi Kanunu, Law no. 1319 (29.07.1970). 
“Aşağıda yazılı binalar, (...) Bina Vergisinden daimi olarak muaftır (...): (...)g) Dini hizmetlerin 
ifasına mahsus ve umuma açık bulunan ibadethaneler ve bunların müştemilatı (...).”  
509 Belediye Gelirleri Kanunu, Law no. 2464 (26.05.1981). 
“Aşağıdaki yazılı yerlerde ve şekillerde tüketilen elektrik ve havagazı vergiden müstesnadır: (...) 
2. Dini hizmetlerin ifasına mahsus ve umuma açık bulunan cami, mescit, kilise ve havra gibi  
ibadethanelerde (...).”  
510 Belediye Gelirleri Kanunu, Law no. 2464 (26.05.1981) Ek Madde 2 – (Ek: 21/1/1982 - 2589/1 
md.) “Aşağıdaki bina inşaatları bina inşaat harcından müstesnadır: (...) f) Dini hizmetlerin ifasına 
mahsus ve umuma açık bulunan ibadethaneler (...).” 
511 İmar Kanunu, Law no. 3194 (03.05.1985) First Add. Clause was amended by Law no. 4928 
(19.07.2003). 
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considered as a place of worship.512 Based on the Diyanet’s opinion that a 
cemevi cannot be a place of worship, the Governorship asked the foundation to 
make amendments in Article 2, 4/a and 4/b of its constitution that indicate 
cemevi as a place of worship. Instead, the Governorship suggested it be 
replaced with “to found cemevi for cultural purposes” (kültürel amaçli cemevi 
yapmak).513   
  The foundation insisted on not making the requested amendments 
three times. In its response to the Governorship, the foundation argued that 
cemevi is the place of worship for Alevi citizens.514 Upon the third refusal, the 
Governorship of Ankara applied to the general prosecutor to have the Çankaya 
Association for Founding Cemevis closed down, on the grounds that it had not 
made the necessary amendments to its constitution. The 16th Civil Court of 
First Instance rejected the case, ruling that the constitution did not violate the 
law and that determination of what counts as religious worship or a place of 
worship by the state was not compatible with the principle of laïcité. 515 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal (Yargıtay) overturned the decision on 
the grounds of Law no. 677 and 633, limiting places of worship to mosque and 
masjid.516After the first-instance court maintained its decision, the case was 
examined by the Yargıtay Grand Civil Chamber (Yargıtay Hukuk Genel 
Kurulu), the highest civil chamber of Yargıtay, that decided on 3 December 
2014 that including the phrase “cemevi, which are places of worship for Alevi 
citizens”, does not contravene the law and as such the constitution of the 
foundation was compatible with law.517  
  It is also interesting to note that this decision came one day after the 
ECtHR’s judgment on Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı (CEM) v. 
Turkey on the status of cemevi, where the ECtHR found Turkey in violation of 
Article 14 in relation to Article 9 for not providing the same benefits which are 
provided to ‘places of worship’, to Yenibosna Cemevi.518 This judgment is 
 
512 Diyanet, Opinion no. 2004/1773 (17.04.2004). 
513 For all legal documents related to this case, see Ali Yıldırım,‘Çankaya Cemevi Davası’ (2015) 
January-February (33) Yol Dergisi 79-126.. 
514 Ibid.  
515 16. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi, E. 2010/492, K. 2011/316 (04.04.2011).  
516 Yargıtay 7. Hukuk Dairesi, E. 2012/262, K. 2012/3351 (10.05.2012).  
517 Yargıtay Hukuk Genel Kurulu, E. 2014/71038, K. 2014/990 (03.12.2014).  
518 Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey App no 32093/10 (ECtHR, 20 June 
2017).  
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examined in Chapter 5 in detail. However, the timing of these two decisions 
indicates that the Court of Appeal might consider the ECtHR judgment on the 
status of cemevi. The decisions of the ECtHR and the Court of Appeal 
(Yargıtay) in December 2014 facilitated CHP (the main opposition party) 
municipalities' support for the construction of cemevi. For example, the CHP 
announced that almost a hundred municipalities regarded cemevi as places of 
worship, on the legal grounds of the ECtHR's decision.519 However, such an 
approach has not been systematically adopted by all the municipalities 
governed by the CHP. Therefore, the current situation regarding the legal status 
of cemevi continues to remain at the discretion of individual administrations.   
  The procedure for constructing a place of worship is as follows: 
according to the Zoning Law, certain areas are designated as places of worship. 
In parallel, the municipalities are charged with land allocation in line with the 
zoning plans. Since cemevi is not mentioned clearly in the provisions for places 
of worship, they are often denied land allocation. Governorships and sub-
governorships are charged with allocating land for places of worship, 
according to the Zoning Law. Since they do not yet regard cemevi as a place of 
worship, no cemevi benefits from land allocation with respect to the Zoning 
Law. This results in illegal construction of cemevi. Municipalities govern the 
land allocation for places of worship and therefore hold a wide range of 
discretion. This is the micro level, where Alevi activism for recognition and 
construction of cemevi is concentrated. In particular, municipalities led by the 
CHP, which is historically supported by the Alevi, tend to facilitate the 
construction of cemevi as cultural houses. Even this ad-hoc solution may 
require Alevi activism. The land allocation of the PSKAD Batıkent Cemevi is 
such an example. This cemevi was not constructed by the municipality. It is 
located in one of the neighbourhoods with the highest population of Alevis in 
Ankara. Therefore, PSAKD asked the mayor to convert a park where there is 
a small construction into a cemevi. When they were refused, they occupied the 
park and constructed a small place for a cemevi. After a court process and the 
intervention of political figures, the mayor was obliged to make amendments 
 
519 ‘Ağbaba: 100 Civarı Belediye Cemevlerine İbadethane Statüsü Verdi’ Bianet (Ankara, 6 Feb 
2015), available at http://bianet.org/bianet/ifade-ozgurlugu/162094-agbaba-100-civari-belediye-
cemevlerine-ibadethane-statusu-verdi (accessed 29 February 2020).   
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in the grant of the land and legalised it.520 I was told that the Alevi stood guard 
day and night in the premises to protect it against the municipal police.521  
  During my fieldwork, I got the impression that municipality staff 
were not clear about the procedure for constructing a place of worship. I visited 
different cemevi: both the cemevi that was constructed and is administered by 
the Çankaya municipality; the cemevi that was constructed by Yenimahalle 
municipality but its administration was given to an Alevi charity that was 
founded specifically for administering this cemevi as well as the cemevi that 
was managed solely by Alevi’s own initiatives. Neither the staff in cemevi nor 
in the municipality were able to describe to me how the official procedure for 
constructing a cemevi, that is officially permissible, would be possible. Indeed, 
during my visit, I was referred to different units within the municipality, as no 
one was sure about it. The staff were attentive, searching for and reading 
relevant sections on regulations from their cabinet, but eventually they advised 
me to get an appointment with the mayor of Ankara. At the time I asked for an 
appointment, the mayor was not available. However, my experience of 
searching for a clear pathway for cemevi constructions is itself indicative that 
construction of cemevi is not subject to transparent rules, and appears to occur 
at the discretion of municipalities.  
  As explained above, cemevi is a recent construct for Alevis.  The 
political and legal framework of Turkish laiklik adversely affected conducting 
Alevi rituals. In addition to this, Alevis’ migration from rural setting where the 
traditional Alevi ties were forged through ocak systems, to urban setting urged 
the need for a shared place for conducting the Alevi rituals and community 
gatherings. Cemevi also provided Alevis to respond to the pressure on going to 
mosque. As explained above, Alevis are considered as an Islamic tradition with 
remnants of Central Asian Turkish culture. As the only designated place of 
worship in Turkey is mosque in Turkey, Alevis try to avoid the pressure on 
going to mosque, by pointing to cemevi, as their place of worship. Moreover, 
 
520 Ankara Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisi (Ankara General Municipality Council), Decision no. 
1279 (12.08.2014) confirmed the amendment in the zoning plan and thus the mentioned parcel 
was allocated to PSAKD Yenimahalle Branch for Cemevi and Culture and Education Centre 
(Cemevi ve Eğitim Kültür Merkezi).  
521 Fieldwork in Ankara, between September 2015 and February 2016. In addition to the people in 
the cemevi and from the Alevi movement that told me this story, I also encountered Alevis on the 
bus on my way to the cemevi who told me that they acted as guards.  
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the generous benefits given to the place of worship presented an opportunity 
for the Alevi movement to advance claims for gaining recognition for cemevi 
as place of worship. Yet the ECtHR success in the case of Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim 
ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı  v. Turkey which is examined in detail in Chapter 5, 
has not yet yielded a change in the Turkish legal system to consider cemevi a 
place of worship. However, this successful advocacy for recognition cemevi as 
place of worship at the ECtHR encouraged some municipalities to allow 
cemevi in their administration to benefit from advantages that are in place for 
places of worship. In the following section, I look at Alevis’ advocacy in 
relation to compulsory religious education. 
4. 7. Compulsory Religious Education 
 
  The 1982 Constitution also put into effect compulsory religious 
education throughout both primary and secondary education (Article 24). It is 
interesting that Article 24 also safeguards freedom of religion and 
conscience.522 Additionally, Article 12 of the State Education Act (Law no. 
1739 of 24.06.1973) provides that “laiklik shall be the basis of Turkish national 
education. Religious culture and ethics shall be among the compulsory subjects 
taught in primary and upper secondary schools, and in schools of these levels.” 
Compulsory religious education is seen as fully compatible with the principle 
of laiklik and freedom of religion. This constitutional development is part of a 
larger political change that the Coup government initiated in Turkey, also 
referred to as the ‘Turkish Islamic synthesis.’523 It indicates a process triggered 
 
522 VI. Freedom of religion and conscience  
Article 24- Everyone has the freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction.  
Acts of worship, religious rites and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, as long as they do not 
violate the provisions of Article 14.  
No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious rites and ceremonies, or to 
reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs 
and convictions.  
Religious and moral education and instruction shall be conducted under state supervision and 
control. Instruction in religious culture and morals shall be one of the compulsory lessons in the 
curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be 
subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal 
representatives.  
No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by 
religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political interest or influence, or 
for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State 
on religious tenets. 
523 Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, ‘Turkeys Diyanet under AKP Rule: From Protector to Imposer of State 
Ideology?’ (2016) 16(4) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 619-635. 
 160 
by the Coup to take political and legal steps to substantiate a state ideology 
centred around the imagined citizen of Turkey being a Muslim and Turk.524 
  The right to exemption from compulsory religious education was 
given to the religious minorities at minority schools, established in the Treaty 
of Lausanne. Additionally, on 9 July 1990, the Supreme Council for Education 
introduced a regulation that extended the exemption from compulsory religious 
education to Christian and Jewish students at state schools. 525  However, 
Turkmen mentions about another decision circulated two year later in 1992 
where the ministry specified that non-Muslim students would not “be 
responsible for chapters concerning Islamic practices, neither for prayers nor 
for suras taught in the course.”526This decision, however, was not mentioned 
in the court cases that I examined and in the ECtHR cases. Therefore, the 1990 
decision of the Supreme Council is taken as a basis for exemption from 
compulsory religious education.  
  Although the legislation on religious education is couched in general 
terms, regardless of a focus on a particular religion, Islamic teaching heavily 
influences the content of these lessons. 527  As a result, Alevi children are 
subjected to compulsory Islamic teaching during primary and secondary school 
education.528 As seen below in this section and in Chapter 5, Alevi parents have 
complained about compulsory religious education before the ECtHR, where 
Turkey was found in violation of Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. 1 of the 
ECHR. Despite these judgments, religious education remains compulsory 
without opting out for Alevi pupils and causes discomfort among the Alevi 
 
524 Derya Bayır, Türk Hukukunda Azınlıklar ve Milliyetçilik (Bilgi 2017); Ceren Özgül, ‘Freedom 
of Religion, the ECtHR and Grassroots Mobilization on Religious Education in Turkey’ (2019) 12 
(1) Politics and Religion 103–133.  
525 Eğitim Öğretim Yüksek Kurulu Kararı, “Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi Dersine Girme 
Zorunluluğu Olmayan Öğrenciler’ (09.07.1990), which states: “(…) azınlık okulları dışında kalan 
ilk ve orta öğretim okullarımızda öğrenim gören TC uyruklu Hristiyanlık ve Musevilik dinlerine 
mensup öğrencilerin; bu dinlerden birine mensup olduklarını belgelendirmeleri kaydıyla, Din 
Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi Dersine girmelerinin zorunlu olmadığı, ancak bu derse girmek istedikleri 
takdirde velilerinden yazılı dilekçe getirmelerinin gerekli olduğu hususunun kabulü 
kararlaştırıldı.”  
526 Buket Türkmen, ‘A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of 
“Religious Culture and Morality” Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula’ (2009) 29 (3) 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 381-397, 388. 
527 See Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007); Mansur 
Yalçın and Others v. Turkey App no 21163/11 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014) 
528 See further below my discussion, based on my fieldwork, about how Alevi parents come up 
with strategies to avoid problems with the compulsory religious education.  
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population.529 Therefore, it is one of the areas where the Alevi movement 
voices concerns.  Following the ECtHR judgment on the case of Eylem Zengin 
v Turkey,530 domestic courts implemented the decision and ruled in favour of 
Alevi parents, who filed petitions for exemption of their children from 
compulsory religious education.531 In these decisions, the courts cited the case 
of Eylem Zengin.532 In the meantime, the Turkish Government implemented 
the ECtHR decision in Eylem Zengin by amending the curriculum. This was 
actually a partial implementation of the decision, since the ECtHR stated the 
necessity for proper opting out mechanisms for the state to respect parents’ 
convictions. In addition to the lack of opting out mechanisms, the amendments 
of the curriculum did not bring in a ‘neutral’ curriculum. Instead, selective 
courses on more aspects of Islam and Prophet Muhammad were introduced.533 
For instance, Turkmen examines the changes made in the curriculum of 
compulsory religious education between 1995 and 2007-2008, when the new 
curriculum was introduced. Her analysis indicates even greater emphasis given 
to Islam in the new curriculum. In comparison to the previous curriculum, the 
place given for religions other than Islam ın the curriculum was shortened from 
9 percentage to 6 percentage.534 The amended curriculum contains detailed 
descriptions of Islamic worships and their meanings with reference to verses 
from Quran. 535 The amended curriculum also introduced few chapters on 
mystic interpretations of Islam, which constitutes only 4 percentage of the 
syllabus. This is where Alevism is integrated in the curriculum. Alevism is 
presented as ‘mystic interpretation’ of Turkish Sunnite Islam. Additionally, the 
syllabus provides of love to Islamic figures, which puts Muhammad at top and 
 
529 This observation is based on my fieldwork. I discuss this point more in the following Chapter, 
which examines the relevant ECtHR cases.  
530 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007). 
531 Danıştay 8. Daire (Council of State), E. 2006/4107, K. 2007/7481 (28.12.2007);   
İstanbul 5. İdare Mahkemesi (Administrative Court), E. 2005/2541, K. 2006/2285 (16.10.2006); 
Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 2007/679, K. 2008/1461 (29.02.2008); İzmir 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 
2007/137, K. 2007/577 (17.05.2007); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 2007/8365, K. 2009/3238 
(15.05.2009).  
532 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007). 
533 Ayhan Kaya, ‘Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and 
Charity’ (2015) 20 (1) South European Society and Politics 47-69, 57. 
534 Buket Türkmen, ‘A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of 
“Religious Culture and Morality” Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula’ (2009) 29 (3) 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 381-397, 391. 
535 Ibid 390.  
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asserts that this hierarchy is accepted by Alevis and Bektasis as well.536As 
explained in Chapter 3 through the story of cem ritual and other Alevi 
traditions, Ali is considered as insan-i kamil (perfect human being). 
Additionally, the consideration of Alevism as a mystical interpretation 
resembles the Diyanet’s view on Alevism, which is highly contested among 
Alevis. In this regard, the amendments in the curriculum raise questions about 
the implementation of the ECtHR decision on the case of Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin. While the Turkish government has not taken steps to introduce a 
comprehensive opting-out mechanism, the religious education has not 
addressed Alevis’ concerns.  
  Following the amendments in the curriculum, the administrative 
courts or the Council of State as a court of appeal began to reject Alevi claims 
about the compulsory nature of religious education, on the grounds that the 
new curriculum secured impartiality and neutrality and was therefore not 
discriminatory against the Alevi.537 A precedent case that led to other negative 
decisions for Alevi applicants grounded its decision on an expert report. The 
court stated that:  
The existing curriculum was removed with the decision of the board of 
education [Talim Terbiye Kurulu] [decision no. 410, date 28.12.2006] 
and the new curriculum was introduced for 2007-2008. The new 
curriculum follows an integrative approach centred around Quran and 
prophet Muhammad, not including sectarian differences […] provides 
citizens the religious culture they need in line with the constitution and 
laws. Therefore, it secures religious education and not indoctrination. 
For these reasons, there is no conflict on the application of law. 538 
 
However, the cases to which I had access demonstrate a tension between the 
Administrative Court (İdare Mahkemesi) and the 8th division of Council of 
State (Danıştay). In some cases, an Administrative Court’s decision in favour 
of Alevi parents was overturned by the Council of State on the grounds that the 
 
536 Ibid 389-392.  
537 Samsun 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2009/792, K. 2009/1147 (07.11.2009); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 
2010/3682, K. 2013/997 (15.02.2013); Samsun 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2013/910, K. 2013/778 
(05.09.2013); Sivas 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2009/1259, K. 2010/870 (22.07.2010); Danıştay 8. 
Daire, E. 2010/8381, K. 2012/4640 (08.02.2012).   
538 Ankara 10. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2005/2703, K. 2009/1804 (01.10.2009); Danıştay 8. Daire E. 
2009/10610, K. 2010/4213 (13.07.2010).  
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new curriculum was not taken into consideration.539 The Administrative Court 
re-evaluated the case in light of the Council of State’s decision and rejected the 
Alevi parents’ claim based on the amended curriculum.540 
  Following the case of Mansur Yalçın v Turkey (2014), where the 
ECtHR made a ruling similar to the case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin and found 
Turkey in violation of Article 2 of Additional Protocol 1, national court cases 
have tended to rule in favour of Alevi parents, although there have been 
negative decisions as well. 541  For instance, in a case I examined, the 
administrative court’s ruling (2012) in favour of Alevi parents was approved 
by the Council of State in 2014. 542 However, the defendant administration 
requested revision of the decision, upon which the Council of State overturned 
the initial decision of the administrative court in 2017 (after the case of Mansur 
Yalçın). The Administrative Court applied the Council of State’s decision in its 
final ruling in 2017 and rejected the Alevi parents’ claim. In overturning the 
judgment, neither the Council of State nor the administrative court referred to 
the case of Mansur Yalçın. Instead, they cited the case of Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin and argued that the amended curriculum provided neutral and objective 
education that does not focus on the internal divisions of Islam. Moreover, the 
Council of State argued that the amended curriculum also provided information 
on ‘Alevi Islam’, thus respecting Alevi parents’ belief. Upon this rejection, the 
Alevi parents sent a petition543 asking for the reversal of this decision to the 
Council of State and have yet to hear from the Council of State. Citing the case 
of Hasan and Eylem Zengin, the petition also emphasised that the applicant 
Alevi parents did not consider Alevism as an instance of Sufi tradition or a sub-
sect of Islam. In this connection, the petition stated that the Court’s opinion on 
Alevism as ‘Alevi Islam’ violated Alevi parents’ freedom of belief.  
 
539 İstanbul 10. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2008/979, K. 2009/584 (20.03.2009); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 
2009/6480, K. 2012/10066 (04.12.2012); İstanbul 10. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2013/976, K. 2013/916 
(24.04.2013). 
540 Samsun 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2009/792, K. 2009/1147 (07.11.2009); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 
2010/3682, K. 2013/997 (15.02.2013); Samsun 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2013/910, K. 2013/778 
(05.09.2013).  
541 Samsun 2. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2014/18, K. 2015/ 1317 (08.09.2015); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 
2013/2523, K. 2014/10190 (12.12.2014).  
542 Samsun 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2011/1926, K. 2012/1353 (30.11.2012); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 
2013/2523, K. 2014/10190 (12.12.2014); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 2015/8390,   K. 2017/5550 
(19.06.2017); Samsun 1. İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2017/1201, K. 2017/1816 (01.11.2017).  
543 Petition sent by Kazım Genç on behalf of the Alevi parents to appeal the decision to the 
Council of State on 02.01.2018.  
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  My case analysis, therefore, shows that national courts are not 
consistent in taking into account the ECtHR judgments in their decisions. 
Moreover, even though they do refer to the ECtHR judgments, this does not 
necessarily result in favour of Alevi parents. Also I argue that these ECtHR 
judgments are not efficient in prompting the Turkish government to make the 
necessary changes to national law, because of the partial implementation of the 
ECtHR judgments.544 The Turkish government initiated changes in curriculum 
content, which is one of the two points of the ECtHR, the other is providing 
proper opting out mechanisms, which has not been addressed so far. Following 
the introduction of the new curriculum, national courts mainly ruled against 
Alevi parents without analysing the necessity of proper opting out mechanisms, 
because they ruled that the information delivered by the religious ethics class 
is impartial and not indoctrinating. Following the case of Mansur Yalçın, the 
Turkish government has not taken any steps either for further amendments or 
introducing opting out mechanisms for Alevis.  
  The only current opting out mechanism is for Christian, Jewish and 
atheist children; but not for Alevis. During my fieldwork, I have not come 
across an Alevi who is not against the religious education in schools.545 Indeed, 
the lawyer Mr. Genç, who has expertise in such cases, emphasised that he used 
to warn Alevi parents who approach him to file a case, about the lengthy court 
process. For instance, in one of the cases I examined, the administrative court 
ruled in favour of Alevi parents. The decision was overturned by the Council 
of State due to the lack of an expert report on the curriculum. Although Mr. 
Genç presented a petition for a review of this decision, the Alevi parents 
withdrew their case as their child had graduated in the meantime.546  
  My fieldwork findings indicate that Alevi parents are reluctant to 
file petitions at schools and follow them up at administrative courts. Instead, 
they may prefer to change schools when they encounter problems with 
religious education teachers. One of the reasons for their reluctance is the fear 
 
544 See Chapter 5 for in depth analysis.  
545 My fieldwork as mentioned in previous chapters, mainly included my interactions with the 
Alevis who are critical of CEM Vakfi, whose lawyers defended the case of Mansur Yalçın. In my 
interview with Namik Sofuoglu, a lawyer of CEM, told me that they are not against the religious 
education but it should include Alevism. See for further analysis of the case of Mansur Yalçın in 
the following Chapter.  
546 Sivas İdare Mahkemesi, E. 2009/1259, K. 2010/870 (22.07.2010); Danıştay 8. Daire, E. 
2010/8381, K. 2012/4640 (08.02.2012). 
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of isolation and discrimination against their children by the school 
administration and by other pupils, as my fieldwork suggests. For example, I 
was told that an Alevi child was called "gavur", which means "infidel", by his 
classmates, following his exemption from religious education. Lawyer Mr. 
Genç attributes the fear of societal pressure and isolation as the reason for Alevi 
parents' hesitation in following up legal procedures for exemption from 
religious education. Most of the participants prefer to negotiate with the school 
authorities at the local level. This would include picking a school where more 
Alevi students would be present or talking with the school administration 
informally, in order to arrange for their children to be informally exempted.547 
In this connection, Alevi pupils are exposed to Islamic indoctrination, if their 
parents cannot solve the issue in some way. Similarly, other scholars also noted 
this observation on the role of religious education in assimilation of Alevis into 
Sunni Islam.548 Turkmen comes to the conclusion from her analysis of the 
amended curriculum that while the 1995 textbooks reveal the beginnings of a 
process of ‘re-Islamization’,  the textbooks of the amended curriculum 
demonstrate how embedded this process has become. 549  She insightfully 
observes that although “civic morality has always been founded on an 
interpretation of Islam, […] this interpretation, as well as the definition of the 
national “we,” has become more Sunnite-centric than ever” during the AKP 
government. In reminiscent, based on his analysis of the policies AKP 





547 Fieldwork interviews between September 2015 and January 2016 in Ankara.  
548 Buket Türkmen, ‘A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of 
“Religious Culture and Morality” Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula’ (2009) 29 (3) 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 381-397; Ceren Özgül, ‘Freedom 
of Religion, the ECtHR and Grassroots Mobilization on Religious Education in Turkey’ (2019) 12 
(1) Politics and Religion 103–133; Ali Çarkoğlu & Nazlı Çağın Bilgili, ‘A Precarious 
Relationship: The Alevi Minority, the Turkish State and the EU’ (2011) 16(2) South European 
Society and Politics 351-364, 358.  
549 Buket Türkmen, ‘A Transformed Kemalist Islam or a New Islamic Civic Morality? A Study of 
“Religious Culture and Morality” Textbooks in the Turkish High School Curricula’ (2009) 29 (3) 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 381-397, 389.  
550 Ayhan Kaya, ‘Islamisation of Turkey under the AKP Rule: Empowering Family, Faith and 
Charity’ (2015) 20 (1) South European Society and Politics 47-69, 57.  
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4. 8. “The Alevi opening” and Alevis’ Current Recognition Demands   
 
  Although Turkey’s EU accession process lost its momentum in the 
mid-2000s, Alevis’ recognition demands were addressed by the AKP 
government through seven ‘workshops’ organized between June 2009 and 
January 2010 with 302 attendees in total, presented by the government as “the 
Alevi Opening”.551 The attendees were selected from academics, dede, certain 
Sunni figures, Alevi organizations, the media and political figures as well as 
theologians of Islam. However, it is not clear on what criteria the participants 
were selected.552 The Alevi Opening caused many disputes both among Alevi 
organizations and within the state institutions. 553  For example, the 
Government’s invitation to Ökkeş Şendiller, who was prosecuted as the first 
suspect of the Maraş pogroms against the Alevi in 1978, caused outrage in the 
Alevi movement.554 As a result, he did not attend the workshop.555 However, 
the workshop to which he was invited saw protests by different segments of 
the Alevi movement including the PSAKD.556These workshops covered the 
issues of identity representation, the status of the Diyanet, compulsory religious 
education, the status of cemevi, the future of dede and the spectre of the Sivas 
incident. The Government published a report of the workshop outcomes on 4 
 
551 ‘Alevi Çalıştayı Başladı’, Radikal (Ankara, 30 Sep 2009) 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/alevi-calistayi-basladi-956930/ (accessed 18 December 2018); 
Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (MoS 2010); Talha Köse, ‘The AKP and 
the" Alevi opening": understanding the dynamics of the rapprochement’ (2010) 12(2) Insight 
Turkey 143-164. 
552 The report prepared by the Ministry did not explicate the selection process, however, the report 
prepared by the HBVAK analyses the composition of those who attended the workshop and found 
that the number is indeed misleading. According to the HBVAK, 2 names were repeated and 44 
persons only attended the workshop in Sivas for the Madımak Hotel. Out of 258 attendees, 118 
were sympathisers of the Diyanet and the government. See for the breakdown of the numbers, 
Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (HBVAK), ‘Aleviler artık burada oturmuyor–Alevi 
Çalıştayları Nihaî Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme’ (HBGVAK 2011) 106-107.  
553 Behsat Miser, ‘Son Alevi Çalıştayı Buruk Başladı’, Radikal (Ankara, 29 Jan 2010), available at 
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/son-alevi-calistayi-buruk-basladi-977399/ (accessed on 18 
December 2018).  
554Behsat Miser, ‘Maras Sanığı Ökkeş Şendiller’e Alevi Çalıştayı Daveti’, Radikal (Ankara, 
12.12.2009), available at  http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/maras-sanigi-sendillere-alevi-
calistayi-daveti-968809/ (accessed 18 December 2018).  
555 ‘Ökkeş Şendiller Alevi Çalıştayı’na Katılmayacak’, ntv.com.tr, (Ankara, 16.12.2009), available 
at https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/okkes-sendiller-alevi-calistayina-katilmayacak,FOWATv-
ZiEioIGI8XZagsQ (accessed 18 December 2018).  
556 ‘Alevi Çalıştayı Tartışmalarla Sona Erdi’, Gazetevatan, (Ankara, 18.12.2009), available at 
http://www.gazetevatan.com/alevi-calistayi-tartismalarla-sona-erdi-276881-gundem/ (accessed 18 
March 2020).  
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February 2010.557 Since the final report was published, no steps have been 
taken to meet the Alevis’ demands.558  
  The final report is criticised by different segments of the Alevi 
movement for its language, for diverting attention from Alevis’ demands 
regarding the problem of defining Alevism and for imposing the state’s own 
agenda for Alevis.559 For example, the counter report prepared by one of the 
Alevi organisations about the workshops underlined that the Government’s 
report gave the impression that the problem had been between the Sunni and 
Alevi without the state authorities having any role in it, and presented the 
situation as if Alevism had been a problem created by internal-external 
enemies, ignorance and prejudice that absolved the moral compass over Alevi 
pogroms throughout history. 560  Additionally, different Alevi organizations 
criticised the final report for trying to impose a very specific definition of 
Alevism that assimilates Alevis into Sunni Islam.561 Indeed, the Government’s 
final report explained the importance of the workshops as a dialogue between 
Alevis, the state and Sunnis.562 In terms of addressing the problems of Alevi 
citizens, according to an opinion poll, 49.2% of Alevi citizens expressed their 
discontent with the Alevi Opening, while only 14.9% said that they were happy 
about the situation.563 Moreover, according to this opinion poll, 59.8% of the 
Alevi respondents considered the Alevi Opening as “a policy of the 
 
557 Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (2010).  
558 Hüseyin Şengül, ‘Alevi Açılımı’ Biamag (Istanbul, 22.11.2014), available at 
https://m.bianet.org/biamag/siyaset/160109-alevi-acilimi (accessed 18 March 2020).  
559 For example, HBVAK published another report as an answer to the final report and an 
evaluation of the workshops, see Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (HBVAK), ‘Aleviler 
artık burada oturmuyor–Alevi Çalıştayları Nihaî Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme’ (HBGVAK 
2011); Pınar Ecevitoğlu, ‘Aleviliği Tanımlamanın Dayanılmaz Siyasal Cabizesi’ (2011) 66(3) 
Ankara Univ. SBF Dergisi 137-156; Çiçek Tahaoğlu, ‘Alevi Çalıştayı Raporu Alevilerin 
Taleplerini İçermiyor’ Bianet (Istanbul, 8 Feb. 2010), available at 
http://bianet.org/kurdi/siyaset/119923-alevi-calistayi-raporu-alevilerin-taleplerini-icermiyor 
(accessed 18 March 2020); ‘Alevi Çalıştayı Ön Raporuna Sert Tepki’ Hurriyet (Ankara, 
12.02.2010), available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/alevi-calistayi-on-raporuna-sert-
tepki-13771159 (accessed 18 March 2020).  
560 Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (HBVAK), ‘Aleviler artık burada oturmuyor–Alevi 
Çalıştayları Nihaî Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme’ (HBVAK 2011) 14.  
561 Pınar Ecevitoğlu and Ayhan Yalçınkaya, ‘Aleviler'artık burada oturmuyor!: Alevi çalıştayları 
ve sonrası’ (Dipnot 2013); Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (HBVAK), ‘Aleviler artık 
burada oturmuyor–Alevi Çalıştayları Nihaî Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme’ (HBVAK 2011);  
 ‘Alevilik Sünnilik İçinde Eritilmek İsteniyor’ Bianet (Ankara, 01.04.2011), available at 
https://bianet.org/bianet/din/129023-abf-alevilik-sunnilik-icinde-eritilmek-isteniyor (accessed 18 
March 2020).  
562 Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (MoS 2010) 25, 34. 
563 Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, ‘Alevi Raporu’ (2009) Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü 50.  
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Sunnitization of Alevis,” whereas only 21.9% of the Alevi respondents said, 
“the Alevi Opening intends to solve the problems of the people.”564  
  The Government’s report presented the workshops as a way of 
reconciling Sunnis and Alevis.565 In this regard, it was not a platform where 
the state  authorities were willing to be informed about Alevis’ demands for 
equal citizenship; but where Sunnis and Alevis under the supervision of the 
state authorities talked about Alevis’ problems. In this vein, the Report 
evaluated the Alevis’ demands regarding the Diyanet and religious education 
comparing them to the views of Sunnis, some of whom have also expressed 
discontent with religious education and the Diyanet. It thereby situates the state 
as the mediator between the Sunnis and the Alevis. In this regard, it casts doubt 
about the sincerity of the state authorities to talk with Alevis about their 
demands. Rather, the picture presented by the Report was as though the 
workshops were organized to listen to the views of Sunni and Alevi about 
Alevis’ demands. Therefore, it indeed promoted a subtle confrontation between 
Sunnis and Alevis, where Sunnis were the well-behaved citizens, while Alevis 
were the noisy citizens. The counter report prepared by the HBVAK made a 
similar point and complained that the Report was presented as though the 
Diyanet and compulsory religious education are problematic only for Alevi 
citizens.566 
  This initiative, the Alevi Opening, is significant for a number of 
reasons: it is the most recent (in fact the first) official dialogue between the 
Alevi movement and the Turkish Government concerning the Alevi 
movement’s current recognition demands; it is representative of the state’s 
view on Alevism and Alevis, whch is also seen in the realm of law and in line 
with the Diyanet’s view of Alevism. It also reflects on the State’s view on the 
Alevi movement. The final report evaluated the Alevi’s demands under four 
subheadings; status of the Diyanet, status of cemevi, compulsory religious 
education in public schools and the status of the Madımak Hotel. In setting a 
future agenda for these demands, it drew attention to certain legal impediments 
or necessities: the conceptualisation of Alevism and the constitutional status of 
 
564 Ibid 56.  
565 Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (MoS 2010) 34.  
566 Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (HBVAK), Aleviler artık burada oturmuyor–Alevi 
Çalıştayları Nihaî Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme (HBVAK 2011) 104.  
 169 
the Diyanet and religious education, while Law No. 677 was also highlighted 
as an obstacle for Alevis’ demands for the cemevi being granted the status of 
place of worship.567  
  The final report’s view on Alevism and Alevis reflects continuity 
with that of the early Republican (Kemalist) Regime on Alevism in the sense 
that Alevis are considered to be the link for the Turkish nation to Central Asia. 
However, it also differs from the early Republicans’ position in that it places 
more emphasis on Islam in the formation of Alevism. As explained above, the 
early Republicans’ perspective points to Shamanic influence in the formation 
of Alevism. While the final report refers to the influence of various ancient 
beliefs on Alevis and thus considers Alevism to be syncretic, it also asserts that 
Islam dominates “the general framework, language and discourse [of 
Alevism].” 568  Therefore, the report considered Alevism as an instance of 
heterodox Islam, peculiar to Anatolia. According to the report, shaped within 
the Islamic theology, Alevism simply refers to groups that venerate 
Mohammad, Ali and Mohammad’s family (ehl-i beyt).569 The references to a 
number of Islamic figures primarily Hz Ali, Ehl-i beyt and 12 imams serve as 
evidence for Alevis being part of Islamic traditions. The report made a number 
of claims about the history of Alevis and the nature of Alevism within the fold 
of Islam, although it considered that only Alevis should define Alevism. The 
description of cem ritual in the report is interesting in the sense of emphasising 
the belief-oriented aspects of the ritual as its primary elements, while semah 
and deyiş/nefes are represented as secondary (complementary) elements.570  
  The arguments proposed by the report trivialise the experiences of 
the Alevi. To argue that the Alevi’s love for Ali, the twelve imams and other 
historical figures that are shared with Islam is equivalent to a belief in Islam 
transforms the Alevi’s experience of their own culture. Similarly, by arguing 
that singing deyiş and turning semah are the same acts of worship as performed 
by tariqas, transforms the Alevi’s experience. Through re-describing these 
experiences as instances of tariqa worship in the case of deyiş and semah, the 
Alevi experience of cem is distorted. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Alevi 
 
567 Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (MoS 2010).  
568 Ibid 43. 
569 Ibid 39.  
570 Ibid 161-162. 
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culture is falsely described as a religion, in the name of Alevism as an 
experiential entity of cultures with religion. This attribution of religion imposes 
an epistemic attitude to tradition and endeavours to see Alevism as a system of 
belief. The prominence of Islamic figures in Alevi rituals and stories is seen as 
evidence for the Alevi’s belief in Islam. In order to engage with the Islamic 
culture, Alevis are obliged to deny their own experiences. The Alevi is not able 
to account for these similarities with Islam without an alternative explanatory 
theory. The dialogue becomes skewed because the party, which makes the 
maximum number of unproven assumptions, does not have to demonstrate 
their truth. Alevis cannot ask the proof of this truth because they are unaware 
of all the assumptions. 571  The dialogue brings about a certain kind of 
violence572 against the Alevi by denying their own experience and by forcing 
them to accept unproven assumptions as a prerequisite to enter in dialogue. 
Indeed, the report prepared by the HBVAK criticised the Government’s 
dialogue attempt to impose a certain mindset on Alevis and emphasised that 
Alevis would continue to protest at this imposition.573  
  Based on its assumptions about Alevi culture, the report considers 
the segments of the Alevi movement that claim Alevism to be separate from 
Islam, ‘marginal’, while the discussions on whether Alevism is within Islam or 
not would lead to sedition (fitne ve fesat) in Turkey.574  Indeed, the report 
argued that the Alevi movement is becoming ‘radical and political’, since 
traditional Alevis, who are in the majority, are not represented by this 
movement.575 However, it is not clear on what basis the report makes such a 
claim, as it is not supported by research. The report is also very much 
concerned with the transformation Alevi traditions have been going through. 
This transformation is discussed through the rupture between ‘traditional’ 
 
571 My analysis draws from the analysis of S.N. Balagangadhara and Sarah Claerhout, ‘Are 
dialogues antidotes to violence? Two recent examples from Hinduism studies’ (2010) 7(9) Journal 
for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 118-143. 
572 Ibid 122. In parallel, my use of violence is in the most general sense: “injury by or as if by 
distortion, infringement, or profanation.”  
573 Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı (HBVAK), Aleviler artık burada oturmuyor–Alevi 
Çalıştayları Nihaî Raporu Üstüne Bir Değerlendirme (HBVAK 2011) 117: “Alevi açılımının 
mimarlarının müzakere anlayışları ile Alevilerin müzakere anlayışları arasında esaslı bir fark 
vardır. Diyalog söylemiyle müzakereye çağıran, ancak çağırdığı özneleri ve onların taleplerini 
kendi diline tahvil ederek dayatan bir zihniyete karşı Aleviler, meydanlarda olmaya devam 
edeceklerdir.”  
574 Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (MoS 2010) 84.  
575 Ibid 49.  
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Alevism, which indicates ocak-based village communities where the dede is 
the sole legitimate leader and contemporary Alevism, where the ocak-based 
system has been mostly dissolved and subsequently the dede’s legitimacy has 
been questioned. The report points to a process of modernisation underlying 
this transformation, which is actually implied as an erosion of the Alevi culture. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the Government manipulated the workshops 
by playing upon the nature of Alevi tradition, which does not assign the utmost 
importance to beliefs and ‘roots.’ As a result, Alevism is defined under the 
main heading of Islam for its notions of ‘Hak-Mohammad-Ali’ (God-
Mohammad-Ali). The state deemed the circulation of Islamic figures in Alevi 
traditions as the beliefs of the Alevi. By forging this link between beliefs and 
practices, it conceived of Alevism within the fold of Islam. 
  The report also posits that urbanisation of the Alevi community is 
another reason for the transformation of the Alevi culture. In this connection, 
the report underlined cemevi as a recent phenomenon, without a history to 
substantiate it as a place of worship. Law no. 677 was presented as an obstacle 
for granting cemevi the status of worship as well as representation of Alevis 
within the structure of the Diyanet. The same law was also implied to be one 
of the reasons behind the devaluation of dede’s status within the Alevi 
tradition. Since the report described Alevism as being part of Islam and the 
only place of worship in Islam is the mosque, the report opposed the idea that 
cemevi could be considered as a place of worship.  
  In terms of the status of the Diyanet, the report underlined the two 
different perspectives: while some Alevis strongly object to the existence of 
the Diyanet, which is considered as contradicting a laic state system, some 
Alevis demand the reorganization of the Diyanet to include services specific to 
Alevis, since they consider its services to be available strictly for Sunni 
citizens. The first perspective adopts a view on secularism that obliges the state 
to be neutral towards religion. In parallel, this perspective avoids the influence 
of the state through the Diyanet on Alevis, since it considers the involvement 
of the Diyanet to provide services to Alevis as a way of “creating state’s 
Alevis” and thus an assimilationist policy.576 On the other hand, the second 
perspective sees the services of the Diyanet as exclusively for Sunni Muslims. 
 
576 Ibid 117. 
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By drawing an analogy between Sunni Islam and Alevism, it requires the 
Diyanet to provide services for Alevis. Yet this perspective, according to the 
report, does not have a proposal on how to re-structure the Diyanet.577  
  In addition to stressing the lack of a unified Alevi stance on the 
Diyanet, the report included a detailed analysis of the Diyanet within the 
Turkish state system to justify the institution’s legitimacy. The report drew a 
line of historical arguments for the legitimacy of the Diyanet by proposing the 
following question: Is the existence of the Diyanet a peculiar choice of the state 
with its emphasis on laicism, or a kind of arbitration with laicism against its 
majority Muslim population?578  Considering the foundation of the Turkish 
republic, the report also asks rhetorically: “How could the state, which has the 
tradition of considering religion as a tool of exploitation by opponents of the 
[Republican] regime, approach religion without giving up its own 
sensitivities?”579 Drawing on legal regulations, the report reiterated the duties 
of the Diyanet as informing the public about religious matters and managing 
places of worship in addition to regulating services on Islamic faith and 
practices.580 In this regard, the report described Turkish laiklik as midway 
between eliminating religion in governance and partially legitimising it so long 
as it serves the values of the new [Republican] regime.581 However, the report 
also recognised the ambiguity that this formulation has brought about in the 
relation between state and religion. In this connection, re-organization of the 
Diyanet’s structure would indicate wide-spectrum reforms including 
constitutional amendments on the relation between the state and religion.  
  In this connection, the report asserted that from the perspective of 
the state, Alevis are part of Muslim communities in the country and hence are 
welcome to benefit from the services of the Diyanet.582 The report also noted 
that the commonalities of different Muslim communities, rather than their 
differences, have been the focus of the Diyanet’s services since its 
establishment, while acknowledging that its services might be, de facto, 
influenced by the Sunni Hanefi school of theology due to ‘the belief map of 
 
577 Ibid 115-116. 
578 Ibid 119.  
579 Ibid 118. 
580 Ibid 122. 
581 Ibid 122. 
582 Ibid 116, 119.  
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Turkey.’583 After this evaluation on the necessity of the Diyanet in Turkey, the 
report pointed out the erosion that Turkish modernism has caused in the 
transmission of Alevism and implied the necessity for Alevis to benefit from 
the Diyanet’s services: “If the state is late to take necessary precautions, the 
biggest danger waiting especially young Alevis, is to cut off completely the 
ties of Alevi identity, to leave Islam or to deviate to Atheism.”584 In this vein, 
the report implied the duty of the Diyanet as the saviours of Alevi youth. Since 
no step was taken for the reorganization of the Diyanet, the existing services 
are expected to meet the needs of Alevi youth, despite the repeated complaints 
of the Alevi movement about them.585  
  The report prepared by the HBVAK criticises the Government’ 
report on the Alevi Opening for trying to assimilate Alevis into Islam and 
considering Alevism as a cultural and political phenomenon. 586  On state 
neutrality, Balagangadhara follows Kant’s dictum that ‘ought implies can’ and 
argues that the secular state cannot be neutral and therefore ought not to be 
neutral. He argues that the secular state, by considering religion as a matter of 
truth, borrows the meta-language of Semitic religions’ theology about what 
religion is. Even though the state does not subscribe to a specific religion’s 
theology for accommodating diversity, this meta-language that the state uses 
fails to be neutral towards communities that do not have an epistemic status to 
their tradition. As discussed in Part I, Semitic religions’ conception of rivalry 
over the truth of sets of doctrines is not shared by cultures without religion, 
such as Alevis. Alevis do not see others as rivals and are indifferent to the truth 
claims of Semitic religions. Indeed, when the report’s assertions on Alevism 
are considered, the Turkish state uses Islamic theology as a meta-language for 
Alevism. When we look at the application of secular state and religious 
freedom in Turkey, Islamic theology is infused at all levels. Therefore, Alevism 
is annexed to Islam as an assimilation tool. Bayır argues that laiklik is used as 
a tool to Sunnitise the public sphere and non-Sunni minorities in Turkey.587 
While the public sphere were eliminated from religious symbols and practices 
 
583 Ibid 119. 
584 Ibid 130.  
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by laws and policies in the name of implementing laiklik, this so-called secular 
public sphere has been utilized to promote a particular form of Islam. For 
example, the Government’s final report challenged Alevis for complaining 
about being considered deviant and yet making no effort to clear up the 
prejudices.588 From the perspective of Islamic theology, Alevism is an instance 
of heterodoxy, which is difficult to be considered as a mezhep or tariqa as it 
deviates from these structures.589 
 
4. 9. Conclusion   
 
  The application of the principles that are derived from Christian 
theology to accommodate differences in Turkey results in a political and legal 
system that uses the meta-language of Islam in the name of laiklik. The 
religious toleration and secular state were possible to be formulated in 
European context because of the belief that it is the moral obligation of a 
Christian to tolerate different religious beliefs because the freedom of Christian 
soul is attained only through the work of the Holy Spirit. Since this theological 
background to transform religious toleration into a moral obligation, together 
with other related Christian themes are absent in Turkey, the transplantation of 
these principles in Turkey brings about a peculiar form of laiklik chiefly 
organised through the establishment of the Diyanet and Law no. 677.  
  Bringing in European discussions about the human corruption of 
religion, they argued that it was the corruption of Islam that was to be overcome 
by the transplantation of these ideas. Although the late Ottoman statesmen and 
early Republicans engaged with European discussions over religious toleration 
and secular state and how to apply these in Turkey, as above discussions 
exemplify, they were not aware of the theological underpinnings of toleration. 
Rather, they picked up the critics over superstition and anti-clericalism and 
argued that Islam in its core reveals similar dynamics that the true religion is 
indeed a matter of conscience and man-made practices are superstitions that 
corrupt religion and therefore had to be banned. The reason that they picked up 
this particular discussion over the corruption of religion through man-made 
 
588 Ministry of State (MoS), ‘Alevi Çalıştayları Nihai Rapor’ (MoS 2010) 46. 
589 As discussed in Chapter 2.  
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practices might be because, as explained in Chapter 2, religion provides an 
account that approaches ritual in terms of its doctrinal references, which is 
fundamentally different from tradition where rituals practiced because they are 
handed down over generations. If the transplantation did anything, it forced a 
sharpening of the realm of false religion as superstitions (batil itikat), which 
targeted both the Alevi traditions as well as Sufi orders and Islamic public 
manifestations. Following the Kemalist regime and introduction of the multi-
party system  
  Keeping in mind the triadic dynamic between true religion, false 
religion and secular as explained in Part I, the Turkish laiklik designated 
Diyanet as the realm of true Islam presented by the Turkish state and 
consolidated its power over true religion through banning of ‘superstitious’ 
practices of Sufi brotherhoods as well as the Alevi. As examined in this Chapter 
as well as Chapter 3, from the point of the Sunni doctrines as purveyed by the 
Islamic theology and the Diyanet, Alevis are followers of a corrupted version 
of Islam that needs to correct themselves. This view on corruption of Alevis 
stems from the confusion over Alevi traditions that share a cluster of figures 
with Islamic traditions. However, these common Islamic figures hold different 
positions within vernacular of Alevi traditions. Before the introduction of 
religious toleration and secular state, Alevis historically were labelled as 
heretics and persecuted because of their heretical practices and beliefs. At best, 
they managed to survive by living in isolated areas and not having had contact 
with the Ottoman rulers. In the Turkish Republic the repositioning of Alevis as 
the carriers of pre-Islamic Turkish culture and as an inner-Islamic richness 
freed them from old persecution. Nonetheless, within the limited freedom that 
Turkish laiklik provides, Alevis have had to negotiate and formulate their 
difference in religious terms.  
  In his analysis of vernacular secularism in South Sudan and the 
legislation for religious freedom after South Sudan’s separation from Sudan, 
Salomon discusses how the South Sudanese government obliges various forms 
of African traditions to obtain recognition as part of policies to ensure religious 
freedom.590  He notes that these traditional practices configured as distinct 
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confessions by the state do not “represent the reality of South Sudanese who 
may identify as Christians, for example, and at the same time see no 
contradiction in maintaining their rites and rituals.”591 He therefore suggests 
that the state’s application of religious freedom and endeavour to legally 
recognise distinct groups, such as Christians and ATRs [African Traditional 
Religions], will endanger the current hybridity of affiliations and bring about 
“more polar forms of identity.” As I argued in Part I, the model of liberal 
secularism indeed tends to formulate plurality into religious conflict, first 
assumes rivalry of competing claims and then presents itself for their co-
existence. In this model, “each tradition in society needs to take the form of a 
religious community defined by a set of beliefs and values.”592 Because the 
categorical separation between religion and tradition is not recognised by the 
political and legal systems, some traditional practices are also considered as 
constituting a religion. In transforming these traditions into religions, truth 
claims of a religion is imposed on traditions. That is to say, belonging to a 
religion excludes other ways of belonging. Therefore, if one adheres to a 
certain religion, one is not able to have other traditional affiliations that might 
seem like religion. Like the case in South Sudan, hybridity of affiliations 
among Alevis is erased in imposed truth claims that compete with one another 
within liberal secular framework. The irony is that this framework produces 
policies for religious freedom and yet feed religious conflict. The construction 
of Alevis’ difference in religious terms, curtails the possibilities of any other 
religious affiliation that individual Alevis might prefer. The current framework 
does not allow the existence of Alevis, who only follow their traditions, 
together with Alevis, who might also identify with Sunnis or Atheists, because 
of the efforts to impose a religious structure on Alevis. In this regard, Alevis 
are pushed into “either or” debates, where Sunni Islam is imposed on them by 
the Diyanet as well as the general Sunni public.   
  In relation to framing cultural differences as differences in 
competing claims (world-views or systems of belief) for the truth, the secular 
state conceives differences as different competing claims for the truth. 
However, the assertion that religions are claims regarding the truth of some 
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doctrines is indeed a theological claim proposed by Christianity, Islam and 
Judaism. Recalling Chapter 2.6, religion revolves around the crucial question 
of the truth and falsity of a set of doctrines.593 Yet this does not correspond to 
the self-descriptions of traditions that do not have religion and thereby an 
epistemic attitude to tradition. As Balagangadhara and De Roover suggests, 
“These self-descriptions [of Hindu and Romans] see the various traditions as 
human search for ‘truth’, and they see the different religions as paths in this 
ongoing quest.” 594 Though there are many differences between the Indian 
traditions and Alevi traditions, they share a common attitude, which 
distinguishes them from Christians and Muslims. They do not approach the 
diversity of human traditions in terms of doctrinal truth. From the viewpoint of 
non-Semitic cultures, there is no one true God against whom many false gods 
are arrayed.595  
  Balagangadhara argues that the Hindu’s claim that ‘all religions are 
true’ demonstrates their ‘incomprehension’ of the Semitic understanding of 
religion as a matter of truth, because it implies that both Christian and Islamic 
doctrines have to be true at the same time.596 Similarly, the Alevi view on the 
truth of religions is different from the Christian or Islamic view. For them, ‘all 
religions are true’. However it is unclear what it means for truth to be conceived 
pluralistically. If all religions are true, both Christian and Islamic doctrines 
have to be true at the same time. This claim then entails that Alevis fail to see 
that one religious doctrine, which claims that God is Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit, and that Jesus Christ is the son of God, stands in contradiction to another 
which asserts that God is one and cannot have a son who is both divine and 
human. This attitude to the truth does not reflect a peculiar notion of religious 
truth, but an attempt to translate the attitude of one culture (religious) into the 
language of another (non-religious), as was discussed more fully in Chapter 2, 
Part I.597 Even though Alevis have discussed hak being the reality, hak appears 
to be of a completely different kind from the doctrinal truth claimed by the 
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Semitic religions. Until we have a clear insight into its nature, it is important 
to emphasise that the Alevi view does not see the different traditions as true or 
false. In this respect, by accepting the Semitic religions’ claim that religion is 
a matter of truth, the possibility of a state being neutral with respect to religions 
is erased. In this connection the secular state can be agnostic about the truth 
claims of different religions, but it is grounded on the Semitic theology that 
religion is a matter of truth that revolves around doctrines.   
  When the Turkish state assumes the truth of a Semitic theological 
claim, and further accepts this claim as its own epistemological position, then 
it actively creates and promotes the religious rivalry between the Alevi 
traditions and Islam.  In other words, the Turkish state creates religious rivalry 
where there is none (if viewed from the Alevi perspective). As a matter of state 
policy, it creates and sustains the opposition between religions and traditions. 
Consequently, the Turkish state transforms the conflict between different 
groups into a religious conflict. In this regard, I argue for the impossibility of 
state neutrality as a method to accommodate diversity; it can only be a remedy 
in competing systems of belief. Thus it entails conflict as an in-built element 
and then presents religious freedom and the secular state as the solution for 
resolving falsely constructed religious conflict. The Government’s initiative to 
establish a dialogue with the Alevi movement further demonstrates how this 
falsely constructed religious conflict between Alevi traditions and Islam brings 
about a certain kind of violence to the Alevi traditions.  
  The politico-legal system in Turkey transforms Alevi traditions into 
false version of Islam and put significant legal impediments on practicing their 
rituals. Although such a division as religious and secular is alien to Alevis, this 
division is internalised by Alevis as well. This internalisation is apparent in 
their rejection of tradition especially in the 1970s with the influence of leftist 
ideologies that consider religion as a source of exploitation. Another facet of 
this internalization, however, took the shape of advocating Alevis’ recognition 
as a faith community by the emergence of the transnational Alevi movement 
that has gained speed especially in the last two decades. Although these two 
tendencies within Alevi culture seem opposite to one another, i.e. that one 
rejected the tradition as a source of exploitation and the other embraced 
Alevism as a religion or system of belief, I argue that they are both 
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manifestations of Alevis’ response on how best negotiate for their difference 
within the politico-legal system that understand their difference in terms of 
religion, instead of traditions handed down by generations and practiced 
exactly because of being a tradition. In this regard, the generous benefits given 
to the place of worship in the Turkish system presented an opportunity for the 
Alevi movement to advance claims for gaining recognition for cemevi as place 
of worship. This advocacy also provides Alevis with a response to the pressure 
on them to go to mosque. As explained above, Alevis are considered as an 
Islamic tradition with remnants of Central Asian Turkish culture. As the only 
designated place of worship in Turkey is mosque in Turkey, Alevis try to avoid 
the pressure on going to mosque, by pointing to cemevi, as their place of 
worship. Similarly, the Alevi advocacy on religious education diverged from 
abolishing it to including Alevism in it, as will be examined in detail in Chapter 
5 through the ECtHR judgments. Although Alevis in this study are of the 
opinion that religious should not be taught at schools, the lengthy court 
proceeding with unreliable results as well as social pressure prevent Alevi 
parents to seek exemption at courts. As the ECtHR judgments on compulsory 
religious education in Turkey were implemented partially by merely amending 
the curriculum, which did not satisfy Alevis’ concerns, religious education 
continue to be compulsory without opting out mechanisms for Alevi parents.  
  In the following chapter, I discuss how claims for recognition before 
the ECtHR illustrate a different dynamic, which stands as a point of 
comparison to what happens in Turkey. While they are contested and litigated 
over in particular ways in Turkey, in the ECtHR, the litigation and contestation 
is pursued in a subtly different way. While in Turkey the Turkish state with the 
Diyanet’s support as the authority in religion, has tried to assimilate Alevis into 
Sunni framework by reducing Alevis’ difference as a matter of ‘inner-Islamic 
richness’ within Sunni Islam, the ECtHR cases brings about a different 
formulation of Alevis’ difference as a non-Sunni Muslim community and 
thereby introduces a division between Sunni Islam and non-Sunni Alevis; a 
sectarian division that might be precarious when applied onto Turkish context.   
in terms of making religious claims, and the implications for Alevi’s seeking 





CHAPTER 5 -- ACCOMMODATION of ALEVIS’ 
DIFFERENCE BEFORE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
5. 1. Introduction  
 
  In light of the main research question set forth in the introduction,598 
I turn my attention to the ECtHR judgments of the cases brought against Turkey 
by two different segments of the Alevi movement. My aim in this Chapter is 
to analyse the ECtHR judgments with a critical eye in terms of how Alevis’ 
difference as explained in Part I is articulated and what implications can be 
drawn from the Alevis’ claims-making and the legal construction of Alevism 
with regard to the accommodation of Alevis’ difference. Through the case-
analysis, I also explore other possible approaches for accommodating Alevis’ 
difference. 
  I examine how the ambivalence of Alevism is transformed through 
the process of becoming legalized and make three points: 1. I show how 
different segments of the Alevi movement litigate before the ECtHR in 
different ways depending on their specific agenda and advocacy for Alevis; 2. 
I show that the ECtHR judgments tend to twist the Alevi claimants’ 
conceptualization of Alevism.  This is particularly evident in Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin v Turkey, which is an important reference in other Alevi cases; 3. I 
demonstrate that the ECtHR conceptualizes Alevism within the fold of Islam, 
by situating it as opposed to Sunni Islam. I argue that there is a pattern that has 
been shaped through Alevi claims brought to the ECtHR. This pattern has 
become more visible with the latest decision Dogan and others v Turkey. I 
argue that this pattern divides Islam in Turkey into Sunni Islam as practiced by 
the majority and the Alevi Islam as practiced by Alevis.  
 
598 The main research question set forth in the introduction was: How do Turkey, the UK and the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter, the ECtHR) accommodate Alevis’ difference, and 
what are the implications of this accommodation for Alevis and the Alevi culture? 
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  Within the broader theoretical framework, I argue that the 
assumptions that undermine the neutrality of the ECtHR create an unnatural 
rivalry by transforming Alevis into a denomination of Islam and postulate it as 
opposed to Sunni Islam. This, in turn, when applied onto Turkish context, 
carries the risk of fostering an environment of conflict. Thus, similar to Turkey, 
the ECtHR also overemphasise the importance of uniformity in different 
interpretations of Alevism. Based on the meta-level it operates, Protestant 
understanding of religion, the Court transforms Alevism into a denomination 
of Islam, by neglecting the diversity of the Alevi perception vis a vis their 
traditions. Although seems preferable to the assimilationist approach of the 
Turkish government and the Diyanet, the ECtHR conceptualisation of Alevis 
separates Alevi citizens and non-Alevi citizens in religious terms and therefore 
introduces a sharper sectarian division to Turkey.  
 
5. 2. The Alevi Advocacy at the European Court of Human Rights 
 
  The Turkish judicial system has significantly changed in the last 
decade mainly with the effect of the legal harmonization process of Turkey 
with the European Union. One of the most dramatic amendments was made in 
the 2004 constitutional amendment package. Amended in 2004, Article 90 of 
the 1982 Constitution addresses the status of international treaties. Article 90 
provides that in case of a conflict between international agreements in the area 
of fundamental rights and freedoms and domestic law, due to differences in 
provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall 
prevail.599 Hence, the amendment made it clear that international human rights 
agreements have precedence over domestic laws. Accordingly, the ECHR (the 
Convention) rulings are binding, since they interpret, clarify and concretize 
provisions of the concerned agreement.600 That is to say, if it conflicts with the 
Constitution,  the Turkish Constitutional Court may overcome the problem 
only by interpreting the Constitution in conformity with the Convention. In this 
regard we can say that ECHR affects the Turkish constitutional system through 
 
599 Ayse Özkan Duvan, ‘Judicial Application of Human Rights Law in Turkey’, (2015) 3(1) 




two distinct paths. First, some of the constitutional provisions are rooted in the 
Convention. The motive for many recent amendments in the Turkish 
Constitution has been to meet the ECtHR, the Convention and standards set by 
it. These constitutional clauses have supremacy over domestic laws. Second, 
the Convention and the ECtHR guide the interpretation of domestic law in 
courts.601 
   Although the ECtHR decisions must have precedence, the domestic 
courts do not necessarily follow the ECtHR decisions. In this regard, despite 
the authoritative nature of the ECtHR judgments, there is no mechanism to 
ensure the implementation of the ECtHR judgments. The divergence of 
Turkish law from the ECHR is evident in the Court’s Alevi case law. The 
ECtHR invokes Article 46 in order to highlight systematic and repeated 
violations of the ECHR and “to bring the relevant domestic law into 
compliance with the Convention that would constitute an appropriate form of 
redress by which to put an end to the violation in question.”602 In cases on 
compulsory religious education (the case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin and the 
case of Mansur Yalçın) the ECtHR invoked Article 46 to ensure the Turkish 
education system respect parents’ convictions.603 Similarly, considering the 
place of religion on birth certificates (the case of Sinan Işık), the Court found 
that the requirement to state a person’s religion on their identity card violated 
Article 9 of the Convention, and indicated that the deletion of the ‘religion’ box 
on identity cards would be an appropriate form of reparation to put an end to 
the breach in question.604 
  It is interesting to note that the first application to the ECtHR by 
Alevis about accommodation of their difference dates back to January 2004, 
the same year as the constitutional amendment package that provided 
precedence to the ECHR over domestic law. Over the years, Alevis have 
brought five cases before the ECtHR against Turkey. These are about 
compulsory religious education (2 cases), the compulsory designation of 
 
601 Ibid 70.  
602 Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2011) 89. 
603 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007); Mansur Yalçın 
and Others v. Turkey App no 21163/11 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014). 
604 Philip Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2011) 90-91; Sinan Işık v. Turkey App no 21924/05 (ECtHR, 2 February 2010). 
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religion on birth certificates, the status of cemevi and the public religious 
services for Alevis (the status of the Diyanet).605 In all these five cases, the 
ECtHR ruled in favour of the Alevi applicants. In this regard, Anagnostou and 
Andreescu consider the ECtHR as a ‘unique forum’ for the Alevi movement to 
challenge the domestic law, since the ECHR framework offers indirect 
opportunity structures for social movements like the Alevi movement. 606 
Opportunity structures refer to the set of rules that a political and legal system 
offer to particular political actors to make recognition claims.607 According to 
Koopmans,  
The key idea underlying the concept of opportunity structures is that 
the structures, institutions and elite attitudes external to a social group 
or organization shape whether and how a group or organization 
mobilizes, including when and why it chooses to pursue (or not to 
pursue) a legal and/or political strategy.608 
I argue that the ECtHR as an opportunity structure is quite limited and functions 
to further impose Islamic framework to understand Alevi traditions.  
  As examined in Chapter 4, the EU accession process and subsequent 
democratization policies in Turkey led to a shift in advocacy of some Alevi 
organizations such as the PSAKD. PSAKD that aimed to advocate Alevism as 
a life style or philosophy, leaned on conceptualizing it as a distinct belief or 
religion in this process. Nonetheless, PSAKD609 continue to make an effort to 
differentiate Alevism from Islam, as opposed to CEMö 610  which portrays 
Alevism as a Sufi Islamic tradition. This difference in conceptualization is also 
evident in the ECtHR cases. For instance, the first two cases (the case of Hasan 
 
605 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007); Sinan Işık v. 
Turkey App no 21924/05 (ECtHR, 2 February 2010); Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey App no. 
21163/11 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014); Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı  v. Turkey 
App no. 32093/10 (ECtHR, 2 December 2014); İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 
62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016). 
606 Dia Anagnostou and Liviu Andreescu, ‘The European Court of Human Rights in National 
Struggles around Religion and Education’ (2019) 12(S1) Politics and Religion 134-150.  
607 Ibid.  
608 Ruud Koopmans, ‘Political Opportunity Structure Some Splitting to Balance the Lumping’ 
(1999) 14(1) Sociological Forum 93-105, 96.   
609 ‘PSAKD’nin 15. olağan genel kurulu başladı’ (Pirha, 21.04.2018), available at 
 https://www.pirha.net/psakdnin-15-olagan-genel-kurulu-basladi-118363.html/21/04/2018/ 
(accessed 21 January 2019).  
610 ‘Cem Vakfi Alevi Islam Inanc Hizmetleri Baskanligi, Dar Kapsamli Inanc Onderleri 
Temsilciler Meclisi Toplantisi Sonuc Bildirgesi’ (Cem Vakfi (CEM), 03.11.2018), available at 
http://www.cemvakfi.org/pages/Haber/183/dar-kapsamli-inanc-onderleri-temsilciler-meclisi-




and Eylem Zengin on compulsory religious education and the case of Sinan Işık 
on birth certificates) were initiated by lawyers who were members of PSAKD, 
while the last three (case of Mansur Yalçın on compulsory religious education; 
Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı –CEM- v. Turkey on the status 
of cemevi; and İzzettin Doğan and Others on public religious services for 
Alevis) were represented by lawyers of CEM. In the first two cases, the Alevi 
claimants’ statements about Alevism are clearly different from the last three 
cases. While in the first two cases the Alevi claimants presented that Alevism 
is a way of life or philosophy, in the three cases brought by CEM, CEM argued 
that Alevism should be represented as an Islamic tradition, distinct from Sunni 
Islam. Not only is conceptualization of Alevism distinct, but also the arguments 
about the violation of rights are different between the cases brought by PSAKD 
and CEM. For instance regarding the two cases on compulsory religious 
education, the applicants Hasan and Eylem Zengin primarily emphasized the 
lack of opting out mechanisms for Alevi parents, while the Mansur Yalçın 
complained about the content of the education. Similarly, in the case of Sinan 
Işık, the applicants argued that the principle of secularism requires state 
neutrality, while İzzettin Doğan and others advocated for public religious 
services to be provided for Alevis.  
 
5. 3. Relevant Provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights  
 
  Provisions of the Convention in matters relating to religion are laid 
down in Article 9 and 14 as well as Article 2 of Additional Protocol No.  
I. Article 9 provides the basic framework for freedom of religion, Article 14 
ensures that ECHR-acknowledged rights should be free from religious 
discrimination, and Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. I gives parents the 
right over the religious education of their children.  
The first and most central to Alevi claims is Article 9, which declares:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance.  
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only 
to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
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public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.  
 
Article 9 (1) provides a positive right to both freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion (known as forum internum) and the manifestation of one’s religion 
or belief (forum externum).611  
The second relevant Article is Article 14, which ensures that  
[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. 
 
However, the ECHR only prohibits discrimination in regard to the rights 
protected under the ECHR. Finally, Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. I, 
concerning the right to education, stipulates that “the State shall respect the 
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their 
own religious and philosophical convictions.” 
  Religion occupies a prominent place in public law as well as 
international human rights law.612 In parallel, the ECtHR considers freedom of 
religion as a substantive right. 613  Freedom of religion, together with the 
principle of secularism, is often praised by the Court as one of the fundamental 
tenets of democratic societies, necessary to ensure pluralism.614 The Court also 
notes that the case law dealing with matters of religion has been increasing over 
the past ten years, given the increasing importance of religion in plural societies 
and thereby the clashes between the interests of individuals and states.615 The 
research division of the Court also adds, “there is hardly any case-law 
concerning the main religions because the tenets are known and the relations 
with the States are well established. However, the issue is more delicate 
regarding minority religions and new religious groups that are sometimes 
 
611 Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge University Press 2011) 82.  
612 Winnifred F Sullivan, 'Judging Religion' (1998) 81 MARQ L REV 441.  
613 Kokkinakis v Greece App no 14307/88 (ECtHR, 25 May 1993) para 31.  
614 See Leyla Sahin v. Turkey App no 44774/98 (ECtHR, 10 November 2005).  
615 ECtHR Research Division, ‘Overview of the Court’s Case-law on Freedom of Religion’ 
(31.10.2013) 5 (para 8), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_religion_ENG.pdf (accessed 8 January 
2019). 
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called “sects” at national level.”616  The Court also noted that “the multicultural 
and church and state aspects” of Article 9 have brought about challenges.617  
 
  Margin of appreciation 
  Margin of appreciation is a doctrine that the ECtHR uses to balance 
the claims and state defences, particularly used for interpreting Article 8-11 of 
ECHR. In this sense, “it is a method determining aberrant state action, in 
conjunction with the consensus standard.” 618  The Court’s application of 
margin of appreciation is case-law dependant. For instance, in dealing with 
religious education, the ECtHR grants a wide margin of appreciation to states 
due to great variety in implementing the principle of state neutrality.619 In 
general, the less consensus reached among member states on a specific matter, 
the wider margin of appreciation is given. 620  In this regard, the ECtHR 
emphasizes its supervisory role and underlines its respect for context-
dependent regulations on religion. Similarly on the relation between a religion 
and the State, the margin of appreciation is kept wide, owing to specific 
historical, cultural and political dynamics and arrangements by the States.621 
On the other hand, the margin of appreciation should be limited when 
considering what counts as religion. The Guidance Note on Article 9 of the 
ECHR states that:  
Religious and philosophical beliefs concern individuals’ attitudes 
towards religion, an area in which even subjective perceptions may be 
important in view of the fact that religions form a very broad dogmatic 
and moral entity which has or may have answers to every question of a 
philosophical, cosmological or moral nature (İzzettin Doğan and Others 
v. Turkey [GC], § 107). Accordingly, the State has a narrow margin of 
appreciation and must advance serious and compelling reasons for an 
interference with the choices that people may make in pursuance of the 
religious standard of behaviour within the sphere of their personal 
autonomy.622  
 
616 Ibid 6 (para 11).  
617 Ben Vermeulen and Marjolein van Roosmalen, ‘Freedom of Thought, Conscience and 
Religion’ in Pieter van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, Leo Zwag (eds), Theory and 
Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (5th edition, Intersentia 2018) 738.  
618 Howard C Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human 
Rights Jurisprudence (Vol. 28 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996) 195. 
619 Ibid.  
620 Ibid. 
621 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guidance Note on Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights’ (31 December 2019) 43 (para 18), available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf (accessed 21 April 2020). 
622 Ibid 28 (para 76).  
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The application of the above mentioned provisions on Alevi cases are analysed 
in the following sections. 
 
5. 4. Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, on Compulsory Religious 
Education  
 
  The first case before the ECtHR regarding Alevis’ recognition 
claims was about compulsory religious education. 623 Despite the parents of 
Eylem Zengin objecting to their children’s compulsory attendance in these 
classes and applying for legal review, their applications were rejected under 
provisions of the relevant legislation, as discussed in Chapter 4. Failing to find 
an adequate remedy at domestic level, one family took their complaint to the 
ECtHR, where Turkey was found in violation of Article 2 of Additional 
Protocol No. I.624  
 
  Domestic proceedings    
  Prior to the case reaching the ECtHR, Hasan Zengin, father of 
Eylem, submitted a request for his daughter's exemption from religious culture 
and ethics classes to the Provincial Directorate of National Education at 
Istanbul Governor's Office. 625  He argued that the compulsory nature of 
religious culture and the ethics course was incompatible with the principle of 
secularism.626 In this regard, it is important to underline that Hasan Zengin’s 
primary objection was the incompatibility of compulsory religious education 
with the principle of secularism, rather than asking for Alevi teaching to be 
included in the curriculum. His request was declined on the basis of Article 24 
of the Constitution, which proclaims religious education as a compulsory 
subject in primary and secondary schools, as well as under Article 12 of State 
Education Act (Law no. 1739), which maintains the principle of secularism as 




625 Interview with Kazım Genç, December 2015, Ankara. 
626 İstanbul 2. İdare Mahkemesi (Administrative Court), E. 2001/537, K. 2001/1756 (28.12.2001); 
Danıştay 8. Daire (Council of State), E. 2002/2939, K. 2003/1720 (14.04.2003).  
627 Article 24 of the Constitution, in so far as relevant, provides: 
“1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. 
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applied to the İstanbul Administrative Court (İdare Mahkemesi) for judicial 
review.628 Here, he argued for the incompatibility of being an Alevi with the 
religious education curriculum, which focus on the teaching of Hanafite Islam 
and do not provide teaching on Alevi faith. Thus, Hasan Zengin’s objection 
was revised in the Administrative Court. Instead of arguing that the religious 
education was incompatible with secularism, he argued that it was 
incompatible with being Alevi, as there was no teaching on Alevism; but the 
Hanafite Islamic teaching. The Administrative Court rejected the case on the 
ground that compulsory religious education was compatible with Article 24 of 
the Constitution and Article 12 of the National Education Act.629 The Appeal 
Court also dismissed Hasan Zengin’s request for his dautgher’s exemption 
from religion classes on the ground that the Administrative Court decided in 
line with the procedural rules and the legislation.630 Therefore, based on the 
constitution and relevant provisions, Hasan Zengin’s claims were dismissed by 
the domestic courts, without evaluation of his substantive claims and an 
analysis of the curriculum.   
 
  The ECtHR’s Judgment 
  Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey 631  is the first case that the 
ECtHR was called upon to deal with Alevis’ claims. This case is significant for 
two reasons: the conceptualization of Alevism; and the ruling on religious 
education ethics classes in Turkey. In this case, we see the ECtHR 
 
2.  Acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies shall be conducted freely, provided that 
they do not violate the provisions of Article 14. 
3.  No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to 
reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs 
and convictions. 
4.  Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under State supervision and 
control. Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of 
primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the 
individual's own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives. 
5.  No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred 
by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for 
even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the State on 
religious tenets.” 
Section 12 of the State Education Act (Law no. 1739) provides: 
“Secularism is the basis of Turkish state education. Religious culture and ethics shall be among the 
compulsory subjects taught in primary and upper secondary schools and in schools of an 
equivalent level.” 
628 İstanbul 2. İdare Mahkemesi (Administrative Court), E. 2001/537, K. 2001/1756 (28.12.2001). 
629 İstanbul 2. İdare Mahkemesi (Administrative Court), E. 2001/537, K. 2001/1756 (28.12.2001). 
630 Danıştay 8. Daire (Council of State), E. 2002/2939, K. 2003/1720 (14.04.2003). 
631 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007). 
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conceptualising Alevism for the first time. This conceptualization has been 
used as a precedent in subsequent cases brought by Alevis. 632 Additionally, the 
Court's ruling about the religious education and ethics classes in Turkey paved 
the way for a reform in religious education curriculum, which introduced some 
topics on the Alevi traditions from the state's perspective; but also more 
teaching on Islam in the form of elective courses on the prophet Muhammad’s 
life.633  The Hanefite view of Islam continued to dominate the curriculum, 
leading to the case of Mansur Yalçın, yielding the same finding on the violation 
of Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. 1 by Turkey.  
  Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. I to the Convention concerns 
one specific aspect of freedom of religion, namely the right of parents to ensure 
the education of their children in accordance with their religious convictions. 
As far as the relevant case law is concerned, the Court makes a distinction 
between religious education and religious indoctrination. The latter is 
considered to carry the possibility of not respecting parents' religious 
convictions.634 In general, the cases about religious education are analysed in 
two aspects – the content of the curriculum and availability of an opt- out 
mechanism. For example, even though the content of a curriculum is heavily 
influenced by a religion, this does not result in a violation of Article 2 
Additional Protocol No. I so long as a proper opt-out mechanism is provided. 
In line with its case law, the Court recognises the States’ competence on the 
educational curriculum.635 For instance, in Pedersen v Denmark, the Court 
found that compulsory sex education did not violate parental freedom so long 
as  “information or knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an 
objective, critical, and pluralistic manner. The State is forbidden to pursue an 
aim of indoctrination that might be considered as not respecting parents’ 
religious and philosophical convictions. This is the limit that must not be 
exceeded.”636 In this vein, the ECtHR recognises the possibility of giving more 
 
632 Ibid para 9.  
633 As discussed in Chapter 4.  
634 Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Law, Religion and the School’, in Silvio Ferrari (ed) Handbook of Law 
and Religion (Routledge 2015) 259-271. 
635 See Dojan and Others v. Germany  App no  319/08 2455/08 7908/10 8152/10 8155/10 
(ECtHR, 13 September 2011). Dealing with a complaint against Germany about mandatory sex 
education. The complaint was found inadmissible, since it was considered that “while the state had 
right to pursue its own educational goals, it was nevertheless under an obligation to act in a neutral 
and tolerant manner vis-à-vis the educational views of parents.”  
636 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark App no 5095/71 5920/72  5926/72 (ECtHR,  
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importance to the majority religion in the curriculum. In terms of the proper 
opt-out mechanism, the Court examines in depth the efficiency of the opt-out 
mechanism in securing the rights guaranteed under Art 2 of Additional 
Protocol No. I. For instance, in Folgero v. Denmark, parents successfully 
argued that religious education in Norway infringed parents’ right secured with 
Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. I, despite the availability of a partial opt-
out mechanism.637 The Court found that the partial opt-out mechanism places 
a heavy burden on parents and thus found Norway in violation of Article 2 of 
Additional Protocol No. I.638 In this finding, the Court stated that it was not the 
dominance of Christianity in the curriculum both in content and quantity that 
caused the violation; but the lack of a proper opt-out mechanism.639 Importance 
of opt out mechanism.  
  After establishing Alevism as a ‘conviction’ for the purposes of the 
Convention, which will be discussed below, the Court examined the case in 
terms of the content of the curriculum and the availability of opt-out 
mechanisms. In line with its case law, in Hasan and Eylem Zengin, the Court 
noted that the importance given to Islamic teaching could not in itself be 
considered contrary to Article 2 of Additional Protocol No I. However, as 
opposed to the Turkish government’s claim that religious education was 
provided “in an objective, pluralist and neutral manner”640, the Court’s analysis 
of the curriculum did not yield this conclusion. Conversely, the Court ruled 
that:  
The instruction provided in the school subject “religious culture and 
ethics” cannot be considered to meet the criteria of objectivity and 
pluralism and, more particularly in the applicants' specific case, to 
respect the religious and philosophical convictions of Ms Zengin's 
father, a follower of the Alevi faith, on the subject of which the syllabus 
is clearly lacking.641  
 
  As discussed in Chapter 4, in the Turkish system, only Christian and 
Jewish parents can ask for an exemption from compulsory religious education. 
However, the ECtHR found that the available opt-out mechanism in the 
 
7 December 1976) para 53. 
637 Folgerø and Others v. Norway App no 15472/02 (ECtHR, 29 June 2007). 
638 Ibid.   
639 Hassan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 89.  
640 Ibid para 42. 
641 Ibid para 70.  
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Turkish system was not sufficient as it compels the Jewish and Christian 
parents to reveal their religious convictions, notwithstanding the lack of any 
opt-out for the Alevi pupils. Therefore, the Court upheld that the classes on 
‘religious culture and ethics’ breached the applicant’s rights protected under 
the Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. I.   
  Hasan and Eylem Zengin’s initial petition to the ECtHR 
(02.01.2004) made every effort to separate Alevism from Islam as well as to 
present it as a separate ‘religion’, or as the petition stated, ‘above religions’. 
According to the claimants’ advocate,642 the statements about Alevism in the 
initial petition to the ECtHR were first prepared by the founders of the Alevi 
Bektaşi Federation in 2001, when they realized “an obvious need” for a unified 
claim on Alevism before courts for the hearing of ABKB, discussed in Chapter 
4.5. These statements clearly revealed the difference of Alevism from 
“conventional” understanding of religion. It asserted: “Alevism created an 
original teaching through the synthesis of figures from different and various 
cultures, beliefs, and religions. It is a philosophy, a belief, a way of life, a 
teaching and indeed transcends all these and becomes a social phenomenon 
which situates the human being in the centre, peculiar to Anatolia.” 
  On this account, the petition did not state whether or not Alevism 
was a religion, albeit “above religions”. It further described Alevism with 
reference to secular principles of humanism, democracy, rationality, 
civilization, universal tolerance, secularism, environmentalism, art, and 
equality between women and men. Some of these subheadings were elucidated 
through Alevi deyiş/nefes. Yet respecting these principles were not tied to a 
religious doctrine or a theology. For instance, the petition stated that “Alevis 
consider nature such as trees, mountains and water as ‘holy’ because they 
protect nature.” Indeed, the petition commented on the holiness of nature, 
stating that the “holiness of nature must originate from protecting nature as the 
source of life.”  
  As discussed in Part I, religion as universalised is construed as a 
system of belief, where traditional practices and rituals are tied to a set of 
beliefs. Since simply feeling love for nature and protecting it were not enough 
 




to place Alevism in the realm of the religious, belief had to follow this action 
of protecting the nature. In this vein, the Alevi claimants presented an argument 
that placed them within religion by outlining a series of principles to which 
Alevis must conform in living their lives. Recalling the epistemic attitude to 
tradition and the compulsion of such approach to frame beliefs or doctrines 
preceding actions, as discussed in Chapter 2, these principles that are cited 
above also ‘explained’ actions and were thus instrumental in presenting an 
Alevi world-view. In this respect, it was a quintessentially religious move on 
the part of Alevis to frame their petition in this way. Simultaneously they were 
'above religions' because they were not specific to one religion but combined 
elements from Islam, Zoroastrianism etc.  
  In addition to the attempts to embed beliefs in Alevi traditions, the 
petition represented God (Tanri) as being equal to human beings, thus God was 
not superhuman. According to the Alevi, human beings instigated creation and 
created life. At the hearing before the ECtHR (03.10.2006) Hasan and Eylem 
Zengin’s advocate, Kazım Genç, introduced Alevism as a cultural and belief-
centred ‘original teaching’, ‘belief, philosophy, and system of thought’ and an 
Anatolian-oriented ‘belief system’. Its philosophy is that ‘everything is equal 
and one’, and focuses on a ‘unity of creatures’. He stated that interpreting 
Alevism within one religion or belief system is ‘misleading’. He later 
continued differentiating it from Islam since Islam has obligations and believes 
in God above everything, life after death, destiny, and follows doctrine, 
whereas Alevism argues for a teaching, which is related to human beings, focus 
on this world, society, and development.643  
The Government’s view on Alevism  
  In Zengin case, the Government argued that the syllabus did not take 
into account “the vision of members of a branch [mezhep] of Islam or a 
religious order [tarikat]” and further stated that “knowledge of the Alevi faith, 
which seemed to belong more to the area of philosophy, required more in-depth 
teaching.”644 In this connection, the Government implicated that Alevism fell 
into the area of philosophy, either as an Islamic branch (mezhep) or order 
 
643 Interview with Kazım Genç, the lawyer of the case, (Ankara, Turkey, 10 August 2010; 24 
December 2015; 28 November 2018). Also see the petition to the ECtHR for the case of Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007). 
644 Hassan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 43. 
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(tarikat). As examined in Chapter 4, this is also the Diyanet’s view on Alevism. 
This view has been instrumentalised to assimilate Alevis into Islam by 
transforming the categorical difference of the Alevi traditions into Alevism as 
an experiential entity.  
  In parallel, the Government suggested to extend the exemption that 
was legally granted to Jewish and Christian pupils 645  to pupils of Atheist 
parents, who wish to opt-out.646 Yet, the Government did not offer this opt-out 
option for the Alevi pupils. The Government’s assimilationist view is apparent 
in this suggestion. By suggesting to extend the exemption to Atheist parents 
but not Alevis, the Government implicitly put two alternatives for Alevi 
parents: either to subscribe to Atheism or remain included within Islam. As 
included in Islam, the Government emphasised that the religious education is 
compulsory as the state’s duty to “prevent abuses” and “to protect children 
from myths and erroneous information, which gave rise to fanaticism.”647 This 
very same justification for state control of religion has also been used for 
banning public manifestations of religion through the Law no 677, as discussed 
in Chapter 4. From the eyes of the Turkish government, Alevi pupils are in 
need of religious education provided by the Government to ensure that they 
would not indulge in myths and fanaticism, to be good citizens of the Turkish 
nation. The Government’s defence, therefore, implicated that the state would 
possess and transmit the best knowledge on religion, ‘true religion’.  
 
  Evaluation of the Court on the nature of Alevism  
  Although this judgment resulted in favour of the Alevi applicants, 
the Court’s evaluation of Alevism differed not only from the Government’s 
view; but also from how the Alevi applicants presented Alevism. The ECtHR 
Guidelines on Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. I underlines that the word 
convictions is different from ‘opinions’ and ‘ideas’.648 ECtHR case law also 
affirms that the term conviction "denotes views that attain a certain level of 
 
645 Eğitim Öğretim Yüksek Kurulu Kararı, “Din Kültürü ve Ahlak Bilgisi Dersine Girme 
Zorunluluğu Olmayan Öğrenciler’ (09.07.1990). 
646 Hassan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 44. 
647 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no: 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 40 and 44.  
648 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guide on Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (31 August 2019) 16, available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_2_Protocol_1_ENG.pdf (accessed 21 April 
2020); Valsamis v. Greece App no 21787/93 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996) paras 25 and 27. 
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cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance".649 In this connection, in its 
judgment, the ECtHR first examined whether or not the Alevi faith could be 
considered as a religious or philosophical conviction. The Court considered 
Alevism as a conviction: Para 66 of the judgment reads as follows:  
As to the Alevi faith, it is not disputed between the parties that it is a 
religious conviction which has deep roots in Turkish society and history 
and that it has features which are particular to it (see paragraphs 8-9 
above). It is thus distinct from the Sunni understanding of Islam which 
is taught in schools. It is certainly neither a sect nor a “belief” which 
does not attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance.650 
 
  However, the Court went further in its analysis of the nature of 
Alevism and eventually entered into a theological debate. Based on the 
submissions made by the applicant and Turkish government, the ECtHR 
outlined what Alevism is as follows:  
Alevism originated in central Asia but developed largely in Turkey. 
Two important Sufis had a considerable impact on the emergence of 
this religious movement: Hoca Ahmet Yesevi (12th century) and Hacı 
Bektaşi Veli (14th century). This belief system, which has deep roots in 
Turkish society and history, is generally considered as one of the 
branches of Islam, influenced in particular by Sufism and by certain 
pre-Islamic beliefs. Its religious practices differ from those of the 
Sunni651 schools of law in certain aspects such as prayer, fasting and 
pilgrimage.652 
 
 Additionally, Para 9 of the judgment reads:  
According to the applicant, Alevism is a belief or philosophy influenced 
by other cultures, religions and philosophies. It represents one of the 
most widespread faiths in Turkey after the Hanafite branch of Islam. It 
advocates close contact with nature, tolerance, modesty and love for 
one's neighbour, within the Islamic faith. Alevis reject the sharia (code 
of laws in orthodox Islam) and the sunna (forms of behaviour and 
formal rules of orthodox Islam) and defend freedom of religion, human 
rights, women's rights, humanism, democracy, rationalism, modernism, 
universalism, tolerance and secularism. Alevis do not pray by the Sunni 
rite (in particular, they do not comply with the obligation to pray five 
times daily) but express their devotion through religious songs and 
dances (semah); they do not attend mosques, but meet regularly in 
cemevi (meeting and worship rooms) for ritual ceremonies. Equally, 
 
649 See Valsamis v. Greece App no 21787/93 (ECtHR, 18 December 1996), Campbell and Cosans 
v. the United Kingdom App no  7511/76 7743/76 (ECtHR, 25 February 1982). 
650 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no: 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 66.  
651 The majority of Turkey’s population follows the Hanafite theological school’s moderate 
interpretation of Islam.  
652 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no: 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 8.  
 195 
Alevis do not consider the pilgrimage to Mecca as a religious 
obligation. They believe that Allah is present in each person. According 
to Alevism, Allah created Adam in his image and all his manifestations 
in this world are in human form. Allah is neither in the sky nor in 
paradise, but in the centre of the human heart.653 
 
  The Court compared Sunni Islam and Alevism in order to 
distinguish them within the Islamic faith. The principles of Sunna and Sharia 
in Islam were contrasted to the secular principles of ‘freedom of religion, 
human rights, women’s rights, humanism, democracy, rationalism, 
modernism, universalism, tolerance and secularism’ in Alevism. This contrast 
actually points to Alevism being outside Islam. When the above 
conceptualization is closely examined, it is not clear how and why Alevism 
was situated within Islam. As cited above, Alevis neither accept Sharia nor 
Sunna. They do not abide by the pillars of Islam such as praying and fasting. 
They respect values that do not have a basis in Islamic theology.654 Despite 
acknowledging these differences of Alevis, the Court attributed Alevis a 
religion by situating them within Islamic faith.  
  It is also important to underline that there were five representatives 
of Hasan and Eylem Zengin, although the Court heard Mr. Genc as the lawyer. 
One of the representatives is Irene Melikoff. As mentioned above, she is a 
student of Köprülü and conceptualizes Alevism as a syncretic belief system 
influenced by the belief systems in Central Asia. The emphasis on Ahmet 
Yesevi and Hacı Bektaş is reminiscent of the conceptualization of Melikoff. 
Additionally the committee of the ECtHR judges in the case includes a Turkish 
judge. In this regard, it is not clear what might have influenced ECtHR’s 
conceptualization of Alevism, despite the lawyer’s submissions that picks out 
Alevism outside the fold of Islam. Moreover, Mr Genc informed me that 
Melikoff’s name was only included on the paper, during the hearing Mr. Genc 
asked if Melikoff wanted to contribute to the presentation before the Court and 
yet she did not make speech or submit a report.655  
 
653 Ibid para 9.  
654 Indeed, it is a hot debate whether Islam is compatible with these values; women’s rights, human 
rights, democracy. See Robin Wright, ‘Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of 
Reformation’ (1996) 7 (2) Journal of Democracy 64-75. 
655 Interview with Kazım Genç, the lawyer of the case, (Ankara, Turkey, 28 November 2018).  
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  The Alevi claimants’ application endeavoured to present the Alevi 
tradition as a belief-guided tradition, commensurate with a religion, to be 
measured by the yardstick of secular law. Yet trying to comply with secular 
law ran contrary to the Alevi tradition, which does not have an epistemic 
approach to tradition. In this connection, the overall presentation of Alevism 
led to confusion in the ECtHR: The Court faced a claim for religious 
recognition, but in Alevism there is no God above everything, no revelation of 
God and no religious doctrine. Instead the Court observed mere respect for 
secular ideas. The confusion of the Court was clearly seen in its contemplation 
of Alevism. The most striking observation of the Court was to define Alevism 
‘within Islam’ despite the Alevi applicants’ submissions, whether written or 
verbal, did not argue such a claim. On the contrary, the application as cited 
above insistently differentiated Alevism from Islam. The applicant’s advocate3 
was asked three times in different interviews if the Zengin application implied 
Alevism within Islam. In both instances he responded in the negative.656 
  Note that in reaching this conclusion, the Court’s analysis 
underlined the teachings of Quran, pilgrimage, belief in otherworld and daily 
prayers, which were the indicators to distinguish Alevism from Sunni Islam. 
Yet, these are essential properties of Islam. After disassociating Alevism with 
these properties, it is not clear what ties Alevism to Islam. The Court’s 
judgment is silent on that. It just refers that ‘many’ consider Alevism within 
Islam, without a reference for this pre-empirical assertion and avoids how ‘the 
rest’ would take on its judgment. 
  To sum up, in Hasan and Eylem Zengin, the Court first 
conceptualised Alevism as a belief within Islam, peculiar to Turkish culture, 
and as such different from Sunni Islam. As discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, the 
framework of religious freedom and secular law presupposes the theological 
claim that religion is about ‘truth’ of a world-view that competes with other 
truth claims. This analysis helps us to see how Alevism is evaluated as a 
religion by the ECtHR. However, why the ECtHR did so by annexing Alevism 
to Islam is not very apparent. Chapter 2 discussed how the practices belonging 
to a tradition are transformed into the difference of cultures without an 
 
656 Interview with Kazım Genç, the lawyer of the case, (Ankara, Turkey, 25 December 2015; 28 
November 2018).  
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epistemic approach to tradition is interpreted by cultures with religion that 
bring an epistemic approach to religion. This difference is denied by converting 
these traditions also as variants of Semitic religions, which postulate certain 
beliefs to traditional practices that constitute a system of belief. Where this 
system seems lacking in Alevism, the ECtHR provided that for Alevis through 
Islamic theology.  
  According to Laborde, religion needs not to be defined semantically 
by the courts of secular law. 657  Adopting an interpretative approach, she 
suggests that the values that religion promotes can be accommodated without 
needing to define religion. Indeed, the ECtHR could have been able to come to 
the same ruling without commenting on the religiousness of Alevism, without 
a semantic approach. To take recourse to Laborde’s suggestion was easier in 
Zengin case because the claimants did not even argue that Alevism should be 
included in religious education curriculum. In this regard, the Court could have 
analysed the merits of the case merely through the lack of necessary opting out 
mechanisms. In this way, the Court could have eschewed entering in theology 
dispute. Yet, it did not follow this course of action.  
 
5. 5. Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey, on Compulsory Religious 
Education  
 
  Almost 7 years after the case of Hasan Eylem Zengin, in 
reminiscence of its decision in Zengin, the ECtHR found Turkey in violation 
of Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. I with respect to the compulsory 
religious education in Turkey in the case of Mansur Yalçın and others v. 
Turkey.658 When Yalçın’s petition to be exempted from religious education 
was denied by the school administration, he opened a file at the Administrative 
Court. The Administrative Court ruled that the content of religious education 
curriculum is comprehensive enough to provide a general understanding of 
religion at schools. According to the expert opinion at the Administrative 
Court, the textbooks of 2005-2006 education year (that were the basis for 
Hasan Eylem Zengin decision) were suspended and a new curriculum had been 
introduced since the school year 2007-2008. The expert report concluded; "the 
 
657 Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion (Harvard University Press 2017). 
658 Mansur Yalçın and Others v. Turkey App no. 21163/11 (ECtHR, 16 September 2014). 
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content of this new curriculum adopts a view that transcends sectarian views 
or different interpretations on Islam. Instead, it aims at an embracing view on 
the diversity of Islam through centralizing Quran and Muhammad." The report 
also referred to cemevi as cultural house (kultur evi), instead of places of 
worship.  
  At the ECtHR, Mansur Yalçın complained that the curriculum 
focused on the Sunni understanding of Islam and considered Alevism as a 
tradition and culture instead of a belief on its own.659 It further complained that 
by denying cemevi the status of place of worship, the government considers the 
Alevi worship of cem and semah as a mere cultural expression.660 Mansur 
Yalçın argued that such a view oversimplifies the distinct features of 
Alevism.661 In light of these arguments, the ECtHR remained reluctant to make 
a bold statement about the religiosity of Alevism. The court referred to Alevism 
as a "confession"662 and yet avoided describing it; but confession is a specific 
concept to the Christian theology.663 The ECtHR assessed the issue as a dispute 
over the content of religious education and thereby examined the curriculum 
for the school year 2011-2012. While acknowledging the amendments in the 
curriculum, the ECtHR found that no viable mechanism to opt out from 
religious education is available to parents and therefore once again found 
Turkey in violation of Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. 1.  
  The case of Yalçın is different from the case of Zengin about 
framing of claims. In Zengin, the primary objection of the Alevi claimants was 
that compulsory religious education is not compatible with the principle of 
laïcité in Turkey, whereas in the case of Yalçın, the Alevi claimants did not 
object to the existence of religious education. Instead, the focus of their 
argument was the content of the curriculum. It is stated above that the ECtHR 
examines claims about Article 2 of Additional Protocol No. 1 in terms of 
content and opt-out mechanisms. In this regard, the locus of Mr. Zengin’s 
objection was the lack of opt-out mechanisms, while Mr. Yalçın pointed to the 
content of the education. Here, we witness that the stark difference between 
 
659 Ibid para 12. 
660 Ibid para 68. 
661 Ibid para 51. 
662 Ibid para 5. 
663 Jakob De Roover, Europe, India, and the Limits of Secularism (Oxford University Press 2015). 
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two segments of the Alevi movement affect how the Alevi claims making are 
shaped and how Alevism was constructed in front of law.  
  As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, my case analysis shows that 
national courts are not consistent in taking into account ECtHR judgments in 
their decisions. Even though they do refer to ECtHR judgments, this does not 
necessarily result in favour of Alevi parents. Also I argue that these ECtHR 
judgments are not efficient in prompting the Turkish government to make the 
necessary changes to national law, because of the partial implementation of the 
ECtHR judgments. The Turkish government initiated changes in curriculum 
content, which is one of the two points of analysis by the ECtHR, the other 
providing proper opting out mechanisms. Following the introduction of the 
new curriculum, national courts mainly ruled against Alevi parents without 
analysing the necessity of proper opting out mechanisms, because they ruled 
that the information delivered in religious education is impartial and not 
indoctrinating. Following the case of Mansur Yalçın, the Turkish government 
has not taken any steps either for further amendments or introducing opting out 
mechanisms for Alevis.  
 
5. 6. Sinan Işık v. Turkey, on Place of Religion in Identity Cards  
 
  The second case, followed by the Zengin case, was concerned a 
challenge to the religion section of all Turkish birth certificates. Under Article 
43 of Law No. 1587 on Civil Registry Services (replaced by the Article 7 of 
Law No. 5490 enacted in 2006), ‘religion’ is to be recorded in family registers 
and identity cards (birth certificate). 664 Only since 2006, based on the Article 
35 of Law no. 5490, have Turkish citizens been allowed to modify, delete, or 
edit the religion section of their identity cards upon receipt of a written 
statement. 665 In addition, Section 3 of Article 24 of the Constitution guarantees 
the freedom of conscience, belief and religious conviction. Sinan Işık, an Alevi 
citizen, objected to the inscription of ‘Islam’ on his identity card and asked for 
its replacement with Alevi. The case was finalized in the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (Yargıtay) against his request on the grounds that Alevism is not a 
 
664 Nüfus Hizmetleri Kanunu (Civil Registry Services Law), Law no. 5490 (25.04.2006).  
665 Ibid, Article 35 “(2) Aile kütüklerindeki din bilgisine ilişkin talepler, kişinin yazılı beyanına 
uygun olarak tescil edilir, değiştirilir, boş bırakılır veya silinir”. 
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separate religion, but exists within Islam. When this was challenged before the 
ECtHR, the Court held that requiring religion to be stated on identity cards is 
a violation of Article 9 of the Convention.666 In this regard, the Court did not 
comment on whether Islam could be replaced with Alevism.  
  At national level, upon the first-instance court’s request, 667  the 
Diyanet (2004) issued an opinion paper on Alevism. It affirmed that Alevism 
is considered neither a separate religion nor a sect (mezhep) but a subgroup of 
and ‘cultural’ interpretation within Islam. The Diyanet argued that Alevi means 
the follower of Ali, who is the son in law to the Prophet Mohammad and the 
caliph of Islam, while Alevis in Turkey were affiliated with Yesevi tradition 
and Bektasi tariqa. It also held that the Law no. 677 banned tariqas and tekkes, 
while keeping mosques as the only places of worship for Muslims. Therefore, 
in view of the Diyanet, replacing Islam with different subcultural and religious 
interpretations of Islam (dini yorum ve alt kültür yorumları) runs contrary to 
national unity, republican principles and the principle of secularism. 668 
Ironically, the principle of secularism is considered as a justification to reject 
the Alevi claimant’s request.   
   As a response to the Diyanet’s opinion, Sinan Işık argued that the 
Diyanet as the representative of Islam is not an authority to provide an objective 
opinion on Alevism and if the Court had to seek an opinion, it should do so by 
asking ABKB (the Federation of Alevi Bektasi Associations). Sinan Işık also 
presented his views on Alevism with reference to the ABKB’s declaration on 
Alevism.669 The summary of these views are as follows: Alevism is a way of 
life, philosophy and culture as well as social phenomenon that tries to 
understand nature, society and god. The petition by Sinan Işık also cited Edip 
Harabi’s deyiş/nefes:670 
Daha Allah ile cihan yok iken / Biz anı var edip ilan eyledik / Hak'a 
hiçbir layık mekan yok iken / Hanemize aldık mihman eyledik 
 
666 Sinan Işık v. Turkey App no 21924/05 (ECtHR, 2 February 2010). 
The Court held by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention 
and held by six votes to one that there is no need to examine separately whether there has been a 
violation of Articles 6 and 14.  
667 11. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi (Civil Court of First Instance), E. 2004/239, K. 2004/355 
(07.09.2004).  
668 Diyanet, Opinion no. 2004/239 (23.06.2004). 
669 This case is discussed in Chapter 4.6.  
670 As also referred in Chapter 3.4, This particular deyiş/nefes is often quoted on the issue of the 
existence of God or Alevism’s link to Islam.  
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Kendisinin ismi henüz yok idi / İsmi şöyle dursun cismi yok idi / Hiçbir 
kıyafeti resmi yok idi / Şekil verip tıpkı insan eyledik.671  
 
It is interpreted for the utmost importance given to the human being in Alevi 
culture. With reference to other sources,672 my translation of this deyiş/nefes 
would be the following: 
While God and the world did not exist / we created and announced time 
/ while there was no place for hak / we put it in our heart.  
While it did not have a name / and not even a shape /  
without clothes and picture / we gave it a shape, just like a/the human. 
 
The first-instance court followed the Diyanet’s view and stated that Ali is 
demonstrated as the lion of Allah in Alevism and since Ali is one of four 
Caliphs, Alevism is an Islamic faith. It further held that Alevism is an 
interpretation of Islam and therefore no error of law was made. The Supreme 
Court of Appeal confirmed the first-instance court’s, without giving any other 
reasoning.  
  Both the Diyanet and national courts considered the place of Ali in 
Alevi culture and Ali in Islam in the same category and found this sufficient 
for linking Alevi culture to Islam through Alevism. Recalling the compulsion 
of cultures with religion to embed beliefs to actions, cultures without religion 
are framed and understood only through some beliefs attached to their 
traditional practices. In this vein, Balagangadhara suggests that from the 
perspective of a religious tradition, “to know a people or culture is to know 
their ‘beliefs’. Because all human actions are expressions of beliefs, to know 
cultures is to have knowledge about the beliefs of these cultures.”673 However, 
as the difference between Ali in Islam and Ali in Alevi traditions discussed in 
Chapter 2 and 3, from a methodological perspective for analysing cultural 
differences, elements existing in cultures that resemble one another might be 
the products of different configurations that as a whole shape the culture.674 
The national authorities neglected the particular features of Alevi culture and 
thus transformed the Alevi practice of calling Ali as the lion of god in poetry 
and the predominant place of Ali as the insan-ı kamil (perfect human being) 
 
671 Dertli Divani, ‘Edip Harabi- Vahdetname’ (2015) 20, May, Sercesme Dergisi 18-22, 20. 
672 Ibid.  
673 S.N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in His Blindness"--: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Brill 1994) 401-402. 
674 Ibid 427.  
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into the belief in Ali as the Prophet Mohammad’s son in law in Islamic 
theology. 
  In his application to the ECtHR, Sinan Işık complained that the 
denial of his request to replace the word “Islam” on his identity card with 
“Alevi” violated Article 9 of the Convention. He further alleged that the 
Turkish courts had violated Article 6, which protects the right to a fair trial, by 
asking for an opinion on the status of Alevism only from Diyanet (2004), 
excluding the view of Alevi organisations. In this regard, the request at the 
ECtHR was not to replace Islam with Alevism, but about the incompatibility 
of the place of religion in identity cards and the principles of Turkish laiklik.  
  In its defence, the Government argued that the religion section of the 
identity cards serve for the purposes of public policy, the general interest and 
social imperatives.675  Moreover, according to the Government, there is no 
direct link between the religion section on identity cards and the freedom of 
religion and therefore the requirement cannot be considered as a hindrance on 
the freedom to manifest one’s religion.676  
  The ECtHR, however, rejected the Government’s argument that the 
religion section in identity cards was for demographic purposes since the 
legislation makes the declaration of one’s religion mandatory.677 The Court 
analysed the case as concerning the negative aspect of freedom of religion, 
which addresses the right of a person not to be obliged to manifest his or her 
beliefs. 678  In this connection, the Court emphasized that the indication of 
religion on identity cards, whether obligatory or optional, is contrary to Article 
9 of the Convention.679  
  The ECtHR also held that the applicant’s inability to replace the 
“Islam” entry on his identity card with the word “Alevi”, because the Diyanet 
considered that the Alevi religion was only a branch of Islam, runs contrary to 
the State’s duty of neutrality and therefore constitute a breach of the State’s 
duty of neutrality and impartiality.”680 In this connection, the Court stated that  
 
675 Sinan Işık v. Turkey App no 21924/05 (ECtHR, 2 February 2010) para 34. 
676 Ibid  para 33.  
677 Ibid para 44. 
678 Ibid para 41 and para 42 reads: “What is at stake is the right not to disclose one’s religion or 
beliefs, which falls within the forum internum of each individual.” 
679 Ibid para 51,52 and 60. 
680 Ibid para 46. 
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The State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality, as defined in its case-
law, is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the 
legitimacy of religious beliefs, and requires the State to ensure that 
conflicting groups tolerate each other, even where they originated in the 
same group (see, mutatis mutandis, Manoussakis and Others v. Greece, 
26 September 1996, § 47, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-
IV, and Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, no. 
45701/99, § 123, ECHR 2001-XII).681  
 
  In analysing the merits of the case, the ECtHR first referred to the 
case of Hasan Eylem Zengin for the religious nature of Alevism, moreover, it 
added that Alevism is influenced by Sufism and certain pre-Islamic beliefs.682 
Yet none of the applications made by Sinan Işık at national or international 
level shared this view on Alevism’s relation to Sufism. Here, in close parallel 
to Hasan Eylem Zengin, the judgment in Sinan Işık also distorts what Alevis 
argued for and conceptualizes an Alevism, based on contemporary social 
science research. As discussed in Chapter 3, the claims linking Alevis to 
Sufism is loose and even might imply a process of secularization of Islam. 
Additionally, the term ‘pre-Islamic’ implies non-Islamic. It is not clear how it 
links Alevism to Islam, in the eyes of the ECtHR. Therefore, the ECtHR too, 
like the Government, could not keep its neutrality in its analysis of Alevism. In 
this connection, it is also important to remind that as opposed to the 
representation of Alevism in the case of Sinan Işık, we witness a more explicit 
connection between Alevism and Sufism at the ECtHR in the following cases 
brought by Alevis. I suggest that it may imply a pattern in the ECtHR judicial 
opinion for an Alevi case law which is also revealed in the case of Dogan and 
others and which introduces a sectarian division between Alevi Islam and 
Sunni Islam in Turkey.683  
  It is also interesting to note that the case of Sinan Işık and Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin were argued by an Alevi lawyer, who was the chairman of 
PSAKD at the time, while the case of Mansur Yalçın, Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve 
Kültür Merkezi Vakfı, and Dogan and others were argued by the lawyers of 
CEM. As explained in Chapter 4 and also seen in above section 5.5, CEM 
promotes Alevism as an Islamic Sufi tradition as well as an alternative to Sunni 
 
681 Ibid para 45. 
682 Ibid para 5. 
683 This point is examined further in the following three cases, which were brought by CEM.  
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Islam, although they do not carry out proselytizing activities. This perspective 
as adopted by CEM is similar to the ECtHR’s conception of Alevism.684 These 
three cases were prepared by lawyers affiliated with CEM. Therefore, the 
arguments in these cases also reflect CEM’s views on Alevism. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, the advocacy developed by CEM positions Alevis within Islam. 
This positioning becomes more apparent at the ECtHR, as I now turn to discuss 
to discuss on the status of cemevi.  
 
5. 7. Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı  v. Turkey, on the Status 
of Cemevi  
 
  The second case that was brought by CEM touches on the status of 
cemevi as a place of worship. As discussed in Chapter 4, the electricity 
expenses of places of worship are to be covered from the Diyanet’s budget 
according to the decision of the Council of Ministers.685 Since cemevi is not a 
recognized place of worship under Turkish law, it does not benefit from this 
subsidy provided by Diyanet. CEM complained that, although electricity bills 
of places of worship were paid by Diyanet, Yenibosna Cemevi was deprived 
of this privilege on account of the failure of the Turkish administration to 
recognise cemevi as places of worship. At national level, the First Instance 
Court rejected this request. It relied upon the opinion of Diyanet, which 
indicated that the Alevi faith is an esoteric interpretation and understanding of 
Islam and not a religion or belief on its own and thereby the decision of the 
council of ministers could not extend to cemevi, as it targeted places of worship 
such as mosque, synagogue, and church. Using parallel reasoning, the Appeal 
Court upheld the First Instance Court’s decision.  
   In its application to the ECtHR, CEM argued that cemevi, like other 
places of worship, is a place of worship for Alevis and should benefit from the 
same privileges. CEM also argued that the Diyanet is not in a position to deny 
the status of place of worship to cemevi and for the national court to rely on the 
opinion of the Diyanet is in breach of Article 9. In response, the Government 
argued that the complaint of the cemevi in question should be compared to the 
 
684 See Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no: 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 8-9.  
685 Bakanlar Kurulu, Decision no. 2002/4100 (23.05.2002). 
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status of other foundations in similar status and not to the status of places of 
worship.686 In its judgment, the ECtHR held that there has been a violation of 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, due to the discriminatory treatment 
given to the Yenibosna Cemevi, administered by CEM.687  
  In evaluating the merits of the case, the ECtHR first observed that 
the complaint in question stemmed from the local courts’ denial of cemevi as a 
place of worship. For the court, the fact that the Alevi worship of cem ritual 
and funeral arrangements that are handled in cemevi attested to the exercise of 
rights, protected by Article 9.688 Therefore the Court found that cemevi, similar 
to other places of worship, are places where worship of a religious belief (“une 
conviction religieuse”) is conducted. 689  It further stated that the right to 
freedom of belief does not require member states to grant specific status for 
places of worship or to provide tax exemptions. However, as such 
arrangements are present in the Turkish system, they should be applicable on 
a non-discriminatory basis, for "the duty of impartiality and neutrality requires 
member states to avoid judging the legitimacy of religious convictions."690 
Therefore, according to the ECtHR, the cemevi in question was in a situation 
comparable to other places of worship. The Court also underlined that freedom 
of religion does not imply that religious groups must be granted a specific legal 
status different from that of other existing bodies; if, however, such status has 
been set up, it must be granted in a non-discriminatory manner.691  
  In examining the justification for this difference in treatment, the 
ECtHR underlined that the domestic court relied on Diyanet’s view on Alevism 
as a Sufi interpretation of Islam (not a religion on its own) and as such cannot 
have its own place of worship, different from mosque and consequently was 
not eligible for the status of worship. According to the ECtHR, such an 
assessment could not be used to justify the exclusion of the cemevi from the 
benefit in question, since they were, like other recognised places of worship, 
premises intended for the practice of religious rituals. As the cemevi in question 
 
686 Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı v. Turkey App no. 32093/10 (ECtHR, 2 
December 2014) para 43. 
687 Ibid.  
688 Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı  v. Turkey App no. 32093/10 (ECtHR, 2 
December 2014) para 44. 
689 Ibid. 
690 Ibid para 49.  
691 Ibid para 45.  
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did not benefit from certain benefits linked to the status of place of worship, 
the Court found unjustified difference in treatment on the ground of religion. 
In view thereof, in the absence of objective and reasonable justification for the 
difference in treatment, the ECtHR unanimously ruled that Article 14 taken 
together with Article 9 was violated, while it saw no reason to analyse Article 
9 separately, with one dissenting opinion on the ground that the complaint in 
relation to Article 9 was sufficiently addressed in the Court’s assessment of 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9.  
  The complaint alleging a violation of Article 9 was based on the fact 
that the local court relied on Diyanet to rule on the status of cemevi. 
Accordingly, CEM argued that the Diyanet, a state institution, could not be 
entitled to rule on the status of cemevi, for the protection of exercising their 
right to freedom of belief, as protected by Article 9. In his dissenting opining, 
Judge Sajo argued for the necessity of an in-depth analysis of Article 9. He first 
noted that the majority of Alevis consider cemevi as their places of worship, 
while they do not deny that they remain within the fold of Islam.692 In the 
absence of a legal procedure for obtaining the status of worship in Turkish law, 
Judge Sajo underlined that the Diyanet as a state institution providing an 
opinion on the religiousness of Alevism contradicts the Turkish state’s duty of 
neutrality and impartiality. The Judge emphasized that the duty of neutrality 
prevents the States from deciding the religious nature of Alevism because such 
an assessment has direct impact on exercising rights secured by Article 9. In 
this connection, he pointed to the Law no. 677 depriving Alevis of de jure 
recognition of their place of worship and thereby restricting their freedom of 
worship. Indeed, in the following judgment of the Grand Chamber on İzzettin 
Doğan and Others v. Turkey, the Court analysed the Alevi claimants’ 
complaint in a manner that is similar to the dissenting opinion of Judge Sajo 
with respect to the impact of Law no. 677 on Alevis’ exercise of rights 
protected by Article 9.693  
  Referring back to Chapter 4, I argued that Law no. 677 misconstrued 
Alevism as part of public manifestations of Islam, which goes back to 19th 
century as explained in Part I and thereby introduced a false division of 
 
692 Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı  v. Turkey App no. 32093/10 (ECtHR, 2 
December 2014), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajo, para 3. 
693 İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016). 
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religious and secular within Alevi traditions. The categorical difference of the 
Alevi traditions faded away by making them a target of Law no. 677. In the 
present case on the status of cemevi, the Alevi claimants could have pointed 
out their difference from Islamic traditions. In this vein, they could have 
followed a different path of argumentation, using Article 8 and 11 of ECHR. 
Article 8 (right to private life) and Article 11 (right to association) are 
increasingly used by the ECtHR to provide protection for cultural identity, 
which is not explicitly covered by ECHR provisions.694 For instance, in dealing 
with the rights of individuals belonging to Roma and Travellers, the Court 
highlighted that Article 8 implies positive obligations for the State to facilitate 
the Gypsy way of life, particularly by meeting their specific needs in the 
relevant regulatory planning framework. 695  The Court also noted that the 
freedom of association, guaranteed by Article 11 protects the right of persons 
belonging to minorities to form associations in order to promote their culture 
and their minority consciousness.696 In Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, the 
issue was the refusal of the national authorities to register the claimant 
association. Therefore, it is similar to the de jure restriction on establishing 
cemevi due to Law no 677, although the law is not endorsed practically. Also, 
the case of CEM is different from Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, because 
the request is for covering the electricity expenses of cemevi and not for 
registration. However, the Alevi claimants could have formulated a claim by 
combining Article 8 and 11 and argued for having the same privilege that is 
given to the places of worship (covering electricity expenses) in order to 
promote and protect their cultural identity. As explained above in this Chapter 
and Chapter 2, Laborde argues for desegregating religion into the values it 
holds by using an interpretive approach to religion. 697  Instead, I argue to 
desegregate religion into the values it holds to strengthen the claims-making 
outside of religious freedom. In other words, the Alevi claimants could have 
argued for having the same treatment with places of worship, without 
 
694 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Cultural Rights in the Case- law of the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (17 January 2017) 14 (para 32), available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_cultural_rights_ENG.pdf (accessed 21 
April 2020).  
695 Chapman v. the United Kingdom App no 27238/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001) para 93. 
696 Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece App no 26695/95 (ECtHR, 10 July 1998).   
697 Cécile Laborde, Liberalism’s Religion (Harvard University Press 2017). 
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identifying cemevi as a place of worship; but as places that are essential for 
preserving their cultural identity, similar to the necessity of places of worship 
for the religious identity for its adherents.  
  Such a formulation of Alevi claims regarding cemevi could be more 
interesting for the ECtHR to develop the Convention in providing protection 
for cultural identity. However, the claim formulated by CEM before the Court 
indicated cemevi as a place of worship, Alevism as a Sufi interpretation of 
Islam, which confirms the Court’s previous assessment on Alevism in Zengin 
case. Both the ECtHR and CEM use a particular discourse on Alevism, which 
allows formulating the difference of Alevis in terms of denominations and 
creating a rivalry between Alevi Islam and Sunni Islam. Nevertheless, although 
the decision have not been implemented by the Government, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, some municipalities felt more confident to facilitate establishing 
cemevi, following the ECtHR’s judgment on CEM. However, cemevi is 
continued to be established as cultural houses, rather than places of worship, 
as discussed in detail in Chapter 4.  
 
5. 8. İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, on Public Religious Services for 
Alevis  
 
"I am a citizen of Turkey, who adhere to Alevi Islamic (Alevi-Bektaşi-
Mevlevi-Nusayri) faith. Alevi faith, which accepts, without doubt, the 
unity of God (Allah), the prophecy of Muhammad, Quran as the word of 
Allah, is a Sufi (tasavvufi) interpretation and application of Islam that 
enriches Islam and is based on reason."698 
 
This is how İzzettin Doğan, the head of CEM Foundation, an Alevi dede and 
an influential Alevi public figure, introduced himself in his petition to the 
Prime Ministry, which enumerated his demands for Alevi citizens of Turkey 
that were reiterated in the ECtHR in the landmark decision of Dogan and others 
v Turkey.699 These demands were:  
a. services connected with the practice of the Alevi faith constitute a 
public service,  
 
698 Petition to the Prime Ministry, on 22.06.2005, original in Turkish reads: “Ben Türkiye 
Cumhuriyeti’nin Alevi (Alevi-Bektaşi-Mevlevi-Nusayri) İslam inancını benimsemiş bir 
vatandaşıyım. Alevilik Allah’ın tekliğini, Hz. Muhammed’in peygamberligini, Kuran’ın Allah 
emir olduğunu tartışmasız esas alan, öncelikle akla aykırı olmayan, İslam’ı zenginleştiren İslam’ın 
tasavvufi yorum ve uygulamasıdır.” 
699 İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016).  
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b. Alevi places of worship (cemevi) be granted the status of places of 
worship,   
c. Alevi religious leaders be recruited as civil servants, and  
d. special provision be made in the budget for the practice of the Alevi 
faith.  
 
  Other than the demand for the recognition of cemevi as a place of 
worship, the demands for public religious services is not shared by other 
segments of the Alevi movement. Many Alevi organizations such as PSAKD 
and ABF oppose the state's involvement in Alevis' affairs in the form of public 
services. 700  Similarly, my fieldwork suggests that Alevis have a sceptical 
attitude to the state’s involvement in the way they practice their culture. 
Specifically, they consider the Diyanet an illegitimate institution in a secular 
state and argue for abolishing it. Moreover, for many Alevis, the Diyanet is the 
biggest threat for assimilation. Notwithstanding the multiple stances taken by 
different segments of the Alevi movement, the ECtHR found Turkey in 
violation of Article 9 and Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9 in its decision 
of İzzettin Doğan and others v Turkey. The decision, however, generated four 
different dissenting opinions of six judges in the Grand Chamber.  
 
  Domestic proceedings  
  Dogan's initial petition to the Prime Ministry that dated June 2005 
requested the above-mentioned demands to correct the service failure of the 
Diyanet, which adopts an exclusively Sunni approach to Islam and thereby 
discriminates against the Alevi. The petition therefore construed Alevi faith 
within Islamic traditions and made a distinction between Sunni Islam and Alevi 
Islam on sectarian lines. In its response, the Prime Ministry claimed that it was 
impossible to meet these demands, due to the fact that the public services 
provided by the Diyanet transcend denominational differences701 (mezhepler 
üstü) and are for all Muslims and thus everyone has an equal right to benefit 
from these services. Thus it accepted the claim that Alevi faith is an Islamic 
tradition and emphasized the common ground with other Islamic traditions, as 
the focus of Diyanet’s services. Further it referred to Law no. 677 for rejecting 
 
700 Talha Köse, ‘The AKP and the ‘Alevi opening’: understanding the dynamics of the 
rapprochement’ (2010) Insight Turkey 143-164, 149. 
701 In the ECtHR decision, ‘mezhepler üstü’ is translated as ‘supra-denominational’; but, see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.8 for how a discussion on Alevis’ affiliation with mezhep.  
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cemevi as a place of worship. 702 As it is discussed, the Law no. 677 of 1925 
criminalised the use of dede title, also indicated that public servants are not 
recruited based on their religious views. Accordingly it stated that no budget 
could be allocated for services that are not stated in the constitution and laws.  
  Upon the refusal of the Prime Ministry, Dogan, along with 1919 
other Alevis, submitted a petition to the administrative court for judicial 
review. 703  The petition narrated that Alevis, as living in rural areas and 
confined to village communities, used to conduct cem rituals in the largest 
house of the village. It further contended that migration from rural to urban 
areas necessitated the construction of cemevi. Drawing on the analogy with 
Christianity and its denominational differences, it underlined the duty of 
secular law to remain neutral against the competing claims of different 
denominations for holding the only truth. In this connection, it argued that the 
Diyanet's view on Alevi faith and cemevi is based on Sunni view of Islam and 
therefore biased and partial. It provided two pieces of evidence for this claim: 
a press release of Diyanet and an interview conducted with its president. The 
press release indicates Alevi and Bektaşi belief groups as internal aspects of 
Islam and cultural richness of Turkey (kültürel zenginlik).704  
  Furthermore, the press release considers cemevi as "a richness that 
needs to be protected and has a mission and identity that is unique, cultural and 
mystic."705 That is, the press release maintains that the discussion on the status 
of cemevi is linked to the discussion on Alevism as a religion on its own or 
separate from Islam, due to the fact that the only place of worship in Islam is 
mosque. Historically speaking, the press release continues, cemevi has never 
been considered as an alternative or equivalent to mosque. In Diyanet's 
opinion, cemevi, which used to be described as 'dergah, tekke, zaviye or 
niyazevi' in history, are recently attempted to be presented as equals to mosque, 
 
702 Law no. 677 (30.12.1925). The law prohibits the bearing of certain religious titles such as 
sheikh, dedelik [an Alevi religious leader], dervichlik, and so forth, the practices connected with 
those titles, and the designation of a venue for ceremonies conducted by Sufi orders (tarikat ayini). 
Failure to comply with these prohibitions is punishable by a term of imprisonment and a fine. see 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.  
703 Ankara 6. İdare Mahkemesi (Administrative Court), E. 2005/1910, K. 2007/1240 (25.09.2005). 
704 The original passage in Turkish reads: “Kültürel kimliğin onemli bir parçası olan İslam içi bir 
oluşum ve tarihi süreçte ortaya çıkan zenglinlik.” Author’s translation: “An important aspect of 
cultural identity, a formation internal to Islam and richness emerged throughout historical 
process.”  
705 The original phrase in Turkish reads: "özgün, kültürel ve mistik kimliği ve misyonu bulunan ve 
korunması gereken bir zenginlik." 
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church and synagogue and this contradicts historical facts. In addition, 
according to the press release, such an approach carries the risk of being a threat 
to national unity. In this connection, the press release considers Alevism as 
internal to Islam, since it has no book other than the Quran and no prophet other 
than Muhammad.  
  The second material presented to the Court as evidence for violation 
of state neutrality is the interview with the president of Diyanet. Upon 
questions on Alevism, he states that cemevi is where Alevi culture is 
transmitted and as such needs to be protected and yet cannot be an alternative 
to mosque, which remains as the place of Muslim worship for 1400 years. He 
analogically sees cemevi as similar to mevlevihane, where Mevlevi culture is 
transmitted and cannot be considered as a place of worship.  
  Additionally, claimants referred to the court cases about the legal 
status of cemevi, where Diyanet provided an opinion upon request that cemevi 
could not be considered as a place of worship. The petition also included an 
interview with Erdogan, the Prime Minister at the time (now, President), about 
his visit to Germany where a large number of the Alevi diaspora live. In this 
interview in 2003, Erdogan stated that: "All the Alevis I met say they are 
Muslims. Muslims' place of worship is mosque. Alevism is not a religion. This 
separation may cause dividing Turkey [in sectarian lines]. One [mosque] is 
place of worship, the other [cemevi] is cultural houses [...] If you are Muslim, 
you [should] go to mosque." Drawing on these pieces of evidence, Dogan and 
the 1919 others argued that Diyanet administration should be charged with a 
serious failure of service (ağır hizmet kusuru), as the Government was in 
breach of its duty of neutrality and impartiality by denying the distinctive 
features of the Alevi faith.  
  The response from the Prime Ministry to the Administrative Court 
about these issues, first, argued for the inadmissibility of the case since the 
claimants could not be considered as the sole representatives of all Alevis, who 
show great variety in their demands. Thus, it played upon the lack of uniformity 
of Alevis in conceptualization of their tradition and its relation with the state. 
It further reiterated that Diyanet provides public religious services to all 
Muslim citizens in line with the principle of laïcité and that historically mosque 
had been the only place of worship for Muslims, as evinced with the 
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construction of mosques adjacent to tekke and dergah. The Prime Ministry 
presented its view on the nature of Alevism as a Sufi interpretation and 
application of Islam that carries elements from Twelve Imams Shiah belief as 
well as esoteric aspects of Islam. Thus, it went on, Alevism is not a sect 
(mezhep); rather, it is similar to Bektaşilik, Mevlevilik, Yesevilik, Kadirilik, 
which can be qualified as creed (itikadi) or jurisprudence (fikhi) based views:  
It is a tariqa and mystic formation that has been shaped through the 
historical process. This formation conducted its tradition in dergahs in 
cities, while in ordinary houses appropriated to their needs in rural 
areas. Today, Sahkulu Sultan and Karaca Ahmet Sultan are still 
operating dergahs of Bektaşis; tekkes. Since 14th century, Alevi-
Bektaşi communities structured their tariqa centered around Erdebil 
and Hacı Bektaş.  
 
  Therefore, the Prime Ministry argued that as a tariqa, granting place 
of worship for cemevi contradicts with Law no. 677. Supportive of these 
arguments, the Prime Ministry referred to two court cases: a case about an 
Alevi dede asking for being recruited to Diyanet as an Alevi dede where the 
administrative court706 agreed to the negative decision of Diyanet and hence 
rejected the case. Similarly, regarding a request to replace Islam in identity 
cards with Alevi faith, the administrative court707 ruled that Alevism was not a 
religion on its own. Additionally, the Prime Ministry underlined that such a 
development [granting cemevi the status of place of worship] as a legal 
precedent will pave the way for various demands of other tariqas, which would 
further run the risk of the emergence of false Sheikhs cunning the public.  
  The administrative court dismissed the preliminary objections of the 
Prime Ministry and examined the application on its merits. The administrative 
court, departing from previous cases where the judges sought Diyanet’s 
opinions, did not ask for Diyanet’s opinion about Alevism; instead, it referred 
to the ECtHR’s decision on Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey and noted that 
Alevism is considered within the ambit of Article 9 of ECHR.708 Yet, the Court 
noted that the ECtHR did not find that the existence of state church would be 
enough for the violation of the Convention. Yet, the Administrative Court 
 
706 Ankara 4. İdare Mahkemesi (Administrative Court) that rejected the case, E. 2002/157, K. 
2002/1149 (23.10.2002). 
707 Izmir 11. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi (Civil Court of First Instance), E. 2004/239, K. 2004/355 
(07.09.2004). 
708 Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no: 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007). 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rejected the case on 4 July 2007, on the grounds that the refusal by the 
respondent authorities was in conformity with the legislation in force. The 
decision of the Administrative Court was confirmed on appeal by the Council 
of State on that ground that the Administrative Court’s decision was in 
conformity with the rules and regulations.709 
  In domestic proceedings, we see again how the state authorities and 
courts of Turkey consider Alevism as a corrupted version of Islam. Both the 
Diyanet’s and Erdogan’s perspective exemplify how the Islamic figures that 
are shared by Alevis evince for their belief in Islam. These elements of the 
culture annex Alevis to Islam; but also emphasise corruption by denying the 
differences of Alevis from Islam. As discussed in Part I, the Alevi traditions 
are construed as centred on belief rather than practices. In this way, Alevi 
traditions were converted to a religious tradition. Alevism is understood as a 
system of belief. This conversion allowed the place of Islamic figures in Alevi 
rituals to testify Alevis prominent belief in these figures that link them to Islam.  
  In articulating their difference, Dogan and others use the Islamic 
framework as well. As discussed in Chapter 4, CEM, founded and chaired by 
Izzettin Dogan conceptualise Alevism within Islam and try to position it as an 
alternative to Sunni Islam. This strategy is one among many. It is certainly 
different from the kind of Alevism that many fractions of the transnational 
Alevi movement in Europe promote. As I elaborate on in Chapter 6, the Britain 
Alevi Federation has been careful to separate Alevism as a distinctive system 
of belief from Islam. Even in the context of Turkey, referring back to my 
analysis on the Alevi workshops, these demands as articulated by CEM in 
Dogan case were not shared by other Alevi organizations. Nonetheless, CEM 
tries to bring the denominational differences of Christianity into Islam in 
Turkey as Sunni Islam and Alevi Islam. Therefore, it challenges the authority 
of the Diyanet providing services only for Sunni citizens. The political and 
legal system of Turkey presents them two options; either to correct themselves 
by abiding the Diyanet’s services or to remain muted about their difference in 
the realm of secular. I argue that the agenda put forward by CEM is a 
manifestation of how Alevis have internalised the Islamic view on Alevis as 
corrupted Muslims and then try to challenge to this view on their corruption 
 
709 Danıştay 10. Daire (Council of State), E. 2008/3098,  K. 2010/475 (04.02.2010).  
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claiming that Alevi Islam is a different kind. In this way, CEM accepts the 
assumptions on Alevism being a religion within Islam, but on these 
assumptions produces claims by dividing Islam as the Sunni way and Alevi 
way.  
  The Diyanet as the representative of true Islam holds authority over 
courts in Turkey. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Turkish judges ask the 
Diyanet’s opinion, whenever Alevis make claims about their difference from 
Islam. Interestingly, in the domestic proceedings of Dogan, the Administrative 
Court did not ask the opinion of Diyanet, but relied instead on the ECtHR’s 
judgment on Hasan and Eylem Zengin and thereby considered Alevism within 
the ambit of Article 9 of the Convention. However, in applying the ECtHR 
judgment in the Turkish context, the Judge considered the status of the Diyanet 
in relation to the ECtHR’s approach to religious establishments. Therefore, the 
Judge argued that the ECtHR does not consider the establishment of a state 
church system on its own in violation of the Convention rights. This evaluation, 
however, runs contrary to the Turkish state’s presentation of the Diyanet. The 
Turkish state never considered the Diyanet as a religious establishment; but as 
a state institution to provide public religious services. In this regard, it is 
interesting how the ECtHR judgments are translated in domestic courts and 
how this ‘translation’ brings about further complications about how Alevis 
could be accommodated in the political and legal system of Turkey.   
 
  The ECtHR judgment  
  Upon the decision of the Council of State, Dogan made an 
application to the ECtHR. The application argued that the dismissal of their 
requests for public religious service impinged their rights as protected in 
Article 9 as well as Article 14 and that Turkey failed to discharge its duty of 
neutrality and impartiality by providing these services solely for Sunni citizens. 
The claimants further asserted that by denying the Alevi faith distinct from 
Sunni Islam, the authorities made an assessment on the substance of their faith 
that breached the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality. The ECtHR held 
sixteen votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 9; and twelve votes to five that there has been a violation of Article 
9. The majority in the Grand Chamber ruled that the refusal of the applicants’ 
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claims amounts to denying the religious nature of the Alevi faith, and therefore 
constitutes an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of religion as 
guaranteed by Article 9 (1) of the Convention. In its judgment, the Court 
tackled three important issues: the overlap between the positive and negative 
obligations of the State for Article 9, the State’s duty of neutrality and 
impartiality and the relationship between religious groups and the State 
(religious establishments).  
  In its reasoning for the violation of Article 9, the ECtHR took a 
broad approach to state’s duties for non-interference with the rights protected 
under Article 9 and also considered the case in relation to the state’s positive 
obligations inherent in Article 9. The latest guidance note of the ECtHR on 
Article 9 provides insights about the Court’s reasoning in the case of Dogan. 
The Guidance Note underlines that  
Interference in the exercise of the rights secured under Article 9 of the 
Convention may, for instance, take the form of  […] denial by the 
domestic authorities of a religious community’s status as a specific 
religion, where such denial is liable to cause a series of practical 
problems and difficulties (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey [GC], 
Para 95).710 
  With these in mind, the ECtHR indeed consider the negative and 
positive obligations of States together. Similarly, derived from Article 1 of the 
Convention that States must “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention”, the Guidance Note 
underscores that the rather negative obligation on a State to refrain from 
interfering in the rights guaranteed by Article 9 may be combined with the 
positive obligations inherent in those rights, since the applicable principles are 
comparable (İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, 96).711 Accordingly, the 
Court considered that the refusal of the Alevi claimants’ demands amounts to 
denying the religious nature of the Alevi faith and therefore constituted an 
interference with the claimants’ right to freedom of religion as guaranteed by 
Article 9 (1) of the Convention.712 Moreover, Para 95 of the judgment reads:  
“The assessment made by the domestic authorities of the Alevi faith equates in 
particular to a refusal to recognise the religious nature of that faith.” In this 
 
710 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guidance Note on Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights’ (31 December 2019) 16-17 (para 36), available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf (accessed 21 April 2020).  
711 Ibid 19 (para 48). 
712 İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016) para 115. 
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connection, the Court noted that the duty of neutrality prevents the State from 
“arbitrarily ‘impose’ or ‘reclassify’ the religious belonging of individuals or 
groups against their will.”713  
  As the ECtHR evaluated the case as an issue of interference, it also 
assessed if the interference could be justified. The Court examined in detail the 
adverse consequences affecting the Alevi claimants due to the Government’s 
refusal to recognise the religious nature of their faith. Despite the restrictions 
imposed by Law no 677, the Government argued that Alevis have been able to 
exercise their freedom secured by Article 9. The Government further 
emphasized the margin of appreciation left to member states in organising 
matters relating to religion. However, the Court ruled that the Turkish 
authorities overstepped their margin of appreciation in their assessment of the 
nature of Alevism. Citing the importance of religious diversity as the necessary 
aspect of democratic societies, the Court did not find a reasonable justification 
for the interference in question.  
  Regarding the claims under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 9, 
the Government argued that the comparison made by the applicants between 
the Alevi faith and the Sunni branch of Islam was erroneous, and their situation 
should instead be compared with that of citizens belonging to the Sufi orders 
(tarikat), which fell into the category of mystical groups.714 It further noted that 
the Diyanet does not offer specific services for Sufi orders. While noting that 
Law no. 677 is no longer applicable as evinced from operation of many cemevi, 
the Government also argued that “the constitutional and legislative provisions 
did not provide for any measures concerning the institutions of the Sufi or 
mystical tradition such as the Dervish monasteries (dergah), or the religious 
practices and mystical conventions and rules of that tradition, such as the 
semah and cems.”715  
  However, the Court did not accept the government’s argument that 
“the comparison made by the applicants in their application between the “Alevi 
faith” and the “Sunni branch of Islam” was in any event erroneous and it was 
 
713 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guidance Note on Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights’ (31 December 2019) 69 (para 206), available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf (accessed 21 April 2020); also see 
İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016) para 100. 
714 Ibid para 166. 
715 Ibid para 151. 
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inappropriate to assess the RAD’s [Diyanet] remit on the basis of that 
comparison, as the theological branches and Sufi sub-branches did not fall into 
the same category.”716  Instead, it compared the situation of the members of the 
Alevi faith to that of Sunni Muslims, who benefit from the services provided 
by the Diyanet. In reaching this comparison, the Court stated that  
Irrespective of the place occupied by the Alevi faith in Muslim 
theology, there is no doubt that it is a religious conviction which has 
deep roots in Turkish society and history (see Hasan and Eylem Zengin, 
cited above, § 66) and that it represents a sizeable community – to 
which the applicants belong – which performs its religious rites in the 
cemevi. As the Court has already noted (see paragraph 122 above), the 
Alevis form a religious community which has distinctive characteristics 
in numerous spheres including theological doctrine, principal religious 
practices, places of worship and education.717  
 
In this regard, the Court recognised that, the different treatment between Sunni 
citizens who benefit from Diyanet’s services and the Alevi citizens caused a 
glaring imbalance that is not justifiable. The Court, therefore, found a violation 
of Art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with Art. 9 ECHR, for the different treatment 
of the Alevi citizens had no objective or reasonable justification.  
  
  Dissenting Opinions  
  The judgment of the Grand Chamber included a number of different 
dissenting opinions, taking different reasoning on the state’s negative and 
positive obligations flowing from Article 9, on the comparison relating to 
Article 14 and on the relationship between the state and religious 
establishments. The joint partly dissenting and partly concurring opinions of 
Judges Villiger, Keller and Kjolbro, argued for no violation of Article 9 and a 
narrower scope for the violation of Article 14. According to their analysis, “the 
applicants’ complaint is not about the lack of a procedure for recognition of 
Alevi faith as a religious group or denomination.”718 In this regard, the case is 
about the positive obligations of the state; but should not have been analysed 
as an instance of interference that has to be justified. They argued that the case 
law the court relied on for its reasoning (for an instance of interference) is not 
comparable to the present case, as in these cases the lack of a procedure results 
 
716 Ibid para 146.  
717 Ibid para 169.  
718 Ibid para 4.  
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in hindrance of rights protected under Article 9.719 Moreover, according to 
Judges Villiger, Keller and Kjolbro, “a procedure for obtaining recognition 
would not in itself have satisfied any of the applicants’ specific requests.”720 
  The judges also disagreed that there is an interference with the rights 
protected under Article 9 that has to be justified: The administrative court 
recognizes the Alevi faith within the ambit of Article 9. There is no significant 
consequence for the Alevi community, as more than a thousand cemevi operate 
in Turkey. Their operation can be seen as evidence for the Government’s claim 
that the Law no. 677 is not applicable in practice. Thus there is no ‘significant 
consequence’ for the Alevi community. Therefore, this dissenting opinion 
stated that “in our view, Article 9 of the Convention cannot be interpreted as 
imposing a positive obligation on a State to provide a religious group with 
religious services, to recognise their places of worship, to employ and pay the 
salaries of the group’s religious leaders and to allocate funds from the general 
budget to finance, wholly or in part, the group’s activities. Such an 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Convention would go too far.”721  
  While concurring with the finding of the violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 9, they saw no difference with the analysis made for 
CEM v Turkey and thereby argued that the difference in treatment should have 
been examined “between the Alevi faith and other religions or religious groups 
with regard to the rights and privileges provided for in the domestic 
legislation.”722 In their view, by comparing members of the Alevi faith with the 
Sunni Muslims, as the beneficiaries of Diyanet, “the court is in practice 
requiring that the [Diyanet] RAD’s service – or some kind of similar privileges 
– be provided not only to the applicants, as followers of the Alevi faith, but 
also to persons of other religious beliefs, since they, like the applicants, do not 
benefit from the religious public service provided by the RAD and are, 
according to the Court’s assessment, in a comparable situation to that of the 
 
719 Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova App no 45701/99 (ECtHR, 13 
December 2001); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia App no 72881/01 (ECtHR, 5 
October 2006); Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria App no 
40825/98 (ECtHR, 31 July 2008). 
720 İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016) para 10. 
721 Ibid para 14.  
722 Ibid para 20.  
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beneficiaries of that service (see paragraphs 183 and 184 of the judgment). In 
doing this, the Court is, in our view, going too far.”723  
  Indeed, the concurring opinion suggested that “the core legal 
problem” which was not tackled properly was the status of Diyanet and 
“whether it can be regarded as compatible with the Convention for one religion, 
in this case the Sunni interpretation of Islam, to occupy a privileged position 
within Turkey for historical and cultural reasons.”724 Therefore, it considered 
the case with respect to the relation between law and religion that the court did 
not address in its decision: “In our view, the crux of the matter is indisputably 
the fact that the Sunni interpretation of Islam, as practised by the majority of 
the population in Turkey, is granted preferential treatment, while other 
religions are not granted similar treatment”. Thus, according to the concurring 
opinion, the Turkish government could have reasonably justified the necessity 
of this difference in treatment, if only it accepted “the privileged position of 
the Sunni interpretation of Islam as supported by the RAD (Diyanet) and its de 
facto status as a “State religion” in Turkey”.725 In his concurring opinion, Judge 
Spano also subscribed to a narrower analysis of Article 14 in conjunction with 
Article 9. He presented no further analysis.  
  The other dissenting opinion by Judge Silvis argued “there is no 
obligation under the Convention for the State to seek an active supporting role 
in matters of religion.” Therefore, he found no violation of Article 9. Similarly 
but in a stronger tone, the dissenting opinion by Judge Vehabovic criticised the 
Court for not leaving enough margin of appreciation for the Turkish 
government and overriding its position for deciding on what counts as religion. 
Judge Vehabovic claimed that:  
In today’s world there are many deviant forms of religious practice and 
belief which should never obtain legitimacy and, by means of such 
recognition, the possibility to spread these deviant ideas and ideologies. 
Of course this case is in no way connected with these ideas, but the 
issue is relevant in terms of the wide margin of appreciation afforded to 
the States in this area and the possibility of creating a precedent for the 
future. The legislature must have broad discretion in deciding what 
should be regarded as a sufficient public benefit to justify including 
other religious groups and religious movements in the system of public 
services. […] Seeking to define religion and to distinguish a religion 
 
723 Ibid para 22. 
724 Ibid para 23.  
725 Ibid para 24.  
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from a sect is a very dangerous undertaking. Is Alevism a religion in its 
own right or is it merely a sect within Islam? The Western concept of 
religion is completely different from the Eastern understanding. 
According to its settled case-law, the Court leaves to Contracting States 
a certain margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what extent 
any interference is necessary. 
 
  My analysis  
  In light of the judgment and dissenting opinions above, two issues 
arise from the Grand Chamber’s evaluation of the Dogan case that might have 
changed the course of the judgment. Indeed as implied by the dissenting 
opinions above, the Court examined the case as a matter of lack of recognition 
of the Alevi faith. Yet, this was not the focus of the Alevi claimant’s complaint. 
Instead, the Alevi claimants requested specific privileges to practice their 
religion. Therefore, the refusal of their requests should have been analysed in 
terms of the state’s positive obligations flowing from Article 9. In this vein, 
Ferri argues that Dogan case is a missed opportunity for the ECtHR to elaborate 
on the positive obligations of the state in relation to Article 9.726 He is of the 
opinion that the positive obligations relating to Article 9 is less developed than 
other provisions of ECHR and suggests to develop it for “European States 
where, following the increase of the number of religious groups which differ 
from those traditionally present, the implementation of freedom of religion 
poses new and problematic challenges.”727 Unlike Ferri, I do not think that the 
accommodation of different ‘religious’ groups like the Alevis could be 
achieved by extending the scope of the state’s positive obligations deriving 
from Article 9. Similar to the dissenting opinions above, I think such a view 
for positive obligations on states to actively promote public services for 
religious groups is going too far from the scope of protection guaranteed under 
Article 9.  
  Legal construction of Alevism  
  What is interesting about the Court’s analysis is that with respect to 
a violation of Article 9, the Alevi claimants argued that Alevi faith is a Sufi 
interpretation of Islam. 728  They maintained that this refusal by the State 
 
726 Marcella Ferri, ‘The Dogan et al. v. Turkey: A Missed Opportunity to Recognise Positive 
Obligations as Regards the Freedom of Religion’ (2017) 2 (1) European Papers 311-319. 
727 Ibid 319.  
728 İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey App no 62649/10 (ECtHR, 26 April 2016) para 71.  
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authorities implied an assessment of their faith on the part of the national 
authorities, in breach of the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality with 
regard to religious beliefs. The Government also recognised the claimants’ 
consideration of Alevism as a Sufi interpretation of Islam.729 However, in its 
analysis for Article 9 with respect to the state’s negative obligations, the Court 
noted that the authorities’ interpretation of Alevi faith as a Sufi order was 
wrong: Para 92 reads:   
According to the national authorities, the Alevi faith, which is to be 
likened to a “Sufi order”, is simply a Sufi interpretation and practice of 
Islam. In practice, as the applicants correctly observed, this assessment 
amounts, in particular, to denying that Alevi religious practices – 
namely the cem ceremony – constitute a form of religious worship and 
to depriving Alevi meeting places (cemevi) and religious leaders (dede) 
of legal protection. 
 
  Both the Alevi claimants, the Government and the Court considered 
the Alevi faith as a Sufi interpretation of Islam. In this regard, the problem does 
not seem to be about the Government’s imposition of its own definition of 
Alevi faith on Alevis, as the Court argued in its reasoning for violation of 
Article 9. But, on this assumption that all parties agreed (Alevism as a Sufi 
order), the claimants argue that they have to benefit from religious services of 
the Diyanet, cem is their worship and cemevi is their place of worship, while 
the Government argued that the Sufi orders also use mosque as a place of 
worship and not places other than mosques.730 The Government also argued 
that the Diyanet does not provide specific services for Sufi orders. In this 
connection, although the Court noted that:  
The case concerns a sensitive debate which is a source of controversy 
in the sphere of Muslim theology and on which it is not for the Court to 
express an opinion (see Mansur Yalçın and Others, cited above, § 70). 
Hence, in referring, for the purposes of its reasoning, to the Alevi faith 
and the community founded on that faith, the Court does not attach any 
particular significance to those terms beyond the finding that Article 9 
is applicable to them.731  
 
The Court, nonetheless, found itself in making claims on controversial issues, 
that is, whether cem is a type of worship and cemevi is a place of worship. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the Christian triad of true worship, false worship, and 
 
729 Ibid para 79. 
730 Ibid para 80. 
731 Ibid para 69. 
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the secular were transformed by the secular law into a triad of truly religious, 
potentially religious and the secular, where the potentially religious is hidden 
in the binary opposition of religious and secular. Referring to Balagangadhara, 
I noted that the reason for this triad is the secular law’s assumption that religion 
is a matter of truth, which implies falsity. In this triad, the potentially religious 
is where the cultures that do not have an epistemic approach to tradition and 
do not consider cultures as candidates for truth find themselves. Yet, to enter 
in the realm of truly religious, these cultures have to be formulated as truth 
candidates competing against each other. The Government’s arguments 
demonstrate how the Islamic triad does not allow cemevi to be considered as a 
place of worship, but mosque is to be the only place of worship. Before the 
ECtHR, as the Alevi claimants use of Islamic theology to provide themselves 
a claim for truth, it becomes possible to argue that cemevi is a place of worship, 
with the generic of Islamic theology. Accepting this claim; but refusing to 
locate this claim in Islamic theology, the ECtHR twists the theological 
discussion over what worship is and where it should be conducted in Islam. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR cannot hold its promise of evading theological 
discussions and keeping its neutrality.  
 
  The ECtHR framework on religious establishments and the 
relationship between the state and religion for analysing the Diyanet’s services 
  Under the ECHR, there is no provision that specifies how to regulate 
relationships with religions and the state. Therefore, when a claimant argues 
for an inappropriate relationship, the Court examines several provisions to 
determine if a particular form of relationship between a religion and state is 
permissible.732 The Guidance Note of the ECHR on Article 9 informs about the 
three categories for organizing the state-religious establishments: “a) existence 
of a State Church; b) complete separation between the State and all religious 
organisations; and c) concordat-type relations (the latter is the predominant 
 
732 Carolyn Evans and Christopher A. Thomas, ‘Church-State Relations in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2006) BYU L. Rev. 699, 700. 
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model in European countries).” 733 In Darby v. Sweden, the European 
Commission held that religious establishment in itself did not constitute a 
breach of the Convention and was prohibited only if it implicated a right of the 
Convention:  
A State Church system cannot in itself be considered to violate Article 
9 of the Convention. In fact, such a system exists in several Contracting 
States and existed there already when the Convention was drafted and 
when they became parties to it. However, a State Church system must, 
in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 9, include specific 
safeguards for the individual’s freedom of religion.734  
 
  Judge Vehabovic pointed to an important aspect of the case. Indeed, 
the court put itself into a position to define religion by comparing members of 
the Alevi faith with Sunni Muslims. However, in the Court’s reasoning, would 
it be a ‘better’ judgment if the Court had dealt with the case in terms of the 
relation between the Turkish State and the Diyanet? Could the Turkish state 
have been able to defend the different treatment between Sunni Muslims and 
other religious groups, if it had accepted that the public services are only for 
Sunni Muslims because the majority belongs to this group? But, that would 
have meant, from the perspective of the Turkish state, there are “non-Sunni” 
Muslims in the country, which contradicts the Turkish nation-building project. 
This project situates Alevis as the heirs of pre-Islamic Turkish culture, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, the Turkish state does not have to use the 
language that used in the ECtHR that refers Alevis “non-Sunni.” Instead, it 
could have argued that the public services are only given for the majority 
understanding and practice of Islam, without labelling it ‘Sunni’, ‘Alevi’, ‘non-
Sunni’. Such a move would require Turkish government to define Diyanet 
more explicitly. This would carry the potential of multiple divisions within 
Islam in Turkey, mainly Alevi Islam and Sunni Islam. Here, we see how secular 
law by configuring claims to the religious realm as competing truth claims can 
provide solutions for co-existence only by first creating conflict and then 
presenting religious freedom as the framework for pluralism.  
 
733 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Guidance Note on Article 9 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights’ (31 December 2019) 50 (para 141), available at 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_9_ENG.pdf (accessed 21 April 2020); also see 
for a critic of this view, Russell Sandberg, ‘Church-state Relations in Europe: from Legal Models 
to An Interdisciplinary Approach’ (2008) 1 (3)  Journal of Religion in Europe 329-352.  
734 Darby v. Sweden App no 11581/85 (ECtHR, 23 October 1990).  
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  How would have the court dealt with the relation between Diyanet 
and the Turkish state, if it had chosen to do so? It is undisputable that Diyanet 
has gradually increased its power over the years with an ever-increasing budget 
size. Comparing with the budget of other ministries, it is reported that in 2013 
general budget, Diyanet received more than the budget of the ministry of 
interior affairs.735 In 2017, it is reported that the number of its personnel is 
117,378.736 It is undisputable that Diyanet was also flourished with the rising 
of AKP and its governance since 2002. 737  The members of cabinet and 
President Erdogan himself often praise members of Diyanet. 738  In this 
connection, although the ECtHR gives wide margin of appreciation to the 
member states to organize their relations with religious establishments, the 
power Diyanet holds in Turkish politico-legal system seems to be exceeding 
limits. However, the ECtHR has a limited jurisdiction. Different from a 
constitutional court, which would have power to endorse principles such as the 
separation of state and religious establishments, the ECtHR’s jurisdiction 
extends only to the rights protected by the Convention. 739  In this regard, 
McCrea suggests that theoretically, if sufficiently liberal, “the Convention may 
even be able to accommodate a rights-friendly theocracy.”740   
  To sum up, Turkish government has yet to implement the judgment 
of İzzettin Doğan and Others v.Turkey. If the government refuses to implement 
it, in the following relevant case, the Government may prefer to argue that the 
 
735 When compared individually, Diyanet’s budget is higher than Ministry of Health or Foreign 
Affairs too. This news reported that Diyanet’s budget was more than the total budget of 8 
ministries. See Arif Koşar, ‘Sekiz Bakanlık bir Diyanet etmedi’ Evrensel (İstanbul, 6 November 
2013), available at https://www.evrensel.net/haber/71458/8-bakanlik-bir-diyanet-etmedi (accessed 
9 January 2019).  
736 ‘Bakanlık verileri: Diyanet’in 2017 bütçesinin yüzde 97’si ‘eridi’’, Diken (Ankara, 3 September 
2017), available at http://www.diken.com.tr/bakanlik-verileri-diyanetin-2017-butcesinin-yuzde-
97si-eridi/ (accessed 4 May 2020). 
737 Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, ‘Turkey’s Diyanet under AKP Rule: From Protector to Imposer of State 
Ideology?’ (2016) 16(4) Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 619-635; Ufuk Ulutas, 
‘Religion and Secularism in Turkey: The Dilemma of the Directorate of Religious Affairs’ (2010) 
46 (3) Middle Eastern Studies 389-399.  
738 The Minister of Defense commented on Erdogan’s ‘gift’ of a Mercedes to the head of Diyanet: 
“not a car but an air plane should be allocated to the head of Diyanet”, see ‘Beklendiği gibi: 
Diyanet İşleri Başkanı Görmez emekli oldu’, Diken, (Ankara, 31 October 2017), available at 
http://www.diken.com.tr/beklendigi-gibi-diyanet-isleri-baskani-gormez-emekli-oldu/ (accessed 18 
January 2019). 
739 Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, 'Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom' (2004) 49 
MCGILL LJ 635.  
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Diyanet specifically provides services for the Islam which is practiced by the 
majority of its citizens. But such a move would push the government to define 
the Diyanet more specific and bring even bolder contours of identity in 
religious terms as Sunni Islam and other forms of Islam. Eventually, it brings 
a shaper sectarian politics to Turkey. If the Government prefers to implement 
the decision, it would require re-structuring of the Diyanet again in sectarian 
lines. As noted by Lord, introducing a denominational structure of the Diyanet 
has been discussed previously; but the Diyanet clergy opposed to it strictly.741 
A possible re-structuring of the Diyanet to provide services for Alevis similarly 
would stir up a heated discussion on sectarian lines. If it is implemented, it 
would structure the differences between Alevis and non-Alevis into a rivalry 
between Alevi Islam and Sunni Islam. In any event, the ECtHR judgment of 
İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey carry the risk of introducing even deeper 
sectarian tensions to Turkey.  
 
5. 9. Conclusion 
 
  Since the 2000s, with the amendments in the Turkish Constitution, 
as part of the EU harmonisation framework, Alevis have sought solutions to 
the deadlock over their different recognition demands in Turkey by bringing 
cases to the ECtHR. In this Chapter, I examined the adjudications of the ECtHR 
on five individual applications that have been brought against Turkey by 
different segments of the Alevi movement. The first two cases were brought 
with the support of PSAKD, while the following three were brought by CEM. 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, CEM promotes Alevism as an Islamic Sufi 
tradition. CEM’s conceptualization of Alevism is favoured by the Turkish 
government, as opposed to PSKAD, which resists considering Alevism in 
relation to Islam and advocates Alevism as a way of life or a belief system on 
its own merits, independent of the Islamic framework. The first two cases that 
were about compulsory religious education and the inclusion of religion on 
national identity cards, while the last three were about compulsory religious 
education, the status of cemevi and the functions of Diyanet that are brought 
 
741 See Chapter 4, also Ceren Lord, ‘Between Islam and the Nation; Nation‐building, the Ulama 
and Alevi Identity in Turkey’ (2017) 23(1) Nations and Nationalism 48-67.  
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by CEM. Given the differences between these two segments of the Alevi 
movement, advocacy at the ECtHR shifted towards religious claims such as the 
place of worship and status of religious establishments. 
  The Alevi activism at the ECtHR was successful in all the five cases 
analysed above. The cases on compulsory education and place of religion in 
identity cards are not specific to Alevis’ concerns, where the Court found the 
compulsory religious education in Turkey violates the Article 2 of Additional 
Protocol No. I of ECHR. Similarly, in the case of Sinan Işık v. Turkey where 
the Court dealt with the incompatibility of the religion section in Turkish 
identity cards with the Article 9. However, the last two cases on the status of 
cemevi and public religious services for Alevis were specific to the 
accommodation of Alevis’ difference. While all these cases brought to the 
ECtHR by the Alevi movement were ruled against Turkey, the ECtHR 
judgments did not result in fundamental changes to meet Alevis’ recognition 
demands, as discussed at length in Chapter 4.  
  Although the ECtHR framework seems to recognise Alevis’ 
difference, I argue that this recognition comes with a burden and a 
transformation. The case of Hasan and Eylem Zengin is important in the sense 
that it was the first case where the ECtHR conceptualised Alevism as a non-
Sunni Islamic tradition. 742  In this case, the ECtHR’s conceptualisation of 
Alevism was different from how the Alevi claimants presented Alevism. While 
Alevi claimants framed Alevism as a ‘supra-religious’ phenomenon, the 
ECtHR considered it as a non-Sunni Islam. In subsequent cases the Court 
preserved this conceptualisation with reference to the Zengin case, not only 
identifying Alevis as a non-Sunni Muslim community but also Alevism as a 
specific manifestation of Islam that dates back to 13th-century Central Asia, 
similar to how Turkish nation-building conceptualised Alevis’ difference 
through the historical link to ancient Turk’s Central Asian roots, which is 
discussed in Chapter 3. This division between Alevi Islam and Sunni Islam has 
become more identifiable with the latest judgment of İzzettin Doğan and 
Others v. Turkey, where the Alevi claimants adopted the view that transformed 
 
The ECtHR frames Alevism as "a religious conviction which has deep roots in Turkish society and 
history and that it has features which are particular to it […] It is thus distinct from the Sunni 
understanding of Islam, which is taught in schools. It is certainly neither a sect nor a “belief” 
which does not attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance." In Hasan 
and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) para 66. 
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Alevism into a Sufi tradition that was different than other Sufi orders and 
‘hierarchically’ equivalent to Sunni Islam. Yet, it would be problematic for the 
Turkish government to implement the judgment of İzzettin Doğan and Others 
v. Turkey. First of all, it is not evident that this specific demand by CEM is 
shared by other segments of the Alevi movement. My fieldwork observations 
suggest that the majority of Alevis do not ask for services to be provided by 
the Diyanet. In another scenario, if a similar case is brought before the ECtHR 
in the future, the Turkish government could present a different claim, one 
which argues that the Diyanet provides services exclusively for Islam as 
practiced by the majority of its citizens. Considering its case law on religious 
establishments, the ECtHR might find this defence within the margin of 
appreciation.743 Therefore, it is unlikely that the ECtHR would provide genuine 
alternatives to accommodate Alevis’ difference in Turkey; but it contributes to 
a framework that recast Alevis’ difference in religious terms. As we have seen 
in the gradual change of Alevi claims making, it might be suggested that Alevis 
further advance the available structures to gain recognition.  
  When compared to the Turkish state’s and the Diyanet’s 
assimilationist approach, Alevis’ advocacy at the ECtHR seems more 
appealing for the ECtHR framework provides Alevis with some autonomy to 
exist with their difference. While Alevis’ difference stands as a matter of inner-
Islamic cultural richness from the view point of the Turkish authorities, the 
ECtHR construes Alevis’ difference as a matter of denomination that continues 
to overlook and simplify it, disregarding the political and historical dynamics. 
However, by converting the Alevis’ difference into non-Sunni Muslim, the 
ECtHR reinforces the positioning of Alevis in opposition to non-Alevis in 
religious terms. Although the Court highlighted its aim to avoid entering in a 
theological debate, the Court eventually entered in a theological when 
examining whether cemevi is a place of worship, provided that the Court 
referred to the Zengin case and positioned Alevis as non-Sunni Muslims. 
Similarly, on public religious services, the Court considered Alevis as the 
beneficiaries of the Diyanet just like Sunnis, as put forward by the Alevi 
claimants as well. Going back to Chapter 3 on how the Christian theological 
 
743 Howard C. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European 
Human Rights Jurisprudence (Vol. 28 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996) 195. 
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ideas evolved into the topoi in Europe and enabled the formulation of the 
religious toleration and secular state, it might be possible that the ECtHR relies 
on the meta-language of Christianity in its conceptualisation of Alevism as a 
denomination of Islam, equivalent to the Sunni branch. However, by 
converting the Alevis’ difference into non-Sunni Muslim, the ECtHR 
reinforces the positioning of Alevis in opposition to non-Alevis in religious 
terms. This has important consequences for the accommodation of Alevis’ 
difference in Turkey and its translation into the Turkish context might risk a 
sectarian tension.  





CHAPTER 6 -- ACCOMMODATION OF ALEVIS’ 
DIFFERENCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
6. 1. Introduction  
 
 
  Discussions about the recognition of Alevis in Turkey imply 
Alevism as a false form of Islam, while the ECtHR frames Alevism as a non-
Sunni Islamic sect. The repercussion of the ECtHR framing is its support the 
claim of Alevism as a Sufi tradition that has the right to public religious 
services by the state and thus feed the debates in Turkey about the role of 
Diyanet in relation to Alevis. Both the Turkish state and the ECtHR foster the 
transformation of the Alevi culture in the shape of Alevism as a religion or 
system of belief. Unlike Turkey and the ECtHR where Alevism has been 
analysed as an Islamic tradition, the politico-legal context in the UK has 
allowed Alevis to divorce Alevism from Islam and to be recognized as a 
distinct faith community. Unlike Turkey, laicism is not a constitutional value 
in the UK. As an established Church of England, the Anglican Church still has 
its privileges and has been established in England since the 16th century.744 
Although the privileged status of the Church of England remains to this date, 
the scope of toleration was widened since the Glorious Revolution that brought 
about two important constitutional documents: the Bill of Rights and the 
Toleration Act of 1689. 745  Toleration Act, as analysed in Part I, granted 
religious tolerance on the theological claim that every soul reaches salvation 
through the work of Holy Spirit, which is not known and therefore ought to be 
tolerated.  
  Following World War II and decolonisation, the UK has received 
even greater numbers of immigrants primarily from commonwealth countries 
and therefore faced greater religious and cultural diversity to accommodate. 
According to Grillo, multiculturalism has been a consistent public policy in the 
 
744 Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion  (Cambridge University Press 2011).  
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UK since 1960s in terms of promoting acculturation through integration and 
addressing inequalities in fields of housing, employment and 
education.746Despite changing language and implementation, which will be 
discussed below, a multicultural framework shapes British politico-legal 
system.  
  Although Alevis’ migration to the UK dates back to the 1970s, 
Alevis were rather culturally and religiously invisible until recently. Their 
recognition demands were formulated only after 2010, together with the 
acceleration of the Alevi movement’s advocacy in London, supported by the 
transnational Alevi movement in Europe.747 Indeed, the fruits of this activism 
for recognition have been delivered only during last few years. Therefore, my 
fieldwork in London captured different aspects of this journey to the official 
recognition of Alevism at different levels. In this chapter, I first examine in 
what ways and how Alevism has been recognized through its inclusion in 
religious education curriculum and through the decision of Charity 
Commission. In this regard, my analysis of recognition of Alevism and 
accommodation of Alevis’ difference in the UK is situated within the larger 
discussions about multiculturalism.    
  This chapter is divided into five sections. First, I provide a brief 
background of Alevis and the Alevi movement in the UK and describe my 
fieldwork in London. I discuss the feeling of discomfort among Alevis about 
describing Alevism and thus self-expression. I argue that addressing the 
problem of self-expression is singled out as the most urgent task by the Alevi 
movement in London. Second, I elaborate on activities organized and promoted 
by the Alevi movement to address the framing of Alevism as a religion and 
Alevis as a faith community. Third, I analyse the project for including Alevism 
in religious education curriculum. This project has been an initiative of the 
Alevi movement, together with the University of Westminster, Prince of Wales 
Primary School and Highbury Grove Secondary School. The preparation and 
implementation of this project is discussed within the larger framework of 
multicultural religious education. The fourth section looks at another area of 
recognition, granting the Britain Alevi Federation the charity status for the 
 
746 Ralph Grillo, ‘British and Others: From ‘Race’to ‘Faith’’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne 
Wessendorf (eds), The Multiculturalism Backlash (Routledge 2010) 50-71, 52. 
747 As discussed in Chapter 3. 
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advancement of religion, which is Alevism. Here also to frame it in larger 
context, I provide a background of the Charities Act 2011 and discuss the 
adjudication of the Charity Commission on matters of religion. I argue that the 
definition of religion within Charity Commission’s adjudication relies on the 
meta-language of Christianity that transforms cultures into rival truth claims. 
However the secularisation dynamic of universalization of religion enables the 
content of religion to become increasingly loose. I argue this claim through the 
Britain Alevi Federation’s application to the Commission, which took more 
than two years but eventually succeeded in its claim of presenting Alevism as 
a religion for the purposes of Charities Act 2011. The last section addresses 
another dimension of the emergence of Alevis as a faith community in the UK: 
political influence on Turkey. In this respect, the establishment of the All Party 
Parliamentary Group for Alevis and Home Office Country Policy and 
Information Reports on the situation of Alevis in Turkey, which examines 
possible asylum claims, are analysed.  
 
6. 2. British Multiculturalism  
 
  Vertovec notes that since its implementation in 1970s, multicultural 
policies have been criticised.748 However the critics became louder since 2000 
on the ground that multicultural policies exacerbated communal separation and 
thus brought about ghettoization.749 Further, the multicultural policies were 
accused of essentialism and criticised for treating cultures as static, bounded 
entities. While conservatives denigrated multicultural policies for undermining 
national unity, social-democrats argued that multicultural policies failed to 
address the inequalities that minorities suffer, instead led to their social 
isolation.750 In 2000, the report by the Commission of the future of multi-ethnic 
Britain, also known as Parekh report, was published.751 The report underlined 
 
748 Steven Vertevec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds) ‘Introduction: Assessing the Backlash Against 
Multiculturalism in Europe’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds), The 
Multiculturalism Backlash (Routledge 2010) 1-31. 
749 Ibid; Will Kymlicka, ‘Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism?’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne 
Wessendorf (eds), The Multiculturalism Backlash (Routledge 2010) 32-49. 
750 Ralph Grillo, ‘British and Others: From ‘Race’to ‘Faith’’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne 
Wessendorf (eds), The Multiculturalism Backlash. (Routledge 2010) 50-71. 
751 Bhikhu C Parekh, The Future of Multi-ethnic Britain: Report of the Commission on the Future 
of Multi-ethnic Britain (Profile Books 2000). 
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the continuous problems faced by minorities and thus pointed to the need for 
policy change. Following 2001 riots in northern cities of England, the Cantle 
report observed that “many communities operate on the basis of a sense of 
parallel lives.”752 July 2005 London bombings further brought about debates 
on the efficiency of multicultural policies, particularly in relation to Muslims’ 
integration.753 The chairman of commission for racial equality at the time, was 
of the view that Britain was “sleepwalking to segregation.”754  
  A re-orientation of policy can be traced through the shift in 
language: emphasis was put on ‘social cohesion’, ‘diversity’ and ‘shared 
values’. 755  The UK Commission on Integration and Cohesion, founded in 
2007, explicitly acknowledged the need to reform the language: “We need to 
update our language to meet the current climate. We therefore intend to avoid 
using the term ‘multicultural’ in our report because of its ‘catch all’ and 
confusing quality.”756For instance, the 2005 Home Office report on ‘Improving 
Opportunities, Strengthening Society’ omitted any reference to 
multiculturalism, but ‘diversity’ in terms of ‘promoting diversity’ was 
mentioned 34 times in a 54 page document.757 The concept of diversity has 
been used since late 1990s, as a reaction to the ‘group-ist’ approach that 
consider cultures as bounded entities, to highlight the individual aspect of 
cultural difference. Despite this shift in language, many argued that the 
principles of multiculturalism (recognition of cultural identities and promoting 
equal opportunities) have shown continuity through incorporating ‘integration’ 
and ‘diversity’ agendas. 
 
752 Ted Cantle, Community Cohesion (Home Office 2001) section 2.1.  
753 Joly Danièle, ‘Race, Ethnicity and Religion: Emerging Policies in Britain’ (2012) 46 (5) 
Patterns of Prejudice 467-485. 
754 Dominic Casciani, ‘Analysis: Segregated Britain?’, BBC News (London, 22 September 2005), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4270010.stm  (accessed 8 August 2019). 
755 Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds), ‘Introduction: Assessing the Backlash Against 
Multiculturalism in Europe’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds), The 
Multiculturalism Backlash (Routledge 2010) 18; Home Office, Improving Opportunities, 
Strengthening Society: The Government's Strategy to Increase Race Equality and Community 
Cohesion (Her Majesty's Stationery Office 2005). 
756 Commission on Integration and Cohesion, Our Interim Statement (2007) available at 
http://www.integrationandcohesion.org.uk (accessed on 8 August 2019).  
757 Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds), ‘Introduction: Assessing the Backlash Against 
Multiculturalism in Europe’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne Wessendorf (eds), The 
Multiculturalism Backlash (Routledge 2010) 1-31. 
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  In his analysis of critiques of multiculturalism, Kymlicka explicates 
the theoretical ground that underlines these principles. 758  From theoretical 
perspective, multiculturalism has been a part of discussions on liberalism and 
discussed in relation to the liberalism’s ideas of equality, toleration and 
fundamental human rights. Argued against the idea of unitary and homogenous 
nationhood, multiculturalism is grounded on acknowledging and responding to 
the diversity within nations. From this point of view, Kymlicka criticizes the 
critiques of multiculturalism on 3 grounds: (a) mischaracterizes the nature of 
the experiments in multiculturalism that have been undertaken over the past 40 
years, (b) exaggerates the extent to which they have been abandoned and (c) 
misidentified the genuine difficulties and limitations they have encountered.759 
Referring to it “the 3S”(saris, samosas, and steel drums) model of 
multiculturalism, Alibhai-Brown questions the efficiency of this model that 
cannot go beyond a mere celebration of cultural markers.760 Kymlicka argues 
that this critique caricaturizes multiculturalism and more importantly misses 
the main point, for multiculturalism is not about celebrating folk practices as 
embodiments of cultural difference.761  Kymlicka takes our attention to the 
post-war period when multicultural policies were argued against the unitary 
citizenship images of nation states and argues for multiculturalism as a way to 
develop new models of democratic citizenship that is based on human rights 
and challenges “the sorts of traditional ethnic and racial hierarchies that have 
been discredited by the post-war human rights revolution.” 762  Calling it 
‘multiculturalism-as-citizenisation’, he underlines that multiculturalism aims 
at transforming existing structures that undermine equal opportunities for 
different segments of society.  
  While Kymlicka’s conceptualization of multiculturalism as 
citizenisation sounds good in theory, the policy applications produce problems. 
Scholars note the increasing importance given to the faith communities in 
 
758 Will Kymlicka, ‘Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism?’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne 
Wessendorf (eds), The Multiculturalism Backlash (Routledge 2010) 32-49. 
759 Ibid 33. 
760 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, After Multiculturalism (Foreign Policy Centre 2000).  
761 Will Kymlicka, ‘Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism?’ in Steven Vertovec and Susanne 
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762 Ibid 39.  
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implementing policies for governing diversity. 763  Joly argues that 
multiculturalism in Britain metamorphosed into a Muslim paradigm through 
increasing funding allocated by local authorities for faith communities. He 
suggests that the structure of British society, particularly the church-state 
relations and existence of an established church “created a window of 
opportunity for Muslims to press their claims for sensitivity to be shown to 
their religion.”764 Similarly Peach argues that British discourse on racialized 
minorities has mutated from colour to race to ethnicity and religion. In his 
analysis of R (on the application of Watkins-Singh) v Governing Body of 
Aberdare Girls' High School, a case concerning 14-year old school girl 
Sarika’s wearing of Kara, Shah discusses how Kara was transformed into a 
Sikh ‘religious’ symbol and Sikh traditions into a religion, which then allowed 
for the English court to rule on whether Kara was of ‘exceptional importance’ 
to Sarika. 765 The British multiculturalism creates space for this form of 
identification in terms of religion and compels communities to formulate their 
claims as such. 
  It is this form of identification that is more relevant to my research 
on Alevis in the UK. While acknowledging the significance of multiculturalism 
as a response to unitary forms of nationhood and its citizenship imaginary, my 
critique will be on the kind of identities that multiculturalism promotes/ breeds. 
Despite the policy implementations of British multiculturalism have changed, 
as evident in language use, the concept of identity is an intrinsic aspect of 
policies governing diversity (be it multicultural or social cohesion and 
integration). The current emphasis on religion (faith communities), while 
trying to respond to the dynamics in British society, especially in the aftermath 
of 2005 and in case of Muslim’s integration, influence on how minorities 
conceptualise their claims for recognition. Because there is no other space to 
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efficiently seek recognition of difference than that of religion, Alevis too, like 
Sikhs in the above mentioned case, might prefer reformulating their difference 
in religious terms. This kind of reformation allows Alevis to access to rights 
and privileges as a group identity.  
  The greatest concern occupying the Alevi movement in Britain is to 
make Alevism known both to Alevis themselves and to the multicultural 
society that they settled in and became part of. This concern has been generated 
by different dynamics, which include the influence of transnational Alevi 
movement that gains recognition in different diaspora countries and 
multicultural policies promoted by the UK, where religion is an important 
identity marker. However even more importantly, this concern is the result of 
questioning one’s identity, since identity acquires importance with the rise of 
multiculturalism and religion appears the most viable one to rely on. The Alevi 
movement argues that this concern is the result of a continuous persecution that 
Alevis faced in Turkey. This narrative points to the oppressive environment of 
Turkey that forced Alevis to hide away their identity and gradually they forgot 
it and thus now want to regain it.766 This claim however does not explain almost 
50 years being in the UK in which Alevis did not feel the need to define 
Alevism.767 Additionally, the persecution they have faced is also the result of 
their difference being conceptualized as religious difference.  
 
6. 3. The Alevi Movement in the UK 
 
  The first Alevi community centre in the UK, the Alevi Cultural 
Centre and Cemevi, was established in 1993 in Dalston, London.768 Although 
there is still one cemevi in London, the number of cemevi in the United 
Kingdom recently increased from twelve in 2015, to seventeen in 2018.769 
These cemevi are united under the banner of the Britain Alevi Federation, 
 
766 My fieldwork findings.  
767 Moreover, the refugee communities are usually quite aware of their religious identity even in 
their country of origin before their departure and continue to organize and do activism in the 
country of settlement right after their arrival. The case of Alevis is different from this kind of 
community formation. 
768 My fieldwork findings (February-May 2015, London). 
769 These are in London, Glasgow, Leicester, Croydon, Harrow, Northamptonshire, York, 
Newcastle, Liverpool, Bournemouth, Nottingham, Doncaster, Hull, Sheffield, Edinburgh, 
Manchester and Newport. See, The Britain Alevi Federation, ‘About us’, available at 
http://www.alevinet.org/SAP.aspx?pid=About_en-GB  (accessed 8 August 2019).  
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which was founded in 2014. It has 6000 members, 4000 of which reside in 
London. However, it claims to represent 300,000 Alevis living in the United 
Kingdom. 770  The Federation operates as an umbrella organization and is 
affiliated with the European Alevi Federation. The Federation used to be based 
in the London cemevi and carries out the agenda for the recognition of Alevis 
as a faith community in the UK. It has been trying to control and influence the 
organization of Alevis based on its own agenda and thus eliminate alternative 
establishments such as CEM having a different agenda of Alevism. 771 
Therefore, it is an important interlocutor in shaping Alevis’ recognition 
demands. The Federation is actively involved in the project of including 
Alevism in religious education curriculum in England. Moreover, it is the first 
Alevi organization that was granted the status of religious charity by the 
Charity Commission following two years of application process. In parallel, 
the Federation initiated establishing an All-Party Parliamentary Group for 
Alevis and promoted semah (Alevi ritual dance) demonstrations in public.  
  I conducted my fieldwork in London in 2015, with follow up visits 
throughout this thesis. 772  Since the cemevi in London was home to the 
Federation as well as many other activities, it was the main site of the 
fieldwork. Describing the cemevi is imperative as it helps visualizing the 
fieldwork. The cemevi is located in the first floor of an old building, nearby 
Ridley Road Market in Dalston, in North London. Although on a single floor, 
it has a two large halls, where communal gatherings take place, as well as six 
small rooms, where administrative meetings and various classes are held. Some 
of these courses are about teaching Alevism, meetings of the Alevi youth, 
courses for children to help with their school education, saz (stringed musical 
instrument used during Alevi rituals) and semah classes. One of the large halls 
is at the entrance and a cafeteria is installed on the corner, where lunch is also 
available. This entrance hosts familiar faces of Alevi elderly every day and 
witnesses their daily chats. Although somewhat similar to a Turkish coffee 
house, the resemblance would be misleading as the walls are all covered with 
Alevi cultural representations. This same hall also functions for funeral 
 
770 Ibid.  
771 I was told in off record meeting with a member of the Federation that CEM tries to have a UK 
branch.  
772 April-July 2016, May-July 2017, August 2018. 
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gatherings, when the families of deceased serve food and accept condolences. 
The second hall is where cem rituals as well as other large gatherings are held 
and therefore is used occasionally.  
  My participant observation is derived from my attendance at 
different ceremonies, celebrations, administrative meetings as well as group 
activities carried out by the Alevi Federation and cemevi. I also conducted 
semi-structured and informal interviews with Alevis, religious education 
teacher and headmaster. Moreover, I observed religious education classes in 
Highbury Grove Secondary School in London and meetings of the project for 
including Alevism in religious education. I also attended the Federation’s 
meeting with the Charity Commission, events organized in the Westminster 
Parliament and the Alevi yearly festivals. My fieldwork also included 
analysing the written material produced by the Federation as well as their social 
media activism.  
  
6. 4. Trouble of Framing Alevism in the UK 
 
  The analysis of the Alevi traditions (Chapter 3) suggests that religion 
seems to be not a property of Alevi culture. In parallel, I suggest that the 
difficulty of understanding the resources of the Alevi traditions and the 
disjuncture between looking like a religion and not having a religion culminate 
in a discomfort within the Alevi community in London. As explained in Part I, 
the ideas of religious freedom and secular state drawn from the Protestant 
theology of Christian freedom are presented as a solution to a conflict within 
Christian denominations. These ideas presuppose a conflict among multiple 
rival claims to the truth. Therefore, it first entails that cultures be candidates 
for truth and, the ideas of religious freedom and the secular state are then 
presented as the solution for the accommodation of these rival claims. 
Especially in the UK where multicultural identity politics guides the policy-
making processes, thereby emphasising religion and faith, as discussed above, 
there seems to be unease about how to fit the Alevi traditions and how to make 
an Alevism. In this connection, the Federation’s advocacy for Alevism should 
be situated within the framework of multicultural policies. Therefore, through 
my fieldwork, I first describe Alevis’ unease about conceptualizing Alevism. I 
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then examine how the Alevi culture is accommodated by multicultural policies 
by focusing on the project of including Alevism in religious education and the 
Federation’s application with the Charity Commission.  
  According to the participants and based on my fieldwork, the most 
difficult aspect of being an Alevi is to describe Alevism to themselves and to 
the outsiders. Some of the participants indeed explicitly said that because of 
the difficulty of explaining themselves they prefer either not talking about their 
Alevi identity and define themselves as atheists, while not being sure about the 
difference between being an Alevi and being an atheist. Some simply call 
themselves Muslims in official papers. As a response, events organized in the 
cemevi prioritise teaching Alevism to Alevis. For instance, the Federation 
organised a seminar series to teach Alevism at the cemevi, which lasted about 
two months during February and March 2015. These seminars were not led by 
a dede or an ocakzade, who are known for their proficiency of traditional 
knowledge. They were led by a poet/asik, who also serves as zakir during cem 
rituals. Although the seminars did not continue due to lack of commitment in 
attendance, the course content was prepared in chronological order of all the 
belief systems and religions, which would eventually influence the Alevi 
traditions such as Brahmanism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism and Islam. 
Therefore, these seminars focused on how to frame Alevism vis-à-vis other 
religions. Yet, the difficulty of describing Alevism was apparent in the 
instructor’s teaching method. The two most popular questions posed by the 
students were what Alevism was and when Alevism appeared (question about 
its roots). The instructor however used to reply that upcoming classes would 
bring clarity to defining Alevism. Even in these courses to 'teach Alevism', the 
instructor used to avoid naming whether Alevism is a religion or not through 
vague sentences such as "Alevism is that which takes the good sides of other 
beliefs and religions and leaves the bad sides." or "we find Alevism out of all 
these [Brahmanism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism]” or “you need 
to drink tea in order to understand what tea is” etc. Yet, it is unclear if these 
answers met the students’ expectations, some of whom complained that “it 
[understanding Alevism] is like a chess game; pieces have never been placed 
properly” and “we are people of an ill-fated era: we struggle to explain 
ourselves”. According to them, they are confronted by having to explain 
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Alevism through an implied requirement of having a book and structure, which 
is the reason for living in an ill-fated era where the chess is not an easy game 
for cultures without religions. Chess could actually allude to the framework of 
multiculturalism that consists of diverse religions and some like the Alevi 
requires strategic moves to navigate on the chessboard and make claims to 
legitimacy.  
  These strategic moves reveal how Alevis experimentally adopt the 
most practical way to formulate Alevism. For instance, rather coincidentally 
upon the Islamic lobby to gain recognition, Alevis began arguing for Alevism 
being a religious tradition in Germany in the 2000s. In this process, Alevis 
generate a religion for the German state by coming up with the doctrine of 
Buyruk or establishing a clergy. In his visit to the London cemevi in December 
2014, Turgut Oker, the former chair of the European Alevi Confederation, who 
was the lead in the process of recognition in Germany, underlined the need to 
re-write Alevism in Europe. He commented that: 
Germany asked us where to put Alevism. We have said 'Alevism is a 
religion' for the last 15 years, we got prospect for future. If not, they 
[German authorities] said that I would talk to you as a part of other 
Islamic groups. We talked with lawyers. We said 'Alevism is a religion' 
to eliminate the influence of Islamic groups on us. There is no need to 
come up with a new prophet.773  
 
His speech indeed summarises how the Alevi strategically use different legal 
frameworks to gain recognition. There is also an interesting link appears 
between German and British context. Referring back to the emergence of 
transnational Alevi movement in Chapter 4, Alevis struggled and succeeded to 
get recognition as a faith community (gemeinschaften) in Germany, after 
Islamic organisations asked for it. In the UK too, it might be suggested that the 
increasing emphasis on Muslims’ integration might have prompted a trend 
among diaspora communities to present themselves as faith communities. This 
view is strengthened given that one of the reasons for Alevism for RE project 
was Alevis’ effort to separate themselves from Muslims. As they were 
considered as either Muslims or atheists at school. In an interview during my 
fieldwork in London, the principal of Prince of Wales Primary School indeed 
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stated that they were treating Alevi pupils as Muslims before they opened up 
and underlined their difference. 
  Yearly Alevi festivals offer another platform for the production of 
an Alevi faith community in Britain. While the main festival event is a daily 
event in Hackney Downs Park in London, various events are organized within 
the festival framework. In May 2015, a semah demonstration event was 
organized in a building belonging to Oxford University. This place was hired 
by the Federation specifically to give publicity to semah. It was an event where 
tens of saz players played music and sang deyiş/nefes while tens of semah 
performers, who wore folkloric costumes. Mini booklets in English containing 
the lyrics of the deyiş/nefes songs that were played in the event were distributed 
to the audience. When I asked why the booklets were only in English, I was 
told that “we already know those deyiş/nefes, it is for the strangers” further 
indicating that the aim of the initiative was to give publicity to Alevism. The 
Federation facilitated buses for the event departing from London. The event 
was well received by the Alevi community, who watched it with pride, even 
though only a non-Alevis were present.  
  The Alevi federation is proud of these achievements examined 
above, as they consider it great respect for Alevis. Indeed, someone from the 
Federation told me that the Federation pursues a project for Alevism in the UK 
in three aspects: “erkan, alevilik, soylem”.774 Erkan indicates the way Alevis 
practice Alevism, while Alevism aspect of the project focuses specifically on 
how Alevis can explain Alevism to non-Alevis in the UK. The discourse aspect 
of the project addresses the representation of Alevism in different social-media 
platforms. In this regard, it is clear that the Federation takes the issue of 
representation of Alevism in the UK context seriously. Additionally, the story 
of success in the UK is situated in opposition to the centuries long persecution 
in Turkey in the discourse of the Federation. Thus, the Alevi movement in the 
UK also aims at lobbying against the deteriorating situation of Alevis in Turkey 
and for the betterment of Alevis’ situation in Turkey.775 In this connection, the 
All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) for Alevis was established in January 
2016. One of the strengths of the Alevi community in London is their 
 
774 This information was provided to me off the record in July 2015.  
775 During my fieldwork, the Federation often organized protests about political situation in 
Turkey.  
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population concentration in certain boroughs, which gives them power to 
negotiate with the political figures. Thus, the MPs of North London cannot 
neglect the Alevi movement. The activities carried by the APPGA aim at 
promoting the Alevi cause, which includes lobbying the Turkish government. 
The aim of APPGA is reported as “to promote in Parliament awareness, 
recognition and engagement of and with the Alevi community in Britain and 
internationally. To advance their development and recognise their legitimate 
socio-political aspirations.” 776  APPGA can be an important instrument to 
influence British foreign affairs. I was told by one of my contacts from BAF 
that a round table was organized to discuss how to lobby against Turkey.777  
 
6. 5. Teaching Alevism in Religious Education  
 
6. 5. 1. Religious education in the UK  
 
  In England and Wales, religious education (RE) occupies a unique 
position, in that it is not part of the national curriculum, but has been a 
compulsory subject in maintained schools since 1944 (Education Act 1944). In 
England, when the 1988 Education Reform Act introduced the (then) ten 
subjects in the national curriculum, RE was not part of this but included in the 
‘basic curriculum’ alongside the national curriculum (Education Reform Act 
1988). All local (education) authorities were given a statutory duty to establish 
a SACRE778  
  Following to the Second World War, religious education was 
introduced as a statutory requirement in state maintained schools in England 
according to the Education Act 1944. 779  Religious ‘instruction’ was non-
denominational covering the core belief shared by all denominations of 
Christianity. This was amended by the Education Reform Act 1988 that 
replaced the phrase religious instruction with religious education. 780  The 
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Education Reform Act 1988 recognized the growing religious diversity of 
Britain and stated that Agreed Syllabuses must include the principal religions 
represented in Great Britain other than Christianity. 781  Therefore, the 
Education Reform Act 1988 marked a transition from confessional religious 
education to multi-faith religious education, where the number of religions 
taught at school gradually increased. The transition to multi-faith model is 
considered as ‘instrumental turn’ because religious education was assumed 
with the aim of promoting social cohesion. 782 Following the race riots in 
England in the summer of 2001 and the events of September 11th in the same 
year, religious education is considered as an area to promote social cohesion.783 
  The number of religions taught in religious education increased from 
one to six (Education Reform Act 1988), to 11 (2004 Framework) and now to 
13 (2013 Religious Education C Framework).784 As a curriculum subject, RE 
consists of the study of different religions, religious leaders, and other religious 
and moral themes. However, the curriculum is required to reflect the 
predominant place of Christianity in religious life and hence Christianity forms 
the majority of the content of the subject. All parents have the right to withdraw 
a child, albeit few parents use opting-out. For example, during the after school 
club for Alevi kids in Highbury Islington, where around 10 – 15 Alevi students 
used to gather for an hour, they used to ask what is Alevism if it is within Islam 
or not and how should they answer these questions. once a student, 
complaining about his lack of knowledge on Alevism, said that “I can say more 
about Christianity than Alevism”. 785  In response they are advised to tell 
whatever they know about Alevis, when posed a question to explain Alevism. 
Kids also complained that in primary school pupils are taught only Christianity. 
 
6. 5. 2. Project of including Alevism in religious education curriculum  
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  Following the footsteps of the Alevi movement in Germany and 
elsewhere in Europe, the Federation in Britain also pursues the goal of getting 
recognition for Alevis as a faith community, which first requires making an 
Alevism. The chair of the Federation explained to me the importance of 
creating a booklet on Alevism as follows: “We don’t have the luxury of 
remaining within our cell anymore. We have to start archiving. The things that 
the elderly inside [the cafeteria] are talking about will be forgotten, this 
building will be forgotten, we will be forgotten but this booklet that we’re 
preparing will remain in 20 years time.” 786  From this point of view, the 
foremost goal of the Alevi movement in London is to make Alevism visible 
and known so that they do not need to explain themselves. This aspiration first 
requires framing Alevism in a certain way. In the 2015 Alevi Festival, the 
opening speech of the chair of the Federation addressed why a certain framing 
for Alevism was needed: “we want to say we’re Alevi in all fields of life and 
we do not want to take into account the prejudices of others. We want that our 
children would not have to live the problems we faced.”787  
  Keeping in mind the feeling of unease about explaining Alevism, 
many Alevis have a strong memory about religious education. One of the 
participants said that he used to "feel insecure, willing to hide away during 
these classes while everyone else would seem proud of their religion belonging 
to something.". In one of these classes, when the teacher asked if Alevis believe 
in God, he described the Alevi understanding of Hak. His teacher commented: 
"That is Atheism". The participant had to accept his teacher’s account, although 
he underlined that he knew that they were not Atheists; but he was not able to 
explain that to his teacher and other students. Another participant recalled how 
she was pressured by other students to explain what Ali means for them exactly 
and was told that based on their belief in Ali, they should be Shia Muslims. 
These accounts indeed are not very different from others' experiences of 
religious education at schools. Cetin’s ethnographic research on suicide 
 
786 The original in Turkish:“Bizim kendimize kalma luksumuz yok. Arsivlemeye baslamaliyiz. 
Icerdeki dedelerin anlattiklari hikayeler unutulacak, bizim bu bina unutulacak, biz unutulucaz 20 
sene sonar ama sizin hazirlayacaginiz booklet kalacak.” 
787 The original in Turkish:“Yasamin her alaninda Aleviyim demek ve bunu soylerken 
karsimizdaki insanin ne dusundugunu ya da onyargilarini hesaplamamak istiyoruz. Bizim 
yasadigimiz sorunlari cocuklarimiz yasamasin istiyoruz.” 
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incidents among second generation Alevi Kurdish young men argues for a link 
between a sense of isolation and the Alevi identity. Cetin suggests that:  
What emerged from discussions with the young people was their sense 
of isolation, particularly at school, where no one knew or understood 
their religion. They identified as “sort-of Muslim” to classmates but did 
not follow the same religious practices of prayer or fasting, and were 
subjected to bullying or ridicule for their beliefs.788  
 
  The initial idea of including Alevism in the religious education 
curriculum at the Prince of Wales Primary School in Enfield, belongs to an 
Alevi lady, who has worked as a play leader at school and is also an active 
member of the cemevi. This lady saw the possibility of including Alevism in 
the school curriculum and spoke about this with the cemevi group that later 
formed the Federation. In searching how this possibility could be materialized 
and how a religious education curriculum for Alevism could be locally 
prepared, the Federation organized consultations with borough councillors and 
the Standing Advisory Council of Religious Education (SACRE). SACREs are 
statutory bodies whose duty is to advise local authorities in preparation of the 
locally agreed syllabus for religious education and monitor its teaching in local 
schools.789  Subsequently, some members of the Federation were elected in the 
borough council of Enfield. The Federation initiated the Alevi Religion and 
Identity Project in collaboration with two scholars from the University of 
Westminster, Celia Atkins and Ümit Çetin, himself an Alevi, as well as 
Highbury Grove Secondary School and Prince of Wales Primary School. 
During my fieldwork, I was informed that although some members of Enfield 
SACRE objected to the project at the initial stage on the ground that Alevism 
is an Islamic tradition and covered by Islam in RE, they were convinced later 
on to support the project in 2010. Subsequently a number of meetings were 
held with the Federation, the scholars from the University of Westminster, the 
Prince of Wales Primary School authorities as well as SACRE to create a 
curriculum for teaching Alevism. 
  As a result of successful advocacy, in 2011 the first lessons on 
Alevism were launched as part of religious education curriculum for Key Stage 
 
788 Ümit Çetin, ‘Durkheim, ethnography and suicide: Researching young male suicide in the 
transnational London Alevi-Kurdish community’ (2016) 17(2) Ethnography 250-277 (ftn 14) 28.  
789Bill Moore, What is a Sacre?, available at http://re-handbook.org.uk/section/managing/sacres, 
(accessed 14 December 2018). 
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1 and 2 in Prince of Wales Primary School in Enfield. For the first time in 2012, 
Alevism was taught as part of religious education for Key Stage 3 in Highbury 
Grove Secondary School. These two pilot schools, Prince of Wales Primary 
School in Enfield and Highbury Grove Secondary School in Islington, 
accommodate a high number of Alevi students. Thereafter the project 
continued to be implemented in these two schools. Enfield SACRE supported 
the project "to raise the self-esteem of Alevi pupils". Making the students "feel 
understood and accepted" were the main reasons for the Prince of Wales’ 
involvement in the project.790 According to the deputy head of Prince of Wales 
Primary School, the success of Alevi pupils increased considerably after 
including Alevism as part of religious education.791 Therefore, the project was 
referred to as a success for the multicultural British society and the Alevi faith 
community.792 In 2017 Alevi festival, the Federation first time set up a stand 
specifically to promote this project by explaining Alevi parents how they can 
apply in their locality, although the stand did not attract attention. In addition, 
there is no research examining the impact of this project on the Alevi children.  
  The project for including Alevism in religious education provides 
insights about how this moment of secularization unfolds itself. According to 
the participants involved in this project, describing Alevism for SACRE was 
difficult and confusing. For instance, when they were asked if they have any 
religious obligations, they gave the example of cem rituals. However, 
attendance at cem rituals is not considered as an obligation for Alevis. In 2014, 
the Federation actually hired the former chair of National SACRE to create an 
Alevism curriculum for religious education. Keeping in mind the difficulty of 
describing Alevism to SACRE, hiring a total stranger, who had no idea of 
Alevism before this project but who is familiar with preparing religious 
education syllabus, was a strategic move. This move did not only demonstrate 
the enthusiasm of the Federation to advocate for the official recognition of 
Alevism; but also, the difficulty to build an Alevism curriculum, from mainly 
 
790 Enfield SACRE, ‘Minutes of Meeting on 16 January 2013’, available at 
http://webfronter.com/enfield/sacre/menu1/Previous_meetings/images/Enfield_SACRE_MINUTE
S_16_Jan_2013.pdf  (accessed 3 May 2015).  
791 Interview in September 2015.  
792 Celia Jenkins and Ümit Çetin, ‘From a “Sort of Muslim” to ‘Proud to Be Alevi: the Alevi 
Religion and Identity Project Combatting the Negative Identity among Second-generation Alevis 
in the UK’ (2018) 20(1)  National Identities 105-123. 
 246 
oral and invariably diverse Alevi traditions. I know turn to how the process to 
prepare this curriculum has been unfolded. 
 
   The Alevism Curriculum 
  Alevism was covered in 6 weeks of the religious education 
curriculum. The curriculum started with the key beliefs of Alevism, continued 
on the roots of Alevism and the cem ritual and ended with an explanation of 
the 4 doors and 40 stations as the Alevi moral framework. Also, students were 
invited to visit the London cemevi at the end of the semester. This is certainly 
a limited time to actually teach about Alevism. Indeed, many faith groups point 
out the limited and insufficient time allocated in the religious education 
curriculum. Some even argue that the religious education curriculum 
caricatures the religious belief. 793  Notwithstanding with these criticisms, 
Alevism was taught along with other religions. This alone was enough to make 
it a ‘success’, an analogy with other religions, from the viewpoint of the 
Federation. However, the content omitted any reference to the ocak system, 
which lies at the core of the Alevi traditions, even though it is said to have been 
dissolving over last 50 years. Also, the beliefs and ‘symbolism’ of Alevism 
were emphasized, while the variety of practices were neglected. Nevertheless, 
the most important ‘loss in translation’ appeared to be how to describe hak. 
The curriculum describes hak as the Alevi word for God and meaning the truth 
but being more like a force or energy. In this shape, it is confusing even to 
adults, let alone pupils. However “may the force be with you” became a mantra 
to describe hak for school age pupils, reminding the infamous movie of Star 
Wars. Cem rituals are taught to be obligatory for every Thursday, although this 
is not the practice as far as I observed.  
  The lessons on Alevism were delivered by people from the 
Federation. The curriculum prepared by the former chair of National SACRE 
was also criticized by the team delivering the class. For example, some videos 
put in the curriculum were not played in the classroom for being ‘biased’. His 
translations for hak and Alevi path were not agreed but used. For example, the 
phrase “Alevi path” was replaced with “Alevi truth” in classroom notes. 
 
793 L Philip Barnes, ‘Humanism, non-religious worldviews and the future of Religious Education’ 
(2015) 36(1) Journal of Beliefs & Values 79-91, 87. 
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Although the team found this replacement misleading, they did not however 
change it while delivering the class. 794  Path continued to be translated as 
‘truth’. This translation however distorts the well-known motto of Alevis “yol 
bir surek binbir” which translates as path is one and the ways to take the path 
is thousands and one. This phrase thus turned into “truth is one and but ways 
to the truth are many”. Similarly, during talks before the class, Alevis 
delivering the class discussed the differences in 12 services among different 
Alevi communities and questioned if the preparatory notes on 12 services are 
accurate or not. In this connection, someone, who was a member of the Alevi 
movement in Germany, visited the BAF to help delivering the Alevism class, 
complained that there is no consistency about 12 services and the Alevi belief 
council 795  in Germany has to decide on these matters to have consistent 
information about 12 services.796 Another person was of the opinion that “if I 
wasn’t an Alevi, I would have told ‘first you have a consensus among 
yourself’”, referring to the person who prepares the curriculum.797  
  In these classes, elements of Alevi culture were described through a 
religious language: Semah was taught not as a dance but told to be a worship, 
baglama is the Book with strings, deyiş/nefes having coded spiritual meanings. 
The aphorisms of Ali or Hacı Bektas Veli are misplaced. His examples for 
aphorisms were not even known to the people delivering the class.798 However, 
he was not informed about these problems relating to the curriculum, to my 
knowledge. It was my contention that Alevis put less importance on how 
Alevism would be told in religious education and more importantly to the fact 
that Alevism is taught in religious education classes.  
  Having said that, the content mattered during the discussions about 
including Alevism’s relation with Islam in the classes. In a meeting aimed at 
discussing matters relating to the preparation of the Alevism curriculum, 
 
794 March 2015, the team sometimes meet in a café before the class to go through the curriculum 
notes prepared by Mr. Bill.  
795 Alevi Inanc Kurulu – Almanya Koeln (Germany), available at http://www.aabf-inanc-
kurumu.com/hakkimizda/aabf-inanc-kurulu-2006-2009/ (accessed 14 December 2018).  
796 March 2015, London, Highbury Islington.  
797 Highbury Grove Secondary School, 15 June 2016, Abbas Tan. Hacı Bektas’s aphorism in 
question was: “peace outside can only be reached through the inner peace”. There is no record that 
this phrase belongs to Hacı Bektas.   
798 During a class that was observed by an Alevi journalist from Turkey who came to observe the 
Alevism lessons, I asked if he knows the mentioned aphorism that was dedicated to Ali, he said he 
has not heard of it.  
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attended by three people representing the Federation, teacher from Highbury 
Islington, the principal of Enfield primary school, a scholar from the University 
of Westminster and Mr. Moore, who was in charge of preparing Alevism 
curriculum, the issue of Alevism’s relation to Islam brought about an 
interesting discussion. Mr. Moore, who did not know about Alevism before his 
involvement in curriculum preparation, received much of his initial knowledge 
from people affiliated with the Federation, who view Alevism separate from 
Islam. Mr. Moore opened up his concern that he was contacted, through 
Twitter, by a teacher at the Enfield Grammar School, who was taught that 
Alevism is a branch of Islam. Therefore, Mr. Moore suggested that the 
curriculum should include different views on Alevism that some consider it as 
an Islamic tradition. In response, the team from the Federation objected to any 
reference to Islam.799 The teacher from Highbury Islington responded that this 
kind of debate also exists in Christianity that some Jehovah Witnesses consider 
themselves within Christianity and yet others do not. He also added that the 
classification of Alevism has not started yet. This interesting remark was not 
elaborated or discussed during the meeting. Dr. Jenkins from Westminster 
University also remarked that the curriculum should not alienate Turkish 
Alevis, who consider themselves Muslims. Yet, later on, a note was included 
that some Alevis consider themselves Muslims. The Federation noted that there 
are Alevis who think of themselves true Muslims or atheists. I argue that the 
problem here is how to create such a curriculum to include all these claims. 
Explaining why some consider Alevism is true Islam requires an in depth 
analysis and explanation that is beyond the limits of religious education, 
especially for secondary school students. It is interesting that despite the 
curriculum’s efforts to differentiate Alevism from Islam, most students from 
the classroom considered Alevism as a sect of Islam during the evaluation at 
the end of the semester, while the RE instructor considered it as a way of life.800  
 
799 This meeting was held among a team of 3 from the Federation, Dr. Jenkins Celia from 
Westminster University, the Principal of Enfield primary school, the head of RE in Highbury 
Islington Secondary School, and Mr. Moore, who is in charge with preparing the curriculum. July 
2016, London. The aim of the meeting was to discuss matters relating to the preparation of the 
Alevism curriculum.  
800 My fieldwork findings, May 2015. During the last class, students were asked if they consider 
Alevism as a religion, sect of Islam or set of codes for social living. Many students raised hands 
for sect of Islam. The RE teacher of Highbury Islington commented that it is a system of values, 
during this class.  
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6. 5. 3. Contemporary issues on religion education  
 
  As indicated above, with the introduction of multi-faith religious 
education (RE), the number of religions taught has been increasing. In parallel, 
the multi-faith RE has been emphasized following to 9/11 and race riots in 
post-2000 era. As a result, RE as a curriculum subject has been assigned to 
foster community cohesion and toleration for difference in multicultural 
Britain.801 However, no casual link “between RE as a curriculum subject and a 
distinctive transformative effect on the attitudes and social behaviour of 
children and young people” has been proven.802 Barnes points to the lack of 
evidence to support how effective the British system as embracing multi-faith 
and multi-ethnic composition of society in religious education.803 There is no 
evidence to support the claim that RE contributes social cohesion and 
multiculturalism. While Ofsted 207 report804 on ‘making sense of religion’ 
concludes that RE carries a potential for contributing to community cohesion, 
education for diversity and citizenship, which is not fully realised, Barnes 
argues that Ofsted inspections are not set up to investigate how learning about 
religions might or might not have this impact. 805 He underlines that 40 years 
after its intro in Britain, we don’t know if there is a positive correlation between 
multi-faith RE and respect for others.806 
  Multi-faith RE has been criticised for trying to achieve too much. 
RE in England and Wales tends to be dominated by surface descriptions of 
religious phenomena rather than deep exploration of contested theological truth 
claims. This is in part due to the reduction of the subject to a form of moral 
education designed to encourage pupils to identify cultural differences and 
 
801 APPG for RE Report, ‘RE and Good Community Relations’ available at 
http://www.cstg.org.uk/2014/03/re-and-good-community-relations/ (accessed 12 December 2018). 
802 Janeth Orchard, ‘Does Religious Education Promote Good Community Relations?’ (2015) 36 
(1) Journal of Beliefs & Values – Studies in Religion & Education 40-53, 51. 
803 L Philip Barnes, ‘Diversity’ in L Philip Barnes (ed) Debates in Religious Education (Routledge 
2011) 65-76. 
804 Ofsted (Office for Standards in Education), "Making Sense of Religion: A Report on Religious 
Education in Schools and the Impact of Locally Agreed Syllabuses’ (June 2007). 
805 L Philip Barnes, Education, Religion and Diversity: Developing a New Model of Religious 
Education (Routledge 2014) 19.  
806 Ibid 46.  
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similarities as a means of enhancing cross-cultural toleration.807 Religions in 
RE can be trivialized, can be exaggerated or have their religiousness reduced 
in order to bring them into public sphere. 808 Religious education is failing to 
motivate pupils and in all probability is contributing little to their moral and 
social development. 809 Similarly, Moulin argues that post 9/11 political 
atmosphere' adversely influenced RE in England, reducing it to providing 
social cohesion only and such not providing sufficient knowledge on 
religion. 810  Representations of religions are considered inauthentic and 
inaccurate.811 Moulin points to research findings that the content of curriculum 
materials and textbooks in RE were perceived as inaccurate, generalized and 
stereotyped by Hindu and Sikh students.812 However Barnes underlines that 
original criticism of multi faith RE confusing pupils produced by conservative 
Christians who wanted to reinstate Christian Confessionalism in state 
maintained schools. He points to the polarized and ideological views on RE: 
while “‘conservatives’ criticism of multi-faith RE seems largely intended to 
advance Christian claims to supremacy […] by contrast ‘liberal’ defences 
simply presuppose the validity and appropriateness of multi-faith religious 
education and are content to expose conservative prejudices.” 813 
  Despite the concerns over presenting too many religions in 
curriculum, the recent discussions on RE focus on inclusion of non-religious 
worldviews, which results in covering even more subjects, rather than 
addressing the critics over the superficiality of current curriculum for including 
too many subjects. British Humanist Association and Religious Education 
Council (REC) lobby to include humanism as a non-religious worldview to the 
RE curriculum. REC published an RE review report, which interpret RE 
instrumental to provide tolerance among diverse faith groups and thus 
 
807 Andrew Wright, ‘Critical Religious Education and the National Framework for Religious 
Education in England and Wales’ (2008) 103(5) Religious Education 517-521, 519. 
808 Ibid 144. 
809 L Philip Barnes, Education, Religion and Diversity: Developing a New Model of Religious 
Education (Routledge 2014) 7. 
810 Daniel Moulin, ‘Doubts about Religious Education in Public Schooling’ (2015) 
19(2) International Journal of Christianity & Education 135-148. 
811 Mary Hayward, ‘Curriculum Christianity’ (2006) 28 (2) British Journal of Religious Education 
153-171. 
812 Daniel Moulin, ‘Doubts about Religious Education in Public Schooling’ (2015) 
19(2) International Journal of Christianity & Education 135-148, 138. 
813 L Philip Barnes, Education, Religion and Diversity: Developing a New Model of Religious 
Education (Routledge 2014) 16.  
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contribute to social cohesion. The review report of REC argues for including 
non-religious worldviews such as Humanism in RE curriculum. However, in 
reviewing this review report of REC, Barnes and others argue that the current 
legal mechanism does not allow including secular worldviews as a curriculum 
subject on their own right, but only as critiques of religion. 814 According to 
them, there are no grounds in the Education Reform Act 1988 for revising the 
reading of the law to include non-religious worldviews in RE on their own. 
Current legal framework allows Humanism only as ‘non-religious criticism of 
religion’. 815 Besides, Barnes points “to the extent that a secular approach to 
education corresponds to a humanist approach, which is precisely the claim 
made by many humanists, it can be said that the modern British school 
curriculum is mainly a transmitter of humanist beliefs and values.”816  He 
further continues to underline that “What is central and even essential to 
humanism is opposition to religion. This is unsurprising, as modern Humanism 
emerged within a European Christian culture and appropriated what were 
originally Christian values, while attempting to give them an exclusively 
naturalistic justification.”817  
  Despite the critiques of multi-faith RE and despite the lack of 
evidence for fulfilling its aim, the prevalent emphasis of multi-faith RE seem 
to dominate the future agenda for RE. These are suggestive of multi faith RE 
with ever increasing number of religions and other non-religious worldviews 
such as Humanism. In parallel, the latest report by the Commission on 
Religious Education in 2018 presented a national plan for RE that consists of 
three main components. According to the national plan, the name of the subject 
as Religious Education would be replaced by “religions and world views” to 
reflect the new vision for the future of RE. The second is to make RE statutory 
subject of the national curriculum. The third is to provide a multidisciplinary 
approach for teachers, which means more funding for their training. Given the 
criticism over the quality and success of already existing RE, the national plan 
is undaunted as well as comprehensive. The Commission advocates for such a 
 
814 L Philip Barnes and Marius Felderhof (eds), ‘Reviewing the Religious Education Review’ 
(2014) 35(1) Journal of Beliefs & Values – Studies in Religion & Education 108-117, 111.  
815 L Philip Barnes, ‘Humanism, Non-religious Worldviews and the Future of Religious 
Education’ (2015) 36(1) Journal of Beliefs & Values – Studies in Religion & Education 79-91, 81. 
816 Ibid 86.  
817 Ibid 88.  
 252 
ground-breaking reform for RE, exactly by pointing to the failure of RE to 
actualise its potential. For instance, the Commission points to the inconsistent 
RE teaching across the country that undermines the quality of teaching. The 
Commission also mentions the lack of confidence in RE teachers and therefore 
suggests more funding to provide RE teachers with the appropriate equipment 
to teach.   
  The suggestion to change the subject name to religion and 
worldviews is significant, for it nestles a number of assumptions that need 
attention to analyse how religion is universalized as an account, as discussed 
in Part I. For the Commission, everyone has a worldview; “their way of seeing, 
making sense of and giving coherence and meaning to the world and to their 
own experience and behaviour.”818 The Commission views worldview as the 
common denominator to address both religions and ‘other’ worldviews. In the 
eyes of the Commission,  
‘Worldviews’ refers to the wide variety of religious and non- religious 
worldviews that can be studied as part of this subject. Retaining the 
term ‘religion’ – and not ‘religions’ – in the subject name is a reminder 
that religion as a category is a crucial object of study, as are other 
conceptual categories such as secular, spiritual, and worldview.819 
  
The Commission describes a worldview as a view of the world:  
A worldview is a person’s way of understanding, experiencing and 
responding to the world. It can be described as a philosophy of life or 
an approach to life. This includes how a person understands the nature 
of reality and their own place in the world. A person’s worldview is 
likely to influence and be influenced by their beliefs, values, 
behaviours, experiences, identities and commitments. We use the term 
‘institutional worldview’ to describe organised worldviews shared 
among particular groups and sometimes embedded in institutions. 
These include what we describe as religions as well as non-religious 
worldviews such as Humanism, Secularism or Atheism. We use the 
term ‘personal worldview’ for an individual’s own way of 
understanding and living in the world, which may or may not draw from 
one, or many, institutional worldviews.820  
 
Further, the Commission is of the opinion that religions and worldviews tackle 
same existential questions about meaning and purpose of life. 821 
 
818 Commission on Religious Education, Final Report: Religion and Worldviews: The Way 
Forward A national plan for RE (September 2018) 26, para 23. 
819 Ibid 31, para 37.  
820 Ibid 26, section 3. 
821 Ibid 30, para 34.  
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Acknowledging that the adherence to religious worldviews is in decline, the 
Commission views the religious and non-religious worldviews interwoven and 
difficult to hold a clear-cut separation.  
  Referring back to Part I, Chapter 2, existential questions about the 
meaning and purpose of life are born within the account religion provides and 
therefore are internal to religion. It is possible to ask these questions only 
because the Cosmos is understood containing meaning and that everything in 
Cosmos including our lives have a purpose. Yet this claim is religion’s own 
claim about itself and Cosmos, emanates from the idea that God created 
Cosmos and everything in it for a purpose. In this connection, Balagangadhara 
argues that indeed religions are the only candidates of worldviews and religion 
is secularized in the form of worldview. Every individual has a worldview 
emanates from the assumption that every culture has a religion. A worldview, 
however loose it is described in the report, is centred around norms and beliefs. 
As discussed in Part I, this is not how non-Semitic traditions are shaped. Alevi 
traditions seemed to be practice oriented where belief becomes secondary. 
That’s why it is difficult to prepare and present an Alevism curriculum for the 
purposes of RE. In preparing its curriculum, certain elements of the Alevi 
traditions are picked, as they are instrumental to present a doctrine oriented 
coherent view of the world for Alevis. This has repercussions for Alevis as the 
core practices of Alevi traditions becomes secondary and reduced to mere 
symbolic meanings in representing Alevi norms and beliefs, rather than being 
appreciated as practices and rituals. For instance, as shown in my analysis of 
the resources of Alevi traditions, deyiş/nefes, semah and ritual of muhabbet are 
covered briefly. Alevis put their energy in producing a worldview. The 
emphasis put on cem ritual as the Alevi worship and cemevi the place of 
worship takes the attention away from other resources of Alevi tradition, 
namely deyiş-nefes and semah. Semah becomes a sacred dance which ought to 
be exclusive to cem rituals. The Alevi traditions turn into mere symbols that 
are ‘meaningful’ as long as they have a role in explaining an Alevi world view.  
 
6. 6. Making Alevism for the Charity Commission  
 
6. 6. 1. Provisions of Charities Act 2011 
 
 254 
   Charities Act 2011, Advancement of Religion and Public Benefit  
  Another area of pride as represented by the Federation was the 
decision by the Charity Commission that recognizes Alevism as a religion for 
the purposes of Charity law.822 This recognition had been gained after more 
than two years of application process. However this may not be a long time, 
keeping in mind the processing time of the Commission reached five years in 
the case of Druid Network823 and Gnostic Center.824 The former was eventually 
recognized as a religious charity, while the latter was found lacking an 
identifiable moral or ethical framework.825 The Commission is known to take 
its time to rule whether a charity’s main objective is advancement of religion 
or not. In other words, the Commission’s examination of religion is scrutinized 
in cases that are not clear cut religions and takes longer to process these 
claims.826 
  A charity is a non-profit organisation, recognised by the state as 
having charitable purposes and which exists for the public benefit.827  The 
Charities Act 2011 defined charity as an institution established for charitable 
purposes only, which are laid down in Section 3 (1) and are for public 
benefit.828 There are a number of fiscal benefits for charities, including tax 
relief on gift aid donations, no income tax or corporation tax to pay, no tax on 
investments, non-domestic rate relief, no VAT on advertising for fundraising 
and on new buildings and preferential rates from banks and suppliers. Charities 
also have the advantage that their status confers respect in public. Their 
finances and conduct are regulated. This encourages people to have confidence 
 
822 Charities Act 2011.  
823 Druid Network, [2010] Charity Commission (21 September), available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/druid-network (accessed 20 March 2020).  
824 Gnostic Centre, RE [2009] Charity Commission (16 December), available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/gnostic-centre (accessed 20 March 2020). 
825 Ibid  para 49: “Although Gnosticism, as advanced by The Gnostic Centre, satisfies a number of 
the essential characteristics of a religion for the purposes of charity law, it was not demonstrated 
that all of the necessary characteristics of a religion were met, given that they had not identified a 
positive, beneficial, moral or ethical framework being promoted. Consequently, the Board 
Members concluded that it has not been demonstrated that The Gnostic Centre is established for 
the advancement of religion, as that is understood in charity law.”  
826 See Druid Network, [2010] Charity Commission (21 September), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/druid-network (accessed 20 March 2020); Gnostic 
Centre, RE [2009] Charity Commission (16 December), available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/gnostic-centre (accessed 20 March 2020). 
827 Charities Act 2011. Also see Charity Commission, ‘Public Benefit: The Rules for Charities’ (14 
February 2014), available at https://www.gov.uk/public-benefit-rules-for-charities (accessed 29 
May 2015).   
828 Charities Act 2011 section 1-2.  
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and make donations. For instance, the chair of Druids Network commented that 
the tax benefits are of little importance but the recognition by the Charity 
Commission would enable them to be recognized by the local councils in their 
administrative status.829 
  In order to be eligible for charity status, an organization must have 
a charitable purpose, which is also for the public benefit.830 Public benefit test 
is to close doors for political groups. Two key principles for public benefit are: 
a. there must be identifiable benefit as relating to the aims of the charity and 
balanced against harm; b. benefits must be public.831 There are 13 charitable 
purposes; the advancement of religion is one of them. Section 3 (2) (a) indicates 
religion including both those involving belief in more than one god and those 
not involving belief in a god. In Annex A of the Commission’s Guidance note 
on the Advancement of Religion for Public Benefit,832 a religion is considered 
as a belief system that a) involves belief in a god or supreme being, divine or 
transcendental being or entity or spiritual principle, which is the object or focus 
of the religion; b) a relationship between the believer and the supreme being or 
entity through worship; c) has a degree of cogency, cohesion, seriousness and 
importance; d) promotes an identifiable positive, beneficial, moral or ethical 
framework. Thus, Charity Commission does not require a religion having 
belief in god and describes Buddhism as a ‘realised’ and not a ‘revealed’ 
religion. Worship is characterised as the expressions of belief in supreme being 
or entity. Advancing religion for the public benefit “means to promote or 
maintain or practice it and increase belief in the supreme being or entity that is 
the object or focus of the religion”. Some of the examples are seeking new 




829 ‘Druidry to be classed as religion by Charity Commission’, BBC News (London 2 October 
2010), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-11457795 (accessed 20 March 2020).  
830 The Charity Commission, ‘Public Benefit: The Rules for Charities’ (14 February 2014), 
available at https://www.gov.uk/public-benefit-rules-for-charities (accessed 29 May 2015).   
831 The Charity Commission,  ‘Analysis of the law underpinning The Advancement of Religion for 
the Public Benefit’ (December 2008), available at  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140505171106/http://www.charitycommission.gov.u
k/media/94857/lawrel1208.pdf (accessed 20 March 2020).  
832 The Charity Commission, “Advancement of Religion for the Public Benefit” (December 2008), 
available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/358531/advanceme
nt-of-religion-for-the-public-benefit.pdf (accessed 20 March 2020).  
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6. 6. 2. Relevant adjudication of the Charity Commission 
 
  The decisions of the Charity Commission concerning religion might 
seem controversial in some of its decisions, particularly for the applications 
made by “new age” religions or those religions that are not straight forward to 
recognize. For instance, in 2009 the Commission refused the application made 
by the Gnostic Centre for the advancement of religion (Gnosticism).833 The 
absence of a moral framework was shown as the reason for its negative 
decision. In its analysis, the Commission accepted that the Gnostic Centre does 
profess a belief in a supreme being and does engage in worship and 
‘demonstrate a core set of beliefs’ despite its internal diversity. And yet, the 
Commission found “an identifiable positive, beneficial, moral or ethical 
framework promoted as it found ‘spiritual improvement’” absent and hence the 
application was turned down. The decision reads: “It is the existence of an 
identifiable, positive, beneficial moral or ethical framework that is promoted 
by a religion which demonstrates that the religion is capable of impacting and 
does impact on society in a beneficial way.”834  
  Similarly, the Commission rejected the application of Scientology 
by noting that the belief system must be more than a philosophy or way of life 
to constitute a religion.835 However, in 2013 the Supreme Court held that a 
church within the Church of Scientology could be a ‘place of meeting for 
religious worship’ under the 1855 Act.836 The Supreme Court decision means 
that the Church of Scientology is now considered to be a religion for the 
purposes of the Places of Religious Worship Registration Act 1855. However, 
Scientology is not currently considered to be a charity for the advancement of 
religion even though the definition of religion under charity law is based on the 
now overruled decision in Segerdal.837 
  The Druid Network was also subjected to a deep scrutiny by the 
commission. However, it was eventually recognized as a religious charity after 
 
833 Gnostic Centre [2009] Charity Commission  (16 December) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/gnostic-centre (accessed 20 March 2020) 
834 Ibid para 60.  
835 Church of Scientology [1999] Charity Commission (17 November), available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/church-of-scientology-england-and-wales (accessed 
20 March 2020). 
836 R (on the Application of Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] 
UKSC 77.  
837 R v Registrar General, ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 679. 
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five years of struggle. In its application, the Druid Network argued that 
“nature” is regarded as the supreme being within Druidry. In its decision838, the 
Commission confirmed that: “[Druidry] is concerned with forming a 
relationship with nature, which Druids consider to be sacred, and through 
spiritual interaction there is a quest for divine inspiration […] All life is 
considered to be sacred and this extends to humanity, the natural and built 
environment, the universe and everything within it”.839  
  The Charity Commission’s adjudication may seem arbitrary. 
Despite being very vague, the Commission relies on a specific framing of 
religious claims as seen in above cases. While there is no single definition of 
religion under English law, the Charity Commission relies on an understanding 
of religion as a belief system that requires a supreme being or principle, 
worship, moral framework and ‘a degree of cogency, cohesion, seriousness and 
importance.’ 840  As discussed in Introduction and Chapter 2, considering 
religion as belief oriented is rooted in the Protestant doctrines. Balagangadhara 
assesses how the secular state impacts on religious violence in India by 
unravelling the presumptions of secular state on the nature of religion. He 
distinguishes the difference between the Semitic view on that “religion 
revolves around the crucial question of the truth and falsity of a set of 
doctrines” on one hand and the Hindu traditions that sees “various traditions as 
human search for ‘truth’” and “the different religions as paths in this on going 
quest”, on the other.841 Against this difference, the secular state has to rely on 
one of these views, which are logical negations of one another.842 That is to 
say, the state has to accept either religion as a matter of truth and different 
religions as rivals or religion is not a matter of truth. Even though the state 
wants to be agnostic towards the truth claims of any particular religion, it 
assumes that religion is a matter of truth. Therefore, state neutrality becomes 
 
838 The Druid Network [2010] Charity Commission (21 September), available at  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/druid-network (accessed 20 March 2020). 
839 Ibid para 26. 
840 The Charity Commission,  ‘Analysis of the law underpinning The Advancement of Religion for 
the Public Benefit’ (December 2008), available at  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140505171106/http://www.charitycommission.gov.u
k/media/94857/lawrel1208.pdf (accessed 20 March 2020).  
841 S.N. Balagangadhara and Jakob De Roover, ‘The Secular State and Religious Conflict: Liberal 
Neutrality and the Indian Case of Pluralism’ (2007) 15(1) Journal of Political Philosophy 67-92, 
74.  
842 Ibid 77. 
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an empty promise, when encountered with cultures that do not have a truth 
claim. The process in which the Federation was granted the charity status for 
the advancement of religion (Alevism), which I now turn to, supports 
Balagangadhara’s arguments pointing to the fundamental difference between 
religion and tradition, as elaborated in Part I.  
 
6. 6. 3. The Britain Alevi Federation’s application to the Charity Commission  
 
  Unaware of the adjudication of the Charity Commission, the initial 
application of the Federation clearly did not have in mind specifically the 
advancement of Alevism as a religion in its objective. The initial application 
states the Federation’s objective to advance Alevism and Humanism, since 
“Alevism is ‘the ancient Humanism’ committed to the ideals of equality, 
democracy, science and respect for others”.843 Therefore, the initial application 
did not represent Alevism as a religion. Quite the contrary, the Federation’s 
objective was “to extend and deepen public understanding of Alevism and 
Humanism as a life stance”. The application went further and described Alevis 
as “humanists strive to be rational, looking to science in attempting to 
understand the universe and ethical, seeking to act in a way that puts human 
welfare at the centre of morality and that they seek to make meaning in life in 
the here and now.”844 The Federation also committed to “promote and protect 
“other non-religious groups’ rights” by upholding the principles of Humanism, 
which was perfectly aligned with Alevism”. In its response to the Federation, 
the Commission seemed to be puzzled, since it responded to the Federation’s 
application with a question on whether its objective was to promote Humanism 
or Alevism. The Federation was warned promoting two philosophies might 
hamper an otherwise successful application.845 The Commission’s confusion 
might stem from its understanding of competing (rival) worldviews:  it has to 
be either Humanism or Alevism. As explored in Part I, there is no rivalry for 
Alevis. They have never engaged in proselytizing activities historically. They 
do not consider other traditions in competition to theirs. Therefore, it makes 
 
843 Interview with the person from BAF in charge with the application to the Charity Commission.  
844 The initial application of the BAF to the Charity Commission, dates 12 January 2014.  
845 My fieldwork notes, email correspondences between the Federation and the Commission that 
was shared with me.  
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perfect sense for them to try to explain Alevism with reference to Humanism. 
After all, Alevis explain their tradition as the value given to the potential human 
being carries, which primarily signifies their difference from religions. For 
Alevis, the reason for considering Alevism and Humanism in parallel might be 
because they do not have access to the cultural background of what religion is, 
a candidate for the truth.  
  Nonetheless, in response to the Commission’s advise, the Federation 
dropped out its objective to promote Humanism and opted only for the 
advancement of Alevism. However, the initial representation of Alevism 
mimicking the ideals of Humanism caused another confusion for the 
Commission as to whether Alevism can be considered as a religion for the 
purposes of charity commission or not. In this regard, the Commission inquired 
about the aspects of Alevism such as the existence of a deity, kind of worship, 
ethical or moral framework as well as the activities for public benefit. Upon 
the Commission's request for elaboration, the Federation provided an account 
where Alevism and Humanism are used interchangeably as ‘a tolerant ethical 
life’, which relies on ‘reason, experience and naturalistic view of the world’. 
Its objects were to promote education, equality and non-discrimination as well 
as human rights and implementation of the Human Rights Act. Humanism and 
Alevism are used interchangeably aiming to protect ‘other non-religious 
people’. Confused with the response, the Charity Commission asked 
specifically whether there is a belief system as well as a moral and ethical 
framework central to the interpretation of Alevism. Despite its attempts to 
avoid talking of 'belief system' or 'religion', the Federation gradually adopted a 
different strategy, as confronted by the Commission. It finally asserted Alevism 
being a belief system inspired from the idea of Batıni (internal)/ Zahiri 
(external) aspects of ‘reality’, which is then translated into ‘truth’ and then to 
God. The concept of God however remained problematic: the Federation 
describes Hak as "I am one with God" or “I am one with truth” interchangeably 
reflecting that "every human being is a carrier of the essence from God". It then 
went on explaining that Alevis do not fear God, believe in the migration of soul 
and respect every religion. The cem ritual is translated as ‘communal worship’, 
while the notion of enlightenment becomes ‘pure consciousness’.  
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Although the Federation wanted to make a move towards 
conceptualizing Alevism as a religion, it enumerated the main values of 
Alevism as: Humanism, Egalitarianism, mutual assistance, and gender-
equality that are considered to be secular and universal values of the Western 
democracy. In response, the Commission referred the application to a specialist 
for a deeper review and posed the expected question: “Is the organisation 
actually set up to promote two different, alternative belief systems?” Further, 
it underlined the similarities between British Humanist Association's and the 
Federation's views on Humanism, except the Federation's additional emphasis 
on deity and super-natural, which caused 'inconsistency' in the eyes of the 
Charity Commission. The Charity Commission explicitly advised the 
Federation to examine the Druid Network's application to see how they were 
able to convert the variety into a coherent system and accordingly to present "a 
system of belief, that is, something unified and coherent". The Federation's 
subsequent response added a program of religious worship and calendar, which 
it did not have it at the first stage of the application. Yet, it could not present a 
coherent claim for Alevism being a religion. For example, it denied the 
existence of a deity at one page of their submission, while claiming Hak as the 
Alevi God in another page.  
Meeting with the Commission 
Unsatisfied with the correspondence, the Commission invited the 
Federation for a meeting its headquarters in Exeter.846 I was also invited to the 
meeting by the Federation.847 In the meeting, the inconsistency that mentioned 
above about the existence of God in Alevism was pointed out as well as 
Alevism’s relation with Islam. For instance, the legal advisor for the 
Commission emphasized that the application should present a coherent 
argument, unlike the current application which argues that Alevis do not 
believe in God while asserting hak as God within the same document submitted 
to the Commission. The Commission also confronted the Federation about 
presenting two different sets of arguments promoting Humanism on one hand 
and Alevism on the other. The Commission’s other concern was whether 
846 The meeting took place in the headquarters of charity commission on 17 July 2015.  
847 The meeting was held between two persons from the Federation, me, and three persons from 
the Charity Commission, including the legal adviser of the Commission.  
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Alevism has a set of beliefs and whether there is a common core belief and 
practices that were shared by diverse Alevi communities. By chance I was there 
with a booklet of Alevism that was prepared by the former chair of national 
SACRE. As the Commission was concerned with commonly shared values of 
Alevism and a written source for it, I gave my booklet to the Commission upon 
the request by the Federation staff. This booklet states that Hak means God, 
but it is more like energy or a force. Further it states that everything in universe 
is an expression of Hak and that the whole universe was ‘created’ by Hak; but 
is not separate from it. It further asserts that “there is something of God in all 
living creatures and most fully in humans” and “all people contain the essence 
of Hak”. Similarly, the Federation described the cem ritual as communal 
worship and 4 doors and 40 stations as the moral framework. They also claimed 
that Alevis do not have written sources as they were persecuted, and their 
written sources were destroyed.  
  Furthermore, the Commission was informed about the Alevism 
project for RE and the referral of dede as clergy by HM Prison, upon a 
prisoner’s request to meet dede in a prison. The Federation also informed the 
Commission that Alevism has been recognized as a religion in many other 
European countries. The Commission noted these as supporting information 
and told that they would look at the booklet. Each ‘achievement’ about the 
recognition of Alevism has been building up for further recognition demands, 
as the chair of the Federation had told me in a meeting. For example, during 
the meeting with the Charity Commission, the Federation presented the 
example of dede allowed as clergy in HM Prison as the evidence for Alevis 
being a faith community.848 Indeed, I was told that a success for the recognition 
of Alevism at one level leads to a success at another level to underline the 
importance of local activity for recognition of Alevism in British context.  
  A few months subsequent to this meeting, the Commission accepted 
the Federation’s application and thus recognized Alevism as a religion for the 
purposes of Charities Act. As indicated in the decision letter, the Commission 
draws its analysis largely on the Alevism booklet which was delivered in the 
meeting. In the decision, the Commission first reiterated that a religion should 
include “a spiritual or non-secular belief system, held by a group of adherents, 
 
848 The interview with the chair of BAF.   
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which claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and relationship with 
the infinite”, referring to Hodkin.849 Then, referring to the booklet mentioned 
above, comes to the conclusion it agrees that Alevism meets this requirement, 
as God in Alevism is Hak, which means the truth and if God has created 
everything, the human beings are sacred in the world and thus Alevis consider 
everything sacred and carrier of an essence from God. It further stated Alevis 
consider god, the cosmos and humanity in a state of total unity.  
  The Commission’s analysis also underlines the following 
characteristic for a religion: “A spiritual or non-secular belief system which 
teaches its adherents how they are to live their lives in conformity with the 
spiritual understanding associated with the belief system”. According to the 
Commission, the following Alevi beliefs evince for this characteristic: Alevis 
consider all nations as one regardless of ethnic, racial, gender and linguistic 
differences, simply because each creature carries the same sacred essence; 
Humanism, egalitarianism, mutual assistance, and gender-equality are the main 
social characteristics commonly shared by Alevi communities; Resistance 
against injustices is a social attitude in Alevism. Moreover, in the 
Commission’s consideration, the self-spiritual development is central in 
Alevism which instructs finding God in one’s self. Additionally, the analysis 
underlines the saying of “Being the Master of one’s hand, tongue and loins” as 
the moral framework of Alevism and interprets 4 Doors 40 Stations in 4 stages 
as 1. Acceptance of Alevism; 2. Studying of Alevism; 3. Practice of Alevism; 
4. Enlightenment -becoming good and eliminating the bad, reaching Hak. 
Lastly, the analysis considers cem ritual and musahip ritual as worship. In light 
of the above-mentioned analysis, the Commission came to the conclusion that 
Alevism is a religion and the BAF can operate for advancing the Alevi faith.  
To sum up, what the representatives of the Federation could not succeed in 
their testimonies, the publication achieves since Alevism is represented as a 
system of belief and a worldview. As a system rather than scattered claims 
about rituals, the booklet provided the gateway for the Federation to the status 
of religious charity.  
 
849 R (on the Application of Hodkin) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] 
UKSC 77. 
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  The Federation could have followed the suit for getting recognition 
for a category other than religion. Yet, they did not. Their choice of religion 
category might be attributed to the increasing importance of religion in public 
policies for governing difference as well as the internalisation of a religious 
view by Alevis. For instance, Shah argues that the Hindu reaction to the Caste 
Legislation is shaped within British multiculturalism that is dominated by 
Western constructs of Hindu traditions, which distort not only these traditions 
but also how the Hindus frame their claims against the legislation. He calls the 
Hindu reaction as the tragedy of the postcolonial Hindu “who argues against 
chimerical allegations about the nature of his culture and society.” He considers 
it as an example of ‘colonial consciousness’ because the Hindu diaspora fail to 
access to their own traditions while do not enjoy access to the Western culture 
that produced notions of the caste system and of Hinduism.850 Both the unease 
of preparing an Alevism curriculum and presenting a claim for religious charity 
before the Charity Commission supports my analysis in Part I about the lack of 
a religion in Alevi traditions, according to Balagangadhara’s theory. In 
addition, it supports my suggestion that the Alevi movement negotiate Alevis’ 
difference to benefit most from the politico-legal systems. Living in the faith 
community focused British multiculturalism, the movement positions Alevis 
as a faith community.  
 
6. 7. Conclusion  
 
  From theoretical perspective, Ivison points to 3 modes of 
understanding multiculturalism: The first ‘logic’ is ‘protective’ or 
communitarian multiculturalism, which considers cultural integrity of a group 
essential. The second is liberal multiculturalism that grounds multiculturalism 
to the ideas of equality, autonomy, toleration and equal respect. The third is 
imperial multiculturalism that critically examines the relations of power and 
conditions that put forward by the state for recognition. In all these approaches 
to multiculturalism, religion is considered as a universal conception of good 
and traditions are subsumed under the category of religion as long as they are 
 
850 Prakash Shah, ‘Orientalism, Multiculturalism, and Identity Politics: Hindus and the British 
Caste Law’ (2017) Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica (special issue: Daimon. Diritto 
comparato delle religioni) 343-357. 
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formulated accordingly. The liberal ideals of equality, toleration and human 
rights gave rise to multiculturalism, which has been evolving rather 
experimentally at policy level. In this connection, instead of being responsive 
to the super-diversity in society, the British multiculturalism is rather reactive 
and thus shaped in parallel to certain crises arose by the difficulty to 
accommodate this super-diversity. The paradigm shifts in policy 
implementations have been influenced by riots. Eventually the problem of 
Muslim’s integration led to an increasing emphasis on accommodation of 
diversity in religious terms.  
  Similar to other communities,851  Alevis are required to describe 
their traditions as a version of religion whose practitioners ought to enjoy the 
freedom to manifest that religion and integrate in the multicultural society of 
Britain. Alevis’ unease with building an Alevism curriculum to be included in 
the religious education and gain recognition for the Federation as a religious 
charity demonstrate this effort. The British political and legal system compels 
the transformation of traditions into quasi-religion; ‘quasi’ because they only 
pretend to take the form of religion without being that. This process of taking 
the form of religion spills back to Alevis’ own experience of their tradition. 
Those elements that are instrumental to provide an Alevi worldview such as 
Bektaşi teachings are retained, while other resources of traditions such as 
semah and deyiş/nefes become secondary and some others such as hak 
increasingly being formulated in terms of the concept of God in Semitic 
religions. The scriptural aspects of the Alevi traditions have dominated the 
Alevi presentation in multicultural Britain, as it provides a belief system with 
an identifiable moral framework.  
  Vertovec discusses the patterns of change surrounding transnational 
diaspora communities in terms of religious affiliations.852 He points to the 
movement and resettlement in a new context bringing in multiple factors to 
alter the social organization and practice of religion. I argue that one of the 
factors, perhaps the most significant one, is the politico-legal system, which 
the diaspora communities respond to for situating themselves in. According to 
 
851 Prakash Shah, ‘Secularism's threat to tradition: A reading of Europe, India and the Limits of 
Secularism’  (2019) Sikh Formations 1-8. 
852 Steven Vertovec, ‘Religion and Diaspora’ (2004) New approaches to the study of religion (2) 
275-304. 
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Friedman, identification is “a practice situated in a special social context, a set 
of conditions that determine in which subjects orient themselves in relation to 
a larger reality which they define in defining themselves.” 853  While the 
politico-legal systems contain certain opportunity structures for 
accommodating diversity, either through multicultural politics or nation-state, 
the Alevi movement that formulate and advocate certain recognition demands 
within these systems.  
  The unease of describing Alevi identity in terms of the existing 
identity categories such as religion or ethnicity has become overtly apparent in 
school environment that cultivates contacts with the other in multicultural 
Britain. Similar to the Turkish context, the school environment becomes an 
area where the Alevi identity is questioned. Yet, different from Turkey where 
the Alevi pupils are pressured to be integrated into Islam, the religious 
education framework in the UK offers an opportunity for Alevis to include 
Alevism in the religious education curriculum. Although the recent 
developments in RE about introducing non-religious world views attempt to 
provide better accommodation for the British multicultural society, ironically 
by using RE as a blanket subject to teach about two distinct phenomena, these 
attempts might bring about further confusion and further universalisation of 
religion as a world-view, which would impose a certain framework on 
traditions like the Alevi. Similar to the limited accommodation the RE presents 
for Alevis, granting the charity status to the Britain Alevi Federation on the 
ground of religion reveals the difficulty for Alevis to articulate a claim that fits 
into the Charity Commission’s understanding of religion as a belief system 
making a truth claim in rivalry with others. Even though Sandberg’s suggestion 
on introducing a broad definition of religion takes place, such a definition 
would possibly frame religion as based on doctrine and belief. As discussed in 
Part I, Chapter 2, religion and tradition are two different phenomena that cannot 
be captured with a loose definition which could fairly be used by judges and 
state institutions. Before we explore better accommodation for traditions like 
the Alevi, we need to first recognise and acknowledge the fundamental 
difference between religion and tradition.   
 
853 Jonathan Friedman, ‘Global Crisis, the Struggle for Cultural Identity and Intellectual 
Porkbarrelling’ in Phina Werbner and Tariq Modood (eds) Debating cultural hybridity: 




CHAPTER  7 – CONCLUSION   
 
7. 1. Introduction  
 
  Using the framework provided by the research group 854  led by 
Balagangadhara, this study has aimed to provide a different reading of the 
issues surrounding Alevis’ recognition demands, as formulated by the 
transnational Alevi movement. Alevis are people who have been persecuted 
for their beliefs and practices for centuries. The religion of Alevis has been 
referred as Alevism since late 19th – early 20th century. Although originating in 
Turkey, many European countries like Germany and the United Kingdom 
accommodate Alevis as a result of migration from Turkey. In these countries, 
different organisations, as part of the transnational Alevi movement advocate 
for recognition of Alevis’ difference with respect to the freedom of religion.  
  This thesis began by problematising Alevism and describing the 
issue of Alevis’ recognition in different politico-legal contexts. The research 
question has been “How do Turkey, the UK and the ECtHR accommodate 
Alevis’ difference, and what is the implication of this accommodation for 
Alevis and the Alevi culture?” I approached my research question by first 
exploring the difference of Alevis within the nexus of culture and religion and 
then examining the accommodation of this difference. In this regard, this thesis 
was divided into two parts: While the first part laid out a theoretical framework 
and analysis of Alevis difference, the second part investigated the states’ 
accommodation of this difference. I used two theories in my analysis: 
Balagangadhara’s theory of religion informed my analysis of the Alevi culture, 
while De Roover’s theory of secularisation guided me to analyse the political 
and legal systems in accommodating Alevis. If Balagangadhara traces the 
secularisation of religion and its reflection in the social sciences, De Roover 
demonstrates the process by which Christian theological ideas were secularised 
 
854 ‘Comparative Science of Cultures, Research Centre Vergelijkende Cultuurwetenschap’, 
available at http://www.gyaana.eu/  (accessed 2 May 2020).  
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in the shape of political theory. In line with Balagangadhara and De Roover, I 
consider secularisation as the process in which theological ideas gradually lose 
their apparent link to the theology and accepted as general facts by society.  
7. 2. A Theory of Secularisation
In Part I, Chapter 2, I laid out the theoretical framework that informs 
my analysis of the Alevi traditions as well as the ways in which the Alevi 
demands for recognition were accommodated in the politico-legal contexts of 
Turkey, the UK and the ECtHR. I first provided a critique of studies that are 
critical of implementation of religious freedom. My critique pointed out the 
implicit assumption in these studies that religion is a culturally universal. 
Secondly, I introduced De Roover’s secularisation thesis, that considers 
secularisation as the process by which theological claims have gradually 
become common sense ideas. Through the work of Jakob De Roover, I 
explored how the secularisation of Christian theological ideas are embedded in 
the political theory of religious freedom and secular state. More specifically, 
the idea of toleration is grounded on the belief that it is the moral duty of a 
Christian to tolerate people’s religion because the salvation comes through the 
free work of the Holy Spirit, which also provides basis for considering religion 
as a matter of conscience in private realm. Moreover, these ideas as well as the 
political theory on accommodation of religion presume that every culture have 
their own religion. This theoretical framework places religion as the foremost 
medium to articulate differences.  
De Roover’s analysis makes two significant claims that are 
important for this thesis: The first is that the framework of religious freedom 
and secular state is dependent on Christian theological ideas to the extent that 
when this framework is transplanted into a different context, it loses its 
intelligibility. The second is that this framework compels communities to take 
the shape of religious communities as the theological ideas that this framework 
implicitly relies on are grounded on the assumption that every culture has a 
religion. From this point of view, I argued that the theoretical ground on which 
policies to govern diversity is actually a secularised version of a claim 
embedded in religion: that every culture has a religion. Moreover, by accepting 
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this assumption as an empirical fact, the social sciences study cultures based 
on a theological claim, and policies enacted to govern diversity also rest on this 
theological claim. In addition to De Roover’s secularisation thesis, I explained 
Balagangadhara’s theory of religion and discussed the compulsion of religious 
cultures to seek religion in all cultures due to the constraint that religion puts 
on how experience gets structured.  
7. 3. Exploration of Alevis’ Difference  
   
  In Introduction, I opened up my discussion over how we 
conceptualize cultural differences. Unlike an approach that focuses on ‘seeing’ 
similarities, I proposed to ‘magnify’ the differences in cultures for an 
alternative reading around the issues of Alevis’ recognition. I pointed out the 
stubborn tendency to conceptualise differences in cultures in terms of their 
religion or systems of belief in spite of the lack of a theory on religion. In Part 
I, I have used the theory of religion and the framework for understanding 
cultural differences, as formulated by Balagangadhara. My analysis of Alevi 
culture showed that religion as an explanatorily intelligible account of the 
Cosmos seems not to be a property of Alevi culture. The crucial elements in 
constituting an explanatorily intelligible account of the Cosmos, such as God 
as the creator of the Cosmos, a doctrine, which specifies God’s purposes and 
the relationship between God and humanity and a rivalry claim for being the 
only true way for going about in the world, are lacking in Alevi culture. 
Balagangadhara suggests that religion provides a dominant (meta) learning, 
which is theoretical knowledge, and thus shapes the culture where religion 
exists. In this regard, as there is no religion in Alevi culture, the dominant 
learning and thus the element that shapes the configuration of learning, which 
is culture specific, cannot be provided by religion. In Balagangadhara’s 
analysis, we see the ritual just like religion can provide a dominant (meta) 
learning for the Indian culture. Balagangadhara’s framework is helpful for me 
to recognise the performative side of the Alevi culture. In this connection to 
my application of his framework, my fieldwork suggests the prevalent role of 
rituals and performances in transmission of Alevi culture, which strengthens 
my argument that there is no religion in Alevi culture in the sense that there is 
no intelligible and explanatory account for the Cosmos that provides a world-
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view or a system of belief and an epistemic approach to tradition meaning an 
approach to traditional practices through certain beliefs that supposedly 
embody these practices.  
7. 4. Implications for Alevis and Alevi Culture 
 
  The theory of Balagangadhara also accounts for the persistent belief 
that every culture has a religion. Referring to ‘mechanism of conversion’, he 
explains how cultures without religion are assimilated into religion’s 
worldview as false religions or idolatry. This theological process is secularised 
in categorizing every culture as a system of belief. The two doctrines of Semitic 
religions do not allow for the existence of cultures without religion. In addition, 
from the viewpoint of a religion (or culture with a religion), actions 
(performances, rituals) should be demonstrating some or other beliefs, which 
then constitute a system and an account of the world that claims to be the truth. 
In this way, religion as an account universalises itself. Secularisation as an 
aspect of universalization of religion, thus means the spread of religion in 
secular terms like a world view or system of beliefs or as an epistemic approach 
to tradition that tries to link actions to certain beliefs. Yet, although 
Balagangadhara attributes this mechanism of conversion in general to each 
religion, his analysis is based on Christianity and how Christianity transformed 
the Roman pagan culture and the Indian culture into false religions.  
  His framework does not explicate on how the mechanism of 
conversion actualises itself in case of Islam and Alevi culture. Nonetheless, we 
can show that in general terms; Islam carries the universalisation dynamic as 
inherent in religion, according to Balagangadhara’s theory. As an aspect of this 
universalisation,  I described secularization of Christianity, subsequent to the 
Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment. My analogy of this dynamic 
explored how the Kızılbaş was identified as heretics by the Ottomans. With the 
transplantation of religious toleration in the Ottoman Empire, we saw the 
transformation of heretic Kızılbaş into members of Alevi religion in the name 
of Alevism. Furthermore, the Turkish nation building instrumentalised Alevis 
as the carriers of pre-Islamic Turkish culture. This conceptualization 
consolidated the formation of Alevism, as the Alevi religion. Through the case 
of Kızılbaş/Alevis, I suggested that the process of universalisation of Islam 
might occur through absorbing non-religious cultures into Islam in the form of 
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Sufi traditions. I do not claim that all Sufi traditions reflect the secularization 
of Islam. However, in case of Alevis, their gradual representation as a Sufi 
tradition suggests a secularising moment of Islam where elements of Alevi 
traditions are transformed into aspects of Islamic traditions.  
  As discussed in this study, the process of framing Alevis’ difference 
in terms of religious difference since the 19th century has gradually given rise 
to the emergence of transnational Alevi movement that advocate for Alevis’ 
recognition as a faith community in different countries. In this regard, I 
examined the birth of transnational Alevi movement, as a product of the 
politico-legal systems that formulate Alevis’ difference in terms of religious 
freedom. Albeit varying in their conceptualisation of Alevism and recognition 
demands, the Alevi movement can be read as Alevis’ negotiation with the 
politico-legal systems that compel them take the form of a religious 
community. 
 
7. 5. Accommodation of Alevis’ Difference in Turkey, the UK and before 
the ECtHR 
 
  Following my exploration on the Alevi culture, with the theoretical 
framework that laid out in Part I guiding me, I examined the accommodation 
of Alevis’ difference. De Roover’s analysis gives us an insight to understand 
how the states and laws operate as grounded on ideas of Christian theology. 
However, it does not explicate on the application of these ideas in Turkey, other 
than pointing to the possibility of distortions stemming from their 
transplantation into non-Christian societies. Therefore, my analyses of the 
three contexts should be read as my interpretation, stemming from and adapting 
his analysis. For example, in the context of Turkey, even though the heretic 
Kızılbaş might disappear from the discourse of the Turkish Republic, whenever 
Alevis ask for recognition of their difference from Islam, the implicit Islamic 
framework that considers Alevis as false worshippers, denies their recognition 
demands. In this connection, cemevi as a place of worship cannot get 
recognized in Turkey because the only place of worship in Islam is identified 
as mosque, as discussed in Chapter 4.   
  As analysed in Chapter 4 on Turkey, where the theological ideas that 
make the principle of religious toleration and secular state intelligible are 
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absent, the transplantation of the idea of religious toleration and secular state 
results in a peculiar form of laiklik that instrumentalise and control religion 
through the Diyanet – Directorate of Religious Affairs. The transplantation of 
this framework in the form of laiklik first brings in a secularised Christian 
theology derived from Protestantism, which presupposes that the realm of 
religion is in the private sphere because the Christian freedom requires the free 
work of the Holy Spirit, which is necessary for true worship, while false 
worship stems from the human corruption of religion. With the developments 
in Europe subsequent to the Protestant Reformation as discussed in Chapter 2, 
to tolerate idolatrous practices has gradually been discussed as a matter of the 
moral duty of a Christian. And yet, toleration required to understand the 
religious core that these practices might stem from. Particularly in foreign 
lands, colonial powers struggled to carve out native religions that their 
idolatrous practices stem from, with the purpose of granting them toleration. 
Yet, the theological framework that allowed toleration to rise is absent in 
Turkey. The Ottomans introduced religious toleration by the Tanzimat 
Reforms; but it was not a well-formulated reform initiated by the Ottomans to 
serve for accommodation of religion. Rather, as discussed in Chapter 3, it was 
introduced at a time when the Empire had no other choice than to respond to 
the European critiques over the disadvantages that the millet system brings to 
religious minorities, mainly Christians. Although the late Ottoman statesmen 
and early Republicans engaged with European discussions over religious 
toleration and secular state and how to apply these in Turkey, they were not 
aware of the theological underpinnings of toleration. Rather, they picked up 
the critiques over superstition and anti-clericalism and argued that Islam in its 
core reveals similar dynamics that the true religion is indeed a matter of 
conscience and man-made practices are superstition that corrupts religion and 
therefore had to be banned. The reason that they picked up this particular 
discussion over the corruption of religion through man-made practices might 
be because, despite the difference in doctrines, these two religions’ view on 
ritual is similar in terms of its doctrinal references. Underneath this framework 
is the assumption that traditional practices have to be grounded on certain 
beliefs that are to be found in scriptures. When divorced from its context, the 
 272 
framework of religious freedom and secular state is transformed into Turkish 
laiklik that is grounded on the control over religion through the Diyanet.  
  When we look at the application of this framework in Turkey, 
Islamic theology is infused at all levels. Alevism is annexed to Islam, which 
effaces Alevi culture’s distinctiveness and assimilates it into Islam. As a 
response, different fractions of the Alevi movement articulated different claims 
for Alevi identity and recognition since 1990s. The EU accession process of 
Turkey in 2000s accelerated the articulation of these claims and indeed gave a 
direction within religious freedom framework. This framework is also utilized 
by AKP to favour the accommodation of Sunni Islam. In this vein, the extended 
courses on religious education, the legal benefits of the place of worship and 
the extension of the Diyanet’s power also compel the Alevi movement to 
pursue religious rights’ advocacy. As part of democratization policies, the AKP 
government initiated a serious of workshops to tackle Alevi claims for 
recognition which addressed primarily the compulsory religious education, the 
status of cemevi and the Diyanet. Yet, no concrete step has been taken since 
the 2010 Alevi workshops.  
  Another element that is important in framing Alevis’ difference is 
the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Although the process has slowed 
down, the harmonisation of Turkish legal system paved the way for Alevi 
activism at the ECtHR. When compared to the Turkish context, the ECtHR 
seems to recognise Alevis’ difference. All five cases brought to the ECtHR by 
the Alevi movement were ruled against Turkey. Yet, the ECtHR judgments did 
not result in fundamental changes to meet Alevis’ recognition demands. For 
instance, the ECtHR judgments on compulsory religious education in Turkey 
did not result in introducing opting out mechanisms for Alevi pupils. Rather, 
the AKP government introduced an amended curriculum that raises even more 
concerns over the heavy of Islamic doctrines on religious education. However, 
the ECtHR judgment on the status of cemevi, might be considered to ease the 
difficulties on constructing cemevi in Turkey. Upon the ECtHR judgment on 
Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı  v. Turkey, some municipalities 
use their discretion to treat some cemevi as place of worship.  
  Although the ECtHR framework seems to recognise Alevis’ 
difference, I argue that this recognition comes with a burden and a 
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transformation. As the first case, Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, 
demonstrates, the way Alevi claimants described Alevism was distorted in the 
judgement, which eventually postulated an Alevi Islam as opposed to Sunni 
Islam. This division between Alevi Islam and Sunni Islam has become more 
identifiable with the latest judgment on Dogan and others v. Turkey, where the 
Alevi claimants adopted the view that transformed Alevism into a Sufi tradition 
that was different than other Sufi orders and ‘hierarchically’ equivalent to 
Sunni Islam. When contrasted with Turkish state’s and the Diyanet’s 
assimilationist approach, the ECtHR’s advocacy for Alevis’ religious freedom 
seems more appealing for it provides Alevis with some autonomy to exist with 
their difference. While Alevis’ difference stands as a matter of inner-Islamic 
cultural richness from the view point of the Turkish authorities, the ECtHR 
construes Alevis’ difference as a matter of denomination that continues to 
overlook and simplify it, disregarding the political and historical dynamics. 
However, by converting the Alevis’ difference into non-Sunni Muslim, the 
ECtHR reinforces the positioning of Alevis in opposition to non-Alevis in 
religious terms. This has important consequences for the accommodation of 
Alevis’ difference in Turkey.  
  Unlike the attributed ties to Islam in Turkey and before the ECtHR, 
Alevism becomes a faith on its own right within the British multiculturalism. 
The Alevi movement succeeds in differentiating Alevism from Islam and in 
getting recognition as a religious charity. Alevism becomes a subject to be 
taught in religious education. Both the literature on Alevis and the Alevi 
movement consider this recognition as a success against the policies of Turkey 
that tries to assimilate them into Islam. There is indeed stark difference between 
compulsory religious education in Turkey that includes very little information 
on Alevis and that information misrepresents them as cultural richness of Islam 
on one hand and religious education in the UK that allows Alevis to represent 
themselves within the RE framework. However, as my analysis reveals, the 
implementation of the Alevism for RE in the UK is caused considerable 
confusion. Similarly, the Federation’s application process with the Charity 
Commission required a lot of manoeuvring before the Federation’s recognition 
as a religious charity. While the developments in the UK context further 
support what I have discussed in Part I that the nature of Alevi traditions cannot 
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be captured by a single belief system and coherent worldview, it brings about 
two kind of burden for Alevis. The first is that it compels Alevis to come up a 
world-view that would provide a foundation for Alevism. The second is that 
those resources of Alevi traditions that are more practice based are converted 
to symbols within this constructed Alevism or neglected.  
 
7. 6. Conclusion  
 
  This thesis has brought together different disciplines and 
methodologies to present an original inter-disciplinary work, aiming to provide 
insights into the accommodation of Alevis in different contexts. I addressed 
first this difference and pointed to the uniqueness of Alevi culture in the nexus 
of religion and tradition. Second, I examined the accommodation of this 
difference and found that the assumption that religion is culturally universal is 
embedded in the political and legal systems of Turkey and the UK as well as 
before the ECtHR. Third, I discussed the implications of this accommodation 
for Alevis and Alevi culture. I argued that as a response to the politico-legal 
frameworks, Alevis have been organised as a transnational movement that 
pursue advocacy in terms of religious freedom. This advocacy is practical in 
terms of accessing to benefits that are granted for religious communities in both 
three contexts. In this regard, the Alevi movement also actively contributes in 
transforming Alevis’ difference as a religious difference. However, this 
transformation comes with a burden on Alevis: trying to adapt an epistemic 
attitude to their traditions, converting them into meaning-carrying practices, 
and trying to ‘interpret’ or ‘extract’ an explanatorily intelligible account of the 
Cosmos.  
  This thesis has argued that discussions about how to implement 
policies to better govern diversity fail to see how the current framework, with 
its emphasis on religion as a culturally universal phenomenon, compels Alevis 
to mould themselves to fit a religious framework. In the process, the 
transformation that the Alevi traditions have been going through might bring 
 275 
in a distance from their own culture.855 For some Alevis who are agnostic about 
religion, Alevi culture means Alevism as a religion, thus they identify 
themselves as ‘not really an Alevi’. I want to summarise this conclusion with 
an example from my fieldwork: I attended and participated at a cem ritual in 
Ankara, at which there was a heated discussion on what Alevism is and its 
relationship to Islam. Afterwards, on the way back from cemevi on the bus, an 
Alevi friend who was also involved in this cem ritual complained to me; 
“everyone says something, whenever I go to cem, different dede do not agree 
with each other on what Alevis is then [as a result] we suffer [from this 
ambiguity].”856  
  My thesis suggests that the accommodation of Alevis’ difference 
first comes with appreciating the uniqueness of their traditions within the nexus 
of culture and religion. How would the picture be if Alevis knew that Alevism 
does not exist, but that it instead signifies a culture with a rich repertoire for 
techniques of well-being?857 The findings of this thesis can be used for further 
research in areas of examining the relationship between culture, religion, law 
as well as ways to accommodate difference. Accordingly, I suggest that we 
need a new framework that does not compel the differences between cultures 
along the lines of religion. If Alevis come to an awareness of the pitfalls of 
transformation that their traditions have been subjected to, it would be more 
possible to modify the advocacy they pursue, if they choose to do so. Yet, the 
current activities of the Alevi movement seem like lacking such awareness or 
do not have an alternative framework to articulate themselves and their culture. 
My framework that I present in this thesis provides such an avenue. However 
such a novel approach does not suggest a return to the ‘native’ or ‘original’ 
 
855 See several scholars talking about the transformation that the Alevis have been going through, 
see Martin Sökefeld, Struggling for Recognition: The Alevi Movement in Germany and in 
Transnational Space (Berghan Books 2008); David Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey: the 
Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition (Routledge 2003); Elise Massicard, The Alevis in 
Turkey and Europe: Identity and Managing Territorial Diversity (Routledge 2012); Ali Murat 
İrat, Modernizmin Erittikleri, Sunniler Şiiler ve Aleviler (Kırmızı 2009); Pınar Ecevitoğlu, 
‘Aleviliği Tanımlamanın Dayanılmaz Siyasal Cabizesi’ (2011) 66(3) Ankara Univ. SBF Dergisi. 
856 January 2016, Ankara.  
857 For instance, the Isha Foundation led by Sadhguru present yoga traditions and the science of 
yoga as creating techniques for well-being; ‘Yoga – A Technology for Ultimate Flowering’, 
available at https://isha.sadhguru.org/us/en/wisdom/article/yoga-technology-ultimate-flowering 
(accessed 6 May 2020). It is used by public figures such as Dr. Gabor Mate; see the podcast with 
Tim Ferris (20 February 2018), available at https://tim.blog/2018/02/20/gabor-mate/ (accessed 6 
May 2020). A similar approach could be taken for the Alevi traditions. Yoga is said to mean 
‘union of the self and the Self’, Muhabbet is said to mean ‘union of hearts’ (gönül birleme).  
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culture. The transformation that the Alevi traditions have been going through 
and that the Alevis’s experience needs to be critically reflected upon.  
  The current framework available in the political and legal systems, 
examined by this thesis, offer different policies to govern diversity. Turkey and 
the UK implement policies respectively derived from the principles of laicité 
and multiculturalism. Additionally, the ECtHR framework that rests on the 
international human rights framework offers different opportunity structures 
that affect the policy-making in Turkey. One commonality among these three 
contexts (Turkey, the UK and the ECtHR) is the assumption that every culture 
has a religion or a system of belief that should provide an account of Semitic 
religions structurally. That is, these politico-legal systems assume the truth of 
Semitic religions’ claim that every culture has a religion and religion revolves 
around the truth of some doctrines. Cultural differences are understood as 
differences in their systems of beliefs, covered by the category of religion that 
is offered (or even imposed) as a take it or leave it option for Alevis. Going 
back to the discussions about formulating cultural differences in the 
Introduction, interpreting traditional practices as manifestations of certain 
beliefs is not how every culture is shaped. Practice is not led by belief but by 
tradition for some cultures, like the Alevi culture as this thesis suggests. Asking 
these cultures to experience their difference through the lens of a different 
culture is to deny and distort these cultures’ experiences. With religion 
positioned at the centre of policies for governing diversity, there remains no 
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Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı  v. Turkey App no 32093/10 
(ECtHR, 20 June 2017)  
Darby v. Sweden App no 11581/85 (ECtHR, 23 October 1990) 
Dojan and Others v. Germany  App no  319/08 2455/08 7908/10 8152/10 8155/10 
(ECtHR, 13 September 2011) 
Folgerø and Others v. Norway App no 15472/02 (ECtHR, 29 June 2007)  
Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey App no 1448/04 (ECtHR, 9 October 2007) 
278 
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